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1.1 AVIATION DISASTERS AND SURFACE DAMAGE
On October 4, 1992, El Al Flight 1862 crashed into two apartment blocks in
the Bijlmermeer, a residential area located 13 kilometres east of Schiphol
airport. The aircraft, a Boeing 747 cargo-carrier, had taken off from runway
01L of Schiphol airport at 17.20 with three crewmembers and a non-revenue
passenger on board. Approximately seven minutes after take-off, the inner
engine of the right wing and its pylon fell off the wing and hit the outer engine
of the right wing, which was subsequently torn off causing damage to the
leading edge of the right wing. In the seven minutes that followed, the pilot
attempted to return to Schiphol airport, but lost control of the aircraft around
17.35, the approximate time of the crash. The damage inflicted on the surface
by the impact of the aircraft was enormous. Aside from the four people on
board, approximately 44 people on the ground were killed. The two apartment
blocks that were struck by the aircraft were partially destroyed at their point
of connection by the impact of the aircraft and subsequent fire. Furthermore,
the soil in the vicinity of the crash-site was polluted by a combination of airline
fuel, oil, and combustion products from the aircraft and its freight.1
In order to determine its causes, various aspects of the accident were
investigated by the Netherlands Accidents Investigation Bureau, specialists
from the Aeronautical Inspection Directorate of the Dutch Department of Civil
Aviation, and accredited representatives from Israel and the United States.2
The aircraft data revealed that the aircraft, a Boeing 747-200 Freighter Type
258F, had been built in 1979 and had been equipped with four engines manu-
factured by Pratt & Whitney. The aircraft had accumulated 45,746 flight hours
and 10,107 flight cycles. The aircraft and its engines had been manufactured,
maintained and inspected in compliance with the applicable regulations and
requirements.3 Furthermore, the applicable Airworthiness Directives (AD’s)
1 Raad voor de Luchtvaart – Netherlands Aviation Safety Board, Airline Accident Report
92-11, El Al Flight 1862, Boeing 747-258F 4X-AXG Bijlmermeer, Amsterdam October 4, 1992,
at 5-9; hereinafter cited as Airline Accident Report 92-11.
2 Airline Accident Report 92-11, at 5.
3 The aircraft was manufactured in accordance with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
type certificate no. A20W, as approved on 30-12-1969. Pratt & Whitney’s JT9D-7J high bypass
ratio turbofan engines had been certified by the FAA on 31-08-1976 with Type Certificate
Data Sheet E20EA. The applicable maintenance and inspection requirements consisted of
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had been implemented or were in the process of being implemented within
the allowed time limits. Checks on the flight crew and weather conditions at
the time of the accident revealed that neither had contributed to the accident.
The probable causes were narrowed down to the design and certification of
the pylon structure by which the engines of the aircraft were attached to the
wing. According to the Netherlands Aviation Safety Board (Raad voor de
Luchtvaart),
The design and certification of the B 747 pylon was found to be inadequate to
provide the required level of safety. Furthermore the system to ensure structural
integrity by inspection failed. This ultimately caused – probably initiated by fatigue
in the inboard midspar fuse-pin – the no. 3 pylon and engine to separate from the
wing in such a way that the no. 4 pylon and engine were torn off, part of the
leading edge of the right wing was damaged and the use of several systems was
lost or limited. This subsequently left the flight crew with very limited control of
the airplane. Because of the marginal controllability a safe landing became highly
improbable, if not virtually impossible.4
Apparently, the fatigue crack in the outboard midspar fuse-pin had not been
discovered during the final ultrasonic inspection of the pylon attachment
points. The question whether the crack should or even could have been dis-
covered was not resolved. The investigation of the crack by specialists of
Boeing suggested that it could have been detected on the basis of its calculated
depth of .14 inch. Perhaps not surprisingly, that assertion was contested by
El Al.5
Aside from its causes, the effects of the Bijlmer aviation disaster were also
considered by the Netherlands Aviation Safety Board. In a recommendation
that is of particular relevance to this study, the Board held that the training
of pilots and ATC personnel in handling emergency situations should not only
take the safety of the airplane and its passengers into account, but also the
risk to third parties, especially in residential areas.6
Aside from the Bijlmer aviation disaster, which ultimately even led to a
parliamentary enquiry in the Netherlands, a number of other infamous exam-
ples of major aviation accidents involving damage to persons and property
on the ground can be enumerated. These include the crash of an Antonov-124
cargo aircraft into an apartment building in Irkutsk, Siberia on December 6,
1997, in which 62 people were killed and the crash of a Concorde jet of Air
the El Al Maintenance Program, the Boeing Maintenance Planning Document, the Main-
tenance Review Board Report and the El Al Engineering and Quality Control Division
requirements and recommendations, see Airline Accident Report 92-11, at 11.
4 Airline Accident Report 92-11, at 46.
5 Airline Accident Report 92-11, at 30. See also El Al Crash Report Raises Ground Safety Issue,
Aviation Week & Space Technology, 7 March 1994, at 38.
6 See Recommendation 4.10, Airline Accident Report 92-11, at 47.
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France near the airport of Charles de Gaulle, Paris, on July 25, 2000. In the
latter case, all 109 people on board as well as several people on the ground
were killed when the aircraft struck a hotel.7
A number of infamous aviation accidents involving surface damage were
deliberately set in motion, such as the Lockerbie disaster of 21 December 1988.
In the Lockerbie disaster, Pan Am Flight 103, a Boeing 747-121A, exploded
from a bomb above the Scottish town of Lockerbie. In the disaster, all 259
people on board as well as 11 people on the ground were killed. Furthermore,
a number of houses of Lockerbie were partly or wholly destroyed by the
impact of portions of the fuselage and wing structure of the aircraft.8 But most
strikingly of all, the gruesome terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on certain
key targets in the United States come to everyone’s mind. In these attacks,
a death toll of thousands as well as a massive destruction of property was
achieved by suicidal terrorists who steered American Airlines Flight 11 into
the North Tower and United Airlines Flight 175 into the South Tower of the
World Trade Center in New York, American Airlines Flight 77 into the Penta-
gon, and United Airlines Flight 93 into an open field near Shanksville, Pennsyl-
vania.9 The psychological, economical, political, and financial impact of these
attacks has been astounding and the enormity of the damage suffered by the
victims and their relatives can hardly be grasped let alone calculated accurate-
ly.10
This range of examples of major aviation accidents can serve as a grim
introduction to this study, of which the objectives will be specified in the next
paragraph.
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
As has been illustrated by means of a number of major aviation accidents in
the previous paragraph, aircraft are capable of inflicting substantial harm to
third parties and property on the surface. The legal aftermath of such aviation
accidents or incidents can raise questions on issues such as the applicable
liability regime per implicated party, insurance issues, and the scope of the
7 See D. Williams, Toll Rises to 48 in Jet Crash Into Apartments in Siberia, International Herald
Tribune, 8 December 1997, at 1, 10, and S. Daley, Continental Is Sued by Air France Over
Concorde, International Herald Tribune, 28 September 2000, at 2.
8 See the Accident Database of AirDisaster.Com for more details on the Lockerbie case.
9 See Special Report War on America, The Economist, 15 September 2001, at 15-19.
10 In a report made in the direct aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the global actuarial
consultancy firm Tillinghast-Towers Perrin estimated that the financial impact on the
insurance industry of the attacks would amount to approximately $30 to $58 billion, of
which $5 to $20 billion was attributed to potential third-party liability claims, see Tillinghast-
Towers Perrin, September 11, 2001- Implications for the Insurance Industry, 21 September 2001,
at 2-11; see also J. Moore, Lloyd’s estimates losses for US attacks at £1.2bn, The Times, 26
September 2001, at 28.
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duty of care of potential defendants in relation to the potential claimants and
recoverability of the damage inflicted by the accident or incident. Dependent
on the circumstances of the case, potentially liable parties can include a wide
range of persons or entities, such as the operator(s) or owner(s) of the involved
aircraft, airline personnel, the producer(s) of the implicated aircraft and their
components, maintenance companies, and air traffic control agencies.11 Parti-
cularly in relation to aviation accidents caused by terrorists and/or explosives,
the question of governmental or State responsibility or liability can even be
raised, but prove difficult to resolve in practice.12
Fortunately, a growing trend to settle the majority of claims arising from
major aviation accidents out of court can be observed.13 However, the notion
that swift settlements are arguably in the best interest of all parties concerned
does not make the underlying liability regimes to which these parties are
subjected unimportant or irrelevant. For such regimes can not only be used
as valuable chips in the game of settlement negotiations, but can also serve
as tools for instigating court procedures in cases where settlement procedures
have failed. Especially in court the otherwise more obscured legal skeleton
of the applicable liability regime will re-emerge from the cupboard and regain
all the importance it may have lacked to a certain extent in cases that are
swiftly settled. In short, liability regimes in this field are considered to be of
importance, despite settlement trends.
This study will primarily focus on two main aspects of the legal aftermath
of aviation accidents or incidents involving damage to third parties on the
ground. These aspects are the third party liability regimes to which the
operators or owners of aircraft are subjected under international, supranational,
and a number of national laws on the one hand and the insurance or other
security requirements imposed upon these entities for third party liability on
the other hand. Why this specific attention for the third party liability regimes
and insurance requirements imposed upon the operators or owners of aircraft?
First of all, the ‘common sense’ argument can be raised that operators or
owners of aircraft involved in accidents or incidents involving damage to third
11 For an enumeration of the range of potential defendants and victims in the Bijlmer case
see P.M.J. Mendes de Leon and S. Mirmina, The International and American Law Implications
of the Bijlmer Air Disaster, 6 LJIL 111, at 111-114 (1993).
12 See H. Wassenbergh, Beveiliging van de burgerluchtvaart en de economie van de luchtdienstexploi-
tatie, 5 JLR 110, at 117 (2002).
13 Since the Tenerife aviation disaster of 1977, in which 75% of all outstanding claims were
settled through a joint settlement fund financed jointly by the liability insurers of the main
defendants KLM, PanAm, Boeing, and the Spanish government, the joint funding approach
has been applied succesfully by the aviation insurance community in a number of cases,
including the Bijlmer accident, see J-M Fobe, Aviation Products Liability and Insurance in
the EU 132-134 (1994). See also (on passenger claims handling) the ICC Explanatory Paper:
Current Airline and Insurance Industry Practice in the Settlement of Liability Claims to
Compensate Passenger Victims in Air Transport, Document no. 310/121-1/5 Rev. 4 of 23
June, 1995, at 3-9.
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parties on the ground will always be implicated in the legal aftermath of such
events as opposed to other potentially liable parties. For irrespective of the
question whether the accident or incident was caused by birdstrikes, meteo-
rological conditions, product defects, human errors, terrorist strikes, or com-
binations of such factors, the operators or owners of the aircraft involved will
be implicated in the legal aftermath. This cannot be said of other potential
defendants, as their potential involvement will depend on the specific causes
of the accident or incident at hand. Producers of aircraft or aircraft components,
for instance, will not be implicated in the aftermath of aviation accidents or
incidents which are not caused wholly or partly by defective products, whereas
the operators of such aircraft will be.
Secondly, the more legally founded argument for primarily focusing on
the operators or owners of aircraft is threefold. Firstly, the current international
liability regime in this field is deemed to be outdated and structurally deficient
in a number of ways, as will be explored in more detail in this study. Secondly,
a supranational European regime in this field is non-existent in terms of
liability and in development in terms of insurance requirements. And thirdly,
national regimes in this field are either non-existent or varying. Variety thus
rules the field in abundance, which not only triggers the curiosity of the
researcher, but also raises the more fundamental question if a more harmonized
approach to third party liability and/or third party liability insurance regula-
tion could not serve the interests of all parties concerned in a field which is
so inherently cross-boundary. Why should there be structural differences in
approach to third party liability regimes internationally, supranationally, and
nationally when the effects of aviation accidents or incidents are so strongly
comparable? Is the current plethora of rules in the field satisfactory or should
more uniformity of legislation be reached on an international or supranational
level in view of the often cross-boundary nature of aviation and in order to
create a more level playing field for aviation in general? Should States in which
regimes in this field are currently non-existing enact such specific regimes to
cover the problem in absence of satisfactory international or supranational
legislation in this field? Such questions will serve as the main point of de-
parture of this study.
Although the stages of determination of liability and the subsequent deter-
mination of the scope of persons entitled to claim as well as scope of recover-
able types of damage are intricately linked to one another, this study will focus
primarily on the first stage of determination of liability. That choice is based
on the notion that questions relating to damage law are not unique to the
specific aftermath of aviation accidents or incidents. For similar questions on
damage law will arise irrespective of the question whether damage is inflicted
by an aircraft, spacecraft, tanker, car, or any other entity. To a slightly lesser
extent the same argument can be put forward for not focusing extensively on
questions of scope of duty of care under common law or of the Schutznorm
under civil law, as those often elusive bridges between liability and subsequent
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scope of persons entitled to compensation as well as recoverable damage are
not unique to damage caused by aircraft. However, the latter problem will
be dealt with in relation to the question to what extent the scope of duty of
care or Schutznorm is effected by the applicable basis of liability of the regime
at hand in this field. The rationale of this approach is to explore whether more
stricter regimes of liability could be counterbalanced by a more narrow scope
of persons entitled to claim as well as a more narrow scope of recoverable
damage.
In order to address such core questions on regimes of third party liability
and insurance requirements in this field, a number of general (sub-)questions
have been formulated. These can serve as guidelines throughout the study,
irrespective of the actual system of liability under investigation. These (sub-)
questions are as follows:
1 Which range of conduct of aircraft can inflict which types of surface
damage?
2 Which regimes can be codified to cover liability of operators or owners
of aircraft for surface damage and what is the scope of such regimes?
3 Which entities and which types of aircraft are (or should be) subjected to
such regimes?
4 Are (or should) such regimes (be) based on unlimited or limited liability?
5 Is (or should) third party liability insurance coverage or another form of
security (be) compulsory for the operators or owners of aircraft?
1.2 DIVISION OF CHAPTERS
In Chapter 2, a theoretical outline of the problem of liability of the operators
or owners of aircraft for surface damage will be given. The options of a ‘ficti-
tious’ legislator for addressing the matter will be enumerated on the basis of
the five (sub-)questions posed in the previous paragraph of this chapter. The
theoretical outline can serve as an introduction to the actual liability and
insurance regimes in force in this field that will be dealt with in this study.
Those regimes can be divided into the international private air law regime
of the Rome Convention of 1952 as amended by the Montreal Protocol of 1978,
supranational European Community law specifying insurance requirements
on third party liability, and a number of specific national liability regimes and
insurance requirements in this field.
Chapter 3 will evaluate the Rome Convention of 1952 as amended by the
Montreal Protocol of 1978 as well as the proposals made under auspices of
the International Law Association to update these instruments. On the basis
of this evaluation, a number of recommendations on the feasibility of these
instruments will be made in general as well as on the manner in which they
can be adequately modernized.
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Chapter 4 will focus on a number of national liability regimes and national
insurance requirements in this field in order to evaluate the underlying ratio-
nale for such regimes and insurance requirements. Furthermore, the current
developments in European Community law in this field will be discussed in
order to determine to what extent Community law can provide an alternative
to the national laws of Member States.
Chapter 5 will deal with the developments in the United States, as most
states within the United States have moved away from specific legislation in
this field. The rationale for that trend will subsequently be analyzed and
compared to the rationale for specific legislation. Furthermore, specific attention
will be given to the complex legal aftermath of the terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001 in view of the impact of these events on both existing tort law
and insurability of war and terrorist-related risks to third parties in the United
States and worldwide.
On the basis of the findings of these Chapters, a number of final recom-
mendations and conclusions will be given on the most preferable regime(s)
of liability and insurance requirements in this field in Chapter 6.

2 An outline of the problem of liability for
surface damage inflicted by aircraft from a
theoretical and legislative perspective
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Aircraft are capable of inflicting damage to people and property on the surface
of the earth by means of various forms of conduct. The potentially adverse
effects of flying are evidently as old as aviation itself and will most likely
remain with us as long as mankind chooses to roam the air, unless somewhere
in the future aircraft entirely cease to crash or produce substantial noise and
pollution.1
This Chapter is meant to provide an outline of the problem of liability for
surface damage inflicted by aircraft from a theoretical and legislative perspect-
ive. The main aim of this exercise is to evaluate and explain the justifications
for the available bases and regimes of liability from which a ‘fictitious’ legis-
lator can choose in order to cover the problem of third party liability in this
field. The figure of a fictitious legislator has deliberately been introduced in
order not to stress the inherent differences between comparable (bases of)
liability regimes under common or civil systems of law in general and more
specifically per national jurisdiction. The point is rather to compare the justifi-
cations and rationale per liability regime in this field, irrespective of the specific
jurisdiction at hand.
The following five (sub-)questions derived from the introductory Chapter
to this study can serve as important guidelines for the structure of this Chapter:
1 Which range of conduct of aircraft can inflict which types of surface
damage?
2 Which regimes can be codified to cover liability of operators or owners
of aircraft and what is the scope of such regimes?
3 Which entities and which types of aircraft are (or should be) subjected to
such regimes?
4 Are (or should) such regimes (be) based on unlimited or limited liability?
5 Is (or should) third party liability insurance coverage or another form of
security be compulsory for the operators or owners of aircraft?
These (sub-)questions will be dealt with in the following order.
1 The New York landmark case of Guille v. Swan, in which a balloonist was held liable in
an action of trespass for damage to crops inflicted by the balloon as well as bystanders
keen on assisting the balloonist, was decided as early as 1822, see Guille v. Swan (New
York Sup. Ct., January, 1822), 1 CCH Avi 1.
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The first question, on the range of conduct of aircraft that can inflict surface
damage, will be illustrated by means of various scenarios of conduct of aircraft
and the subsequent forms of potential damage that can arise under such
scenarios (2.2).
The second question, on the various bases and regimes of liability that the
fictitious legislator can opt for, will subsequently be addressed. First, the option
of liability regimes based on fault or negligence in general will be taken into
account. A general division has been made between these general headings
of liability under civil and common law systems for that purpose. The general
headings of fault liability under civil law systems will be dealt with first (2.3),
followed by the general heading(s) of negligence under common law systems
(2.4).
The arguments in favor of and against the application of fault liability or
negligence to the problem of surface damage will subsequently be discussed
(2.5). The main alternative of specific regimes based on absolute or strict
liability will then be defined and described (2.6), followed by the justifications
for application of such bases and regimes of liability in this field (2.7). Finally,
the potential scope of absolute or strict liability regimes will be described (2.8).
The third question, on which entities and which types of aircraft should
be subjected to such specific regimes will then be dealt with (2.9).
The fourth question, on whether such regimes should be based on
unlimited or limited liability, will be evaluated by enumerating the arguments
in favor of and against both alternatives (2.10).
The fifth question, on the need for compulsory third party liability in-
surance coverage or other securities, will be dealt with by means of a descrip-
tion of aviation third party liability insurance in general and an assessment
of the question whether and when such coverage should be made compulsory
(2.11).
The Chapter will close with a general enumeration of the main options
for regimes of liability and insurance requirements in this field and their
justifications, followed by justifications and recommendations for the most
suitable options (2.12).
2.2 SCENARIOS OF CONDUCT OF AIRCRAFT AND SURFACE DAMAGE
In order to address the first question posed in the previous paragraph, an
assessment of the potential range of conduct of aircraft that is capable of
inflicting potential surface damage has to be made. For that purpose, a slightly
arbitrary division has been made between three main scenarios and certain
sub-scenarios of conduct of aircraft that can inflict surface damage, which will
be discussed in sub-paragraphs 2.2.1 – 2.2.3 respectively. A brief recapitulation
of these scenarios will be given in subparagraph 2.2.4. Despite the fact that
justice cannot be done to the complex variations in circumstances and causes
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of aviation accidents or incidents by such a general division, this approach
is deemed useful enough to clarify and objectify the potential scope of conduct
of aircraft and subsequent damage. On the basis of such a division, our ficti-
tious legislator can subsequently determine which scenarios should preferably
fall under the scope of his liability regime.
2.2.1 Scenario 1. Surface damage inflicted by ‘direct contact’ or ‘impact’ of
the aircraft or parts, objects, chemicals, or persons from the aircraft
The first and most significant scenario of potential damage to persons and/or
property on the ground arises when such damage is inflicted by the impact
of- or direct contact with the aircraft or aircraft components and/or other
objects, persons, or materials from the aircraft. Firstly, this scenario encom-
passes genuine aviation accidents. Whether named aviation ‘accidents’,
‘crashes’, ‘disasters’, or whatever other term is deemed suitable, such occur-
rences can lead to the most serious forms of potential personal injury and
property damage.2
Collisions between two or more aircraft can also be categorized under the
first scenario. Such collisions can occur in any stage of operation, ranging from
parked aircraft colliding with moving aircraft on the ground to aircraft col-
liding in mid-air.3 An impressive classification of American aviation accidents
and case law has been made by Speiser and Krause. Their enumeration
includes takeoff accidents, accidents caused by windshear, bird strikes, mis-
cellaneous pilot errors, mid-air collisions, cases of near misses, in-flight disinte-
gration or break-up of the aircraft, and cases of aircraft flying into mountains,
canyons, trees, buildings, cities, wires, power lines, poles or other aerial ob-
structions. Specific cases involving ground personal injury, death, and property
damage have also been included.4
Secondly, the scenario of potential surface damage caused by direct contact
with (parts of) the aircraft encompasses cases in which the aircraft does not
actually crash. Examples that have mainly been derived from older American
case law include scenarios involving people on the ground that were injured
or killed by the wings of landing airplanes or propellers of aircraft.5 A more
2 see paragraph 1.1 of this study for examples of major aviation accidents involving surface
damage.
3 In Southern Air Transport v. Gulf Airways, Inc.(Louisiana Sup. Ct., April 25, 1949), 2 CCH
Avi 14900, a parked aircraft that was moved by the strong winds of a storm hit and caused
damage to another aircraft.
4 S.M. Speiser & C.F. Krause, Aviation Tort Law 119-197 (1979).
5 Speiser & Krause at 150 and 194-195; see, e.g., the cited cases of Platt v. Erie County Agri-
cultural Soc. (1914) 164 App Div 99, 149 NYS 520, 1 CCH Avi 34 (in which the wing of
a landing airplane extended into the crowd alongside the landing ‘court’, injuring several
persons), and Strong v. Chronicle Publishing Co.(1939) 34 Cal App 2d 335, 93 P2d 649 (in
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recent example involved a ground crew worker that died after being struck
by a rotating propeller of an aircraft operated by Continental Express in July
1999, in Little Rock, Arkansas.6 Fortunately, such scenarios can also occur
without causing any damage, as was the case with a Boeing 747 of KLM on
its way from Los Angeles to Schiphol Airport on August 28, 2000. The aircraft
lost a part of its engines whilst in flight, which subsequently hit a crowded
beach and barely missed one of its visitors.7
Similar scenarios involving military aircraft can evidently arise through
deliberately inflicted damage by air raids and bombardments on surface
targets. But military aircraft can also inflict surface damage through contact
with objects on the surface in more unusual ways. A striking example of such
an incident occurred near the town of Cavalese, Italy, on February 3, 1998,
when a US EA-6B Prowler jet that was flying too low and too fast clipped
the wires supporting a ski gondola. This incident led to the death of the
operator of the gondola as well as the 19 people transported by it.8
Finally, the activity of crop dusting or spraying by aircraft can be cate-
gorized under the scenario of damage inflicted by materials carried by the
aircraft. The activity of crop dusting can inflict damage to persons but mainly
property (often livestock or bees) through contact with the chemicals released
by the aircraft.9
From the perspective of a fictitious legislator, a definition that encompasses
such scenarios can be useful in order to determine the scope of his specific
liability regime. In that context, the general definition of the term ‘accident’
of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Chicago 1944,
can serve as a guideline.10 The definition, of which the relevant elements are
in italics, reads:
Accident.
An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between
the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time
as all such persons have disembarked, in which:
which a newsboy, rightfully in the area as an invitee, walked into the idling propellor of
an airplane which had stopped on a totally dark airfield to deliver the papers to airport).
6 Aerospace Risk, issue 15, March 2000, at 1-2.
7 See KLM-Boeing in de problemen bij Los Angeles, NRC Handelsblad, 28 August 2000, at 3 and
KLM Wolkenridder Nr. 129, 1 September 2000. The presumed cause of this incident was
a birdstrike.
8 See Charge US Pilot for ski lift deaths, Dispatch Online, 3 July 1998, at 1-2. (www.dispatch.
co.za/1998/07/03/foreign/Skilift.htm).
9 Speiser & Krause at 154-157; see also I.H.Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor, Aviation’s Impact on
Agriculture and Its Animal Habitat, Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum.6(2), at 127-128 (1998).
10 See Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Chicago 1944 (hereinafter
referred to as the Chicago Convention of 1944) on Aircraft Accident and Incident Investiga-
tion, July 2001, at 1. Annex 13 contains International Standards and Recommended Practices
(‘SARPS’) for Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation.
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a) a person is fatally or seriously injured as a result of:
· being in the aircraft, or
· direct contact with any part of the aircraft, including parts which have become detached
from the aircraft, or
· direct exposure to jet blast,
except when the injuries are from natural causes, self-inflicted or inflicted by other
persons, or when the injuries are to stowaways hiding outside the areas normally
available to passengers and crew; or
b) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which:
· adversely effects the structural strength, performance or flight characteristics of the
aircraft, and
· would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component,
except for engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to its engine, its
cowlings or accessories; or for damage limited to propellors, wing tips, antennas,
tires, brakes, fairings, small dents or puncture holes in the aircraft skin; or
c) the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible
Although justly criticized by De Miranda on the grounds that the potential
effects of common cargo were not taken into account, the definition does make
clear that fatal or serious injuries to persons can be inflicted by direct contact
with any part of the aircraft, including parts which have been detached from
the aircraft, or direct exposure to jet blast.11 And such a definition could easily
be transformed to encompass death or personal injuries as well as material
property damage of third parties in a specific liability regime by our fictitious
legislator and thus serve as a manner to determine the scope of such a liability
regime.
2.2.2 Scenario 2. Surface damage inflicted by flight in non-conformity with
air traffic regulations; too low general or sudden overflight
In the second scenario, the aircraft does not crash, neither do objects or com-
ponents fall from it, nor does it make contact with anybody or thing on or
near the surface. The aircraft merely flies at a (too) low altitude. This can take
place for a short period of time (e.g. by means of a sudden dive of the aircraft),
11 For common cargo can become highly toxic when released in an aviation accident and lead
to fatalities on the surface without ‘direct contact with any part of the aircraft’, see K. de
Miranda, Some aspects of ICAO’s Annex 13 ‘Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation’, Annex
16 – Volume 1 ‘Environmental Protection – Aircraft Noise’ and Annex 18 ‘Safe Transport of
Dangerous Goods by Air’ in National Context, in Pan European Foundation for Aviation Safety
Management and Research, A structured approach to aviation safety oversight, Part 1
Adherence to ICAO Standards Section 5 ICAO Annexes 13, 16 and 18: Comments on
National Aspects, 7 April 1999, at 4.
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or for a longer stretch of the flight. The potential damage thus inflicted can
arise from fright of people or animals caused by the sudden sight and/or
sound of the aircraft approaching too low. Reactions based on fright can
subsequently lead to more serious personal injuries or damage to animals,
for instance if a driver of a car suddenly looses control of the vehicle and has
an accident or if a horse bolts out of fright. The scenario can also lead to
property damage caused by the vibrations of the low flying aircraft.
The second scenario is meant to refer to flight in non-conformity with the
applicable air traffic regulations at hand, or flight that can generally be qual-
ified as unlawfully low. By means of the qualification of flight in non-conform-
ity with air traffic regulations, a distinction can be made between this second
scenario of too low overflight and a third scenario of lawful overflight in
conformity with air traffic regulations and subsequent potential surface
damage. Evidently, borderline cases between the two scenarios can be en-
visaged in which the question whether the flight was in conformity or in non-
conformity with air traffic regulations is not necessarily easy to solve. But the
main point of this distinction between too low and normal overflight lies in
the determination of the potential scope of specific liability regimes in this
field, as will be seen in more detail in due course of this Chapter and study.
Under the second scenario, personal injuries or property damage can
potentially be as severe as under the first scenario, albeit generally on a less
grand scale than in case of genuine aviation accidents. As has been touched
upon previously, a driver may lose control of his car and suffer personal
injuries or inflict such injuries to others due to sudden fright evoked by a low
flying aircraft. Likewise, various types of domestic animals and livestock may
harm or kill one another or themselves out of fright in such cases. Property
damage can also consist of the partial destruction of a roof due to the move-
ments of a low flying helicopter. Genuine examples of such scenarios can be
derived from mainly older American case law, which includes cases of damage
inflicted to fences and cattle and to horses frightened by too low overflights.12
A more recent German case involved two jet-aircraft flying over a street in
a short distance from one another, which frightened a driver who subsequently
lost control of the car and had an accident. Another German example of
property damage inflicted under this scenario involved a helicopter flying over
a house at a low altitude, which led to the collapse of part of the 90 year old
roof.13
12 See Decision of U.S. Comptroller-General McCarl (1923) 3 Comp.-Gen. 324 (in which a claim
for damage to cattle and fences was made due to the stampeding of cattle against the
Federal Government) and Neismonger v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. (1929) U.S. Av.
R. 96 (in which a low flying airship frightened horses), as cited in A.D. McNair, The Law
of the Air 68 (1964).
13 See BGH Urteil vom 1. December 1981, NJW 1982, 1046 and BGH Urteil vom 27. Januar
1981, BGHZ 1979, 259 as cited by S. Grabherr, Kausalität und Zurechnung bei der Gefährdungs-
Chapter 2 15
2.2.3 Scenario 3. Surface damage inflicted by normal overflight
In the third scenario of potential surface damage, aircraft take-off, fly, and
land in conformity with the applicable air traffic regulations concerning the
normal rights of passage. The main cause of potential damage lies in the
nuisance and/or noise involved in normal flight operations, which can parti-
cularly affect persons and property in the vicinity of airports with many take-
off and landing movements.14 Potential damage can consist of certain degrees
of mental injury to persons and animals and in certain extreme cases even
death of animals, if the livestock is particularly sensitive to noise. Furthermore,
normal overflight can result in property devaluation, especially directly under
certain flightpaths and near airports.
In comparison with the previous two scenarios, however, the third scenario
as a whole will normally inflict the least serious forms of potential damage,
as death or bodily injury of people or actual destruction of property are highly
unlikely to occur under this scenario.
2.2.4 A recapitulation of scenarios 1–3
In summary, the first broad and most significant scenario of conduct of aircraft
that can inflict surface damage has been defined by using criteria such as
‘impact’ or ‘direct contact’ of the aircraft, parts of the aircraft, or objects or
chemicals or other substances from the aircraft with the surface.15 The scenario
encompasses genuine aviation crashes, including collisions between aircraft,
which can cause substantial damage in the form of personal injuries and
destruction of property due to the impact of- or direct contact with- the aircraft
and its components or the potentially dangerous toxic cargo that can be
released in aviation crashes.
Furthermore, the first scenario encompasses cases of direct contact with
the aircraft or its components or objects or substances dropped or falling from
the aircraft without the aircraft actually crashing. Damage caused by crop-
dusting could also be categorized under the first scenario in that context.
Under the second and third scenario, the damage is caused by too low
or regular overflight respectively without any form of contact or impact
haftung nach § 33 LuftVG, 35 ZLW 103, at 103-104 (1986); see also sub-paragraph 4.4.2.2 of
this study for a description of these cases in more detail.
14 This noise-related scenario can also raise questions on the potential liability of other parties
than the implicated aircraft, such as airports or governments, see, generally P. Mendes de
Leon, Liability of airports for noise hindrance: a comparative analysis, 11 Korean Journal of Air
and Space Law 169, at 174-176 (1999).
15 Notably, direct contact between for instance the property that suffers damage and the
aircraft or parts of the aircraft is not necessary under this scenario. A barn located near
the place of the accident catching fire due to gusts of wind is easily envisaged.
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between surface and aircraft or objects from the aircraft whatsoever. These
scenarios can be divided in the second scenario of damage due to fright of
persons and animals or property damage caused by too low overflight and
the third scenario of noise-related damage caused by normal overflight, es-
pecially in the vicinity of airports. However, borderline cases between these
three scenarios can easily be envisaged.
The three aforementioned scenarios make clear that potential surface
damage will generally be the most serious under the first scenario and the
least serious under the third scenario. Such distinctions can be important for
the legislature in order to determine and justify the scope of a specific liability
regime in this field.
2.2 FAULT LIABILITY UNDER CIVIL LAW
The scenarios of the previous paragraph have made clear how aircraft can
inflict damage to third parties on the surface. The question now arises how
the fictitious legislator can deal with the problem.
His first option lies in simply leaving the problem to the applicable general
rules of fault liability under civil law systems or negligence under common
law systems. In this paragraph, the main elements of the general headings
of fault liability under a number of civil law systems will be discussed in a
number of sub-paragraphs. A choice has been made for German, Dutch, and
French civil law. These three systems of civil law admittedly do not cover the
entire range of civil law countries of which the specific regimes of third party
liability in this field are discussed in Chapter 4. The point of this selection is
far more to demonstrate the general characteristics that the headings of fault
liability have in common with one another in comparison with the general
characteristics of stricter forms of liability. For that purpose, a smaller selection
of fault liability regimes is deemed sufficient.
In the next paragraph, the main elements of negligence under common
law systems will be dealt with. For although the continental and common law
approach to fault and negligence may vary, the main elements of fault liability
and negligence are deemed to be well suited for comparison as their essential
characteristics resemble one another.16 The general descriptions of fault liabil-
ity and negligence are meant to serve as an introduction to the specific applica-
tion of these headings of liability to the problem of liability surface damage,
which will be dealt with in paragraph 2.5.
Under systems of civil law, liability based on fault arises when a number
of general elements are met. Although the legal interests protected by these
16 See W. Friedman, Legal Theory 527-531 (1967). Friedman points out that upon closer
scrutiny, both continental and common law systems reveal a far more substantial difference
in form than in substance.
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main headings of fault liability may vary, their main elements are at least
comparable.17 These main elements consist of an unlawful act, fault, damage
and a causal connection between the act and the damage in order for liability
to arise. Furthermore, the victims and types of damage suffered must generally
fall under the protective scope of the regime of fault liability. The alleged
tortfeasor can subsequently escape liability if he is able to invoke one or more
of the general defences available to him under the general heading of fault
liability at hand. The general criteria of unlawful act, fault, causation, and
protective scope of fault liability will be discussed in more detail in
subparagraphs 2.3.1 – 2.3.4. The main defences that can be invoked to wholly
or partly escape liability will subsequently be discussed in sub-paragraph 2.3.5.
2.3.1 Unlawful act
In order to address the question whether an act can be qualified as unlawful,
a closer scrutiny of the general headings of fault liability under discussion
is necessary.
The most broad heading of fault liability under German civil law is § 823
(1) BGB, as it covers the most important legal interests that can be violated.
Under § 823 (1) BGB, the requirement of an unlawful act or unlawfulness is
met upon intentional or culpable invasion of the legal interests of life, body,
health, freedom, ownership, and ‘other rights’.18 In this context, the terms
‘intentional’ or ‘culpable’ refer to the degree at which the tortfeasor was at
fault.19
The two other headings of fault liability of § 823 (2) BGB and § 826 BGB
complement the German regime of fault liability. The former provides a cause
of action in case of culpable breach of protective statutory provisions and the
latter offers protection against injury inflicted in violation of general standards
of proper social conduct (contra bonos mores).20 Since surface damage inflicted
by aircraft can consist of personal injuries as well as property damage, the
legal interests of life, body, health and ownership as covered by § 823 (1) BGB
are of particular relevance to this study.21
17 As will be seen in more detail, German civil law specifically narrows down the scope of
protected interests covered by its fault liability regime, whereas French civil law knows
no limitation of protected interests; see Van Gerven et al, Tort Law: Scope of Protection 3-5
(1998).
18 See K. Larenz/C-W Canaris, Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts 373-376 (1994); see also W. Fiken-
tscher, Schuldrecht, 741-742 (1997) and K. Zweigert & H. Kötz, An Introduction to Compara-
tive Law 599 (1998). ‘Other rights’ refer to servitudes, rent charges, patent rights, etc., see
Zweigert & Kötz at 600.
19 See in more detail paragraph 2.3.2.
20 Van Gerven at 4.
21 Larenz/Canaris at 377-392 and Fikentscher at 742-745 on the definition and scope of these
legal interests.
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The question what can be qualified as an unlawful act under Dutch civil
law has been dealt with by the Dutch Supreme Court in the landmark case
of Lindenbaum vs. Cohen. Since that ruling, an unlawful act covers ‘an act or
omission which violates another person’s right, or conflicts with the defend-
ant’s statutory duty, or is contrary either to good morals or to the care which
is due in society with regard to another’s person or property’.22 Transformed
into the current Dutch Civil Code in Article 6:162 (2) BW, the following acts
are deemed to be unlawful: the violation of a subjective right, an act or
omission violating a statutory duty or a rule of unwritten law pertaining to
proper social conduct, unless there is a ground of justification.23 The subjective
rights that can potentially be infringed in cases of surface damage inflicted
by aircraft include (the right to) life, bodily integrity, and property. Dependant
on the circumstances of the case, both categories of act or omission violating
a statutory duty and a general rule of unwritten law pertaining to proper social
conduct can also play a role; the former can apply if the aircraft operator
violates Dutch air traffic regulations or acts in violation of his license, and the
latter if he is found to be in breach of general safety standards.24
The general principles of Articles 1382 and 1383 of the French Civil Code
have been formulated in a far more open fashion than the German and Dutch
regimes of fault liability by means of a mere reference to damage without the
specific requirement of an unlawful act, as opposed to a categorization of
specifically protected interests. Article 1382 of the French Civil Code simply
requires that ‘every act whatever of man which causes damage to another
obliges him by whose fault the damage occurred to repair it’. Article 1383 of
the French Civil Code subsequently holds that ‘everyone is responsible not
only for the damage which he has caused by his own act but also for that
which he causes by his negligence or imprudence.’25 In short, the requirement
of ‘every act whatever’ is linked to the requirement of ‘fault’, adding up to
a ‘faulty act’ (‘le fait fautif’).
Despite a lack of clear distinction between the elements of unlawfulness
or fault under French law, the requirement of an act to be faulty or illicit at
least makes clear that the act must somehow be contrary to law in the broad
sense of accepted oral, legislated, or customary rules of conduct governing
interpersonal relationships.26
22 HR 31 Jan 1919, NJ 1919, 161, Lindenbaum-Cohen. See also Asser/Hartkamp 4-III, Verbinte-
nissenrecht, 36-37 (1998); A.S. Hartkamp, Introduction to Dutch Law 134 (1999).
23 Van Gerven at 8; See for the translation of Article 6:162(2) BW into English P.P.C. Haanappel
& E. Mackaay, New Netherlands Civil Code 298 (1990).
24 See S.D. Lindenbergh 1999 (T&C Vermogensrecht), art 6:162 BW, aant. 3.
25 The English translations of Articles 1382 and 1383 of the French Civil Code have been
derived from Zwiegert & Kötz at 615-616.
26 See A. Sériaux, Droit des Obligations 325 (1992).
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2.3.2 Fault
The requirement of fault makes more explanatory sense when linked to the
person committing the act than to the act itself. Read as such, the requirement
of fault refers to the culpability of the tortfeasor, which is generally measured
in terms of lack of degree of care as demanded by society. Such a lack of
degree of care can range from intentional to negligent conduct. In other words,
to what extent can the alleged tortfeasor be blamed for the act?
The notion of fault as a requirement aside from the element of unlawfulness
of the act corresponds with the German and Dutch civil law approach, and
leads to a more clear distinction between the two elements than has been made
under French civil law.27 It also clarifies that liability of an alleged tortfeasor
will not arise unless it can be established that he was at fault, even if he
committed an unlawful act.28 Fault in this sense should be interpreted subjec-
tively. The test to determine if someone was at fault will thus somehow have
to compare the presumed conduct of a ‘normal’ person in an identical situation
to the conduct of the alleged tortfeasor. For specific activities which require
specialized skills, such as the flying of an aircraft, such a test will make a
comparison between the behaviour of the pilot in question and the presumed
behaviour of an average pilot under the same circumstances in order to help
determine if the pilot in question was at fault.29 Ultimately, however, the
question remains if the alleged actor can be blamed for the act, taking his
specific qualities into account.30
Without having to delve into academic discussions on the borderlines
between the concepts of unlawfulness and fault per system of civil law, the
assertion that if an act can be qualified as unlawful, this will often imply that
the actor was at fault can lead to a certain fortification of the position of
plaintiffs faced with the task of having to prove fault. Under Dutch law, for
instance, the courts can reverse the burden of proof if the unlawful act is
qualified as an infringement of written or unwritten safety standards.31
27 Zweigert & Kötz remark that a different approach to the elements of unlawfulness and
culpability has also been adhered to in Germany by not qualifying the infringment of the
legal interests of §823 (1) BGB as unlawful sec, but to make that qualification dependent
on the culpability of the tortfeasor; in other words, if the tortfeasor is not at fault, the act
is not unlawful. In the end, this different approach leads to same outcome as the traditional
approach (for instance, that liability does not arise, irrespective of the question if the act
is qualified as lawful due to lack of culpability or unlawful without the alleged tortfeasor
being culpable), see Zweigert & Kötz at 599-600.
28 See A.S. Hartkamp at 134.
29 Zweigert & Kötz at 599, referring to German law.
30 See for Dutch law, Asser/Hartkamp, at 82.
31 See Asser/Hartkamp at 82-83 and Onrechtmatige Daad I (Jansen), nr. 59; the Dutch case
law cited therein often refers to a breach of safety standards in maritime and road traffic
accidents, see e.g. HR 10 januari 1929, NJ 1929, 419 and HR 1 november 1974, NJ 1975, 454.
Analogous application to aviation accidents involving surface damage is imaginable.
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2.3.3 Causal connection between the act and the damage
The next element that needs to be established in claims based on fault liability
under civil law systems is that of causation.
Under German civil law, a two-tier test of causation is applied. First, a
causal link between the event and the sustained injury must be established
(the so-called haftungsbegründende Kausalität), followed by the link between
injury and subsequent damage (the so-called schadensbegründende Kausalität).32
The theory of adequate causation, which applies to the second test, is based
on the criterion of foreseeability. This criterion requires that a sufficient link
between the unlawful act and the specific interests enumerated in § 823 para
1 must thus be established that ‘was apt to lead to the result which occurred,
taking things as they normally happen and ignoring very peculiar and improb-
able situations which men of the world would not take into account’.33
Under Dutch civil law, the link of causation between the unlawful act and
damage is also determined in two stages. Establishment of liability requires
that the occurrence was a condicio sine qua non for the subsequent damage.
That stage is followed by a second test of legal causation, by which the scope
of recoverable damage is determined.34 Although the applicable criteria of
legal causation depend on the circumstances of the case, the criterion of
‘reasonable foreseeability’ can serve as an overall guideline. By means of the
criterion of reasonable foreseeability, the scope of the more strict probability
test of adequate causation has been broadened as to also cover certain cases
of damage which might not be construed as foreseeable, but should lead to
compensation nonetheless.35
French civil law requires a so-called lien de causalité, or link of causation
between the conduct and the harm, which the victim has to establish.36
Positive proof of this link is required by case law.37 Two main theories on
causation are applied in France, the so-called theory of l’équivalence des con-
ditions and the theory of adequate causation, of which the latter prevails. The
first theory holds that all (sub) causes that can be linked to the damage are
equally valid, since the elimination of one of these would lead to a situation
in which the damage would not have arisen. The theory of adequate causation,
32 See W. Wussow, Unfallhaftpflichtrecht 58-59 (1996).
33 Zweigert & Kötz at 601; see also Geigel, Der Haftpflichtprozeâ 2 (1993).
34 See Article 6:162(1) BW jo. Article 6:98 BW.
35 Under Dutch tort case law, the theory of adequate causation has generally been replaced
by that of reasonable foreseeability in the 1970’s on practical grounds. However, the notion
of foreseeability has not been entirely abandoned: for the more foreseeable the damage,
the more swiftly compensation will be granted still goes, see W.J.G. Oosterveen 1999 (T&C
Vermogensrecht), art. 6:98 BW, aant. 5.
36 See A. Bénabent, Droit Civil 279-280 (1995).
37 “la seule concomittance entre tel comportement et le dommage n’est certainement pas suffisante,
non plus qu’une simple probabilité que le comportement ait causé le dommage”, see A. Sériaux
at 322.
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on the other hand, merely focuses on the cause efficiente or general condition
amongst potential other causes and the subsequent damage.38
2.3.4 Protective scope
In combination with the requirements of legal causation, the potential range
of claimants and potential forms of recoverable damage can be limited by the
protective scope of the applicable regime of fault liability.
Under § 823 (1) BGB, the scope of the so-called Schutzzweck der Norm can
generally be derived directly from violation of one or more of the criteria of
unlawfulness specified therein. In other words, violation of the legal interest
of ‘health’ can not only be qualified as an unlawful act, but also specifies that
the protective scope of § 823 BGB covers breach of all types of injury that fall
under that interest.39 The protective scope of § 823 (1) BGB can be limited
when an occurrence leads to more indirect forms of violation of health in the
form of certain psychological reactions, such as fright, anger, nervous shock,
or heart attacks without any physical injuries. The classical example of nervous
shock that arises after witnessing a traffic accident may thus lead to non-
recoverability of such damage for the witness.40 The protective scope of statu-
tory provisions under § 823 (2) BGB depends on the formulation of the statutory
regime at hand.41
Under Dutch civil law, the protective scope of Article 6:163 BW holds that
‘there is no obligation to repair damage when the violated norm does not have
as its purpose the protection from damage such as that suffered by the vic-
tim.’42 Comparable to the German approach of general fault liability, the
specific questions of protective scope thus first depend on the question whether
the violated norm concerns subjective rights, an act or omission in violation
of a statutory duty, or an unwritten rule of law pertaining to proper social
conduct.43 Once the violated norm has been established, the question arises
if the claimant and the types of damage suffered fall under the scope of the
protective norm. For more intangible forms of damage, such as mental injury
38 See A. Bénabent at 280-282.
39 A violation of health (Gesundheitsverletzung) is held to cover disturbances of a physical,
psychological, or mental nature, see Larenz/Canaris at 377.
40 See G.H. Lankhorst, De relativiteit van de onrechtmatige daad 36 (1992).
41 See para 4.4.2 of this study for the scope of § 33 (1) LuftVG.
42 ‘Geen verplichting tot schadevergoeding bestaat, wanneer de geschonden norm niet strekt tot
bescherming tegen de schade zoals de benadeelde die heeft geleden’; the translation has been
derived from Haanappel & Mackaay 299 (1990).
43 See paragraph 2.3.1. Similar to the German system, the Dutch rule of scope of protection
also applies to regimes based on absolute or strict liability, although the protective scope
of the violated norm then involves the specific criteria of damage caused by realization
of danger for which the specific regime of absolute or strict liability was enacted, see
Lankhorst at 41.
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arising from the witnessing of accidents, the yardstick if the tortfeasor should
have taken the interests of such a witness into account is applied.44
Contrary to German and Dutch civil law, a general rule that limits the
protective scope of liability has never seen the light of day in French civil law;
the protective scope of (fault) liability is merely limited by the notion that
damage has to be a direct and immediate consequence of the event.45
2.3.5 Defences
The question if a claim based on fault liability will be granted does not only
depend on the aforementioned elements but also on the question whether the
alleged tortfeasor is able to invoke a defence in order to partly or wholly
escape liability. A general distinction can be made between defences or
grounds of justification that aim to justify the act such as force majeure and
defences that aim to partly or wholly exculpate the conduct of the actor such
as fault of the victim or behavior of a third party.
Under German civil law, a breach of a legal interest of § 823 (1) BGB
amounts to unlawfulness (Rechtswidrigkeit), unless a ground of justification
can be raised by the alleged tortfeasor. Similarly, an unlawful act can lose its
unlawful character under Dutch civil law on the basis of a ground of justifica-
tion.46
In relation to the problem of liability for surface damage, perhaps one of
the most important grounds of justification consists of force majeure under both
systems of civil law. Force majeure can generally be defined as any force which
cannot or need not be resisted or ‘an irresistible and unforeseeable event
outside control of the defendant.’47 In case of aviation accidents or incidents,
severe meteorological conditions come to mind in that context.48
Under French civil law, the defence of force majeure can both be invoked
in the stage of qualifying the act as faulty as well as in the subsequent stage
44 The problem particularly applies to witnessess that are also relatives of more direct victims
of such accidents, see C.C. van Dam, Aansprakelijkheidsrecht 171 (2000).
45 Une suite immédiate et directe, see Zweigert & Kötz at 621, Lankhorst at 13, and Van Gerven
at 32.
46 See Van Dam at 85 and Article 6:162 (2) BW respectively.
47 See Asser/Hartkamp at 70-71, in which various forms of force majeure are discussed in
more detail; see on the second (French) definition of force majeure, Zweigert & Kötz at 621
and A. Bénabent at 283.
48 Although not a case involving damage to third parties, the aviation accident of a DC10
of Martinair at Faro, Portugal, in December 1992 can serve as an example in which meteo-
rological conditions played an important role. After the aircraft abandoned his first approach
to the runway due to severe rainfall and gusts of wind, the low level wind conditions
suddenly altered due to windshear at the second approach, which caused the right wing-tip
of the aircraft to touch the surface and made the aircraft veer off the runway and crash,
see S. Barlay, Cleared for take-off 204 (1997).
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of determination of the causal link between fault and harm. If successfully
invoked in the first stage, the act will lose its faulty character; if successfully
invoked in the next stage, force majeure will be construed as a ‘strange’ or
external cause (cause étrangère) to the alleged causal link between damage and
conduct of the alleged tortfeasor. Other defences that can wholly or partly
be qualified as strange or external causes include fault of the victim or acts
of third parties.49 The degree of fault of the victim to the unlawful act can
lead to a proportional diminuation of compensation.50
2.4 NEGLIGENCE UNDER COMMON LAW
In common law jurisdictions, the industrial revolution and subsequent increase
of non-intentional accidents gave rise to the general tort of negligence, which
developed out of trespass. In the past, common law mainly focused on inten-
tional wrongdoers by means of specific intentional torts. This left inadvertent
harm unresolved, which was likely to arise with the introduction of industrial
machinery and new forms of transport during the industrial revolution.
Through the gradual development of negligence as a separate broad basis of
liability, the defendant could also be held liable for non-intentional damage
arising from industrial accidents if he had failed to take reasonable care to
prevent the accident.51
In this paragraph, the general characteristics of negligence will be discussed
on the basis of a similar division of negligence into main elements as has been
done in the previous paragraph and sub-paragraphs in relation to fault liability
under civil law.
The main elements of (breach of) duty of care, causation and damage, and
defences that can be invoked by alleged tortfeasors will be dealt with in
subparagraphs 2.4.1–2.4.3 respectively.
2.4.1 Duty of care
In brief, the tort of negligence requires a person to negligently or carelessly
inflict harm without the need of actual awareness of the possibility of such
harm, but with awareness of an unreasonable risk of harm. The main test to
49 Bénabent at 283 and Zweigert & Kötz at 621.
50 See for German civil law § 254 (1) BGB (Mitverschulden) and S.P. de Haas & T. Hartlief,
Verkeersaansprakelijkheid 92 (1998); see for Dutch civil law Article 6:101 BW and Van
Wassenaer van Catwijck, Eigen Schuld en medeschuld 124 et seq (1985).
51 See J.G. Fleming, The Law of Torts 101-102 (1992); D.B. Dobbs & P.T. Hayden, Torts and
Compensation, Personal Accountability and Social Responsibility for Injury 105-106 (2001).
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determine negligence is based on the question how a reasonable person would
have acted under the same circumstances.52
Another way of defining the tort of negligence can be achieved by con-
struing it as a breach of the duty of care. Or, stated as questions, can liability
arise in a certain type of situation in the first place (duty)? If affirmative, did
the defendant fail to conform to the standard required of him in the situation
at hand (breach of duty)? In comparison with civil law systems, the concept
of breach of duty of care encompasses both the criteria by which an act is
qualified as unlawful as well the criteria by which the actor is determined
to be at fault to a certain extent.53 Furthermore, the concept of duty
encompasses the both the scope of persons and types of injury to whom and
for which one owes a duty of care. In that sense, it is comparable to the
Schutznorm as applied under various civil law systems.54
The role of the actor is determined by generally establishing how a reason-
able person would have acted under comparable circumstances. That question
can be narrowed down by looking at the manner in which a reasonable person
in a certain position would behave. The behavior of a pilot implicated in the
causes of an aviation accident would thus be compared to that of a fictive
‘reasonable pilot’ under similar circumstances. One of the dangers of applica-
tion of the open-ended criterion of the reasonable man standard is that it can
mask the role of judges or juries as policy-makers. In the amusing words of
Atiyah and Cane:
Judges in this country (Great Britain) have traditionally eschewed the role of policy-
maker: they continue to proclaim that they are not concerned with policy but only
with law, and it is possible that the public prefers it this way. To many people
‘impartial justice’ means justice without policy. If a judge were to say to a de-
fendant: ‘You have failed to do what I think you should have done and that
amounts to negligence’, the defendant may come away thinking of the judge, ‘Who
are you to tell me that?’ But if the judge says: ‘You have failed to do what the
reasonable person would have done, and that amounts to negligence’, the defendant
may come away with more respect for the judge and the law.55
The broadly formulated reasonable man standard can also be refined by means
of a number of helpful yardsticks: first, the degree of probability that damage
would result from the conduct; second, the magnitude of the harm which was
likely to arise if the conduct took place; third, the value or utility of the con-
duct; and fourthly, the burden of taking precautions against the risk of damage
measured in terms of costs, time, and trouble. These yardsticks indicate that
52 See M.D. Bayles, Principles of Law, A Normative Analysis 225 (1987).
53 See C.AE. Uniken Venema, Van Common Law en Civil Law 101-102 (1971).
54 M.D. Bayles at 228 et seq. See also on the scope of duty of care and the tests of foreseeability
and proximity, Van Gerven at 16 et seq.
55 See P. Cane, Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law 30-31 (1999).
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the defendant must be able to foresee such risks in order to take precautionary
measures to prevent them beforehand, which brings the requirement of
foreseeability into the equation.56
2.4.2 Causation and damage
Under common law, the question of causation is determined in two stages.
In the first stage, the question if the carelessness of the defendant caused the
damage is addressed. This is the so-called question of ‘factual causation’ or
‘cause in fact’ or ‘but-for cause’.57 In the words of Markesinis: ‘would the
loss have been sustained but for the relevant act or omission of the de-
fendant?’58
The second stage of causation or legal cause requires the establishment
of a sufficient link between the conduct and the subsequent loss. Criteria such
as foreseeability and proximity can then be of aid.
Evidently, difficulties can arise in this area if various persons are implicated
in a long chain of causation. Complex examples are easily envisaged. One
could imagine a victim of an aviation accident being driven to a hospital at
high speed by an ambulance that arrives at the hospital at a later time than
planned because it first ran into a tree after a near miss of a pedestrian. When
the victim finally reaches the operating theatre, his injuries can be aggravated
by an incompetent doctor who makes certain crucial mistakes. The difficult
test of legal causation would then be to determine to what extent the original
tortfeasor (the operator of the aircraft) can be held liable for the final aggra-
vated injuries. However, the but-for test at least has been met in such a case.
2.4.3 Defences. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
Under negligence a number of defences are available to defendants. Some of
these defences spring into action in combination with the common law doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur (‘the thing speaks for itself’). This doctrine can come to the
aid of plaintiffs in certain cases when negligence can be difficult to prove, for
instance if the cause of the harm lies exclusively within control of the de-
fendant, although more conditions may be required for the doctrine to be
invoked successfully. Typically, the claimant can only establish the fact that
an accident has happened, without being able to prove the exact conduct of
56 P. Cane at 32-38.
57 The ‘but-for’ rule indicates that if the defendant had not behaved negligently, the victim
would not have suffered injuries. In other words: but-for the defendant’s conduct, the
injuries would have been avoided, see Dobbs & Hayden at 192-195.
58 See B.S. Markesinis & S.F. Deakin, Tort Law 163 (1994).
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the defendant by which the accident occurred. The test would then be if it
is more likely than not that the effective cause of the accident could be ascribed
to the act or omission of the defendant. Such an act or omission could then
qualify as a failure to take reasonable care of the safety of the claimant.59
In such cases, a presumption of negligence can be accepted by the court,
which has to be rebutted by the defendant in order to escape liability.60 Inso-
far as it can be defined as a defence (since it comes down to a denial of fault),
the defendant can rebut negligence by claiming that the event that led to the
damage was an ‘inevitable accident.’61 An ‘inevitable or unavoidable accident’
has been defined as
one produced by an irresistible physical cause; an accident which cannot be pre-
vented by human skill or foresight, but results from natural causes, such as light-
ning or storms, perils of the sea, inundations or earthquakes, or sudden death or
illness. By irresistible force is meant an interposition of human agency, from its
nature and power absolutely uncontrollable.62
As the definition requires that the accident cannot be prevented by human
skill, the defence of an ‘inevitable accident’ cannot be invoked when the risk
at hand is reasonably foreseeable.63
As will be seen in more detail in the next paragraph, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur has been used to assert that negligence should prevail as the ideal
basis of liability in aviation accidents involving surface damage.
Aside from the defence of an inevitable accident, the defence of act of God
can be invoked if the accident at hand came about due to natural forces beyond
anyone’s control.64
Another important defence available to defendants under negligence is
that of contributory negligence, or failure to take care of one’s own safety in
the situation at hand. Contributory negligence thus relates to the careless
conduct of potential claimants, or his act or omission which has materially
contributed to the damage.65 If accepted, such a defence may reduce the
59 See Judge Walton, R. Cooper & S.E. Wood, Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence 350-351
(2001).
60 See Shears & Stephenson, James’ Introduction to English Law 323 (1996). The classic res
ipsa loquitur case, Byrne v. Boadle 2 H & C 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Exch. 1863) involved
a pedestrian that was hit by a barrel of flour that fell from an open door in a warehouse.
This was construed as a scenario which held sufficient proof of negligence to go to jury
without extra evidence on how the accident could have happened.
61 Markesinis at 673.
62 Black’s Law Dictionary 776-777 (1990).
63 Walton, Cooper & Wood at 219.
64 Markesinis at 673. Note that an important difference between an inevitable accident and
an act of God lies in the fact that an act of God is the opposite of act of man, and is thus
much broader in scope than natural causes without human intervention, see Walton, Cooper
& Wood at 220-221.
65 Walton, Cooper & Wood at 170.
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compensation due to the victims in proportion with their own degree of
carelessness.66
2.5 FAULT LIABILITY, NEGLIGENCE AND SURFACE DAMAGE
The quest for specific regimes of liability for surface damage of aircraft
operators or owners could stop at this point. The fictitious legislator could
simply decide to leave the problem to his national general rules of fault liability
or negligence. He could argue that the presumption of fault or negligence,
which will most likely be present in cases of genuine aviation accidents,
provides a sufficient safeguard for third parties to establish liability of the
implicated aircraft operators or owners.
However, he could also conclude that such an outcome may lead to unsatis-
factory results if fault or negligence turn out to be difficult or impossible to
prove and thus lead to situations where damage to persons and property are
left uncompensated. If he finds such an outcome unsatisfactory, he could
ponder over a regime based on stricter forms of liability. In this paragraph,
the general headings of fault liability and negligence will be applied to the
three described scenarios of conduct of aircraft that are capable of inflicting
surface damage in sub-paragraphs 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 respectively. This exercise
is meant to determine whether and when fault liability or negligence are not
the most preferable bases of liability in this field. Furthermore, the relationship
between property ownership and overflight under common and civil law will
be examined in that context in sub-divisions 2.5.2.1 and 2.5.2.2 of sub-para-
graph 2.5.2.
2.5.1 Fault liability, negligence and the first scenario of surface damage
The first and most significant scenario of surface damage arises when one or
more aircraft have a genuine accident, that is, actually crash. Irrespective of
the causes of the case at hand, the common denominator of this scenario is
that damage to persons and/or property on the ground will be caused directly
or more indirectly by the impact of the aircraft or parts of the aircraft with
the surface. The assertion is that the victims may not be able to prove fault
or negligence of the operator, even with the aid of instruments such as a
procedural reversal of the burden of proof under civil law systems or the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur under common law systems. That this is not a mere
66 Cane at 44 et seq. It is noteworthy that under English Law, the Law Reform (Contributory
Negligence) Act of 1945 made certain that damages were merely reduced instead of denied
completely in cases of contributory negligence, see also Walton, Cooper & Wood, at 175.
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imaginary scenario, can be illustrated by the American case of Crosby v. Cox
Aircraft Co., in which the standard of negligence was applicable.67
In the Crosby case, the plaintiff’s garage was damaged by a crash landing
of an aircraft. Strict liability was denied in favor of the standard of negligence
on the grounds of common usage of aircraft and their social utility as well
as the appropriateness of air navigation over plaintiff’s property. Remarkably,
the court followed a line of reasoning in defence of the standard of negligence,
which seems to establish exactly the opposite. For the court held that:
The causes of aircraft accidents are legion and can come from a myriad of sources.
Every aircraft that flies is at risk from every bird, projectile and other aircraft. The
injury to the ground dweller may have been caused by faulty engineering, construc-
tion, repair, maintenance, metal fatigue, operation or ground control. Lightning,
wind shear and other acts of God may have brought about a crash. Any listing
of the causes of such accidents undoubtedly would fall short of the possibilities.68
For precisely the fact that such variable and multiple causes can cause aviation
accidents indicates that the main problem of relying on the standard of negli-
gence in such cases can be its difficulty to prove. In view of this problem, the
dissenting opinion in the Crosby case enumerated a number of key arguments
in favor of application of stricter forms of liability in this field. The dissent
held that the burden of loss should fall on the person who by his own free
will and for his own benefit voluntarily chooses to fly instead of on wholly
innocent, non-active, and non-benefited third parties who suffer damage.
Furthermore, the dissent argued that negligence can be difficult to prove in
aviation cases even with the aid of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.69
Doubts on the fairness of application of negligence in combination with
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to aviation accidents are by no means new.
As Knauth put it as early as 1938:
Airplane crashes usually kill all the occupants and “inside” witnesses (=black
boxes). The wreck is frequently burned, or under water. The track of the aircraft,
being traced in air and not on the ground, cannot be reconstructed. There are
seldom any “outside” or neutral witnesses; the air lanes are not watched by as many
pairs of eyes as are the highways. Accidents happen very suddenly, above the
clouds, in remote places. It is said we should use the rule of res ipsa loquitur; and
of necessity we often do so. But that is a very troublesome and unsettled rule of
evidence; it enjoys two major and many minor interpretations. It is at best a stop-
gap invented by humane judges to help plaintiffs get over the high barriers pres-
67 746 P.2d 1198 (Washington 1987).
68 746 P.2d at 1201, as cited by W.K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprise, 92 Colum.
L. Rev. 1705, at 1748 (1992).
69 746 P. 2d at 1203-1204, as cited by W.K. Jones at 1748.
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ented by the general rule that the plaintiff in a negligence suit has the burden of
proving some negligence…70
And a closer examination of American case law in this field on the question
when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can be invoked, reveals that the odds
are comparable to those of a lottery. In some cases, the doctrine was acknow-
ledged, such as in the case of San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. United States.71
In that case, a government aircraft controlled by a pilot instructing a student
pilot hit electric powerlines on the surface and subsequently crashed. The
owner of the powerlines based his claim on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
A witness saw the aircraft flying too low (in non-conformity with air traffic
regulations) for its last 5 minutes of flight and subsequently disappear behind
a hill in the last 5 seconds before the crash. The court permitted the doctrine
to be invoked on the grounds of a presumption of continuing negligence
during the last 5 seconds of flight prior to the crash, which, incidentally, could
still have been countered by disproving negligence.72
However, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not accepted in a number
of other cases. This was due to the fact that the mere occurrence of an aviation
accident was not deemed a sufficient ground for the doctrine to apply auto-
matically. Wolff has distinguished three main groups of cases where the
doctrine failed because the criteria of the doctrine were not met:
1 cases in which the evidence failed to establish that the aircraft was under
exclusive control of the defendant;
2 cases in which it was held that it is not an unusual occurrence for an
airplane to crash without the intervention of a human agency;
3 cases holding that experience was not sufficiently uniform to justify a
presumption that such accidents do not happen in the absence of negli-
gence.73
The case of Williams et al. v. United States (1955) indicates that a number of
these elements can be required jointly by the court.74 In the Williams case,
a B-47 Strato-Jet bomber of the United States Airforce caught fire, exploded,
70 A.W. Knauth, The Uniform State Aeronautical Liability Act Adopted at Cleveland, July 23, 1938,
9 ALR 352, at 353 (1938).
71 San Diego & Electric Co. v. United States (1949, CA9 Cal) 173 F2d 92, as cited by T.L. Kruk,
Res Ipsa Loquitur in Aviation Accidents, 25 ALR4th 1237, at 1283 (1983).
72 T.L. Kruk at 1283.
73 W.C. Wolff, Liability of Aircraft Owners and Operators for Ground Injury, 24 JALC 204, at 212
(1957); Dobbs & Hayden also point out that the doctrine is not always applicable to aviation
cases, but that the circumstances per case must be considered before invoking the doctrine;
aside from the criteria provided by Wolff, they have added the criterion of absence of
voluntary action or contribution by the plaintiff, see Dobbs & Hayden at 185-187 and the
case law cited therein.
74 Williams et Al. v. United States, 218 F. 2d 473 (5th Cir. 1955); see also 4 Avi 17187 (District
Court Decision, October 23, 1953).
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and disintegrated above the city of Marianna, Florida on 22 July 1952. Some
of the aircraft parts and its contents, which included inflammable substances,
fell to the earth and scattered over a large area and subsequently caught fire.
Two minor children of the plaintiffs, the Williams family, were burned so
severely by the heat and flames that they died soon after the accident in the
hospital.75
Not only did the court of appeals hold that the mere criterion that the
aircraft was under exclusive control of the defendant (the government) could
not suffice, but also that the accident would not have occurred in the ordinary
course of events if due care had been exercised. If this cannot be established,
no basis for recovery exists (in casu under the Federal Tort Claims Act). Wolff
points out that, although human experience in the field is often so uniform
and well established that it is not necessary to prove this by extraneous negli-
gence, in this particular case a problem arose since the court had no technical
or judicial knowledge of what might cause a jet airplane to suddenly explode
in flight. Then the story ends for plaintiffs if they cannot present evidence to
show that such an accident could not occur but for negligence. In other words,
evidence of negligence must be presented before the defendant is required
to disprove negligence in such cases.76
2.5.2 Fault liability, negligence and the second and third scenarios of surface
damage
Aside from genuine aviation accidents, surface damage can arise in scenarios
where aircraft fly in non-conformity or even in conformity with air traffic
regulations. Since the differences between too low overflight and normal
overflight can be narrow, these two scenarios will be discussed jointly. A
division has been made between the problems presented by overflight in
relation to property ownership under common and civil law in sub-paragraphs
2.5.2.1 and 2.5.2.2 respectively.
2.5.2.1 The relationship between ownership of land and overflight under common
law
In scenarios of damage resulting from overflight, the most important category
of potential plaintiffs is formed by landowners. The classic conflict of interests
between landowners and those engaged in the activity of flying has been
expounded on in legal doctrine and case law. The ancient law doctrine of ‘cujus
est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos’ (‘whose the soil is, his it is from
the heavens to the depths of the earth’) was formulated in pre-aviation times.
75 Williams et Al., 4 Avi 17187.
76 Wolff at 212-213.
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The doctrine has not been considered to be valid in order to determine the
borderlines between the right of overflight of aircraft and actual interference
of the land.77 But if the doctrine is outdated, how can the borderlines between
the interests of landowners and those of aviation be demarcated?
Perhaps the most famous American case in which this problem has arisen,
is Causby v. U.S.78 In the Causby case, the respondents owned a piece of land
on which they raised chickens. At a certain point in time, the respondents were
forced to give up their chicken business. This was due to the fact that the
chickens killed themselves by flying into the walls out of fright caused by the
noise of overflying aircraft. The noise was generated by various four-motored
bombers and other heavy aircraft that flew over the land at close range (there-
by barely missing the tops of the trees) in order to take-off and land from the
nearby airport. The respondents were also deprived of sleep as they were
tormented by nervousness and fright caused by both the noise and the nightly
glare produced by the aircraft. On the basis of these facts, the Court of Claims
held that the property had depreciated in value and that the United States
had taken an easement over the property and that the value of the property
destroyed and the easement taken was $2000.79
The United States argued that when flights are made within navigable
airspace without any physical invasion of the property, there has been no
taking of property, but at most incidental damage occurring as a consequence
of authorized air navigation. Furthermore, the United States argued that the
landowner does not own superadjacent airspace which he has not subjected
to possession, e.g. by the erection of structures.
However, the Supreme Court held that although the Civil Aeronautics Act
(1938) gives citizens of the United States a public right of freedom of transit
through the navigable air space of the United States, that is, airspace “above
the minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Civil Aviation Author-
ity”, landowners are not deprived of all rights to air space above their heads.
If the taking-off and landing procedures are performed at altitudes so close
to private property and at frequent intervals as to interfere with its use, they
can amount to a taking of private property without just compensation (the
77 J.G. Verplaetse, International Law in Vertical Space 220-225 (1960). For an example of early
case law, see Johnson v. Curtis Northwest Airplane Company et Al., United States District
Court, District of Minnesota, Second Judicial District, September 27, 1923, 1 Avi 61. In this
case, the doctrine was invoked and rejected in a case where the aircraft flew over plaintiff’s
land at a level of 2000 feet. The rejection was based on the notion that the upper air is a
natural heritage common to all people, which should not be hampered with by an artificial
maxim of law.
78 United States v. Causby and Wife, Supreme Court of the United States, May 27, 1946, 2
Avi, 14189.
79 United States v. Causby, 2 Avi., at 14190.
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Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation).80
In an interesting dissenting opinion Justice Black pointed out that the
Supreme Court’s opinion
seems to indicate that the mere flying of planes through the column of air directly
above respondents’ land does not constitute a taking. Consequently it appears to
be noise and glare, to the extent and under the circumstances shown here, which
make the government a seizer of private property. But the allegation of noise and
glare resulting in damages, constitutes at best an action in tort where there might
be recovery if the noise and light constituted a nuisance, a violation of a statute,
or were the result of negligence. But the Government has not consented to be sued
in the Court of Claims except in actions based on express or implied contract. And
there is no implied contract here, unless by reason of the noise and glare caused
by the bombers the Government can be said to have “taken” respondents’ property
in a Constitutional sense. The concept of taking property as used in the Constitution
has heretofore never been given so sweeping a meaning.81
Justice Black continued to attack the Court’s interpretation of a taking and
its definition of property owners rights by stating that old concepts of private
ownership should not be introduced in the field of air regulation. Just claims
of aggrieved parties could be met far better by awarding of damages for
injuries suffered from the flying of planes, or by the granting of injunctions
to prohibit their flying, instead of through the application of rigid Constitu-
tional restraints formulated and enforced by courts.82
Unfortunately, no hard and fast rules can be given on the question when
the operation of an airport or the flight of aircraft constitute a taking under
American law. Some courts have held that there must have been a direct
invasion of the property of the landowner or of the airspace directly above
his land. Other courts have recognized that flights not directly over such land
can also be an infringement of the rights of property owners and thus consti-
tute a taking. In some cases, courts have held that only the operator of the
airport can be held responsible for takings by flights and not the aircraft
operators, since property owners would otherwise have to make long-term
observations of the overflights, identify each aircraft, and are burdened with
difficult to prove exact altitudes of such flights. Alternative remedies could
include actions based on nuisance, negligence, or trespass.83
80 United States v. Causby, 2 Avi., at 14189-14190.
81 United States v. Causby, 2 Avi., at 14193-14194.
82 United States v. Causby, 2 Avi., at 14195.
83 See J.M. Zitter, Airport operations or flight of aircraft as constituting taking or damaging of property,
22 ALR 4th 863, at 868 et seq (1980).
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2.5.2.2 The relationship between ownership of land and overflight under civil law
Civil law systems have acknowledged the relationship between ownership
of land and overflight in specific property law provisions of their civil codes.
German civil law, for instance, has codified a specific provision in § 905 BGB,
which holds that the right of a landowner reaches into the space above and
below its property. However, he cannot prohibit the effects of invasion of that
space at heights or depths which go beyond his interests of ownership.84
Inspired by the German provision, the relationship between the rights of
land-owners and the rights of overflying aircraft have been demarcated in
the following fashion in Article 5:21 BW of the Dutch Civil Code:
Article 5:21 BW:
(1) The right of the owner of land to use it includes the right to use what is above
and below the surface.
(2) Other persons may use what is above and below the surface if this takes place
so high above or so deep below the surface that the owner has no interest to
object thereto.
(3) The preceding paragraphs do not apply to the right of overflight.85
As the Dutch author Ploeger points out, both the German and Dutch provision
have been inspired by the ‘cujus est solum’ doctrine. In relation to overflight,
the question will arise when overflight constitutes a breach of the rights of
the landowner. Under German civil law, the essential criterion that has to be
met holds that the landowner must have an interest (‘interesse’) in the claim
to prevent the effects (‘Einwirkungen’), in order for the claim to be justified.
If there is no such interest, the so-called actio negatoria or right to deny third
parties access to the column of air above him is denied to him.86 It is note-
worthy that the Dutch system specifically exempts the right of overflight from
the rights of the landowner. The question then remains when the right of
overflight becomes unlawful in the sense of a breach of the rights of use that
are granted to the landowner.
In civil law systems, the approach to the problem of surface damage
inflicted by aviation from the perspective of property law points to landowners
having to prove a breach of certain of their rights, which has to be unlawful.
The element of unlawfulness conveniently leads back to the realm of the
84 § 905 BGB reads: Das Recht des Eigentümers eines Grundstücks erstreckt sich auf den Raum
über der Oberfläche und auf den Erdkörper unter der Oberfläche. Der Eigentümer kan
jedoch Einwirkungen nicht verbieten, die in solcher Höhe oder Tiefe vorgenommen werden,
daâ er an der Ausschlieâung kein interesse hat.
85 The English translation is derived from Haanappel and Mackaay at 163.
86 H.D. Ploeger, Tot de poorten van de hel, Over art. 5:21 BW en de exploitatie van de derde dimensie,
in M.H. Claringbould et al., Van Beheering, ‘goederenrechtelijke beschouwingen’, 129 at
135-136 (1998).
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general provisions of fault liability in the sense that the breach has to constitute
an unlawful act. Plaintiffs will then have to subsequently establish the applic-
able criteria of fault, damage, and a sufficient causal link between the damage
and the act. In comparison with the scenario of aircraft actually crashing, an
obvious advantage of such scenarios is that the aircraft will generally be
completely intact, which makes the finding of clues as to the reasons of the
(too) low overflight more accessible since the pilot(s) can be questioned on
their conduct and the flight data are preserved. The element of unlawfulness
will most likely be met automatically if the aircraft has flown too low, that
is, in non-conformity with air traffic regulations. More difficulties may lie in
proving fault of the operator and in the potential defences that the operator
can invoke. In this context, the defence of force majeure or Act of God could
prove to be an important barrier to compensation, for instance if the aircraft
flew too low to evade certain meteorological conditions. Causation could also
raise difficulties, since the causal connection between the damage and the act
of flying over at a low level is less evident than in cases where the aircraft
actually crashed (unless perhaps contact has been made during overflight
between the aircraft and objects or persons on the surface).
The key question that has to be addressed by our fictitious legislator is
whether the relationship between owners of land and overflying aircraft should
be covered by a more strict regime of liability than the current systems of
common and civil law can provide. In other words, to what extent – if at all –
should claims based on nuisance, noise, glare, and sudden fright fall under
separate regimes of codified strict or absolute liability? In order to address
this question, a general definition of the concepts of absolute and strict liability
is useful. Justifications for regimes based on absolute or strict liability as well
as their potential scope, will subsequently have to be taken into account.87
2.6 THE ALTERNATIVES OF ABSOLUTE OR STRICT LIABILITY
Before delving into the justifications for application of the bases of absolute
or strict liability to the problem of surface damage inflicted by aircraft, some
workable definitions of these concepts can be of use. For although these
concepts are often used synonymously and can be difficult to distinguish in
practice, a number of distinctions can be made in the manner in which liability
arises under both bases of liability.
Bin Cheng’s has attempted to define these two closely aligned bases of
liability in the following manner. Taking the bases and criteria of fault liability
or negligence as a starting point, strict liability arises when the offending act
has been committed by the person to be held liable without fault on his part
and when there is a causal link between the person held strictly liable and
87 See paragraphs 2.6-2.8 of this study.
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the damage. In other words, only the criterion of fault has actually been
eliminated from the original criteria of fault liability or negligence by Bin
Cheng. All other criteria and defences related to fault liability or negligence,
except those aimed at disproving fault, are thus left intact under regimes of
strict liability.88
Although absolute liability also dispenses with the fault criterion, it differs
from strict liability in that it arises whenever the circumstances stipulated by
the legislature for such liability to arise are met. As opposed to strict liability,
there is no specific requirement that the damage has to be caused by the person
to be held liable, nor are the normal defences available. This means that the
person addressed by the absolute liability regime can be held absolutely liable
for damage under the specified circumstances of the regime without necessarily
having caused the damage himself.89 The legislature should seriously consider
the exact wording of his absolute liability regime in view of potential liability
of the operators or owners of aircraft in cases of terrorism such as the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States. For under a regime of
absolute liability, the operator could be held liable for deliberate acts of a third
party, depending of course on the exact scope and wording of such a regime.
Although absolute liability dispenses with the defences available under
fault liability or negligence as a starting point, this does not mean that no
defences are left to the person held absolutely liable under the regime at hand.
As Bin Cheng stresses, exceptions to absolute liability can be specifically
enacted in the form of available defences, e.g. in case of contributory negli-
gence, armed conflict, or exceptionally grave natural disasters. Thus, even the
defence of Act of God could be enacted under an absolute liability regime.90
Recapitulating, the following definitions emerge:91
Strict liability:
(reponsabilité objective; responsabilité objective simple; gewöhnliche Kausalhaftung)
arises if the criteria of author of an act causing damage are met. The usual de-
fences as under regimes of fault liability can be invoked, except those directed
to proving absence of fault.
88 See Bin Cheng, A reply to charges of having inter alia misused the term absolute liability in relation
to the 1966 Montreal Intercarrier Agreement in my plea for an integrated system of liability, McGill
Annals of Air and Space Law 3, at 9 (1981).
89 Bin Cheng at 9. Aside from absolute third party liability regimes in the field of aviation,
the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Paris, 29 July 1960),
can serve as an example of a absolute liability regime in which the operator of a nuclear
installation can be held absolutely liable for damage to third parties caused by nuclear
incidents.
90 Bin Cheng at 11.
91 Bin Cheng at 10 (the definitions are based on the diagram).
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Absolute liability:
(responsabilité objective; responsabilité objective proprement dite; responsabilité absolue;
reine Kausalhaftung; Gefährdungshaftung) arises when the criteria person in a
prescribed relationship to a specific circumstance, such circumstance arising and
causing damage are met. Only those defences specifically provided for are
available.
In the context of this study, the Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign
Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, Signed at Rome on 7 October 1952
(hereinafter cited as the Rome Convention of 1952), can serve as an example
of an international air law regime based on absolute liability, which has been
codified in the following fashion:
Article 1 (1) Any person who suffers damage on the surface shall, upon proof only
that the damage was caused by an aircraft in flight or by any person or thing falling
therefrom, be entitled to compensation as provided by this Convention. Neverthe-
less there shall be no right to compensation if the damage is not a direct conse-
quence of the incident giving rise thereto, or if the damage results from the mere
fact of passage of the aircraft through the airspace in conformity with existing air
traffic regulations.
Liability is attributed to the operator of the aircraft (Article 2(1) Rome Conven-
tion 1952). Taking Bin Cheng’s definition into account, the absolute nature
of the liability regime lies in the fact that the operator can also be held liable
without having necessarily caused the damage himself under certain conditions
specified in the Convention.92 In the system of Bin Cheng, the regime would
be strict if for instance codification of Article 1(1) would have been as follows:
‘Any person who suffers damage on the surface shall, upon proof only that
the damage was caused by the operator of an aircraft in flight or by any person
or thing falling therefrom, etc’, and if all the usual defences available under
fault liability or negligence were left intact with the exception of disproval
of fault.
Furthermore, the regime of the Rome Convention of 1952 also qualifies
as absolute, as it only allows for number of defences, such as contributory
negligence, the defence that the damage is the direct consequence of armed
conflict or civil disturbance, and the defence that such person (the legitimate
92 For the operator can also be held liable for damage caused by other persons under the
conditions specified in for instance Article 2(1) (b) (use by servants or agents), Article 3
(person without exclusive right to use the aircraft for more than fourteen days causing
damage leads to joint and several liability with the operator), Article 4 (person using aircraft
without consent of the operator causing damage leads to joint and several liability with
the operator, unless operator can prove that he has exercised due care to prevent such use)
Rome Convention.
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operator) has been deprived of the use of the aircraft by act of public author-
ity.93
However, it should be borne in mind that the concepts of absolute and
strict liability are often used synonymously and that the aforementioned
definitions should thus not be applied too rigidly. The guidelines on the exact
type of liability can best be derived directly from the wording of the regime
at hand; the question whether such a regime should or could be qualified as
absolute or strict then becomes a secondary matter.
In the next paragraph, the main justifications for regimes of absolute or
strict liability in this field in general will be enumerated.
2.7 JUSTIFICATIONS FOR REGIMES BASED ON ABSOLUTE OR STRICT LIABILITY
The key question arises on what ground regimes of absolute or strict liability
should be codified in order to cover the problem of surface damage inflicted
by aviation. In this paragraph, seven arguments in favor of absolute or strict
liability in this field will be enumerated. The first two arguments have been
derived from the dissenting opinion in the previously discussed American
Crosby-case. The third, fourth, and fifth argument relate to ‘things’ or ‘activi-
ties’ in general (e.g. ships, railways, tramways, space ships, unmanned missiles,
oil wells, pipelines, nuclear installations, and of course aircraft) and are primar-
ily based on the serious danger that such things or activities can pose to third
parties.94 Finally, the sixth and seventh argument are directly related to avi-
ation.
1 The burden of loss should fall on the person who by his own free will and
for his own benefit voluntarily chooses to fly in stead of on wholly inno-
cent, non-active and non-benefitted third parties on the surface who
consequently suffer damage.
The first argument, which holds that the burden of the risks of flying should
preferably fall on those willing to take those risks in stead of on innocent non-
benefitted third parties, almost goes without saying. As a minor counter-
argument the objection could be raised that certain third parties that suffer
damage can be benefitted by aviation in a more general sense, for instance
if they are employed in the aviation industry or fly frequently. Goedhuis has
raised this issue in relation to the scope of the original Rome Convention of
1933 by dividing surface victims in two main categories encompassing those
employed in the aviation industry and others. The former category included
93 Bin Cheng at 11; see Articles 6 and 5 of the Rome Convention of 1952.
94 The third, fourth, and fifth argument have been derived from Stone, Liability for Damage
Caused by Things, IECL, XI, Torts, Chapter 5 (1983).
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employees of the aircraft operator or carrier implicated in the accident or
incident, employees of airports struck by an aircraft on the airport, and a
number of other related categories of persons somehow linked to- or involved
in the aviation business.95
Such distinctions may have certain validity from an academic point of view,
but seem to lack fairness and practicability. For such a division would mean
that the basis of liability to which aircraft operators are subjected would vary
per victim. While certain victims would be entitled to compensation almost
automatically on a basis of absolute or strict liability, others would have to
prove negligence because of the mere coincidence of employment in the
aviation industry.
2 The fact that negligence (or fault) can be difficult to prove in aviation cases,
even with the aid of doctrines such as res ipsa loquitur, which can not be
invoked successfully in every accident or incident.
The second argument, which holds that negligence or fault can be difficult
to prove for surface victims in view of the inherent complexity of most aviation
accidents, can be qualified as valid in any era of aviation. As has been estab-
lished previously in this Chapter, even doctrines such as res ipsa loquitur in
common law jurisdictions are not universally applicable to soften the burden
of having to prove negligence. Procedural reversals of the burden of proof
under certain civil law systems are neither automatically guaranteed, but can
depend on the discretion of the court seized of the case.96 And even if they
do apply, aircraft operators can still disprove fault or negligence.
Another related argument against application of the standard of negligence
concerns the historic notion that under common law, the barrier of negligence
was introduced in the industrialization period of the nineteenth century as
a protective measure for nascent industries. Although perhaps valid at a certain
point in time, aviation cannot be said to be a nascent industry anymore.97
Finally, one could remark that negligence or fault can be difficult to prove
on the often mere basis of investigative reports made by governmental accident
investigation agencies such as the National Transportation Safety Board. For
such reports are not intended to attribute blame or liability to the implicated
parties and are thus not drafted in that sense. The difficulty need not only
lie in the fact that such reports may stress certain causes while leaving others
out (which may be crucial for the determination of liability), but also in the
95 See D. Goedhuis, Aansprakelijkheid voor luchtvaartschade, NJB 161, at 162 et seq (1935).
96 As under Article 177 Rv (Dutch Procedural Code).
97 See also paragraph 5.2 of this study.
Chapter 2 39
fact that the use of such reports as evidence in courts could be restricted.98
Another problem concerns the fact that it can take years before such an
accident report sees the light of day, especially in complex cases.99
3 The perception of the inherent dangerous qualities of certain things or
activities or of them becoming dangerous when used improperly;
The third argument is related to the perception of aviation as an ultra-
hazardous or dangerous activity and reveals a remarkable line of reasoning
that has been applied in this field in the United States. Under common law,
the rationale for application of regimes of absolute or strict liability to new
developments in society has traditionally been based on the landmark case
of Rylands v. Fletcher. In Rylands v. Fletcher, a form of strict liability for escaping
things was introduced based on the more ancient common law doctrines of
trespass and nuisance.100 The rule has helped to establish a separate category
of strict liability for damage caused by so-called ultrahazardous activities in
the United States, which initially included the risk posed by aircraft to third
parties on the surface.101 However, in due course of time, the perceived
danger or ultrahazardous nature of aviation gradually transformed into the
notion of aviation being regarded as a safe activity. This change of attitude
corresponded with the notion that negligence should therefore apply as the
preferable basis of liability in cases of surface damage inflicted by aircraft.102
Upon closer scrutiny, the argument reveals a Catch-22-like line of reasoning.
For if an aircraft happens to fall out of the sky in a period when flying is
deemed ‘safe’, victims will have to prove negligence to receive compensation,
whereas victims were able to rely on absolute or strict liability in times when
aviation was still considered ultrahazardous. But at what exact point in time
can aviation be perceived as safe if aircraft can evidently also crash in ‘safe’
98 Under the rule of Article 179 Rv (Dutch Procedural code) for instance, accident investigation
reports can be presented as evidence before courts; however, courts are completely free
to ignore them under Dutch law. If acknowledged by the court, evidence to the contrary
can be produced by the other party, see R.W. Polak, Onderzoekscommissies onderzocht, in E.R.
Muller & C.J.J.M. Stolker (Eds.), Ramp en Recht, Beschouwingen over rampen, verantwoor-
delijkheid en aansprakelijkheid, 357 at 367 et seq (2001).
99 See C.C. Lebow et al.,‘Safety in The Skies’, Personnel and Parties in NTSB Aviation Accident
Investigations, RAND Institute for Civil Justice, at 16. In some cases, the release of such
NTSB reports took up to four years.
100 See Rylands v. Fletcher (1865)3 H.&C. 774 (Court of Exechequer);(1866) L.R.1 Ex.265 (Court
of Exechequer Chamber); (1868) L.R.3 H.L.330 (House of Lords), as cited in Winfield and
Jolowicz on Tort 443 (1994).
101 Prosser and Keeton on Torts 550 et seq. (1984). Although the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher
was initially rejected in a number of early American cases on the grounds that it conflicted
with US law principles based on the assumption that negligence was required, it flourished
in later case law, see J.J. Phillips et al., Tort Law, Cases, Materials, Problems 438 et seq. (1997).
102 See C.J.J.M. Stolker and D.I. Levine, Compensation for Damage to Third Parties on the Ground
as a Result of Aviation Accidents, XXII AASL 60, at 61-63 (1997).
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times? For a glimpse in any newspaper of recent years will confirm that aircraft
still crash nowadays. Even if only one accident involving surface damage
would occur every ten years, that specific accident could still pose the problems
of having to prove negligence or fault for the victims, irrespective of the
perceived safety of flying in general. And that reveals the fallacy of the line
of reasoning which is based on the general (and perhaps statistically even true)
notion that aviation is safer than in its early days, but does not take into
account that aviation accidents keep occurring, irrespective of their numbers.
And in such cases, the danger or ultrahazardousness of the activity is just as
apparent as in earlier times (at least to those involved in the accident) and
should thus justify absolute or strict liability.
4 The balancing of the use of the activity to society in general and the poten-
tial harm it can create to certain members of society;
The fourth argument, which is based on the idea of balancing the interests
of the activity on the one hand and society as a whole on the other is related
to the first argument and tips the scales in favor of absolute or strict liability.
For although society as a whole may benefit from aviation, this should not
mean that the inherent risks of flying should be borne by certain members
of society if they are faced with cases where negligence or fault turn out to
be difficult to prove.
5 The economically founded argument of the relatively common and easy
availability of insurance coverage for the entities that choose to take the
risk of the activity rather than letting the risk fall on innocent parties or
their insurance coverage;
The fifth argument is based on the economic notion of relatively common and
easy availability of insurance coverage for third party liability for operators
of aircraft. This is perceived as more preferable and practical than leaving such
risks to innocent third parties and their insurance coverage for such risks, if
obtainable at all.
For ‘normal’ aviation accidents, the argument rings true: operators of
aircraft can obtain insurance coverage for third party liability from the inter-
national aviation insurance market, albeit up to certain limits of coverage as
set out in the policy. Normally, such coverage is meant to suffice in cases of
liability arising from surface damage. Common sense also dictates that opera-
tors of aircraft are in a better position to take out insurance for such third party
liability and assess the risks imposed by the activity of flying. However, as
the terrorist attacks of ‘9/11’ on the United States have made clear, trouble
can arise for the aviation industry if the damage inflicted by such attacks
exceeds the obtainable coverage for such specific risks related to war and
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terrorism by far.103 For as opposed to the risks of ‘normal’ aviation accidents
and incidents, the risks of terrorism pose a new threat in terms of potential
damage and in terms of insurance coverage since September 11, 2001. However,
such abnormal occurrences should be seen as exceptions, which do not dis-
prove the argument in general.
It should be remarked that the insurance argument essentially merely states
that the party better equipped to do so, should take out insurance. Perceived
in that sense, the argument can be raised irrespective of the question whether
the underlying regime of third party liability is based on general fault or
negligence or on a specific regime based on absolute or strict liability. Notably,
the insurance argument goes a large step further in this context by actually
linking the notion that the party taking the risk is better equipped to insure
himself than innocent third parties to a justification for application of absolute
or strict liability in this field.
6 Absolute or strict liability is the corollary to the freedom of flying over
private property. This argument is substantiated by the fact that property
owners generally cannot prevent overflight legally;104
The sixth argument is based on the rationale that aircraft may fly freely over
the country, its inhabitants, and their property, as long as they assume respon-
sibility in the form of a severe regime of liability when things go wrong.
7 The developments in the field of passenger liability under the Warsaw
system.
Finally, a perhaps more spurious seventh argument can be put forward if one
allows the recent developments in the field of contractual international private
air law to be taken into account. Under the so-called system of Warsaw, a
gradual move to an international regime based on contractual absolute liability
towards passengers can be observed. For the latest update of the regime of
Warsaw by means of the so-called Montreal Convention of 1999 provides that
carriers shall not be able to exclude or limit their liability for damage sustained
103 The specific risks brought about by factors such as war and hijacking can lead war risk
insurers to give seven days notice of review of the rate of premium, conditions and the
geographical limits of the policy, see R.D. Margo, Aviation Insurance, 329-330 (2000). This
has occurred after the recent terrorist attacks on the United States in the form of a drop
of obtainable coverage to 5% of the initial coverage for hull, passenger, and third party
liability risks.
104 See N. Matte, Treatise on Air – Aeronautical Law 504 (1981).
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in case of death or bodily injury of passengers for damages not exceeding
100,000 Special Drawing Rights.105
As an interim measure before the Montreal Convention of 1999 comes into
force for a substantial number of Member-States, the European Council has
made a similar protective move toward passengers by means of Council
Regulation No. 2027/97 of 9 October 1997, as amended by Regulation (EC)
No 889/2002 of 13 May 2002. Under the Regulation, the liability of Community
air carriers in respect of passengers and their baggage shall be governed by
all provisions of the Montreal Convention relevant to such liability.106
Arguably, these moves toward more protection of passengers by means
of absolute liability regimes up to 100.000 SDR which are growing into the
accepted standard in international civil aviation, should lead to at least similar
legal treatment of third parties that did not even volunteer to take the inherent
risks posed by international civil aviation. If a passenger and a surface victim
both suffer similar bodily injuries arising from the same aviation accident,
why should the passenger automatically receive up to 100.000 SDR for his
injuries, whereas the surface victim may have to prove fault or negligence as
a prerequisite to any compensation?
If our fictitious legislator is convinced by the line of reasoning of one or
more of these seven arguments, he can opt for a specific regime based on
absolute or strict liability in this field. In the following paragraphs, the legis-
lative steps needed for such a regime will be enumerated.
2.8 SCOPE OF ABSOLUTE OR STRICT LIABILITY
In this Chapter, the three main scenarios of conduct of aircraft capable of
inflicting surface damage have been given. Furthermore, the main justifications
for regimes based on absolute or strict liability in general and in this field have
previously been enumerated. The combination of scenarios and justifications
makes clear that the first scenario of damage inflicted by impact of the aircraft
or parts of the aircraft, including objects or persons falling from the aircraft,
should definitely fall under the scope of the regime. For in case of such genuine
105 In full: Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, signed
at Montreal on 28 May 1999, hereinafter cited as the Montreal Convention of 1999; see Article
17 (1) jo. Article 21 (1) Montreal Convention 1999.
106 See Article 3 Council Regulation (EC) No 889/2002; see also Council Decision of 5 April
2001 on the conclusion by the European Community of the Convention for the Unification
of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (the Montreal Convention). Earlier
contractual moves by air carriers in this direction initiated by Japanese Airlines and the
IATA by means of the IATA Intercarrier Agreement have paved the way to these latest
legislative developments; see, e.g., M. Milde, Warsaw requiem or unfinished symphony? (from
Warsaw to The Hague, Guatemala City, Montreal, Kuala Lumpur and to…?), TAQ 37, at 37-51
(1996).
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aviation accidents, the damage will be the most severe and fault or negligence
will be most difficult to prove, since the aircraft does not remain intact. Avi-
ation accidents involving damage to third parties should be the cornerstone
of a separate regime in the first place.
The next scenario of damage inflicted by flight in non-conformity with
air traffic regulations can also cause personal injuries or property damage,
albeit generally on a less grand scale. In comparison with the previous scenario,
it is at least apparent that the causal connection between the damage and the
conduct of the aircraft operator is more diffuse in cases of low flying aircraft
than in cases of genuine aviation accidents. Furthermore, proof of fault or
negligence will generally be less difficult to produce, as the aircraft remains
intact. This scenario therefore provides less justification for a regime based
on absolute or strict liability. In case of exclusion of this scenario from the
scope of absolute liability, third parties will evidently have to fall back on the
applicable general rules of fault liability or negligence or other available
headings of liability. However, some national regimes in this field, such as
the German one, have encompassed this scenario. Under the German regime,
for instance, this has been achieved by means of the yardstick of an accident
(‘Unfall’), which has been defined as a sudden and external event causing
personal injuries or property damage.107
Although borderline cases between damage caused by too low overflight
and damage caused by general overflight can be envisaged, the criteria of the
German private air law regime at least make clear that a requirement of
suddenness is one of the key elements for inclusion within the regime. And
that element is not met in cases of general overflight and the subsequent more
‘long run’ forms of potential nuisance and noise. In that context, it is evident
that damage caused by aircraft in normal overflight and in conformity with
air traffic regulations (and if prescribed, in conformity with specific noise
modifications of the aircraft itself as well) should be excluded from the scope
of a liability regime in this field. This can be substantiated by the fact that no
criteria that would justify a regime based on absolute or strict liability, such
as potential danger or seriousness of damage, play any significant role part
in this scenario. The conduct of aircraft engaged in normal overflight cannot
even be qualified as unlawful.
Article 1 of the Rome Convention of 1952 can serve as an example of how
the international legislator has dealt with the three aforementioned scenarios.
It reads:
Article 1.(1) Any person who suffers damage on the surface shall, upon proof only
that the damage was caused by an aircraft in flight or by any person or thing falling
therefrom, be entitled to compensation as provided by this Convention. Neverthe-
107 ‘ein plötzlich von auâen kommendes unvorhersehbares, einen Personen- oder Sachschaden verur-
sachendes Ereignis’, see § 33 et seq. Luft VG and sub-paragraph 4.4.2.2 of this study.
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less there shall be no right to compensation if the damage is not a direct conse-
quence of the incident giving rise thereto, or if the damage results from the mere
passage of the aircraft through the airspace in conformity with existing air traffic
regulations.
(2) For the purpose of this Convention, an aircraft is considered to be in flight from
the moment when power is applied for the purpose of actual takeoff until the
moment when the landing run ends. In the case of an aircraft lighter than air, the
expression ‘in flight’ relates to the period from the moment when it becomes
detached from the surface until it becomes again attached thereto.
Arguably, the first and second scenarios are covered by the regime, although
such an assessment depends on the exact interpretation of the scope of the
first two sentences of Article 1. The criteria of ‘any person who suffers damage
on the surface caused by an aircraft in flight as long as the damage is a direct
consequence of the incident giving rise thereto’, seem to point in the direction
of inclusion of both genuine accidents as well as incidents involving damage
caused by (sudden) too low overflight. However, the wording of these sen-
tences remains ambiguous.108
The third scenario, of damage caused by normal overflight, has literally
been excluded in the last part of Article 1(1). Notably, Article 1(2) governs
the point where the aircraft is on the runway just before for take-off up to the
point when the landing run ends. Apparently, the potential dangers to others
involved in the process of taxiing to and from runways were not considered
worthy of inclusion within the scope of absolute liability of the Convention.
Aside from these considerations on scope, the severity of the regime
evidently also depends on the basis of strict or absolute liability and the
defences allowed under the regime at hand to those entities addressed by it.
2.9 PERSONS OR ENTITIES ADDRESSED BY THE REGIME
A legislator faced with the task of creating a specific regime of liability for
surface damage inflicted by aircraft must first determine who can be held liable
under the regime and which types of aircraft are covered by the regime.
The first question involves the qualification of two entities, the operator
and the owner of the aircraft, which can be one and the same if the operator
happens to own the aircraft. As a starting point for defining the operator, the
general definition of the entity of an aircraft operator under international public
air law can be of use. In Annex 10/II of the Chicago Convention 1944, an
aircraft operating agency has been defined as ‘the person, organization or enter-
prise engaged in, or offering to engage in, an aircraft operation.’ As will be
described in more detail in Chapter 4, national air regimes in this field refer
108 See paragraph 3.3.2 of this study.
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varyingly to entities such as the operator or custodian of aircraft in their
specific regimes of liability in this field. Although slight variations prevail per
regime, the operator is generally perceived as the person or entity who actually
uses the aircraft, for instance as an airline involved in a scheduled international
air service.109
The owners of the aircraft, on the other hand, need not necessarily be the
same entities as the operators, for instance in cases of charter and lease agree-
ments. Under leasing agreements, the term ‘owner’ can refer to a number of
potential entities engaged in the financing of aircraft, such as lenders, investors,
and lessors of aircraft. Lessors on their part can be divided into financial and
operational lessors, although the latter category is strictly speaking not a
financier due to the nature of the lease.110
As financiers of aircraft are generally not involved in the operational
aspects of the flight of the aircraft, the chances of their implication in liability
suits are evidently more remote than those of the operators of aircraft. How-
ever, owners of aircraft may be implicated in certain cases, for instance for
supplying a defective aircraft or aircraft components or for improper mainten-
ance, if they are obliged to provide such a service under the conditions of the
lease. More alarmingly, they may even be implicated for the mere fact that
they are perceived as the so-called deepest pocket from which to seek compen-
sation.111
These distinctions between operators and owners of aircraft imply that
the legislature should clearly exclude the category of owners from his absolute
or strict liability regime if the owners are not the same entities as the operators
of aircraft. In this context, the example of Article 2 (3) of the Rome Convention
of 1952 can serve as a crafty piece of legislation, which reads:
The registered owner of the aircraft shall be presumed to be the operator and shall
be liable as such unless, in the proceedings for the determination of his liability,
he proves that some other person was the operator and, in so far as legal procedures
permit, takes appropriate measures to make that other person a party in the pro-
ceedings.
Dependant on the exact basis and regime of liability, the legislator will
subsequently have to determine whether and to what extent other parties can
be held liable under the regime, such as the servants or agents of the aircraft
109 Although difficulties can arise if the term ‘operator’ does not make clear if the person who
has control of the aircraft or the person who profits economically from the aircraft is
covered; in France, for instance, legal opinion is divided on this question whether the
custodian (of 1384 CC) or the person in control of the aircraft or the person who profits
economically is meant, see P. le Tourneau, L. Cadiet, Droit de la Responsabilité 810 (1996).
110 See R.D. Margo & A.T. Houghton, The Role of Insurance in Aviation Finance Transactions, in
G.F. Butler et al (Eds.), Handbook of Airline Finance, Aviation Week US, at 279 (1999).
111 Margo & Houghton at 284.
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operator or unlawful users. Next, the legislator has to define the term aircraft
and determine which types of aircraft should fall under the scope of the
absolute or strict liability regime. In order to do so, he could implement a
general definition of the term ‘aircraft’ in his national aviation law regime in
order clarify which objects in the skies do and which do not fall under the
regime. Such a definition can also help to demarcate the boundaries of third
party liability in air law on the one hand and space law on the other hand.
The latter field makes use of the term ‘space objects’ in that context.112 A
number of general definitions of the term aircraft derived from various sources
could serve as examples in that context:
Aircraft
1 A (or any) machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the re-
actions of the air other than the reactions of the air against the earth’s sur-
face113
2 An aeroplane, helicopter or airship114
3 A device that is used or intended to be used for flight in the air115
In conjunction with the general definition of aircraft, the legislator will have
to specify what types of aircraft fall under the scope of the regime. Dependant
on policy motives, he could opt for categories such as (inter)national civil,
general, military, and state aircraft.
From the perspective of both aviation in general and its potential victims,
the most fair option would be to include the broadest possible scope of types
of aircraft in order to create a level playing field for all parties concerned.
Especially in potential collision cases between differing types of aircraft, the
rationale of such an option becomes clear. For in such cases, a regime of joint
and several absolute or strict liability could be enacted, in which third parties
suffering harm could opt for claiming from either of the aircraft involved in
the accident or incident on a similar basis and regime of liability. In chapters
112 State liability for surface damage inflicted by so-called ‘space objects’ is covered by the
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, of March 29, 1972.
Although the term ‘space object’ has not been defined in the Convention, it becomes
apparent that the term includes component parts of space objects as well as its launch
vehicle and parts (Article I sub d Convention). See L.P. Wilkins, Substantive bases for recovery
for injuries sustained by private individuals as a result of fallen space objects, 6 Journal of Space
Law 161, at 162 (1978). See also R.E. Alexander, Measuring damages under the Convention on
International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects, 6 Journal of Space Law 151, at 151-
159 (1978); R. Bender, Space Transport Liability, National and International Aspects 129-157
(1995); I.H.Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor, Comparisons Between Air Law and Space Law Concerning
Liability for Damages Caused by Aircraft and Space Objects, ZLW 385, at 385-392 (1979).
113 See Annex 1,2,3,6/I/II/III,7,8,11,13,16/I of the Chicago Convention, PANS RAC (ICAO
Doc 4444/13 (RAC-Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Services), and JAR-1. The Dutch Aviation




3 and 4, the manner in which international and national regimes have dealt
with these issues will be described in more detail.
2.10 LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
Liability regimes based on fault or negligence give rise to unlimited liability
of the person or entity that was at fault or negligent. ‘Unlimited’ liability means
that victims are then entitled to full compensation of their damages.
A fictitious legislator could validly argue that one or more of the seven
arguments previously raised in favor of absolute or strict liability should suffice
to make regimes based on absolute or strict liability unlimited as well. For
the combination of absolute or strict and unlimited liability would then simply
serve the purpose of facilitating the process of obtaining full compensation
from the entities addressed by the regime. As a quid pro quo for the severe basis
of liability, rights of redress and subrogation from other potentially liable
parties could be attributed to those entities by the legislature. The presumed
and desired effect of such a regime of absolute or strict liability would be to
channel liability to the operator of the aircraft vis-à-vis third parties.116 De-
pendant on the circumstances of the case, the operator can subsequently seek
redress from other potentially liable parties, such as producers of the aircraft
or its components.
However, if a fictitious legislator is of the opinion that a combination of
absolute or strict and unlimited liability would be to much to bear for aircraft
operators, he could also opt for a legally limited system of liability based on
policy reasons of protectionism. The rationale would then be that limited
liability is perceived as a quid pro quo for absolute or strict liability. Article
6:110 BW of the Dutch Civil Code can serve as a general example of a provision,
which makes such a legal limitation of liability possible and reads:
Maximum liability amounts can be set by regulation, so that the liability which
may arise from damage does not exceed that which can be reasonably be covered
by insurance. Separate amounts can be fixed according to, amongst others, the
nature of the event and of the damage, and the ground for liability.117
Notably, a link has been made between legal limitation and insurability as
well as the ground for liability, which indicates that the Dutch legislature is
not permitted to enact levels of legal limitation at random.
In the field of international air law, the idea of legal limitation of liability
was first launched during the discussions on the Rome Convention of 1933.118
116 See on this notion also paragraph 3.10 of this study.
117 The translation has been derived from Haanappel & Mackaay at 275.
118 See paragraph 3.2 of this study.
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Drion has enumerated eight general justifications for limitation of liability in
international air law in his famous thesis on the subject.119 These are:
1 Analogy with maritime law with its global limitation of the shipowner’s
liability.
The first ground is mainly derived from the early stages of development of
air law, which were influenced by maritime law principles. However, the mere
fact that maritime law applies certain regimes based on limited liability is not
in itself considered to be a strong enough argument to automatically apply
limitation to aircraft.120
2 Necessary protection of a financially weak industry.
The second argument refers to the support of new industries, such as aviation
in its early stages, by means of lenient liability regimes for airlines, which used
to be mostly owned or subsidized by states in the past. Although perhaps
attractive from the perspective of such states, the argument is weakly founded
when perceived from an economic and policy point of view. For if industries
cannot carry their own losses or compensate the potential harm they might
inflict by their enterprises, their right to carry on becomes questionable in
whatever stage of development.121
3 Catastrophic risks should not be borne by aviation alone.
The third argument, holding that catastrophic risks should not be borne by
aviation alone, focuses on the potential extent of surface damage after extreme-
ly serious accidents. The notion is that if damages exceed all normal propor-
tions, such disasters can no longer be qualified as mere aviation risks that
should be borne by aviation alone, but on a larger, more national scale.
Although this argument reveals a certain protectionism of the aviation industry,
it has definitely regained validity in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 on the United States.
The Bush Administration has acknowledged the validity of this argument
by signing into law the so-called Air Transportation Safety and System Stabiliza-
tion Act. The Act aims to preserve the financial viability of the U.S. airline
industry on the one hand and to provide partial compensation for victims of
the terrorist attacks on the other hand. The Act provides that the liability of
the implicated airlines “shall not be in an amount greater than the limits of
the liability coverage maintained by the air carrier” for all claims resulting
from the terrorist related aircraft crashes of September 11. By means of Title
119 See H. Drion, Limitation of Liabilities in International Air Law 12 et seq. (1954).
120 Drion at 13-14.
121 Drion at 14-16.
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IV of the Act, the so-called September 11th Victim Compensation Fund has been
created, which has been described as a “fast-track administrative procedure
for recovery from the Government of economic and non-economic losses
incurred by victims and their families.”122
4 Necessity of the carriers or operators being able to insure against these
risks.
The argument of insurability establishes a link between the limitations of
insurance liability policies and the extent of legal limitation. By making such
a link, the problem is subsequently transformed into the question who should
bear potential losses in excess of insured and legal limitations of liability: the
implicated aircraft operators or the victims of an aircraft accident or incident?
Within the framework of ‘normal’ aviation accidents or incidents not brought
about by acts of terrorism, the most evident bearers of such risks seem to be
the parties engaged in the activity of flying as opposed to third parties.
5 Possibility for potential claimants to take insurance themselves.
As opposed to many other forms of potential liability that can arise in society,
such as traffic situations in which members of society can both be tortfeasors
as well as victims, the risks imposed by aviation to third parties are almost
uniquely one-sided. Practically no better example than the problem of surface
damage inflicted by aircraft can serve to refute the argument that all potential
victims as opposed to the operators of aircraft, should take out insurance
coverage against the risks imposed by aviation.
6 Limitation of liability as a counterpart to the aggravated system of liability
imposed upon the carrier and operator (the quid pro quo argument).
The previously discussed ‘quid pro quo’ argument has proven to be a heavy
price for unification of international private air law in this field, as the system
of legal limitation of the Rome Convention of 1952 has been based on relatively
low levels of limitation which are difficult to escape from legally. The inherent
fallacy of this argument, especially on an international level, will be explored
in greater detail in Chapter 3 of this study.
122 See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub L. No. 107-42 § 401 et seq. (2001),
49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2001). See also Zuckert Scoutt & Rasenberger, Aviation Advisor, Special
Edition #1 of September 24, 2001, at 1-3; see also paragraph 5.10 of this study.
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7 Avoidance of litigation by quick settlements.
The notion of avoidance of litigation by limitation of liability is based on the
presumption that claimants would rather prefer a swift settlement of part of
their damages to the burdens and risks of the far more long-run route of
litigation for total compensation. The argument may hold a certain degree
of truth, but only if the limited amount offered as a settlement comes close
enough to the total amount of potential compensation obtainable through
litigation to be of interest.
8 Unification of the law with respect to the amount of damages paid.
The last justification, unification of the law in respect of damages paid, will
be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 3 of this study in conjunction with
the previously mentioned ‘quid pro quo’ argument. At this point, common sense
suffices to reveal the impossibility of such an endeavor in view of the extreme
differences in living standards and potential damage awards worldwide.
In general, legal limitation of liability proves to a concept full of pitfalls. If
a fictitious legislator should opt for such a system in this field anyhow, he
could do so by linking levels of limitation of liability to certain weight cat-
egories of aircraft. As a general rule, the legislator is also advised to leave
actions based on fault liability or negligence open to claimants in order to claim
for damages that exceed the limitations thus enacted, as a matter of fair play.
Only in exceptional cases of catastrophic risks posed by war and terrorism,
which should not be borne by aviation alone and may prove to be difficult
to insure, should legal limitation of liability thus play a role in this field.
Articles 153 and 154 of an elder version of the Aviation Law of Argentina
(1954) can serve as an example of a regime based on limited liability in this
field:123
Article 153.
The operator of an aircraft shall be liable with respect to each accident up to a total
amount computed at the rate of one hundred and fifty thousand pesos in national
currency (then $150.000) for each kilogram of the weight of the aircraft. The weight
of the aircraft shall include the total maximum load capacity as stated in the
certificate of airworthiness.
However, the liability of the operator may not be less than one hundred and
fifty thousand pesos in national currency (then $150.000) nor more than one million
two hundred thousand pesos in national currency (then $1.200.000). One third of
123 Aviation Code of Argentina, Promulgated August 4, 1954; Law No. 14,307, passed July
1954 (published in Boletin Oficial, Aug. 18, 1954), in Air Laws and Treaties of the World,
An Annotated Compilation Prepared for the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S.
House of Representatives, Eighty-Seventh Congress, First Session, May 11, 1961, 22-23 (1961).
Chapter 2 51
such amount shall be used for payment of the damage caused to property, and
the remaining two thirds for the payment for injuries to persons, but in the latter
case the compensation may not exceed one hundred thousand pesos in national
currency ($100,000) for each person injured.
Article 154.
If several persons have sustained damage in the same accident and the total amount
due to be paid exceeds the limits provided in the preceding article, there shall be
a proportionate reduction of the amount due to each person in order that the
aforesaid total limits may not be exceeded.
The regime immediately reveals that inflation-correction is necessary from
time to time. Furthermore, the inherent problem how to divide the total limit
between the categories of personal injury and property damage is revealed.
Whatever ratio is opted for cannot conceal a certain randomness.
2.11 INSURANCE
Third party liability insurance in the field of aviation raises a number of
questions. Firstly, how can third party liability insurance be defined and what
is its scope of coverage? These issues will be dealt with in subparagraphs 2.11.1
and 2.11.2. Secondly, the question arises on which grounds third party liability
insurance should be made compulsory by the legislature. This issue will be
dealt with in subparagraph 2.11.3. On the basis of these issues, a number of
final observations on insurance will be made in 2.11.4.
2.11.1 Third party liability insurance in the field of aviation
Although policies may vary, aviation insurers will generally indemnify the
insured parties (in this case, the operators of aircraft)124 for ‘all sums which
the insured shall become legally liable to pay as damages in respect of bodily
injury, whether fatal or otherwise, and damage to property caused by the
insured aircraft or by any person or object falling therefrom.’125 Aside from
direct bodily injury, coverage can also include ‘sickness, disease, mental
124 Evidently other parties, such as airports, can also obtain third party liability insurance
coverage, see D.S. Hansell, Introduction to Insurance 90 (1996).
125 See Lloyd’s Aircraft Policy AVN. IA 14.11.73, Section II (Legal Liability to Third Parties);
see also R.D. Margo at 251. Margo refers to AVN (Aviation policy or policy clause) 1C and
20. AVN 1C limits the cover to compensatory damages and requires that the bodily injury
and property damage be ‘accidental’(s II, §1). AVN 20 only refers to ‘damages’ and requires
bodily injury and property damage to be ‘caused by an occurrence’. An occurrence is
defined as to include an accident (s I, Coverages A and B).
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anguish due to an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use
of any aircraft specifically described in the policy.’126
The amount of coverage that can be obtained in aviation insurance liability
policies is limited to certain maximum levels. Dependent on factors such as
the type of operation and contractual preference of the insured party, the latter
can either opt for specific coverage per category of potential liability or for
a single limit that covers all potential claims arising from ‘any one accident’
or ‘any one occurrence’.127 In the first case, separate liability coverage can
be obtained for the categories ‘(a) bodily injuries excluding passengers’, ‘(b)
passenger bodily injury’, and ‘(c) property damage.’ In the second case, the
coverage for these three categories is combined in a single limit policy, which
has the advantage of simplification and reduction of administrative costs. An
alternative single limit may also be available for categories (a) and (c), if the
operation does not involve the transportation of passengers.128 The maximum
coverage per category or as a single limit will vary according to the demands
of the aircraft operator at hand.129
Upon indemnifaction of the insured by the insurers, the insurers obtain
the rights of recovery that the insured may have against third parties on the
basis of the doctrine of subrogation. The insured is subsequently required to
take all necessary steps to enforce such rights. The doctrine merely aims to
prevent that the insured recover more than full indemnity. The same system
applies in the relationship between insurers and reinsurers.130
2.11.2 Exclusions
In view of the combination of potential scenarios of surface damage, liability
regimes, and questions of insurability, it should be stressed that policies usually
126 A.T. Wells, Introduction to Aviation Insurance 68 (1986).
127 The term ‘(any one) occurrence’ is generally defined in the policy as ‘an accident, happening
or event or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions occurring during the policy
period which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended
from the standpoint of the insured’. The term ‘(any one) accident’ is related to passengers
and requires the criteria of ‘unlooked-for mishap or…untoward event’, which causes bodily
injury or death of the passenger, see Margo at 245-246.
128 Wells at 68. The single limit policy may also include insurance of the hull, and provide
a combined hull and liability insurance policy, see R.L. Carter, Reinsurance 450 (1979).
129 Wells gives examples of limits per category (based on figures of 1986): (a) bodily injury
excluding passengers: $100.000 per person/$300.000 each occurrence; (c) property damage:
$100.000 each occurrence; or a single limit including passengers varying from $1.000.000
to $200.000.000 for major carriers, see Wells at 68-69. Nowadays, a great number of major
airlines carry insurance on a single limit basis for amounts from $1 to 2 Billion (Information
based on an interview with Mr. F. Husman of KLM airlines); see also N.K. Baden, The
Japanese Initiative on the Warsaw Convention, 61 JALC 437, at 464 (1995-1996); Margo at 407.
130 Margo at 421 et seq.; Wells at 71. Reinsurance will not be dealt with in this study; see on
this topic, Margo at 491 et seq.; Carter at 448 et seq.
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do not cover claims ‘directly or indirectly occasioned by noise (whether audible
to the human ear or not), vibration, sonic boom and associated pheno-
mena.’131 However, specific coverage for noise or associated phenomena is
available under separate policies in the London market.132
Margo gives the example of a case of noise-related damage and the inherent
problems of proof involved in such a case. The case involves an aircraft flying
at a low level, which could cause a horse to take fright and run into a fence,
due to a combination of the noise and sight of the aircraft. If there are two
proximate causes (sight and sound), the claim will be excluded under the
policy. However, if the injury is caused by the concurrent operation of both
sight and sound, the loss may be attributed to a risk, which is insured.133
Other general exclusions include claims ‘directly or indirectly caused by
pollution and contamination, electrical and electromagnetic interference, and
interference with the use of property, unless caused by or resulting in a crash,
fire, explosion, collision or recorded in-flight emergency causing abnormal
aircraft operation.’134 Pollution or contamination by aircraft of airports and
their vicinity is also generally excluded, unless such environmental damage
occurs as a consequence of an immediate or sudden accidental event.135
Liability for crop spraying is an altogether different field of coverage, which
is only insured by a small number of insurers. Even then, a great number of
risks relating to crop spraying have been excluded, such as injury to or destruc-
tion of crops, pastures, trees or tangible property, etc.136
In view of the problems posed by terrorism, a number of general exclusions
under Lloyd’s policy are of interest. These hold that the underwriters are not
liable ‘whilst the Aircraft is being used for any illegal purpose or for any
purpose other than those stated in the Schedule and as defined in the Defini-
tions,’ or ‘whilst the Aircraft is being piloted by any person other than as stated
131 Margo at 252. ‘Sonic boom’ has been defined as ‘the acoustic event which is a manifestation
of the shock wave system generated by an aircraft when it flies at a speed greater than
the local sound velocity’ in ICAO Do 9064, SBC/2 (1973). Claims based on sonic boom will
generally be excluded under AVN 46B, the so-called Noise and Pollution and Other Perils
Exclusion Clause, App 624.
132 Margo at 255. The coverage can be obtained through AVN 47, Noise Coverage Policy, App
625. The policy covers compensation in respect of accidental bodily injury (whether fatal
or not) or accidental physical damage to or destruction of property (including animals)
caused by the noise of an identified aircraft as specified in the policy. Notably, claims based
on nuisance and/or compensation for the taking, use of or acquisition of rights to property
or airspace and/or any other direct or indirect consequences of aircraft noise are not
covered.
133 Margo at 252, in reference to Lloyd instruments Ltd v Northern Star Ins Co Ltd [1987] 1 Lloyd’s
Rep 32.
134 Margo at 253, in reference to AVN 1C, s II, §2(e) jo AVN 46B.
135 Margo at 256-257; see also Justice Derrington & R.S. Ashton, The Law of Liability Insurance
603 et seq. (1990).
136 Margo at 254-255.
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in the Schedule except that the Aircraft may be operated on the ground by
any person competent for that purpose.’
A whole series of exclusions is provided for claims caused by occurrences
such as
war, invasion, acts of foreign enemies, hostilities (whether war be declared or not),
civil war, rebellion, revolution, insurrection, martial law, military or ursurped power
or attempts at usurpation of power, any hostile detonation of any weapon of war
employing atomic or nuclear fission and/or fusion or other like reaction or radio-
active force or matter, strikes, riots, civil commotions or labour disturbances, any
act of one or more persons, whether or not agents of a sovereign Power, for political
or terrorist purposes and whether the loss or damage resulting therefrom is acci-
dental or intentional, any malicious act of sabotage, confiscation, nationalisation,
seizure, restraint, detention, appropriation, requisition for title or use by or under
the order of any Government (whether civil military or de facto) or public or local
authority’, and last but not least, ‘hijacking or any unlawful seizure or wrongful
exercise of control of the Aircraft or crew in flight (including any attempt at such
seizure or control) made by any person or persons on board the aircraft acting
without consent of the Insured.137
Margo points out that such exclusions were introduced by the London Market
by means of the so-called war and hijacking risk exclusion clause AVN 48 B,
after the Israeli raid on Beirut airport on 28 December 1968. However, aircraft
operators are able to obtain coverage in respect of hull and liabilities against
higher premiums for certain of these risks on the basis of so-called Extended
Coverage Endorsements. Apart from the category ‘any hostile detonation of any
weapon of war employing atomic or nuclear fission and/or fusion or other
like reaction or radioactive force or matter’, such risks will then be written
back in the liability all risks policy. Such coverage can be obtained from the
more specialized war insurance market through so-called aviation hull war
and allied perils policies.138 After the attacks on the United States of Septem-
ber 11, 2001, war risk insurers invoked their right to give seven days’ notice
of review of the rate of premium and/or the geographical limits of the policy.
This action included a right to cancel the policy after this period if agreement
could not be reached between the insurers and insured parties. In this specific
case, the war risk insurers severely limited the maximum fleet aggregate limits
for which the insured parties could be indemnified to 5% of the initial total
limit. If it were not for the (temporary) guarantees on extended coverage made
by the Member States under auspices of the European Community and the
137 See Lloyd’s Aircraft Policy AVN. IA 14.11.73 Section IV (A) (General Exclusions Applicable
to All Sections); see also E.R. Hardy Ivamy, Personal Accident, Life and Other Insurances
209 (1980).
138 See Margo at 325-330.
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United States, that move of the war risk insurers would have effectively
stopped the operation of most, if not all, international air transport.
2.11.3 Compulsory insurance
In view of the risks posed by aviation to passengers and third parties, the
legislature can oblige aircraft operators to insure themselves against such
liability risks as an extra financial safeguard for compensation of these potential
victims. The idea of compulsory insurance has been inextricably linked to the
problem of liability for surface damage from the early days of aviation to the
present day. Specific insurance provisions can thus be found in applicable
international law, European Community law, as well as in many systems of
national law in this field, as will be seen in more detail in the next chapters.
As a general rule, the State of Registry requires aircraft operators authorized
by that State to carry ‘adequate insurance’ on the basis of its national insurance
requirements. Such requirements might also be supplemented by each State
of operation.139 Although not always formally compulsory, insurance cover-
age for third party liability will thus generally be at least implicitly required
by most States, such as the United Kingdom.140 Other examples of States
with compulsory insurance requirements include Denmark, Norway, Germany,
Canada, and the United States.141
Furthermore, such a requirement has been enacted on a supranational
European Community level by means of the EC Council Regulation 2407/92
on Air Carrier Licensing of 1992. The Regulation obliges air carriers under
European jurisdiction to insure themselves against liability for passengers,
139 Notably, the regulations of most States need to be updated on the levels of required
“adequate insurance”, as these are often no longer in conformity with the levels of coverage
actually obtained by aircraft operators in the world today; see, e.g., paragraph 5.9 of this
study on the third party liability insurance requirements posed by the United States in
that context, which amount to a mere $ 20.000.000 per involved aircraft for U.S. and foreign
direct air carriers. In reality, US and foreign air carriers are generally insured for all legal
liability on the basis of the substantially higher single limit of $ 1.5 Billion; this information
was provided by G.N. Tompkins, Jr.
140 Under UK law, for instance compulsory insurance against surface damage is currently not
required formally, since the provisions on compulsory insurance as contained in Part IV
of the Civil Aviation Act 1949 never came into force and have been repealed by section
128 of the Companies Act 1967 and by section 26 of the Civil Aviation Act 1968. However,
applicants for air service licenses, will not be granted by the Civil Aviation Authority if
that governmental agency is not satisfied that the financial arrangements made by the
applicant are adequate for discharging any obligations he may have to meet while operating
under the license (under section 65(2)(b) of the Civil Aviation Act 1982). This practically
comes down to compulsory insurance under the Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act 1960, see
N. Legh-Jones (General Ed.), MacGillivray on Insurance Law 852 (1997); see also J. Birds,
Modern Insurance Law 395 (1997) and paragraph 4.5.3 of this chapter.
141 See Margo at 23-27.
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luggage, cargo, and third parties.142 In view of the binding nature of Council
Regulations, this makes third party liability insurance compulsory for under-
takings established in the European Union.143
2.11.4 Final observations on insurance
In the previous sub-paragraphs, a general outline has been given on the topic
of third party liability insurance coverage in the field of aviation. When general
policies are set-off to the previously discussed potential scenarios of surface
damage, it becomes apparent that potential liability arising from those scenarios
need not necessarily be covered by insurance. Important scenarios of surface
damage which are not necessarily covered by insurance include those gen-
erated by noise, vibration, sonic boom, and associated phenomena, scenarios
of general environmental damage not arising from aircraft accidents, and a
number of scenarios relating to war, invasion, acts of terrorism, etc. In some
of these cases, specific coverage can be obtained through specific extra policies.
Aside from scope of coverage, insurance policies are always limited to certain
levels of coverage, dependent on factors such as weight of the aircraft and
type of operation.
Evidently, insurance coverage provides an important extra safeguard for
compensation of damage to third parties. Thus, our fictitious legislator is well
advised to enact regimes based on compulsory insurance coverage for third
party liability in this field. The scope of such regimes should at least cover
international and domestic civil and general aviation; military or state aircraft
need not necessarily be included, since they are generally covered by the State
directly. He is also advised to enact minimal levels of required coverage, for
example on the basis of the maximum take-off weight of the type of aircraft
at hand. In relation to the aforementioned European Community insurance
requirements of EC Council Regulation 2407/92, it is of interest that a new
proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
insurance requirements for air carriers and aircraft operators is currently in
an advanced drafting stage. The proposal aims to fill in the current open-ended
insurance requirements of EC Council Regulation 2407/92 and broaden the
scope of aircraft operators covered by current European Community law.144
142 Article 7 EC Council Regulation 2407/92, OJ 1992 L240/1, as adopted on 24 Aug 1992.
143 Article 4(1)a of EC Council Regulation 2407/92. The Regulation only applies to carriers
whose principal place of business is located in a member state and not to carriers with
branches in member states (which would in effect encompass most of the international
carriers worldwide), see J. Balfour, European Community Air Law 35 (1995).
144 See in more detail paragraph 4.7 of this study.
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2.12 FINAL REMARKS AND CONCLUSIONS
In this Chapter, the problem of liability for surface damage inflicted by aircraft
has been evaluated on a theoretical and legislative perspective. On the basis
of the five general questions posed in the introductory Chapter of this study
and the beginning of this Chapter, the various issues at stake in this field have
been dealt with.
First, the range of conduct of aircraft that can inflict surface damage has
been taken into account by dividing that range of conduct into three main
scenarios. These scenarios varied from actual aircraft accidents to potential
damage caused by normal overflight.
Second, the option of subjecting liability for surface damage to the general
headings of fault liability under civil law or negligence under common law
has been discussed. The main criteria for fault liability and negligence have
been evaluated, as well as the general defences available under these bases
of liability. The previously mentioned scenarios of conduct have subsequently
been linked to fault liability and negligence in order to assess the arguments
in favor and against application of these general headings of liability to the
problem of surface damage inflicted by aircraft. A link between the rights of
overflight and the rights of property owners has been made in that context.
One of the main problems turned out to be that fault liability or negligence
could be difficult to prove under the more serious scenarios of surface damage,
even with the aid of doctrines such as res ipsa loquitur. As an alternative, the
fictive legislator could opt for regimes based on absolute or strict liability in
order to circumvent the problems that victims may face when having to prove
fault or negligence. The justifications for such bases of liability in the field of
air law have been subsequently enumerated and analysed. As a preliminary
conclusion, these stricter bases of liability generally seemed more justifiable
in this field than application of general fault liability or negligence. Further-
more, the preferred scope of such stricter bases of liability has been evaluated
by linking the bases of absolute or strict liability to the earlier described
scenarios of conduct of the aircraft. This assessment revealed that at least the
first scenario of accidents, not necessarily the second scenario of too low
overflight, but definitely not the third scenario of normal overflight should
fall under the scope of an absolute or strict liability regime.
This line of reasoning brought the third main question into range, namely
which person(s) should be subjected to such an absolute or strict liability
regime and which types of aircraft should be covered by such a regime. As
a general rule, the operator as opposed to the owner of the aircraft should
be subjected to the regime, which, from a perspective of a level playing field
for both aircraft operators and third parties, should encompass the broadest
possible scope of types of aircraft.
The fourth question focused on the arguments in favor of and against
limitation of liability of the regime. The main arguments for such legal limita-
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tions generally turned out to be invalid or outdated. However, the terrorist
attacks on the United States of ‘9/11’ have shed a new light on the argument
that catastrophic risks should not be borne by aviation alone. In such extreme
cases, possible solutions can lie in the exclusion of such scenarios from the
scope of the regime of absolute or strict liability altogether, in limited liability
within the regime up to levels of obtainable insurance coverage, and/or in
solutions outside of any liability regime, e.g. by means of specific governmental
compensation funds.
Finally, the fifth question on the feasibility of compulsory insurance cover-
age for third party liability necessitated a brief examination of the coverage
obtainable under liability policies. In view of the fact that compulsory insur-
ance can provide an extra safeguard for compensation of potential victims,
the legislature of the State of Registry would be well to enact compulsory
insurance regulation in this field, as is mostly the case in practice. It should
be borne in mind that the fact that insurance coverage is limited should not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that the underlying liability regime should
be legally limited as well. That specific lack of correlation will be dealt with
in greater detail in the next Chapter of this study.
A final problem that has not been addressed in this Chapter concerns the
question whether a separate third party liability regime in this field should
be solely based on national law or if such a regime should (also) be unified
on an international or supranational European Community level in view of
the cross boundary nature of aviation in order to create a more level playing
field for those aircraft operators addressed by the regime. That issue will be
explored in Chapters 3 and 4 of this study on the basis of the actual regimes
in force in international air law and in a number of national air laws in this
field.
3 Liability for surface damage inflicted by
international civil aviation under international
air law
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Any legislature faced with the problem of having to codify a liability regime
for surface damage inflicted by aircraft or not will have to take various con-
siderations into account. In the previous chapter, such considerations have
been evaluated on a theoretical level. The fictitious legislator turned out to
basically have two main options. He could either leave the problem to the
general rules of fault liability or negligence or other general applicable
headings of liability or opt for a specifically codified regime based on absolute
or strict liability. In the latter case, he will have to determine which persons
or entities should be subjected to the regime and which types of aircraft fall
under the scope of the regime. Furthermore, he will have to determine the
scope of the absolute or strict liability regime in terms of scenarios of potential
conduct of the aircraft covered by it. And finally, he will have to determine
if the regime should be based on limited or unlimited liability and if the
persons or entities subjected to the regime should be obliged to take out third
party liability insurance coverage. These main points of consideration are more
or less identical for any legislature on a national level. However, the problem
of liability for surface damage inflicted by aviation can also be partly looked
upon from an international angle, as international civil aviation falls under
jurisdiction of the international legislature. The rationale for such an approach
to the problem is that international civil aviation is by its very nature a cross
boundary activity, which could justify a certain level of international uniformity
in this field. This Chapter will focus on the question how the international
legislature has dealt with the problem by means of various international air
law instruments and why these instruments have ultimately failed to attract
a substantial number of ratifications.1
In comparison with the aforementioned similar considerations that have
to be taken into account by national legislatures, the international legislator
also has to deal with the extra problem of jurisdiction and the more practical
problem of having to find common ground between the delegates from States
1 ICAO, the international legislature in the field of international civil aviation, is a specialized
agency of the United Nations. ICAO came into being on 4 April 1947, after the 26th ratifica-
tion of the Chicago Convention of 1944 was received (on 5 March 1947), see www.icao.org/
icao/en/takeoff.htm.
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participating in the drafting process on all issues that are dealt with. The past
and present international air law instruments in this field consist of:
1 the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to
Damage caused by Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, Rome, 29th May, 1933,
hereinafter cited as the Rome Convention of 1933;
2 the Brussels Protocol of 1938, hereinafter cited as the Brussels Protocol of
1938;
3 the Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the
Surface, Signed at Rome, 7 October 1952, hereinafter cited as the Rome Con-
vention of 1952;
4 the Protocol to Amend the Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft
to Third Parties on the Surface, as adopted and signed at Montreal on 23 Septem-
ber 1978, hereinafter cited as the Montreal Protocol of 1978.2
Of these instruments, only the Rome Convention of 1952 and the Montreal
Protocol of 1978 are in force.3 However, since the Rome Convention of 1952
is an amended version of the Rome Convention of 1933 and since certain
differences between the two can be of interest for future legislative attempts
to revise the current instruments in force, both Conventions will be taken into
account whenever deemed of comparative value.
The topics that will be dealt with in this chapter have been divided in the
following manner. First, a brief historical review of the system of Rome will
be given in order to clarify the current status quo (3.2). Next, the basis and
scope of liability of the Rome Conventions will be discussed in relation to the
potential scenarios of surface damage (3.3). The persons or entities and types
of aircraft subjected to the regime of the Rome Conventions and the defences
they can invoke will subsequently be enumerated (3.4). The systems of limita-
tion of liability of the Rome Conventions will then be dealt with (3.5), followed
by the provisions on insurance (3.6). The provisions on jurisdiction of the Rome
Conventions will then be compared and evaluated (3.7). Finally, the regimes
of the Rome Conventions as a whole will be briefly recapitulated (3.8).
Next, the final official attempt to amend the Rome Convention of 1952 by
means of the Montreal Protocol will be discussed (3.9). The proposals to do
so as drafted under auspices of the International Law Association will
subsequently be dealt with (3.10). The chapter will end with a summary of
the current status quo and proposed amendments. The latest attempt to revise
the Rome Convention of 1952 by means of a new Draft Convention that was
2 In this Chapter, a reference will often be made to the ‘system of Rome’ for practical pur-
poses. However, it should be borne in mind that only the Rome Convention of 1952 has
gained a reasonable number of ratifications.
3 The Rome Convention of 1952 entered into force on 4 February 1958 and was ratified or
adhered to by 45 Parties as of July, 2003. The Montreal Protocol of 1978 entered into force
on 25 July 2002 and was ratified or acceded to by 8 parties as of July, 2003, see the status
of both instruments at www.icao.org.
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prepared by the ICAO Secretariat in 2003 will also be discussed in that context.
Some final observations on the feasibility of an international regime in this
field in the first place can serve as an introduction to the alternative of (supra)
national solutions, which will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 (3.11).
3.2 A BRIEF HISTORICAL REVIEW
The story of the system of Rome begins with national aviation laws. After the
First World War, the existing divergence of national aviation laws prompted
a number of international organizations to lobby for unification of various
fields of private air law. This led to the French initiative of the First Inter-
national Conference on Private Air Law, which was held in Paris in 1925.
During this Conference, a motion was accepted to form an International
Technical Committee of Aerial Legal Experts, known officially as the Comité
International Technique d’Experts Juridiques Aériens (or C.I.T.E.J.A). This Commit-
tee, which was to study the various fields of private air law, divided those
fields amongst four Commissions. The so-called Third Commission was
assigned to the problem of liability for surface damage.4 From 1927 to 1933,
the Third Commission aimed to reconcile the different existing national avi-
ation law regimes in that field in order to find consensus on a new inter-
national instrument, which was to be known as the Rome Convention of 1933.5
In approximately the same period of time, a parallel move toward more
uniformity in air law was made in the ‘New World’ of the Americas, where
a number of States had formed an organization known as the Pan American
Union. During its Fifth Pan American Conference in Santiago de Chile in 1923,
the so-called Inter-American Commercial Aviation Commission was appointed,
which prepared a draft instrument on a number of aviation rules in
Washington in 1927. After certain modifications, the draft instrument, known
as the Pan American Convention, was adopted during the Sixth Pan American
Conference in Havana in 1928. Contrary to the move toward unification that
was set in motion in Europe, the problem of liability for surface damage was
left to the discretion of national laws in Article XXVIII of the Pan American
Convention.6
4 This problem was divided into three main areas of study for the Third Commission: (1)
damage and liability to third parties in taking-off, landing and jettison; (2) limits of liability;
and (3) insurance, see K.W. Colegrove, International Control of Aviation 99 (1930).
5 See J.J. Ide, The history and accomplishments of the International Technical Committee of Aerial
Legal Experts (CITEJA), 3 JALC 27, at 35 (1932).
6 K.W. Colgrove at 88-92. The Pan American Convention is also known as the Habana
Convention on Commercial Aviation of Feb. 20, 1928. The Convention came into force on
Aug. 26, 1931 for the United States (Treaty Series, No. 840), see H.S. Leroy, Observations
on Comparative Air Law, 8 ALR 273, at 274 (1937).
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Back in Europe, the Third Commission was in the process of drafting the
Rome Convention of 1933. In that context, the excellent comparative overview
that was compiled by Kaftal of a number of national aviation laws of the time
is of interest in order to comprehend what the Third Commission was up
against.7 Kaftal took the national aviation laws of Austria, Bulgaria, Chile,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, Mexico,
Norway, Poland, Salvador, Siam, Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, (17
states of the) USA, the USSR, and Yugoslavia into account.8 Upon comparison
of these 21 aviation laws, it becomes apparent that the majority were based
on regimes of absolute liability of the aircraft owners, (unlawful) possessors,
or operators of aircraft. These entities were generally only permitted to invoke
the defence of contributory negligence in order to escape liability. Only the
Austrian, British, Mexican, Polish, and Czeco-Slovakian aviation laws were
based on a presumption of fault.9 Furthermore, these aviation laws were
practically all based on unlimited liability with the exception of the German
aviation law.10 It is also of interest to note that the majority of these aviation
laws did not prescribe guarantees in the form of insurance or security deposits.
And those regimes that did prescribe such guarantees did not automatically
link such requirements to a legally limited regime of liability.11 Ergo, a great
number of States had adequately covered the problem of liability for surface
damage inflicted by aircraft in their national aviation laws in the drafting
period of the Rome Convention of 1933. In most cases, such regimes were
based on victim-oriented regimes of absolute and unlimited liability, and in
some cases backed up by compulsory insurance requirements. The standard
of a (presumption of) fault had only been adopted in a minority of these
regimes.
7 A. Kaftal, The problem of liability for damages caused by aircraft on the surface, 5 The Journal
of Air Law 179, at 179-232 (1934).
8 Austria: Law of Dec. 10, 1919; Ordinance of the Minister, Sept. 23, 1925; Bulgaria: Law of
July 23, 1925; Chile: Decree of May 15, 1931; Denmark: Law of May 1, 1923; Finland: Law
of May 25, 1923; France: Law of May 31, 1924; Germany: Law of Aug. 1, 1922; Ordinance
of July 19, 1930; Great Britain: Air Navigation Act 1920; Hungary: Ordinance of Dec. 30,
1922; Italy: Decree-Law of Aug. 20, 1923; Mexico: Law on General Means of Communications
and Transit, Aug. 31, 1931; Norway: Law of Dec. 7, 1923; Poland: Decree of March 14, 1928;
Salvador: Decree of May 17, 1923; Siam: Law B. E. 2465 (1922); Sweden: Law of May 26,
1922; Switzerland: Decree of Jan. 27, 1920; Czecho-Slovakia: Law of July 8, 1925; U.S.A.
(17 States): Uniform State Law of Aeronautics, 1923-1929; U.S.S.R.: Air Code of April 27,
1932; Jugoslavia: Law of Feb. 22, 1928, see Kaftal at 230.
9 The Italian Law has been remarkably divided into three bases of liability: absolute liability
for objects thrown from the plane, a presumption of fault for objects falling from the plane,
and droit commun for take-off, landing and fall of the plane, see Kaftal at 230.
10 Kaftal at 198 and 231.
11 Only the laws of Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Norway, Switzerland, and Czecho-
slovakia oblige the person potentially liable under the law to carry certain guarantees, see
Kaftal at 231.
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In retrospect, the Third Commission would have been wise to follow the
guidelines of absolute and unlimited liability thus provided for by a majority
of the national aviation laws of the time. For then the Third Commission would
not have opted for a regime based on limitation of liability, which was to haunt
the drafters of all future instruments within the system of Rome forever after.
The idea of limitation of liability was backed up by resolutions of the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the International Air Traffic Associ-
ation (IATA), but was initially outvoted in favor of unlimited liability by 12
to 7 votes during the Fourth Session of CITEJA in 1928. However, it was finally
settled upon during the next session after compromises made by those del-
egates in favor of unlimited liability.12 Thus, the concept of limitation of
liability stood at the basis of the draft version of the Rome Convention of 1933,
which was approved in Budapest in 1930.13
Protectionism of aircraft operators in the form of a legal limitation of their
liability for surface damage had thus won the day, which was to be backed
up by compulsory insurance or other guarantees, as urged upon by the Swiss
Delegation of the time. A recommendation on the possibility of direct actions
of the victims of surface damage against insurers was also accepted. This lead
to a final draft of the Rome Convention of 1933 based on absolute, limited,
and compulsory insured liability of the operators of aircraft. However, the
possibility of direct actions of third parties against insurers turned out to be
an obstacle for a number of delegates. For such an option could lead to situ-
ations in which third parties would be able to invoke more rights against the
insurers than the insured operators of aircraft themselves. These objections
led to the codification of the Brussels Protocol of 1938, in which a number of
extra defences for insurers were enacted. Although the Brussels Protocol of
1938 can formally be qualified as an integral part of the system of Rome, it
is generally regarded as a dead letter in aviation insurance practice and in
legal dogma, since it was only ratified by two States.14
In view of the lack of number of ratifications of the Rome Convention of
1933 and the Brussels Protocol of 1938, a new Sub-Committee of the Legal
Committee of the newly formed International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) was appointed in 1947 to revise these pre-war instruments.15 This
involved a rather detailed process of preliminary groundwork by the Sub-
Committee, which included the sending of a questionnaire to all member
States. The questionnaire consisted of questions on issues such as the preferable
basis and regime of liability, limitation of liability, collisions of aircraft, and
12 Ide at 35.
13 Ide at 39.
14 See E.G. Brown, The Rome Conventions of 1933 and 1952: Do they point a moral?, JALC 418,
at 423-424 (1960/61).
15 During the Second World War, the annual meetings of the C.I.T.E.J.A. did not take place.
After the Second World War, the C.I.T.E.J.A. was abolished and succeeded by the ICAO
on the basis of the Chicago Convention of 1944, see Brown at 424-425.
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insurance.16 The responses to the questionnaire were so alarmingly diverse
that no preliminary draft could be made on the basis of these responses. After
a re-examination of the main issues at stake, another questionnaire on the sole
issue of limitation of liability was sent to all member States by the Sub-Com-
mittee. Despite the almost predictable divergency of responses to the second
questionnaire, the so-called Taormina Draft was made, which was the main
foundation of the new Rome Convention of 1952.17 Despite the detailed over-
haul of its predecessor of 1933, the Rome Convention of 1952 was still based
on similar pillars of absolute and limited liability, although the limits were
substantially raised. A greater number of ratifications could not obscure the
fact that none of the major aviation countries such as the United States, France,
or the United Kingdom felt inclined to adhere to the Rome Convention of
1952.18 The core objections that were raised against issues such as limitation
of liability, the lack of clarity on potential recoverability of nuclear damage
and damage caused by sonic boom, and the choice of the single forum of the
place of the accident, erased any chance of substantial success of the Rome
Convention of 1952. The final official attempt to amend the Rome Convention
of 1952 by means of the Montreal Protocol of 1978 essentially only managed
to raise the limits set out in the Convention. However, it has not been ratified
widely either.19
Apparently, the story of the system of Rome has not ended yet. For the
Legal Committee of ICAO recommended to include the subject of possible
modernization of the Rome Convention of 1952 in its Work Programme of
2001. Another questionnaire on the subject was subsequently sent to the
member States.20 This has led to a Draft Convention on Damage Caused by
Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, which was prepared by the ICAO
Secretariat and considered by the ICAO Secretariat Study Group on the Modern-
ization of the Rome Convention in April and September 2003. The (revised)
16 See for the questionnaire ICAO Legal Committee, Third Session, 1949, Minutes and Documents
(1949), at 243 –247.
17 See the Synthesis of Replies to the Second Questionnaire, ICAO Legal Committee, Fifth
Session, 1950, Minutes and Documents (1950), at 265-280. The responses clearly indicate
a substantial divergence of opinion on the combinations of weight of the aircraft and
corresponding limits of liability. The Taormina Draft was gradually modified during
subsequent drafting sessions held in Montreal (1950), Mexico City (1951) and finally Rome
(1952).
18 France and the United Kingdom merely signed the Rome Convention of 1952 at 7 October
1952 and 23 April 1953 respectively; the United States did not even bother to sign, see the
status of the Rome Convention of 1952 as of July, 2003, at www.icao.org.
19 The Montreal Protocol of 1978 has only been ratified or adhered to by Azerbaijan, Brazil,
Burkina Faso, Guatemala, Kenya, Morocco, Niger, and Suriname, see the status of the
Montreal Protocol of 1978 as of July, 2003 at www.icao.org.
20 See ICAO’s State letter LE 3/14.2-01/62 of 15 june 2001 on the Study of the Modernization
of the Rome Convention of 1952 – damage caused by foreign aircraft to third parties on
the surface, and the attached questionnaire.
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Secretariat Draft No. 2 of 1 August 2003 will be dealt with in paragraph 3.11
of this study on the basis of the findings of this Chapter.21
3.3 BASIS AND SCOPE OF LIABILITY
3.3.1 Basis of liability
Although the exact wording varies, both of the Rome Conventions have clearly
been based on absolute liability. For Article 2 of the Rome Convention of 1933
stipulates that ‘damage caused by an aircraft in flight to persons and property
gives a right to compensation on proof only that the damage exists and is
attributable to the aircraft.’ ‘In flight’ has been defined as the period ‘from
the beginning of the operations of departure until the end of the operations
of arrival’.22 Absolute liability also encompasses ‘damage caused by an object
of any kind falling from the aircraft, even in the event of the proper discharge
of ballast or of jettison made in case of necessity’ and ‘damage caused by any
person on board the aircraft.’ However, the latter scenario has been excluded
if caused by ‘an act unconnected with the management of the aircraft com-
mitted intentionally by a person not being a member of the crew, and without
the operator or his servants or agents having been able to prevent it.’ This
means that the operator cannot be held absolutely liable automatically for
damage caused by unlawful seizure or hijacking of the aircraft.23
Similarly, Article 1(1) of the Rome Convention of 1952 entitles compensation
to third parties ‘upon proof only that the damage was caused by an aircraft
in flight or by any person or thing falling therefrom.’ ‘In flight’ has now been
defined more precisely as the period from the moment when power is applied
for the purpose of actual takeoff until the moment when the landing run
ends.’24
3.3.1.1 Rationale for absolute liability
In its deliberations on the preferable basis of liability for the Rome Convention
of 1933, the C.I.T.E.J.A chose to ignore the existing variations in bases of
liability within national regimes in the field. Instead, the CITEJA took what was
perceived as the common international interest into account by creating a ‘new’
21 See ICAO Legal Bureau, Memorandum of 07/08/03 on the Third Meeting of the ICAO
Secretariat Study Group on the Modernization of the Rome Convention, Montreal, 3 to
5 September 2003 (SSG-MR/3) and the enclosed working paper SSG-MR/3-WP/1 – Revised
Draft Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface.
22 See Article 2(3) Rome Convention of 1933.
23 See Article 2(2) sub a and b Rome Convention of 1933.
24 See Article 1(2) Rome Convention of 1952.
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regime based on absolute liability. The following four arguments were raised
in favor of absolute liability by the Rapporteur:
a. the eminent position of the aircraft toward third parties on the surface;
b. the impossibility of the victim of proving negligence of the operator in
the majority of cases;
c. the use of a thing (aircraft), which involves new risks and special dangers,
obliges the operator to certain guarantees toward other persons;
d. objective liability is the corollary to overflight above private property.25
The basis of absolute liability was also favored by the Sub-Committee of the
Legal Committee of ICAO, which was appointed to revise the Rome Convention
of 1933 in 1947. The Sub-Committee chose to support absolute liability despite
the suggestion that such an extreme measure to protect third parties from the
risks incidental to aviation were no longer justified on the grounds that air
transport had developed rapidly since the nineteenthirties and had become
such a common factor and vital part of economic life. The Sub-Committee
rejected this line of reasoning and justified its support for absolute liability
on the grounds that the trend of the time pointed toward absolute liability
for damage caused by aircraft, railways, and other forms of transport in various
European countries.26
A subsequent questionnaire that was sent to the member States and two
international organizations on the revision of the Rome Convention of 1933
revealed that fourteen States were in favor of retaining the basis of absolute
liability of the Rome Convention of 1933.27 Only a few States such as the
United States and Canada were opposed to the basis of absolute liability. The
United States held that the operator should be liable for surface damage only
if unable to prove that he had taken ‘all measures to avoid damage and all
events leading thereto which an operator exercising the highest degree of care
would have taken under the circumstances’.28 In the end, absolute liability
was settled upon despite these reservations of a minority of addressed States.
25 See Goedhuis, Handboek voor het Luchtrecht 281-282 (1943). These arguments are com-
parable to a number of those raised in favour of absolute or strict liability in paragraph
2.7 of this study.
26 See Report submitted by the Sub-Committee entrusted with the study of the revision of
the Rome Convention and of the Brussels Protocol and inter-related matters (Approved
by the Legal Committee on June 5, 1948) and distributed as Doc. 6011, LC/108, 18/6/48,
in Annex IV to ICAO Legal Committee, Second Session, 1948, Minutes and Documents
(1948), at 129, hereinafter cited as the Report.
27 See, for the contents of the questionnaire ICAO, Legal Committee, Third Session, 1949, Minutes
and Documents (1949), at 243-247. Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Finland, France,
Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the Union of South
Africa, and the United Kingdom turned out to be in favour of absolute liability, see ICAO
Legal Committee, Fourth Session, 1949, Minutes and Documents (1949), at 174.
28 See ICAO Legal Committee, Fourth Session, 1949, Minutes and Documents (1949), at 174-175.
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3.3.2 Scope of absolute liability
If one links the three main scenarios of conduct of aircraft that are capable
of inflicting surface damage to the bases of absolute liability of both Rome
Conventions, the following picture emerges:29
Scenario 1. Surface damage inflicted by ‘direct contact’ or ‘impact’ of the aircraft or
parts, objects, chemicals, or persons from the aircraft
Surface damage inflicted under this scenario is covered by the regimes of both
of the Rome Conventions. In case of a genuine accident of an aircraft, the
criteria of (any) damage caused by an aircraft in flight to persons and property
on the surface are met upon proof of a causal connection between the damage
and the accident. Things or persons falling from the aircraft are also covered
by the absolute liability regimes of both Conventions.30
The scope of the first scenario has deliberately been narrowed down by
means of the criteria of ‘direct contact’ or ‘impact’. For the Sub-Committee
responsible for the redrafting of the Rome Convention of 1933 initially sug-
gested the following scope of absolute liability as opposed to the mere criterion
of ‘in flight’ of the Rome Convention of 1933:
Damage arising from contact between an aircraft or anything falling therefrom,
and any person or object on the surface shall give a right to compensation by the
mere fact that it is established that the damage exists and that it was caused by
the aircraft or anything falling therefrom during the period of taxiing immediately
prior to and for the purpose of taking off, during take-off, actual flight, landing
and taxiing immediately after landing until the terminal or mooring or parking
place is reached.31
The advantage of such a formulation would have been that the scope of
absolute liability was then clearly not meant to cover damage caused by noise
of aircraft at all.32
The (sub-)scenario of collisions of aircraft causing damage is also covered
by both Rome Conventions.33 For Article 6 of the Rome Convention of 1933
and Article 7 of the Rome Convention of 1952 provide that the operators of
29 See paragraph 2.2 of this study for the foundation of these scenarios.
30 See Article 2 of the Rome Convention of 1933 and Article 1 of the Rome Convention of
1952.
31 The Report at 133.
32 The more broad formulation that was ultimately opted for in Article 1 of the Rome Conven-
tion of 1952 seems to indicate that the scenario of damage caused by noise was intended
to fall under the scope of the regime to a certain degree; that scenario will be dealt with
in more detail under the second scenario of potential surface damage.
33 Despite ideas of the time on a separate Convention on aircraft collisions (‘Convention pour
l’unification de certaines règles relatives à l’abordage aérien’), see Goedhuis at 305.
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colliding aircraft can be held liable jointly and severally under the conditions
and limitations of the Convention. In view of the limited liability regimes of
both Conventions, certain collision cases could give rise to problems. If an
aircraft of a State party to the Rome Convention of 1952 collides with an
aircraft of which the State of registration is not party, the question could arise
if the operator of the latter could profit from the regime and limitations of
liability of the Rome Convention of 1952. If interpreted strictly, this would
not be the case.34 However, Drion has argued that such a scenario could be
covered by the regime of the Rome Convention of 1952 on the grounds that
that would promote adherence to the Convention. Such an interpretation would
correspond with the aim of more international uniformity in this field.35
Inclusion of such a scenario seems to stretch the scope of the regime of the
Convention a bit far and implicitly raises an important objection against the
limited liability regime of the Rome Convention of 1952. For the chances are
greater that third parties will prefer to file claims against the other (non-
signatory) operator of the two colliding aircraft on the basis of an applicable
unlimited and more lenient national regime as opposed to filing claims against
the (signatory) operator on the basis of the Rome Convention of 1952.36
Scenarios 2 & 3. Surface damage inflicted by flight in non-conformity with air traffic
regulations; too low general or sudden overflight (2). Surface damage inflicted by
normal overflight (3).
The question to what extent the scenario of surface damage inflicted by flight
in non- conformity with air traffic regulations is covered by the Rome Conven-
tions has never been resolved satisfactorily. A closer scrutiny of the wording
of Article 2 (1) of the Rome Convention of 1933 seems to indicate that this
scenario falls under the scope of absolute liability as it reads: ‘damage caused
by an aircraft in flight to persons or property on the surface gives a right to
compensation on proof only that the damage exists and that it is attributable
to the aircraft.’ In fact, such a wording could even cover damage caused by
normal overflight in conformity with air traffic regulations.
The underlying question of scope of causation was addressed by the
German delegation of the time, which suggested to limit the scope of the Rome
Convention of 1933 to ‘accidents’ causing surface damage. According to the
34 For a strict application of Article 7 of the Rome Convention of 1952 indicates that the
Convention only applies to the operators of aircraft whose mother-States have ratified the
Convention. This means that other aircraft will be covered by the domestic law applicable
to the case, see Shawcross & Beaumont, Air Law, paragraph V/112.
35 Drion, at 87-89.
36 In practice, plaintiffs will most likely file claims against both operators. But the point of
the example is that the limited liability regime of the Rome Convention of 1952 will unjustly
protect the operator that is covered by the regime of the Convention in comparison with
the other operator involved in the collision.
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German delegation, the term ‘accidents’ should also encompass cases of sudden
overflight causing damage due to fright (for example, horses that are scared
by sudden overflight of an aircraft and bolt, thereby killing someone), but not
damage caused by frequent overflight. However, the German suggestion was
not adopted by the Conference.37
As has been mentioned previously, the Sub-Committee responsible for
redrafting the Rome Convention of 1933 initially suggested to limit the scope
of recoverable damage to cases of damage arising from direct contact with
the aircraft or things/persons/objects (falling) therefrom. Although most States
supported that definition, the answers to a questionnaire revealed that some
States found the criterion of ‘contact’ unsatisfactory, as it excluded damages
caused by airstream of propellors, fire, explosion, or extraordinary noise.
Initially, the Sub-Committee left the question open to the Legal Committee
with the warning that such types of damage were unusual and would be
difficult to prove.38
During the Fifth Session of the Legal Committee in Taormina in January
1950, the so-called Taormina Draft was adopted. The scope of absolute liability
was defined as follows in Article 1 (1) of the Taormina Draft:
Any person who suffers damage on the surface shall be entitled to compensation
as provided in this Convention upon proof only that the damage was caused,
through contact, fire or explosion, by an aircraft in flight or by any person or thing
falling therefrom.39
Discussions on the preferable wording of the Taormina Draft continued in
Montreal in June, 1950. The Swiss delegate commented that the drafting was
not complete, since an aircraft flying at a low altitude could cause an avalanche
by its airstream and thus bring about considerable surface damage. His sug-
gestion to include the words “or by the airstream of an aircraft in flight” was
initially adopted.40
The Drafting Committee subsequently came up with two drafting sugges-
tions which incorporated items such as contact, fire, explosion, heat, chemical
action, and disturbance of the air, but also added a third alternative, in which
the problem of noise was addressed and excluded from the scope of the
Convention.41 Combined with the suggestion of the United Kingdom delegate
37 Goedhuis at 288. Goedhuis points out that Ripert found it practically impossible to define
the phrase ‘accident’ satisfactorily.
38 See ICAO Legal Committee, Fourth Session, 1949, Minutes and Documents (1949), at 241.
39 See ICAO Legal Committee, Fifth Session, 1950, Minutes and Documents (1950), at 347.
40 See ICAO Fourth Session of the Assembly, 1950, Legal Commission, Minutes and Documents
(1950), at 57-65.
41 See ICAO Fourth Session of the Assembly, 1950, Legal Commission, Minutes and Documents
(1950), at 164.
70 Liability for surface damage inflicted by international civil aviation
to add “or the passage of aircraft in normal flight”,42 the final outcome of
the suggested revisions of Article 1(1) of the Taormina Draft by means of the
Montreal Draft read:
Any person who suffers damage on the surface, other than damage due to noise or
to passage of aircraft in normal flight, shall be entitled to compensation as provided
by this Convention upon proof only that the damage was caused directly by an
aircraft in flight or by any person or thing falling therefrom.43
The Montreal Draft was transformed into the Mexico City Draft during the
Seventh Session of the Legal Committee and stood at the basis of the Rome
Convention of 1952. In the final redrafting procedures, the codified certainty
of non-recoverability of damage caused by noise was unfortunately eliminated
from the wording of Article 1(1) of the Rome Convention of 1952 by the
Drafting Committee. However, damage caused by mere overflight in conform-
ity with air traffic regulations remained excluded from the scope of absolute
liability. This brief enumeration of the drafting history of the Rome Convention
of 1952 seems to imply that damage caused by the noise arising from overflight
in non-conformity with air traffic regulations was intended to be excluded
from the scope of the Convention, although this is not entirely certain.44
Summarizing, the not quite resolved question thus remained whether
surface damage arising from noise inflicted by aircraft flying in non-conformity
with air traffic regulations was meant to be covered by the absolute liability
regime of the Rome Convention of 1952 or not. Inclusion of this scenario would
correspond with the wish of the German delegation to include cases of sudden
fright to people or animals due to sudden noise of aircraft flying too low on
a one-time basis. Exclusion would seem more in line with the wishes of those
responsible for redrafting the Rome Convention of 1933 in a later stage. The
question of potential recoverability of damage caused by noise resurfaced in
combination with questions on the recoverability of damage caused by sonic
boom during the deliberations on the Montreal Protocol of 1978. However,
that important issue remained unresolved there as well, as will be seen in more
detail in paragraph 3.8.45
42 See ICAO Fourth Session of the Assembly, 1950, Legal Commission, Minutes and Documents
(1950), at 166.
43 See ‘Draft Convention on Damage Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface as
Revised by Legal Commission on Fourth Session ICAO Assembly’, in ICAO, Fourth Session
of the Assembly, Final Report of the Legal Commission (1950), at 11-20.
44 See ICAO Conference on Private International Air Law, 1952, Volume II, Documents (1953),
at 229.
45 Remarkably, this problem was linked to Chapter V (Application of the Convention and
General Provisions) and not to discussions on Article 1 of the Rome Convention of 1952.
A proposal made by the Sub-Committee of the Legal Committee to insert an extra Article
24A which read: “This Convention shall not apply to damage caused by noise or sonic
boom produced by an aircraft in flight” was rejected during the 22 Session of the Legal
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3.4 PERSONS OR ENTITIES LIABLE UNDER THE CONVENTIONS. DEFENCES. RIGHTS
OF RECOURSE. AIRCRAFT.
3.4.1 The operators of aircraft
Under both Rome Conventions, liability is primarily attributed to the operator
of the aircraft, although the definitions of this entity vary slightly per Conven-
tion.46 The Rome Convention of 1933 defines the operator as ‘any person who
has the aircraft at his disposal and who makes use thereof for his own ac-
count’.47 The ambiguity of that definition made Goedhuis remark that the
issue would hopefully be settled more clearly in the future.48 One of the
problems of the definition is that its criteria of ‘disposal’, ‘use’, and ‘own
account’ have been codified in a cumulative as opposed to an alternative
fashion.49
After rigorous study of various options by the Working Group ‘Operator’
in 1950, a more complex definition was construed for the Rome Convention
of 1952. The operator was now defined as
the person who was making use of the aircraft at the time the damage was caused,
provided that if control of the navigation of the aircraft was retained by the person
from whom the right to make use of the aircraft was derived, whether directly
or indirectly, that person shall be considered the operator.50
The definition was further refined by adding that
a person shall be considered to be making use of an aircraft when he is using it
personally or when his servants or agents are using the aircraft in the course of
their employment, whether or not within the scope of their authority.51
Committee, see ‘Verslag van de Nederlandse Delegatie naar de Diplomatieke Conferentie
tot Herziening van het Verdrag van Rome van 1952, betreffende Schade door Luchtvaartui-
gen (te Montreal van 6 – 23 september 1978)’ (Report of the Dutch Delegation on the
Diplomatic Conference to revise the Rome Convention of 1952), at 13 et seq.
46 See Article 4(1) of the Rome Convention of 1933 and Article 2(1) of the Rome Convention
of 1952.
47 See Article 4(2) of the Rome Convention of 1933.
48 See the discussions referred to by Goedhuis at 299-301. One of the problems can serve as an
example: the Rapporteur of the time was of the opinion that the operator was the person
who had the right to employ the captain as well as to provide the aircraft with fuel;
however, under certain agreements on use of the aircraft, those two conditions could be
divided between the involved parties.
49 See Drion, at 144-145 on this issue. His advise would be to bring an action against all
persons who could potentially be held as the operator.
50 See Article 2(a) of the Rome Convention of 1952; Drion at 143 and, on the Working Group
‘Operator’, ICAO Fourth Session of the Assembly, 1950, Legal Commission, Minutes and
Documents (1950), at 313-331
51 See Article 2(b) of the Rome Convention of 1952.
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The rather remarkable and complicating extra scenario of a person who only
had the exclusive right to use the aircraft for a period of maximally fourteen
days dating from the moment when the right of use commenced was added
to the definition. If such a person caused damage while using the aircraft, he
could be held jointly and severally liable with original operator from whom
such right was derived under the regime of the Convention.52 Essentially,
the core meaning of the definition of the term operator seems to point primar-
ily to the person in actual control of the aircraft, that is, whose crew was
operating the aircraft at the time of the damage.53
3.4.2 The owners of aircraft
Although not specifically defined, the owners of aircraft can be held liable
only if they are presumed to be the operators of those aircraft upon proof to
the contrary under both Conventions.
Under the Rome Convention of 1933, the owner is deemed to be the
operator of the aircraft if the name of the operator has not been registered
in the aeronautical register or on some other official document. Under the
Rome Convention of 1952, the registered owner is presumed to be the operator
unless, in the proceedings for the determination of his liability, he proves that some
other person was the operator and, in so far as legal procedures permit, takes
appropriate measures to make that other person a party in the proceedings.54
3.4.3 Unlawful users
Unlawful users, defined as persons who make use of the aircraft without
consent of the operator of the aircraft, can be held liable jointly and severally
with the operator under the regimes of the Rome Conventions, unless the
operator proves that he has exercised due care to prevent such use.55 Thus,
the operator can escape liability if he proves that he was not negligent or at
fault in relation to the unlawful use. This means that the standard of fault or
52 See Article 3 of the Rome Convention of 1952.
53 Drion points out that in practice, the definition of the term ‘operator’ of the Rome Conven-
tion of 1933 does not differ substantially from that of the Rome Convention of 1952, see
Drion at 143-145.
54 See Article 4(3) of the Rome Convention of 1933 and Article 2(3) of the Rome Convention
of 1952.
55 See Article 5 of the Rome Convention of 1933 and Article 4 of the Rome Convention of
1952. Note that the wording of the articles varies slightly (the defence of due care of Article
4 originated from the notion of the operator having not taken all proper steps to prevent
the unlawful use of Article 5).
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negligence, and not that of absolute liability, prevails for the operator in cases
of unlawful use under both Conventions and then only within the limits of
liability set out in the Conventions. In effect, the provisions on unlawful use
thus offer operators of aircraft the protection of a limited liability regime based
on a presumption of fault or negligence.
The unlawful user should be distinguished from the person who ‘wrongfully
takes and makes use of an aircraft without the consent of the person entitled
to use it (the operator).’ For if such a person causes damage, his liability shall
be unlimited.56
This second category points to actual hijackers of an aircraft, who are thus
deprived of the advantages of legal limitation of liability.57 Unfortunately,
the victims are not likely to profit much from unlimited liability of hijackers
of aircraft. This can be due both to the extreme difficulty of claiming from
such individuals in general as well as to their presumable lack of assets to
cover the damage they inflicted, assuming that the filing of such claims can
be done successfully in the first place.58
An interesting and complex problem for the potential future of the system
of Rome has arisen due to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the
United States. In light of the catastrophic damage inflicted by the use of aircraft
as manned bombs in those attacks, the question for the future will be on which
basis of liability and to what extent the original operators of such aircraft can
be held liable for such acts.59
3.4.4 Defences and rights of recourse
Under the absolute liability regime of the Rome Convention of 1933, the main
defence of the operator is that of contributory negligence of the injured
party.60
Under the absolute liability regime of the Rome Convention of 1952, the
number of defences was expanded by holding that a person otherwise liable
under the Convention shall not be liable if the damage is the direct conse-
quence of armed conflict or civil disturbance, or if such person has been
56 See Article 12(2) of the Rome Convention of 1952.
57 Drion at 322.
58 Unless perhaps sufficient evidence can be put forward that links the hijackers to a respon-
sible State, although this may prove difficult in practice, see Wassenbergh at 117. Referring
to the Lockerbie aviation disaster, Wassenbergh points out that Libya cannot be condemned
to compensate the victims.
59 See sub-paragraph 3.11.2 of this study.
60 See Article 3 of the Rome Convention of 1933.
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deprived of the use of the aircraft by act of public authority.61 Another im-
plicit defence against unlawful use holds that if the operator can prove that
he has exercised due care, he cannot be held jointly and severally liable with
the unlawful user, as has been described in the previous sub-paragraph.
The regime of the Rome Convention of 1933 does not prejudice the question
whether the operator has a right of recourse against the author of the
damage.62 The Rome Convention of 1952 takes the rights of recourse a step
further and makes such rights applicable to all persons potentially liable under
the Convention against any other person.63
3.4.5 Aircraft types
A definition or specification of the term ‘aircraft’ is not given under the Rome
Conventions, which leaves that issue to the discretion of national courts.64
Both Rome Conventions merely stipulate that their regimes do not apply to
military, customs, or police aircraft.65
3.5 LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
The most remarkable and elemental characteristic of the system of Rome
concerns the fact that it is has been based on a legal limitation of liability of
the operator. In this paragraph, the concept of limitation of liability will be
divided in subparagraphs on the rationale for limitation of liability (3.5.1),
the chosen system of limitation (3.5.2), the apportionment of limits (3.5.3), and
the potential escape routes to unlimited liability (3.5.4). The effects of limitation
of liability on insurance and jurisdiction will be taken into account in sub-
sequent paragraphs (3.6 and 3.7).
61 See Article 5 of the Rome Convention of 1952. See also Article 6 of the Rome Convention
of 1952 on the defence of contributory negligence, which was maintained, albeit with a
different wording than under the Rome Convention of 1933. Note that Article 8 of the Rome
Convention of 1952 specifically allows a number of other mentioned parties aside from
the operator to invoke the defences, such as the owners that are presumed to be operators
of Article 2(3) of the Rome Convention of 1952.
62 See Article 7 of the Rome Convention of 1933.
63 See Article 10 of the Rome Convention of 1952.
64 See Goedhuis at 285; see also paragraph 2.9 of this study on definitions of aircraft derived
from other sources, such as the Chicago Convention of 1944. The possible consequence
of leaving this issue to the discretion of national courts is that variations in scope of aircraft
that are deemed to be covered by the Convention may occur between different national
courts. Such variations in scope also exist in national aviation legislation; see in that context
paragraph 4.3 of this study.
65 See Article 21 the Rome Convention 1933 and Article 26 Rome Convention 1952.
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3.5.1 Rationale for limitation of liability
As has been touched upon in paragraph 3.2 of this Chapter, the origins of the
limited liability regime of the Rome Convention of 1933 largely lie in the
protectionistic attitude of the IATA and the ICC of the time toward aviation.
From the moment the idea of legal limitation of liability was launched, none
of the instruments within the system of Rome managed to escape from its
clutches. Its fundamental role can clearly be derived from the preamble of
the Rome Convention of 1952 which informs the reader that the drafters were
moved by a desire to ensure adequate compensation for persons who suffer damage
caused on the surface by foreign aircraft, while limiting in a reasonable manner the
extent of liabilities incurred for such damage in order not to hinder the development of
international civil air transport, and also convinced of the need for unifying to greatest
extent possible, through an international convention, the rules applying in the
various countries of the world to the liabilities incurred for such damage.
Even without the aid of any minutes or documents that record the drafting
history of the Rome Convention of 1952, the application of plain logic makes
clear that such a desire cannot be accomplished fairly on an international level.
This is due to the fact that the potential level of damage and subsequent
compensation to persons and property can vary enormously per State or even
part of a State. A foreign aircraft that comes down in a town in Ethiopia will
cost a fraction of the amount of compensation due for a similar aviation
accident in a town of comparable size in the United States. This is because
the living standards and thus the potential level of damage of inhabitants of
Ethiopia and the United States vary vastly. The extent of potential surface
damage is bound to vary not only in a geographical sense, but also in the
course of time. For the aforementioned aviation accidents in both the United
States and Ethiopia would have led to a far lesser degree of liability exposure
three decades ago than now, due to factors such as inflation and changing
living standards. The point is that if one compares potential victims of surface
damage worldwide and in time, it becomes apparent that limitation of liability
is the one aspect of an international liability regime that cannot be unified
worldwide satisfactorily. For such a unification would place the potential
victims in poorer countries in a more advantageous position than those in more
developed countries. This is due to the fact that the former have a far greater
chance of receiving ‘adequate compensation’ than the latter as their level of
suffered damage is more likely to fall fully or to a far greater extent within
the legal limitations set out in the regime of the Convention.66 Ergo, any form
66 This argument has also been raised by Drion in his enumeration of justifications for legal
limitation of liability. The aim of unification of the law with respect to the amount of
damages to be paid has been rejected by him on the grounds that it would be inappropriate
to unify the amount of damages to be paid in case of death or injuries, as local views and
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of limitation of liability has a strong chance of falling under the actual damage
suffered in an international aviation accident or incident, especially in the more
developed countries of the world. To coin the phrase, such a regime can never
create a level playing field either for aviation or its potential victims.
The other notion of the preamble, which holds that limitation of liability
is necessary in order not to hinder the development of international civil
aviation, also seems remarkable in light of the fact that national air laws in
this field were largely based on unlimited liability in the drafting period of
both Rome Conventions. The development of international civil aviation seems
not to have been seriously hindered by such regimes, which were mostly based
on unlimited liability.67
3.5.2 The chosen systems of limitation
Aside from the impossibility of fairly limiting liability on an international basis
in general, a great number of specific problems can arise when the legislature
sets out to codify a system of limitation. The most elementary problem con-
cerns the problem how to limit liability adequately.
Under the regime of the Rome Convention of 1933, the operator could be
held liable for each occurrence up to an amount of 250 francs for each
kilogramme of the weight of the aircraft, whereby the limit of the operator’s
liability was not be less than 600,000 francs, nor greater than 2,000,000 francs.68
This rather straightforward classification system in which weight of the aircraft
was combined with certain levels of limitation was transformed into a more
complex system by the drafters of the Rome Convention of 1952. On the basis
of replies to a second questionnaire sent out by the Legal Committee on the
sole issue of limitation of liability, the foundation for the revised system of
limitation was codified in the so-called Taormina Draft, which stood at the
basis of the Rome Convention of 1952.69 Under the Rome Convention of 1952,
the following system of limitation was codified in Article 11(1):
circumstances of a social and economic character are of such importance in that field, see
Drion at 42.
67 A synthesis of national laws that was made in the drafting period of the Rome Convention
of 1952 revealed that the laws of thirty-three States contained special provisions on the
topic of third party liability and the laws of eighteen other States did not; of the laws that
did, the majority was based on absolute liability; and that, irrespective of the basis of
liability, all the laws were based on unlimited liability, but for the six States which had
ratified the Rome Convention of 1933 and three other States (of which the specific laws
were not yet in force at the time of the survey), see ICAO Legal Committee, Fifth Session,
1950, Minutes and Documents (1950), at 281-295.
68 See Article 8(1) and (2) of the Rome Convention of 1933.
69 See Syntheses of Replies to The Questionnaire on the Limits of Liability in Relation to the
Rome Convention, ICAO Legal Committee, Fifth Session, 1950, Minutes and Documents
(1950) at 265-280; Brown at 426. These sources reveal the divergency of views on this issue.
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1 Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the liability for damage giving a right
to compensation under Article 1, for each aircraft accident and incident, in
respect of all persons liable under this Convention, shall not exceed:
a. 500 000 francs for aircraft weighing 1000 kilogrammes or less
b. 500 000 francs plus 400 francs per kilogramme over 1000 kilogrammes for
aircraft weighing more than 1000 but not exceeding 6000 kilogrammes;
c. 2 500 000 francs plus 250 francs per kilogramme over 6000 kilogrammes
for aircraft weighing more than 6000 but not exceeding 20 000 kilogrammes;
d. 6 000 000 francs plus 150 francs per kilogramme over 20 000 kilogrammes
for aircraft weighing more than 20 000 but not exceeding 50 000 kilo-
grammes;
e. 10 500 000 francs plus 100 francs per kilogramme over 50 000 kilogrammes
for aircraft weighing more than 50 000 kilogrammes.
Furthermore, the liability in respect of loss of life or personal injury was limited
to 500 000 francs per person killed or injured in Article 11(2) of the Rome
Convention of 1952.
Upon reflection of this system of limitation of liability approximately fifty
years after its drafting, the amounts evidently seem outdated both in terms
of chosen levels and mode of expression (the Gold Franc) anywhere in the
world.70 But that it is not the main point, for the legislature could devise ways
in which such limits could be corrected from time to time in order to keep
up with changing economic circumstances and inflation.71 The point is far
more that a correlation has been presumed between the weight of an aircraft,
a certain limit of liability, and actual damage, whereas such a correlation need
not necessarily exist. In other words, the presumption that a Boeing 747 is
capable of inflicting far more substantial surface damage than a Fokker 50
due to the differences in weight of both aircraft may not be automatically valid,
but will depend on the circumstances of the aviation accident or incident at
hand. If, for instance, the Boeing 747 and Fokker 50 both crash into a nuclear
plant in an identical fashion, the ultimate effect would be strongly comparable
in terms of damage if the plant breaks down after impact with both the heavier
and the lighter aircraft. And even if a correlation between weight of the aircraft
and subsequent damage does exist, such a correlation is certainly not in exactly
the same ratio as codified in Article 11 of the Rome Convention of 1952.
In short, this means that any chosen level of limitation is essentially ar-
bitrary. Even if legally limited tiers of liability are linked to the argument of
capped insurability of third party liability, the subsequent legal limitations
of liability are difficult to codify fairly, as will be explored in more detail in
paragraph 3.6.
70 The franc has been defined as a currency unit consisting of 65,5 milligrammes of gold of
millesimal fineness 900 in Article 11(4) of the Rome Convention of 1952 .
71 Although such updates would evidently still leave the impossibility of fairly creating a
uniform system of limitation intact.
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3.5.3 Apportionment of limits
Aside from the more or less arbitrary correlation between weight of the aircraft
and limitation of liability, other problems will arise in the process of codifying
a system of limitation. One of those problems concerns the distribution of the
limits between the damage categories of personal injuries and property
damage, especially in cases of surface damage that exceed those limitations.
Under Article 8(3) of the Rome Convention of 1933, a division was made
whereby one-third of the amount of maximum liability was to be appropriated
to compensation for damage caused to property and the other two-thirds to
compensation for damage caused to persons. In the latter case, the compen-
sation payable was not to exceed 200,000 francs per person. In cases of excess
damage above the limits set out in Article 8, the compensation due to each
person was to be reduced proportionately so that the total would not exceed
the limits.72 Despite the fact that a certain randomness between the categories
of personal injuries and property damage is clearly perceivable, such a division
does make clear that the drafters of the Rome Convention of 1933 were of the
opinion that personal injuries deserved a greater part of the total limit than
property damage.
Another inherent problem of distribution of limits concerns the question
what is to be done if the level of property damage remains under the legal
limits, whereas the limits for personal injuries are exceeded by the actual level
of personal injuries. Would it then be possible to transfer the property damage
‘excess coverage’ to the side of personal injuries by means of a process referred
to as reversability? If interpreted strictly, such reversability would not be
possible under the regime of the Rome Convention of 1933.73 However, such
a rule would seem fair from a more modern perspective. For as a system of
legal limitation of liability already protects the operator to a great extent, the
least one would expect is that compensation is paid to the full amount of
limitation set out in the regime, if this would otherwise mean that certain
victims are left uncompensated.
As has been the unfortunate case with a great number of the revisions of
the Rome Convention of 1933, the problem of apportionment was also com-
plicated in Article 14 of the Rome Convention of 1952. The Article reads:
If the total amount of the claims established exceeds the limit of liability applicable
under the provisions of this Convention, the following rules shall apply, taking
into account the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 11:
a. If the claims are exclusively in respect of loss of life or personal injury or
exclusively in respect of damage to property, such claims shall be reduced in
proportion to their respective amounts.
72 See Article 9 of the Rome Convention of 1933.
73 Goedhuis at 308-309.
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b. If the claims are both in respect of loss of life or personal injury and in respect
of damage to property, one half of the total sum distributable shall be appropri-
ated preferentially to meet claims in respect of loss of life and personal injury
and, if insufficient, shall be distributed proportionately between the claims
concerned. The remainder of the total sum distributable shall be distributed
proportionately among the claims in respect of damage to property and the
portion not already covered of the claims in respect of loss of life and personal
injury.
Again, a rather randomly chosen system of division between the main cat-
egories of personal injury and property damage becomes apparent. In that
context, Drion raised the question if the special limit per person killed or
injured should be applied before or after claims for death were reduced by
the global limitation per aircraft, which can make rather a difference, and was
not clarified by the drafters of either Rome Convention.74
All in all, the aforementioned systems of apportionment of limits between
personal injuries and property damage seem outdated and often difficult to
apply in practice, especially in complex cases of ‘mixed’ surface damage with
various categories and degrees of both personal injuries and property damage.
The problems inherent to apportionment thus illustrate yet another complica-
ting factor to regimes based on limited liability.
3.5.4 Escape routes to unlimited liability: gross negligence or wilful mis-
conduct
Up to this point, it has become apparent that both Rome Conventions have
been based on a combination of absolute and limited liability. Limited liability
was justified as a quid pro quo for the severe basis of absolute liability and
was perceived necessary in order not to hinder the development of inter-
national civil aviation. As has been established, the unwanted effect of limited
liability on an international level is that it can lead to discrepancies in levels
of compensation worldwide, as potential damages can vary so enormously
per State. Furthermore, the national air laws in this field of the time indicate
that they were practically all based on absolute and unlimited liability or at
worst on unlimited regimes based on a presumption of fault or negligence,
without apparently disturbing the development of international air transport
at all. A combination of these facts would lead to the inescapable conclusion
that the fairest and most logical escape route from the absolute and limited
liability regimes of both Rome Conventions would lie in proof of fault or
negligence of the operator. For having to prove fault or negligence would have
been the worst case scenario for claimants under a number of national aviation
74 Drion at 175-181.
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laws of the time anyhow, as they could generally rely on absolute and
unlimited liability on the basis of those national third party liability regimes.
However, the drafters of both Rome Conventions made a remarkable move
in their choice of escape routes from limited to unlimited liability. For they
opted for proof of gross negligence or wilful misconduct in order to escape
from limited to unlimited liability.75 This was an even more severe basis of
liability than that of ‘normal’ fault liability or negligence!
Under the regime of Article 14(a) of the Rome Convention of 1933, the
operator could not profit from the limited liability regime of the Convention
if it was proven that the damage resulted from the gross negligence (“faute
lourde”) or wilful misconduct (“dol”) of the operator, or his servants or agents,
except when the operator could prove that the damage resulted from negli-
gence in the pilotage, handling or navigation of the aircraft, or, where his
servants or agents are concerned, that he had taken all proper steps to prevent
the damage.
The means of escape from limited liability have not been made any easier
under the regime of Article 12(1) of the Rome Convention of 1952. Liability
of the operator could then only become unlimited upon proof of a deliberate
act or omission done with the intent to cause damage by him or his servants
or agents, provided that the latter were acting in the course of their employ-
ment and within the scope of their authority.76
Bearing in mind that one of the main points of creating a regime based
on absolute and limited liability is that proof of negligence or fault of the
operator can be difficult to furnish, the demand of having to prove gross
negligence or wilful misconduct in order to escape from the limitations of the
regime seems absurd to say the least. At most, one would expect plaintiffs
to be able to fall back on the general rules of negligence or fault liability in
order to obtain full compensation from the operator if fault or negligence of
either the operator or his servants or agents can be proven. However, the
apparent point at the time was that if the limits were banished even in cases
of slight fault, the whole point of the quid pro quo regime would be lost: for
then, plaintiffs could easily circumvent the regime’s limits once the slightest
degree of fault was successfully established.77
75 The other being that the operator has not furnished one of the securities prescribed by
Article 14(b) of the Rome Convention of 1933.
76 The Rome Convention of 1952 has not made things easier. Liability of the operator only
becomes unlimited if he or his servants are proven to have committed a deliberate act or
omission done with the intent to cause damage, “provided that in the case of such act or
omission of such servant or agent, it is also proved that he was acting in the course of his
employment and within the scope of his authority.”
77 See Goedhuis at 309-312.
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3.6 INSURANCE
Without legislative interference in this field, operators of aircraft would be
free to choose to either fly uninsured or insured. In case of flying uninsured,
the effect would be that the operator is obliged to compensate potential damage
for which he can be held liable from his own assets. In case of flying insured,
the insurers would be obligated to indemnify the operator on the basis of the
conditions stipulated in the insurance contract between the insurers and the
operator. The amount due will depend both on the level of damages suffered
and on the level of obtained insurance coverage. If the actual damage exceeds
the level of coverage, the amount in excess of coverage may have to be com-
pensated by the operator. The chain of events that follow in the aftermath of
an insured aviation accident in which surface damage arises makes clear that
at least formally there is no relationship whatsoever between the third parties
that suffer damage and the insurers. The third parties will have to claim from
the operator of the aircraft, who on his part will file a claim with his insurers.
The insurers will subsequently have to indemnify the operators, who in turn
will compensate the third parties. Even if the insurers of potential liable parties
create a fund from which they compensate the victims directly, this does not
establish a formal delictual relationship between the victims and the insurers
of the implicated aircraft.
One could argue quite convincingly that the legislator should leave it up
to operators of aircraft to take out insurance or not, since most aircraft
operators will most likely not take the risk of flying uninsured. The question
then arises why and how the international legislator has interfered in the free
forces of the aviation insurance market and has set out to regulate third party
liability insurance for operators of aircraft in the Rome Conventions.
In the preliminary drafting work on the Rome Convention of 1933, a link
between its proposed absolute and limited liability regime and insurability
was made by reasoning that only a limited liability regime could be covered
by insurance against reasonable premiums.78 This led to the following regime
of liability. The main rule held that every aircraft that fell under the scope
of its regime should be insured for the liability limits set out in article 8 of
the Convention in respect of third party liability. Detailed rules were
subsequently given on where such coverage should be obtained and on the
possibilities of substituting insurance for other guarantees on the basis of the
municipal laws of the Contracting States.79 Proof of such coverage was to
78 See Goedhuis, at 283-284. A remarkable early objection raised by the Swiss delegation held
that insurers could even take on the risk of unlimited liability without a substantial raise
in premiums, but this was unfortunately outvoted, so that the limited liability regime won
the day for the C.I.T.E.J.A.
79 See Article 12 of the Rome Convention of 1933. The other guarantees can be money deposits
made with a State institution or with an authorised bank or bank guarantees from such
a bank.
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be substantiated either by an official certificate or by an official entry in one
of the documents carried on board the aircraft.80 A remarkable extra safeguard
against not taking out such compulsory insurance or providing other guaran-
tees was built in by ruling that the operators’ liability would then become
unlimited.81
The possibility of direct actions of third parties against insurers turned
out to be a controversial aspect of the system. Such a possibility had been
introduced during the drafting period of the Rome Convention of 1933, but
had met with opposition from a minority of the delegates of the time. Their
objections justly held that it would be unfair toward insurers if third parties
could potentially invoke more rights against them than the insured operators,
for example if the insurance contract between the insurer(s) and the operator
had expired. Since these obstacles were not overcome, the possibility of a direct
action was left open in Article 16 of the Rome Convention (on choice of juris-
diction for claims).82
The obstacles raised against direct actions led to codification of the Brussels
Protocol of 1938, in which the following extra defences of insurers against third
parties were enacted under article 1(1) of the Brussels Protocol:
a. that the damage occurred after the insurance ceased to have effect;
b. that the damage occurred outside the territorial limits of the coverage, unless
flight outside such limits was due to force majeure or to a justifiable deviation
or negligence in pilotage;
c. that the damage was a direct consequence of international armed conflict or
civil disorder.
Aside from these defences, insurers were allowed to invoke the similar de-
fences available to the operators of aircraft under the Rome Convention of
1933 against claims from third parties.83 However, the Brussels Protocol of
1938 became of little to no importance to the system of Rome, since it was
only ratified by two States.84
Thus, the question whether a direct action would be possible was left
unresolved and had to be reconsidered by the drafters of the Rome Convention
of 1952 in the late nineteenforties. Whereas a certain simplicity was maintained
in the insurance and security requirements of the Rome Convention of 1933,
the Rome Convention of 1952 turned out far more complex and detailed in
that respect. In Chapter III of the Rome Convention of 1952, the rules on
80 See Article 13 of the Rome Convention of 1933.
81 Article 14 sub b of the Rome Convention of 1933 proved a barrier for ratification for a great
number of parties, see Drion at 21.
82 See J.G. Sauveplanne, Luchtvaartverzekering 132-133 (1949).
83 Sauveplanne at 137.
84 Margo at 17.
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insurance and security were codified in highly detailed Articles 15 through
18. The main points of these provisions will be enumerated briefly.
The general rule holds that Contracting States may require the operators
of aircraft of other Contracting States to be insured for damage up to the limits
set out in the Convention.85 The term ‘may’ indicates that the compulsory
nature of the provisions on insurance and security of the Rome Convention
of 1933 was abandoned in favor of facultative enforcement by Contracting
States.
Detailed rules on the status of insurers and alternative guarantees to
insurance were also enacted, including specific rules on insurance certificates,
which the authorities of one Contracting State were able to demand from
operators of aircraft from another Contracting State which flew over that
State.86 Furthermore, insurers were granted a number of extra defences, aside
from the standard defences available to the operators of aircraft. These were:
a. that the damage occurred after the security ceased to be effective;
b. that the damage occurred outside the territorial limits provided for by the
security, unless flight outside those limits was caused by force majeure, assist-
ance justified by circumstances, or an error in piloting, operation or naviga-
tion.87
However, if the security ceased to be effective, a legal continuation in force
was enacted for the sole benefit of third parties in the following cases:88 if
the security expired during a flight, it was to be continued in force until the
next landing specified in the flight plan, but no longer than twentyfour hours;
and if the security ceased to be effective for any reason other than expiration
or a change of operator, it was to be continued until fifteen days after notifica-
tion to the appropriate authority of the State which certifies the financial
responsibility of the insurer or the guarantor that the security had ceased to
be effective, or until effective withdrawal of the certificate of the insurer or
the certificate of guarantee.89
Thus, third parties maintained the right to file direct actions against
insurers or guarantors (a) where the security was continued in force under
85 See Article 15(1) of the Rome Convention of 1952.
86 See Article 15(2)-(9) of the Rome Convention of 1952. The drafters have left nothing to chance
by even providing for detailed scenarios of cases where the State overflown has reasonable
grounds for doubting the financial responsibility of the insurer or of the bank which issues
a guarantee. Such a state may request extra evidence of financial responsibility. If this is
not satisfactory, a specific arbitral tribunal can even be called upon to look into the case,
see Article 15(7) of the Rome Convention of 1952 for this fascinating exercise in over-
regulation.
87 See Article 16(1) of the Rome Convention of 1952. These provisions were clearly inspired
by the prewar system of the Rome Convention of 1933 and the Brussels Protocol of 1938.
88 See Article 16(4) of the Rome Convention of 1952.
89 See Article 16(1)(a) of the Rome Convention of 1952.
84 Liability for surface damage inflicted by international civil aviation
the provisions of paragraph 1 (a) and (b) of Article 16, and in case of (b) the
bankruptcy of the operator.90 Potential bankruptcy of the operator is perhaps
the only solid reason for direct actions in the first place. For direct actions can
prevent that indemnification of operators of aircraft by insurers, which is meant
for third parties, will be partly or wholly swallowed up by claims from credi-
tors of the bankrupt operator. However, Article 18 of the Rome Convention
of 1952 provides a feasible solution for this specific problem, which rules out
the necessity of direct actions. For it holds that any sums due to an operator
from an insurer shall be exempt from seizure and execution by creditors of
the operator until claims of third parties under the Convention have been
satisfied.
But the more structural question on the complex insurance and security
provisions of the Rome Convention of 1952 remains why they have been
codified at all, as they have not even been made compulsory. This point was
also raised by the Dutch delegation in a later stage during the deliberations
on the Montreal Protocol of 1978, although the delegation acknowledged that
their potential adverse effects were inconsequential in view of their non-com-
pulsory nature.91
3.7 JURISDICTION
The limited liability regimes of both Rome Conventions have had important
effects on their jurisdictional provisions, especially on those of the Rome
Convention of 1952. In this paragraph, the provisions on jurisdiction and their
rationale will be taken into account. First, the two competent forums of the
Rome Convention of 1933 will be discussed (3.7.1). Next, the rationale for the
move back to a single competent forum under the Rome Convention of 1952
will be examined (3.7.2). And finally, some suggestions on jurisdiction will
be made for the future (3.7.3).
3.7.1 Forum rei and forum delicti
The Rome Convention of 1933 provided the plaintiff with a choice between
the judicial authorities of the defendant’s ordinary place of residence and those
90 See Article 16(5) of the Rome Convention of 1952.
91 See ‘Verslag van de Nederlandse Delegatie naar de Diplomatieke Conferentie tot Herziening
van het Verdrag van Rome van 1952, betreffende Schade door Luchtvaartuigen (te Montreal
van 6 – 23 september 1978)’ (Report of the Dutch delegation on the Diplomatic Conference
to revise the Rome Convention of 1952) at 16 as well as the instruction of the Dutch govern-
ment in Attachment V to the Report.
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of the place where the damage was caused.92 In view of the fact that the
operator was protected by a regime of limited liability, a problem could have
arisen if claims were filed simultaneously before more than one competent
court. In order to preserve its limited liability regime, the Rome Convention
of 1933 provided the following solution to this problem. If several plaintiffs
were to file claims before more than one competent court, the defendant was
permitted to give evidence of the total amount of the outstanding claims and
liabilities before each of these courts in order to prevent that his legal limit
of liability under the Convention were exceeded.93
There is a lot to be said for the jurisdictional solution of the Rome Conven-
tion of 1933, for it provides a reasonably fair balance between the interests
of defendants that are served by the advantages of the forum rei, as well as
most of the plaintiffs, that can also opt to file claims before the nearby forum
delicti of the place of the aircraft accident or incident.94 Even the solution for
the potential problem of rewards in excess of the limited liability regime by
more than one competent court seems feasible, aside from reservations to a
limited liability regime in general. Why then were the provisions on juris-
diction of the Rome Convention of 1933 not simply maintained in the Rome
Convention of 1952? That issue will be discussed in the next sub-paragraph.
3.7.2 Forum delicti as the single forum
During the drafting process of the Rome Convention of 1952, all competent
courts but one were eliminated: the court of the country where the damage
occurred.95
Why a single forum? Toepper has enumerated several reasons for adopting
such a solution. First, the fact that the limited liability regime of the Rome
Convention of 1952 had to be protected; for if a proportional reduction of
claims was to be made, this could best be done by one court. Second, the
notion that a foreign aircraft of a Contracting State, which inflicts surface
damage in another Contracting State, will generally affect the nationals of the
latter State. The courts of the Contracting State in which the damage has arisen
92 See Article 16 of the Rome Convention of 1933. Article 16 has been codified without pre-
judice to any direct action on the part of the injured third party against the insurer in all
cases where such a direct action lies: this means that in such cases, extra tribunals may
be competent to deal with such cases.
93 See Article 11 of the Rome Convention of 1933.
94 In other Conventions, similar provisions on jurisdiction have been enacted; see, for instance,
Article 19 of the Convention on Civil Liability for Damage resulting from Activities Dangerous
to the Environment (Lugano, 21 June 1993). Under Article 19, actions can be brought at the
court of the place where the damage was suffered or where the dangerous activity was
conducted or where the defendant has his habitual residence.
95 See Article 20(1) of the Rome Convention of 1952.
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are thus considered the most appropriate and practical for filing claims from
the perspective of the nationality of the victims. The latter argument can be
substantiated by the notion that cases of surface damage in airports in which
potential victims of many nationalities are involved has always been an ex-
ceptional one.96 Third, the more implicit argument in favor of a single forum
that the operator of a foreign aircraft which flies within the boundaries of
another State and makes use of its navigational aids and facilities, should also
accept the court decisions of that State. And fourth, that the single forum has
the practical advantages of reducing legal costs and facilitating the production
of evidence.97
However, the drawbacks of a single forum seemed to have outnumbered
its advantages by far, which became apparent in Article 15 of the Taormina
draft of the Rome Convention of 1952, in which the single forum was first
introduced.98 One of the main problems was that Article 15 of the Taormina
draft aimed to create a uniform procedure of enforcement of foreign judgments
for claimants. The idea was that claimants would be able to enforce collection
of the judgment made by the court of the place where the damage occurred
(loci delicti) in whatever contracting State the operator had its assets. However,
such a multilateral Convention that recognized and could enforce foreign
judgments had no precedent at the time.99 Aside from that lack of precedent,
the procedural rules set out in Article 15 of the Taormina draft raised a great
number of technical difficulties. For Article 15(4) of the Taormina draft read:
Where any final judgment is pronounced by a competent Court in conformity with
this Convention, whether in the presence of the parties or in default of appearance,
on which execution can be issued according to the law applied by the Court,
execution shall be issued in each of the other Contracting States upon presentation
of a copy of the judgment authenticated in accordance with the law of the State
where the judgment was pronounced. The merits of the case may not be reopened.
96 In modern times, on the other hand, cases of many nationalities suffering damage in one
country could prove to be a more common reality than in the fifties and not only in airports,
but also for instance in large international firms operating worldwide and attracting an
international workforce, see in that context sub-paragraph 3.7.3 of this study.
97 See A. Toepper, Comments on Article 20 of the Rome Convention of 1952, 21 JALC 420, at 421-
422 (1954).
98 See 17 JALC 194, at 194-199 (1950), for the text of the Taormina Draft.
99 See J.C. Cooper, Recognition of Foreign Judgments under Article 15 of Proposed Revision of Rome
Convention, 17 JALC 212, at 212 et seq (1950). Cooper enumerates the many attempts that
have been made by experts in international law to agree on a legal basis for a multilateral
recognition of foreign judgments. These started during a session of the Institute of Inter-
national Law in 1878, but were all to no avail due to all sorts of technical problems, such
as the extent to which the procedure and other conditions of the judgment may be examined
by the court from which the execution of the judgment is requested.
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The exact requirements of the summary procedure (comparable to exequatur)
by which the court presented with the judgment of the court of the loci delicti
could enforce that judgment were not specified at all. Could, for instance, the
defendant be heard before his assets were executed? Specifically for common
law jurisdictions unfamiliar with the exequatur-procedure, a number of prob-
lems would have arisen under the regime of Article 15 of the Taormina draft.
For common law jurisdictions generally required plaintiffs to commence a new
proceeding against defendants before their national courts, in which the foreign
judgment merely functions as evidence to substantiate their claims.100
Aside from such procedural difficulties, the single forum raised a number
of constitutional problems relating to the requirements of due process in the
United States. For the rules of due process required that the defendant must
have had the opportunity to be heard and defend his case before the foreign
court that dealt with the case. An unresolved issue remained if the rather open-
ended wording of Article 15 of the Taormina draft could meet these constitu-
tional requirements.101 In view of the American opposition, Article 15 of the
Taormina draft was modified in two drafting stages (Montreal, June 1950 and
Mexico City, 1951) into the rather complexly formulated Article 20 of the
Mexico City draft. In the new Article 20 of the Mexico City draft, a number
of exemptions to execution of a foreign judgment were provided for.102 The
exemptions of Article 20(6) read:103
the provisions of paragraph (4) of this Article shall not be deemed to require the
issue of execution if the court applied to for execution is satisfied that:
a. the judgment was given by default and that the defendant did not acquire
knowledge of the proceedings in sufficient time to act upon it;
b. the defendant was not given a fair and adequate opportunity to defend his
interests;
c. the judgment is in respect of a cause of action which has already, as between
the same parties, formed the subject of another judgment which is recognized
under the law of that court is final and conclusive;
d. the judgment has been obtained by fraud of any of the parties;
e. the right to enforce the judgment is not vested in the person by whom the
application for execution is made;
f. the judgment is one which is contrary to the public policy of the State in which
that court is located.
These exemptions were literally implemented in article 20 (5) (a-e) and 20(7)
of the Rome Convention of 1952.104 In the end, however, these amendments
100 Cooper at 215.
101 Cooper at 218-219; see also Brown at 427.
102 Brown at 427-428.
103 See 18 JALC 98, at 98-108 (1951), for the text of the Mexico Draft.
104 Article 20(7) of the Rome Convention of 1952 corresponds with article 20 (6) sub f of the
Mexico Draft.
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were not to diminish the controversy of the single forum, especially for the
United States. Ultimately, the choice for a single forum can thus be pointed
out as one of the main obstacles to adherence to the Rome Convention of 1952
for a number of States.
3.7.3 The future. An extra forum actoris?
In retrospect, one of the main reasons for the choice of the single forum of
the loci delicti under the Rome Convention of 1952 turned out to be the notion
that the limited liability regime of the Convention would be best distributed
by one court. This notion can serve as yet another argument against an inter-
national regime based on limited liability in this field: for under an inter-
national regime based on unlimited liability, the potential problem of more
than one competent court rewarding compensation in excess of the legal
limitations would simply not arise. Therefore, a re-introduction of the two
competent courts of the Rome Convention of 1933 seems to provide the most
feasible solution for any update of the Rome Convention of 1952. Such a
solution would again rebalance the interests of potential defendants as well
as most potential plaintiffs. Most, but not all potential plaintiffs. For a final
problem remains unsolved in case of reintroduction of the aforementioned
two competent tribunals. This problem can arise if the potential victim of
surface damage is not a resident of the country in which the damage was
inflicted. This could be the case if a foreign aircraft of a Contracting State
causes damage in an international airport or a large multinational with an
international workforce in another Contracting State. A question for the future
of the system of Rome could be if such a plaintiff should be allowed to file
a claim before a court of the country of his domicile (forum actoris) as an
alternative to the forum delicti and the forum rei under certain conditions. Such
an extra alternative has been contemplated during the deliberations on the
Montreal Convention of 1999 in relation to international air carrier liability
toward passengers. The so-called fifth jurisdiction was ultimately added to
the four competent courts of Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention in Article
33 of the Montreal Convention of 1999. The fifth jurisdiction gives access to
the courts of the country of principal or permanent residence of the passenger
in case of damage resulting from his death or injury if certain cumulative
conditions are met.105 It should be borne in mind that these cumulative condi-
105 The conditions that have to be met have been codified in Article 33 (2) of the Montreal
Convention of 1999, which reads: ‘in respect of damage resulting from the death or injury
of a passenger, an action may be brought before one of the courts mentioned in paragraph
1 of this Article (which is meant to refer to the original four jurisdictions of article 28 of
the Warsaw Convention), or in the territory of a State Party in which at the time of the
accident the passenger has his or her principal and permanent residence and to or from
which the carrier operates services for the carriage of passengers by air, either on its own
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tions are tailored to the specific contractual relationship between passengers
and air carriers and can thus not be automatically applied to the delictual
relationship between third parties and aircraft operators. However, the alter-
native of such an extra jurisdiction based on the principal or permanent
residence of the victim could perhaps make a revised Rome Convention more
attractive for a number of potential adhering States in the future. The United
States may very well insist on such an extra alternative in view of its com-
parable lobby for a fifth jurisdiction during the deliberations on the Montreal
Convention of 1999. The American tourist abroad that is injured by a foreign
(non-US) aircraft of another nationality than that of the country where the
American is staying would then be able to file his claim before a court within
the United States. In order to prevent that the interests of potential plaintiffs
are thus outweighed by those of potential defendants, certain conditions could
be linked to such an extra jurisdiction, for instance that the operator of the
aircraft operates to or from the place of principal or permanent residence of
the plaintiff.106
Recapitulating, a transformation of the single forum into at least the options
of both forum rei and delicti is recommended as a legislative move for future
revision of the Rome Convention of 1952. As an afterthought, the alternative
of a forum actoris could be considered for specific cases wherein the victims
are not permanent residents of the country in damage is suffered. However,
it should be borne in mind that a number of reservations can be made against
that last option, since the forum actoris is generally considered to be ‘exorbitant’
in international cases. Introduction of such an extra alternative would therefore
require the enactment of one or more extra links between the operator of the
implicated aircraft and the country of principal or permanent residence of the
potential victim.107
aircraft, or on another carrier’s aircraft pursuant to a commercial agreement, and in which
that carrier conducts his business of carriage of passengers by air from premises leased
or owned by the carrier itself or by another carrier with which it has a commercial agree-
ment..’.
106 The Montreal Convention of 1999 makes use of the ‘principal and permanent residence’
of the passenger and not his nationality. The principal and permanent residence is defined
as the one fixed and permanent abode of the passenger at the time of the accident in article
33 (3) sub b of the Montreal Convention of 1999. Note that national due process require-
ments within the United States may also have to be met in order to file a claim before an
American court.
107 See J.A. Pontier, Onrechtmatige daad 15 (2001). Pontier points out that the forum rei is
considered to be the most natural forum for the defendant to defend his case as opposed
to the exorbitant forum actoris. The latter is considered to much of a burden for defendants,
as it is located abroad.
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3.8 A RECAPITULATION OF THE ROME CONVENTIONS
The main characteristics of the Rome Conventions of 1933 and 1952 have been
discussed in the previous paragraphs. As has been established, neither has
been greatly successful in terms of number of ratifications.
From the nineteen-sixties onward, the question thus arose for the ICAO
Legal Committee how the failure of the Rome Convention of 1952 could be
transformed into success. Before delving into the official and unofficial attempts
that have been made to update the regime of the Rome Convention of 1952,
a brief recapitulation of its main points will be made in this paragraph. Such
an exercise is deemed useful in order to comprehend what the future holds
for the system of Rome.
The following seven core and in some cases controversial characteristics
of the Rome Conventions have been evaluated in the previous paragraphs
of this chapter:
1 The basis of absolute liability. Despite opposition by a number of delegations,
the basis of absolute liability has been established to be one of the most
fundamental pillars of both Rome Conventions. The policy-based rationale
for absolute liability has been elaborated upon in this Chapter as well as
Chapter 2. An international basis of absolute liability holds a certain time-
less quality of protecting the interests of third parties worldwide against
potential difficulties of having to furnish proof of fault or negligence of
the operators of international aircraft that inflict damage to third parties
on the ground. For any feasible future of the system of Rome, one of the
main difficulties will lie in convincing important opponents of absolute
liability, such as the United States, of the feasibility of absolute liability.
For if it were to be abandoned in favor of an international basis of fault
or negligence, the whole point of the system of Rome would be lost.
2 The scope of liability. The scope of absolute liability of the Rome Convention
of 1952 has not been entirely resolved. The question to what extent damage
caused by noise and sonic boom should fall under the regime will have
to be dealt with in the future. The problem of potential nuclear damage
has been considered in that context by the drafters of the Montreal Protocol
of 1978, as will be seen in more detail in the next paragraph.
3 Defences. Although no major difficulties have arisen in conjunction with
the available defences under the regime of the Rome Convention of 1952,
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States have made
clear that potential defences against damage caused by unlawful use and
the wrongful taking of aircraft may regain importance in the future. In
view of the enormity of the potential surface damage that can be inflicted
by terrorist attacks in which aircraft are used as manned bombs against
surface targets, the question may even be to what extent such scenarios
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can be covered by any future international liability regime at all or should
be partly or wholly excluded.108
4 Limitation of liability. As a cornerstone of the entire system of Rome, the
legally limited liability regime of both Conventions can be pinpointed as
its main burden at the same time. For the limited liability regime has
affected other important areas of the Rome Convention of 1952 as well,
such as its provisions on jurisdiction and the severe escape route from
limited to unlimited liability by means of proof of gross negligence or
wilful misconduct of the operator. Despite its rationale as a protective quid
pro quo for absolute liability, such a regime cannot be implemented fairly
on an international level since potential surface damage can vary so greatly
worldwide and in the course of time. These problems all point to the only
feasible solution: a transformation of the limited liability regime into a
regime based on unlimited liability. Perhaps the only feasible exception
to that rule could lie in a limited liability regime for acts of unlawful
interference, war, or terrorist acts on the grounds that catastrophic risks
should not be borne by aviation alone, which has been evaluated as a
justifiable reason for legally limiting liability.109
As will be seen in the following paragraphs of this Chapter, the prob-
lem of limitation of liability in general has been approached differently
in the Montreal Protocol 1978 and in the drafting suggestions made under
auspices of the International Law Association to update the Rome Conven-
tion of 1952. Both lines of approach hold important lessons for the future
of the system of Rome.
5 Insurance. The complexly formulated but non-compulsory provisions on
insurance or other financial guarantees of the Rome Convention of 1952
have been established to be in need of reconsideration. The fallacy of the
link between legal limitation of liability and the fact that insurance coverage
is also capped should be exposed in the future. The most logical alternative
seems to lie in simplification and a transformation into a compulsory
regime of insurance requirements or other guarantees for international
operators of aircraft for certain minimal levels of coverage. However, the
liability and insurance requirements need not necessarily be combined in
a single instrument in view of their different legal nature.
6 Jurisdiction. The single forum of the loci delicti of the Rome Convention of
1952 has been exposed as a controversial choice, which was largely based
on the limited liability regime of the Convention. Preferably, it should be
abandoned in favor of a combination of the forum delicti and the forum rei
108 See sub-paragraphs 3.11.2 and 3.11.3 of this study on the latest suggestions made in the
new ICAO Draft Convention of 2003 on liability relating to acts of unlawful interference,
war or terrorists acts.
109 See paragraph 2.10 sub 3 and sub-paragraph 3.11.3 of this study.
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of the Rome Convention of 1933. If certain conditions are met, the extra
alternative of the forum actoris could also be considered.
7 Necessity. Put here as a final point of attention, the problem of necessity
concerns the question if an international convention is necessary at all in
view of the notion that (supra) national alternatives could suffice in this
field. This question will be dealt with in the final paragraph of this chapter
as an introduction to such (supra) national alternatives, which will be
discussed in the next chapter.110
In future attempts to revise the system of Rome, these core characteristics will
have to be re-addressed. Next, the main existing attempts to revise the regime
of the Rome Convention of 1952 will be evaluated as a preliminary exploration
to future attempts to do so.
3.9 THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL OF 1978
3.9.1 Introduction
The lack of success of the Rome Convention of 1952 in terms of number of
ratifications and the perceived necessity of amendment in general induced
the ICAO Council to instruct the Legal Committee to re-examine the regime
of the Rome Convention of 1952. In 1967, the Legal Committee focused on
three main controversial issues of the regime on the basis of preliminary work
done by a Legal Subcommittee. These issues concerned the recoverability of
damage from sonic boom, nuclear damage, and the problem of limitation of
liability. The Legal Committee was divided on the question whether sonic
boom should be recoverable under the Convention and could not take a
position on nuclear damage. Furthermore, it was of the opinion that the Legal
Subcommittee would not be able to update the limitation provisions of the
Convention on its own. After six years in which ICAO considered other more
urgent matters concerning the Warsaw Convention, a report on the matter
was filed by the Subcommittee and considered by the Legal Committee in 1973.
On the basis of the findings of the report, a new Subcommittee was set up.
The new Subcommittee also failed to provide solutions for the problems raised
by limitation of liability and the question of recoverability of damage caused
by noise or sonic boom. However, certain Articles of the Rome Convention
of 1952 were amended on the basis of the report of the new Sub-Committee
during the 22nd Session of the Legal Committee in 1976.111 A more definitive
110 See sub-paragraph 3.11.6 of this study.
111 See ICAO Legal Committee, 22nd Session, 1976, Volume II, Documents (1977), at 51-554.
Certain amendments were made to articles 2, 11, 15, 16, 17, 20 and a suggestion was made
to delete articles 22 and 29 of the Rome Convention of 1952. On the limitation of article
11, the remark was made that the amounts of the limits of liability were to be studied by
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draft was made during the 23rd Session, which took the latest developments
on lease, charter and interchange of aircraft into account.112
This preliminary work preceded the International Conference on Air Law
held in Montreal in September 1978, in which the Montreal Protocol of 1978
was adopted. The Conference was attended by delegates of 58 States and
observers of the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the Inter-
national Federation of Airline Pilots Association (IFALPA), the International
Law Association (ILA), and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).113
3.9.2 The provisions under reconsideration
During the International Conference on Air Law held in Montreal in September
1978, the Rome Convention of 1952 was reviewed per Article on the basis of
the proposed amendments made by the Legal Committee during the 22nd and
23rd Sessions. In this sub-paragraph, an overview of the main points under
reconsideration will be given on the basis of a similar division as made in
paragraph 3.8 of this Chapter. The final outcome of the Montreal Protocol of
1978 will be taken into account in sub-paragraph 3.9.3.
1 The basis of absolute liability. The basis of absolute liability was not a point
of discussion or controversy for the Conference.114
2 The scope of liability. The scope of absolute liability was a point of considera-
tion for the Conference. The main problem concerned the question if
damage caused by noise or sonic boom should fall under the scope of
absolute liability of Article 1 of the Rome Convention of 1952. For this issue
had not been settled prior to the Conference by the Legal Committee or
its Legal Subcommittees. The problem led to diverging opinions. A number
of States, such as the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and the Nether-
lands were in favor of excluding damage caused by noise and sonic boom
from the scope of the Convention. France on the other hand, turned out
to be in favor of inclusion, and was backed up by a number of States such
as Brazil and Argentina. At the end of the day, the suggestion of bringing
damage caused by noise or sonic boom within the scope of absolute liabil-
ity did not reach the required majority of 2/3 of the votes during the
Plenary Meeting. Thus, the question whether the Rome Convention of 1952
the diplomatic conference with a view to reach a decision on an acceptable increase of these
limits (expressed in Special Drawing Rights).
112 See G.F. Fitzgerald, The Protocol to Amend the Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft
to Third Parties on the Surface (Rome, 1952) Signed at Montreal, September 23, 1978, McGill
Annals of Air and Space Law 29, at 32-36 (1979).
113 See the Final Act of the International Conference on Air Law held under the auspices of
the International Civil Aviation Organization at Montreal in September 1978.
114 Fitzgerald at 38.
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as amended by the Montreal Protocol of 1978 is applicable to noise and
sonic boom remains unresolved to this day.115
3 Defences. The defences available under the absolute liability regime of the
Rome Convention of 1952 were not considered to be an important issue
during the Conference.116
4 Limitation of liability. The deliberations on limitation of liability that were
made during the Conference provide an interesting and convincing
example of the futility of such an exercise on an international level. For
if one starts deliberating on the appropriate level of limitation instead of
on the feasibility of an international system of liability based on legal
limitation in the first place, such an exercise will be predictably futile.
During the Conference, a number of delegations favored a regime based
on unlimited liability, such as the United States, Canada, and the United
Kingdom. On the other hand, the delegations in favor of a limited liability
regime ventured widely diverging opinions on how to transform the
existing limits of the Rome Convention of 1952 to more acceptable levels
for 1978. Bearing in mind that their suggestions were merely based on their
own preconceived ideas on level of necessary protection of their national
operators, the following amusing variety of suggestions saw the light of
day.117 Brazil and Ecuador favored an increase of the exiting limits by
five times, Argentina and Chile by six times, and France, Japan, and Nor-
way by ten times. A ‘reasonable increase’ of the limits was considered
adequate by the Federal Republic of Germany and the U.S.S.R and a
‘moderate increase’ by Spain and the Ukrainian S.S.R; ‘very high limits’
were propagated by Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland.118 The Dutch del-
egation linked the weight of 320,000 kilo of the Boeing 747 to a limit of
$ 28,000,000, which amounted to ten times the original limit of the Rome
Convention of 1952. In the sixth meeting of the Commission as a Whole
that amount was accepted as a maximum tier of limitation.119
115 See ‘Verslag van de Nederlandse Delegatie naar de Diplomatieke Conferentie tot Herziening
van het Verdrag van Rome van 1952, betreffende schade door luchtvaartuigen (te Montreal
van 6 – 23 september 1978)’ (Report of the Dutch Delegation on the Conference to revise
the Rome Convention of 1952), at 13-14.
116 Some proposals were made to amend certain defences. The IATA, for instance, suggested
to amend the defence of contributory negligence in a manner that took the pre-existing
physical condition of the third party that suffered damage into account, see Fitzgerald at
40; however, none of these amendments were adopted.
117 This was also due to the fact that the Conference was not based on any hard economic
data on matters such as insurance and levels of coverage, etc. For the only paper containing
such data (which was submitted by the International Law Association) had no official status,
see Fitzgerald at 44 and 50.
118 Fitzgerald at 41.
119 Fitzgerald at 43-45.
Chapter 3 95
Similar discussions evolved on the weight categories expressed in
Article 11 of the Rome Convention of 1952. A number of delegates pre-
ferred a reduction of the existing number of weight categories and a num-
ber wanted to add extra categories. Divergence of opinion also prevailed
on the limit of liability per person as enacted in Article 11 (2) of the Rome
Convention of 1952. Suggested alternatives ranged from $ 40,000 to $
240,000.120
At the end of the day, the discussions on the appropriate levels of
limitation culminated into four main proposals made by the U.S.S.R.,
Norway, Argentina and a block of eleven other South American States,
and France. These proposals were discussed in the ninth and tenth meeting
of the Commission as a whole and were to be unified by a specific working
group on the matter. The working group came up with two options. The
first option was based on a relatively small increase of the limits as pre-
ferred by the South American block and the second alternative was based
on a relatively greater increase of the limits as propagated by France.121
The final outcome was based on a compromise between these two alter-
natives.122
Another amendment which was made during the Conference concerned
the manner in which the limits were to be expressed. The Poincaré Gold
Franc of the Rome Convention of 1952 was substituted by the more modern
Special Drawing Rights (SDR) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).123
5 Insurance. The insurance provisions of the Rome Convention of 1952 were
evaluated during the Conference. However, the Swiss-Norwegian proposal
to make them compulsory was rejected. More successful amendments
included the deletion of Articles 15(3)-(6) and a simplification of Article
15(7), which was transformed into a new Article 15(2). The defences avail-
able to insurers were also simplified.124
6 Jurisdiction. Despite the objections against the single forum of the State
where the damage occurred, the provisions on jurisdiction were not
amended in structurally. Only a number of slight technical amendments
to Article 20(4) were made.125
7 Necessity. If the relatively small number of approximately 60 delegations
that participated in the Conference is taken as a yardstick, the impression
of relative unimportance of the Protocol that had already became apparent
120 Fitzgerald at 42-43.
121 The first (South American) proposal was based on an upper limit of $24,951,000 for a Boeing
747 and a personal limit of $125,000; the second (French) proposal was based on an upper
limit of $28,622,000 for a Boeing 747 and a personal limit of $250,000, see Fitzgerald at 50-51.
122 See paragraph 3.9.3 of this study.
123 Fitzgerald at 46-47. In September 1978, 1 SDR equalled approximately $ 1.3.
124 Fitzgerald at 55-59.
125 Fitzgerald at 59-60.
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by the lack of popularity of the Rome Convention of 1952 is strengthened.
The more important aviation-generating nations, such as the United States
and Great Britain, hardly even participated in the discussions at all and
the Protocol was hardly ratified. The probable reasons for this overall lack
of enthusiasm will be evaluated in more detail at the end of this Chapter.
3.9.3. The final outcome
The final outcome of the Conference, the Montreal Protocol of 1978, reveals
that the only major amendment of the Rome Convention of 1952 that was
achieved consisted of a raise of its limits, which were now expressed in Special
Drawing Rights. The main new categories of Article III (1) of the Montreal
Protocol of 1978 were:
a. 300 000 Special Drawing Rights for aircraft weighing 2000 kilograms or less;
b. 300 000 Special Drawing Rights plus 175 Special Drawing Rights per kilogram
over 2000 kilograms for aircraft weighing more than 2000 but not exceeding
6000 kilograms;
c. 1 000 000 Special Drawing Rights plus 62.5 Special Drawing Rights per kilogram
over 6000 kilograms for aircraft weighing more than 6000 but not exceeding
30 000 kilograms;
d. 2 500 000 Special Drawing Rights plus 65 Special Drawing Rights per kilogram
over 30 000 kilograms for aircraft weighing more than 30 000 kilograms.
According to Article III (2) of the Protocol, liability in respect of loss of life
or personal injury was not to exceed 125 000 Special Drawing Rights per
person.126
Article 14 of the Rome Convention was deleted and replaced by Article
IV, which specified the manner of division of the limitations set out in the
Protocol if the total amount of damage exceeded these limitations. If such
claims were exclusively in respect of loss of life or personal injury or
exclusively in respect of damage to property, they were to be reduced
proportionately (Article IV(a)). If claims were made in both categories, the total
sum distributable was to be appropriated preferentially to meet proportionately
the claims in respect of loss of life and personal injury. The remainder, if any,
of the total sum distributable was subsequently to be distributed
proportionately among the claims in respect of damage of property.’(Article
IV(b)). The formulation of the latter scenario was open-ended and left the
126 States not member to the International Monetary Fund were allowed to fix the limits on
the basis of so-called monetary units. A monetary unit corresponded to sixty-five and a
half milligrammes of gold of millesimal fineness nine hundred in 1978, see Article III (4)
of the Montreal Protocol of 1978.
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question on how to divide the limits between the two main categories of
personal injury and property damage to the discretion of the courts.
Minor amendments were also made to the insurance provisions of Chapter
III of the Rome Convention of 1952, but which failed to reach a compulsory
status under the Protocol.127 A more important modification held that the
Convention shall not apply to nuclear damage.128
As a whole, the final outcome of the Montreal Protocol of 1978 makes clear
that the only substantial change to the regime of the Rome Convention of 1952
consisted of an increase of its limits of liability, including a raise of the limit
for personal injury. And the limited liability regime has been labeled as the
key attribute as well as the key problem to the entire system of Rome. Limita-
tion can simply not be codified fairly on an international basis in any fashion
due to the fact that damage to persons and property can vary so enormously
worldwide. Furthermore, any choice of limits can be qualified as random, since
the correlation between weight of the aircraft and subsequent damage need
not necessarily exist. As has been proven by the Montreal Protocol of 1978,
the amendment of the system of Rome by means of potentially endless updates
of its limited regime of liability is therefore predictably futile. Moreover the
resistance against limited liability regimes in this field by important potential
adherents to the system of Rome such as the United States has become
apparent. The inevitable question then arises how to amend the system in a
more satisfactory manner in order to meet the needs of the future. In that
context, the proposals made under auspices of the International Law Associ-
ation in the eighties can help provide interesting alternatives.
3.10 THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION PROPOSALS
3.10.1 Introduction
Aside from the official legislative route taken by the international legislature
in the field of third party liability from the twenties up to the drafting of the
Montreal Protocol of 1978, the Air Law Committee of the International Law
Association (ILA) made a proposal to integrate the regimes of contractual and
delictual liability of international air operators and air carriers into one instru-
ment in 1967. The proposal was based on the pillars of absolute, unlimited,
and secured liability and resulted in three separate reports by Bodenschatz
127 See Articles V, VI, VII, and VIII of the Montreal Protocol of 1978. One of the main changes
consisted of a transformation of the term ‘security’ into ‘guarantee.’
128 See Article XIV of the Montreal Protocol of 1978. The suggestion for this amendment was
made by the French delegation, see ‘Verslag van de Nederlandse Delegatie naar de Diploma-
tieke Conferentie tot Herziening van het Verdrag van Rome van 1952, betreffende Schade
door Luchtvaartuigen (te Montreal van 6 – 23 September 1978)’ (Report of the Dutch
Delegation on the Diplomatic Conference to revise the Rome Convention of 1952, at 12.
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on surface damage, by Guldimann on aerial collisions, and by Rosevaer on
air carrier’s liability. These reports were presented during the next ILA Confer-
ence in Buenos Aires in 1968. After a number of years with more urgent
matters on the agenda, the topic of third party liability resurfaced during the
Madrid Conference of 1976 in the form of a report on a single convention
which was presented by Mankiewicz. This report was transformed into a
Memorandum on an Integrated System of Aviation Liability and distributed
among a working group on this subject. The working group revised the report,
which was subsequently submitted to the Air Law Committee during the 59th
Conference of the International Law Association in Belgrade in 1980.129 The
report contained the following three guidelines for further work by the Air
Law Committee:
1 There shall be an integrated system of civil aviation liability in international
carriage by air and in respect of surface damage;
2 All claims shall be channeled through respectively the carrier and the
operator of the aircraft;
3 Compensation for personal injuries, including death, shall be based on the
principle of absolute, unlimited and secured liability.
The first 17 points of the report contained an evaluation and criticism of the
limited contractual liability regime of the system of Warsaw and will not be
dealt with in further detail. Nor will the in itself interesting idea of an inte-
grated system of contractual and delictual liability be expounded upon in more
detail, as these two main branches of international private air law have
remained on different legislative tracks in reality to this day. However, points
18 to 22 of the report are of interest for this study as they dealt specifically
with the problem of surface damage. According to that part of the report, the
problem of liability to third parties raised similar questions as those raised
in the field of liability to ‘second’ parties, the passengers of international air
carriers. Moreover the Rome Convention of 1952 was deemed totally obsolete,
despite its ‘cosmetic surgery’ by means of the Montreal Protocol of 1978.130
The central assumption of the report was that the solution to the problem
of liability for surface damage would lie in an international regime based on
a combination of absolute and unlimited liability of the aircraft operator or
carrier, which was to be backed up by compulsory insurance or other financial
guarantees. Such a regime would enable victims to claim directly from the
implicated aircraft operator or carrier. Certain scenarios of potential damage
that were covered by other Conventions were exempted from the regime, for
example those involving nuclear damage. Ideally, claims against other poten-
129 See the International Law Association, Report of the Fifty-Ninth Conference, Belgrade (1980),
at 471-472. The working group consisted of Böckstiegel, Bodenschatz, Chaveau, Guldimann,
Manciewicz, Matte, and Nys.
130 See the International Law Association, Report of the Fifty-Ninth Conference, Belgrade (1980),
at 473-480.
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tially liable parties aside from the implicated aircraft operator(s) or carrier(s)
would be legally blocked or at least discouraged. The fact that the regime was
to be based on unlimited liability of the aircraft operator or carrier was felt
to provide for sufficient disincentive to claim from other potentially liable
parties anyhow. It was held that rules of subrogation would enable liable
aircraft operators or carriers to reclaim from such other liable parties
proportionately dependant on the circumstances of the case.131 As the quan-
tum of potential surface damages would largely depend on the place of the
aviation accident or incident, the report held that a combination of the forum
loci and lex loci would not give rise to great problems.132
On the basis of the report, a revised report which included two draft
proposals on appropriate instruments was drawn up. These proposals will
be discussed in the next sub-paragraph.
3.10.2 The two draft proposals
Two draft proposals on an integrated system of aviation liability were sub-
mitted to the 60th Conference of the International Law Association which was
held in Montreal in 1982.
The first draft consisted of a Protocol of four articles, which was drawn
up by Manciewicz. The Protocol aimed to modify any existing international
or national instrument in the field of aircraft operator or carrier liability vis-à-
vis passengers or third parties. Such a modification would transform the
applicable regime into one based on absolute and unlimited liability of the
aircraft operator or carrier and was meant to channel the liability to the aircraft
operator or carrier on a mandatory basis. In return those entities would be
subrogated wholly or partly for compensation granted to passengers or ground
victims in case of (co-) liability of other parties.133
The second draft was drawn up by Bin Cheng and Dutheil de la Rochère
and a Working Group and consisted of an entire Draft Convention. The Draft
Convention aimed to unify the fragmented contractual and delictual systems
of international private air law of Warsaw and Rome into one Convention.
The Draft Convention consisted of a first part on international carriage by air
(‘Part One’) and a second part on surface damage caused by foreign aircraft
131 See the International Law Association, Report of the Fifty-Ninth Conference, Belgrade (1980),
at 484.
132 See the International Law Association, Report of the Fifty-Ninth Conference, Belgrade (1980),
at 483. It should be remarked that this assertion has not proven to be entirely true in the
past in view of the objections raised to the single forum by mainly common law jurisdic-
tions, as has been described in paragraph 3.7 of this study.
133 See Bin Cheng, News from international organisations, International Law Association – An
integrated system of aviation liability: draft protocol and convention, VIII Air Law 126, at 126-127
(1983).
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(‘Part Two’). The aim of this division was that both parts of the Draft Conven-
tion could be treated and accepted as separate conventions. Contrary to the
regime of the aforementioned Protocol, liability was not channeled to the
aircraft operator or carrier on a mandatory basis under the Draft Convention.
During the Air Law Working Session of 3 September 1982, Bin Cheng remarked
that a practical, de facto type of channeling was intended.134
The suggested amendments of ‘Part Two’ of the Draft Convention will be
discussed on the basis of the division into main areas of importance of the
regime of the Rome Convention of 1952 as described previously in paragraph
3.8 of this Chapter.135
1 The basis of absolute liability. The basis of absolute liability of Article 1 of
the Rome Convention of 1952 was retained under the Draft Convention.136
2 The scope of liability. The scope of absolute liability of Article 1 of the Rome
Convention of 1952 was broadened as to cover all damage, including
supersonic damage by a slight rewording of the Article. The exemption
of potential damage caused by aircraft flying in conformity with air traffic
regulations was retained. This seems to imply that damage caused by too
low flight in non-conformity with air traffic regulations was also to be
covered by the regime of the Draft Convention. Unfortunately, that nuance
was not specified by the drafters.137
3 Defences. The defences of Article 4, 5, 6, as well as references to the defences
available to the owners of aircraft under Article 8 of the Rome Convention
of 1952 were left intact in identical Articles 4, 5, 6, and 8 of the Draft Con-
vention.138 In accordance with the channeling principle, the aircraft
operator or carrier was provided with a right of recourse against other
(co)liable third parties, such as the producers of aircraft or aircraft com-
ponents.139
4 Limitation of liability. In order to provide for a system based on unlimited
liability, the Articles 11 to 14 on limitation of liability of the Rome Conven-
tion of 1952 were simply deleted in the Draft Convention.140
134 See Bin Cheng (1983), at 126-127; the International Law Association, Report of the Sixtieth
Conference, Montreal (1982), at 583-584.
135 The text of the Draft Convention is contained in the International Law Association, Report
of the Sixtieth Conference, Montreal (1982), at 557-582. Part Two, ‘Surface Damage by
Foreign Aircraft’, is a redraft of the Rome Convention of 1952, hereinafter cited as the Draft
Convention.
136 See Article 1 of the Draft Convention.
137 See Article 1(1) of the Draft Convention and the comments on Article 1, at 574-575. Note
that the exclusions of the Rome Convention of 1952 have been left intact, e.g. aerial collisions
(Article 24), and nuclear damage (Article 27), see Bin Cheng (1983), at 132.
138 See the Draft Convention at 575-576.
139 See Bin Cheng (1983), at 132.
140 See the Comments to Chapter II – Extent of Liability of the Draft Convention, at 577.
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5 Insurance. Contrary to the facultative insurance requirements of the Rome
Convention of 1952, the Draft Convention enacted a mandatory system
and restored the term “security”.141 The new Article 15 of the Draft Con-
vention read:
Article 15.
1. Every operator is required to maintain insurance or other forms of security
including guarantees covering his liability for such damage as may arise
under this Convention in such amount, of such type and in such terms
as the State of registry of the aircraft and the State of the operator, if they
be different, may specify. The operator may be required by the State over-
flown to provide evidence that this condition has been fulfilled by pro-
ducing appropriate certificate or certificates from the State or States con-
cerned.
2. Direct action shall lie against the person furnishing financial security
pursuant to the above paragraph, if the law of the competent court so
provides.
Article 15 corresponded to Article 35A of Part 1 of the Draft Convention,
in which a similar compulsory insurance regime for contractual liability
of international air carriers was drafted.142 The rationale for compulsory
insurance can be found in the commentary on Article 35A, and applies
similarly in relation to third party liability. In short, compulsory insurance
coverage would ensure that potential liability of the aircraft operator or
air carrier would be met. Technical details on matters such as the level
of required coverage and the types of permitted security were left to the
discretion of adhering States. The Draft Convention also allowed compensa-
tion funds or insurance pools to be created on a national, supranational,
or international basis, which could be addressed whenever the damage
arising from an aviation accident or incident was in excess of the com-
pulsory level of coverage. The drafters pointed out that similar funds
existed in the field of maritime insurance.143
The possibility of direct actions of third parties against insurers was
left to the discretion of the law of the lex fori. According to Böckstiegel,
such direct actions would channel liability through the implicated insurance
companies. That could be advantageous for the implicated aircraft operators
or air carriers, as their role in the aftermath of aviation accidents or in-
cidents is then reduced and simplified. Evidently, a de facto type of channel-
ing without a formal legal basis is also possible by simply authorizing
insurance companies to take over the claims handling.144 However, it
141 See the Comments to Chapter III – Security for Operator’s Liability, at 577.
142 See the Draft Convention at 572-573. The wording of Article 35A of the Draft Convention
was based on Article VII (1) and II (7) of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability
for Nuclear Damage.
143 See the Draft Convention, comments on Article 35A, at 573.
144 See the Draft Convention, comments on Article 35A, at 573.
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should be noted that an important objection which was raised against direct
actions in this study concerns the fact that it can lead to situations in which
plaintiffs obtain more rights against the insurers than the insured parties
themselves.
Another interesting but more controversial revision was drafted in
Article 15A of the Draft Convention, which read:
Article 15A. In cases where an operator and the person furnishing financial
security pursuant to this Article both fail to meet their liabilities arising under
this Convention, and in those cases where the State of registry and the State
of the operator both allow the operator to obtain financial security only up
to specified maxima, the State or States issuing the certificate of insurance or
other forms of security shall be responsible for the liabilities of the operator
and of the persons furnishing such financial security arising under this Conven-
tion to the extent to which such liabilities have not been met.
Article 15A would ultimately make the State of registry liable for scenarios
where the operator and the insurer(s) both fail to meet their liabilities. It
immediately becomes apparent that it would be an unwise move for States
to only allow financial security coverage up to certain maxima as opposed
to certain minima. The question also arises whether such a formulation
is realistic in view of the fact that States are unlikely to resort to legally
compulsory maxima anyhow.
The comments on this provision reveal that the drafters were inspired
by precedents in the field of space law. The drafters were of the opinion
that a regime based on secured liability will generally guarantee that
compensation shall be paid, but that Article 15A of the Draft Convention
would provide an extra safeguard by ultimately implicating the State of
registry.145 Despite the attractiveness of this provision from the per-
spective of potential victims, one can seriously question the willingness
of adhering States to accept such a solution in view of the fact that far less
aircraft are partly or wholly owned by States than in the past. Why then,
should they automatically become implicated under the scenarios sketched
by Article 15A?
That question has become particularly relevant in relation to the risks
posed by terrorism in the aftermath of ‘9/11’. Although ‘9/11’ has made
clear that governments may resort to the creation of specific compensation
funds or other forms of temporary aid of the aviation industry on a more
or less facultative basis, it is highly questionable if any State will accept
full liability to the extent that the liabilities of the implicated operators and
their insurers have not been met in view of the potential enormity of the
145 See the Draft Convention, comments on Article 35B, at 573-574.
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damage involved in acts of terrorism related to aviation.146 Therefore,
a system whereby State aid and/or other governmental measures are per-
mitted on an ad-hoc basis would seem a more preferable and feasible
alternative to automatic State liability in cases of excessive surface damage.
Article 15B of the Draft Convention completed the security provisions
of the Draft Convention and read:
Article 15B. Contracting States undertake to consult, if necessary under the
auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organisation, with the view of
establishing a common fund for the purpose of meeting the consequences of
any catastrophic aviation accident, the incidence of which exceeds the capability
of any individual State.
Again in light of the recent terrorist attacks on the United States, schemes
by which such common funds are created have become of renewed interest
for major aviation disasters that exceed the compensation capability of
individual aircraft operators or even of States. The comments on this Article
point out that the drafters were inspired by a similar, but more strongly
worded provision of this nature as derived from the 1972 Space liability
Convention. At the time of drafting, no similar common fund construction
existed in air law.147
Generally speaking, the open question for the future would be to what
extent States are willing to formally take over responsibility or liability
of aircraft operators and their insurers in cases of catastrophic aviation
accidents, which exceed all normal monetary expectations in terms of
damage. The implication of States by the drafters can thus both be qualified
as both the strong and weak point of these suggested amendments to the
insurance and security provisions. Strong in the sense that the funding
approach has become of renewed interest, and weak in the sense that
automatic State liability would arise under the amendments in any case
of failure of the implicated operators and their insurers to meet their
liabilities. However, it should be remarked that such criticism is easy to
express in hindsight, as nobody could have foreseen the new level of risk
posed by terrorism prior to ‘9/11’. As a perhaps more feasible alternative
for the aftermath of ‘9/11’, a system whereby any reference to State re-
sponsibility is excluded by merely requiring that aircraft operators or air
carriers should take out adequate insurance coverage up to certain minimal
146 Apparently, Guldimann also expressed reservations on the subject, although these have
not been specified in the comments, see the Draft Convention, comments on Article 35B,
at 574. The comments also make clear that scenarios such as the terrorist attacks of ‘9/11’
were clearly not foreseen by anybody at the time, as they read: “it should perhaps be
mentioned that in practice, it is most unlikely that Article 35B(/15A) will ever be invoked.
But here again, organisations such as ICAO can play a useful role in setting up compensa-
tion funds among members, which will no doubt be useful to those States which are anxious
not to shoulder such contingent liabilities of their own.”
147 See the comments to Article 15B of the Draft Convention, at 578.
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(and not maximal) levels of coverage is recommended. Ad hoc measures
could then be taken by States on a case by case basis in cases of surface
damage which severely exceed normal levels of obtainable insurance
coverage.
6 Jurisdiction. The ‘single forum’ of Article 20 of the Rome Convention was
maintained in Article 20 the Draft Convention, albeit with slight amend-
ments that deleted all references to limitation of liability.148 In view of
the problems that have arisen for mainly the common law jurisdictions
in relation to the single forum during the drafting process of the Rome
Convention of 1952, this can be qualified as a remarkable step by the
Drafters. As has been described in this Chapter, one of the main arguments
in favor of the single forum was that such a forum would be best equipped
to apportion the legal limits of a limited liability regime amongst plaintiffs
without interference from other competent courts in other Contracting
States. For such a solution could lead to difficulties in view of the fact that
more courts in different States would have to divide the applicable limit
of liability between third parties that bring their case before these courts.
Since the limited liability of the Rome Convention of 1952 has been
abandoned in the Draft Convention, that rationale for a single forum has
also vanished. A far more feasible solution thus seems to be to add at least
the jurisdiction of the place of domicile or permanent residence of the
aircraft operator or carrier to the single forum of the loci delicti. Such a
solution would correspond with the provision on jurisdiction of the Rome
Convention of 1933.
Taken as a whole, however, the regime of absolute, unlimited, and secured
liability of ‘Part Two’ of the Draft Convention can be seen as a remarkable
step forward in bringing the current system of Rome up to date, despite the
fact that it has never seen formal codification. For it managed to finally break
with any form of legal limitation of liability, which kept haunting the official
instruments of the system of Rome. In the next sub-paragraph, the main
objections raised against the innovations of the Draft Convention will be
evaluated.
3.10.3 Objections raised against the ILA proposals
Despite the fact that the objections that were raised against the Draft Conven-
tion mostly referred to Part One (contractual liability), a number of points these
objections are also of relevance for Part Two. The main objections were to:
148 See Article 20 of the Draft Convention, at 579-580.
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The basis of absolute liability
The basis of absolute liability was attacked as being too novel for a number
of States. These objections can be refuted on various grounds. First, the basis
of absolute liability was agreed upon by most States in the process of codifica-
tion of the system of Rome, as has been established in the course of this
chapter. Second, such a basis of liability had already been enacted in a great
number of national regimes in this field in the past, as has also been evaluated
in this Chapter. And third, the argument raised by Bin Cheng can be men-
tioned that one of the States that most strongly objected to absolute liability,
the United States, had agreed upon such a basis of liability in another inter-
national air law instrument, the Montreal Agreement of 1966. Ergo, the prin-
ciple of absolute liability could very well be accepted by adhering States in
the future.149
The channeling of liability to the operator
The channeling principle was criticized on the grounds of being too burden-
some for the implicated aircraft operator or air carrier. Although this may be
valid to a certain extent if such channeling of liability is made mandatory as
under the Protocol drafted by Manciewicz, the Draft Convention does not
forcefully channel liability to the operator. The line of reasoning of the drafters
of the latter instrument simply holds that as the Draft Convention is based
on absolute, unlimited, and secured liability of the aircraft operator or air
carrier, the most logical step for claimants will subsequently be to claim from
him and not from other potentially liable parties which are perhaps subjected
to less favorable regimes of liability. Evidently the aircraft operator or air
carrier should subsequently be permitted to (re)claim from any other liable
party. But such a regime does not preclude claims made by victims from other
parties.150
The principle of unlimited liability in view of its uninsurability
A number of reservations were made to the introduction of a regime based
on unlimited liability. The reservations were based on the rationale that
regimes based on unlimited liability are not insurable, since coverage provided
by insurers will always be capped to certain levels of coverage. As no insurer
can provide blanket coverage for third party liability, it follows that the legal
liability of the operators of aircraft should also be capped by means of a legal
limitation of his liability. The argument of cost of insurance premiums was
149 See Bin Cheng (1983), at 134. Notably, the United States have also ratified the Montreal
Convention of 1999 on 5 September 2003, which is also based on a (two-tier) system of
absolute liability, see the list of ratifications of international air law treaties at www.icao.org.
150 See the comments made by Bin Cheng during the Air Law Working Session of Friday,
September 3, 1982, in: the International Law Association, Report of the Sixtieth Conference,
Montreal (1982), at 583-585.
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raised in that context, of which any economical analysis was unfortunately
lacking at the time.151 With this argument, the drafters’ assurance that in-
surance premiums were relatively cheap was perhaps justly countered to a
certain degree, as insurance premiums can fluctuate, dependant on the situation
in aviation insurance markets and the specific risks involved. Insurance of
war and terrorist risks, for instance, has evidently become troublesome after
September 11, 2001.152 The question remains if this argument is valid if taken
in a broader sense. The point then becomes that the link between insurability,
limited liability and surface damage cannot be made on an international level
fairly for the simple reason that surface damage can vary enormously, as has
been illustrated previously in this Chapter. As a main rule, a regime of absolute
and unlimited liability combined with capped insurability should thus prevail.
The risks posed by war and terrorism should be seen as exceptions to the rule,
which grant special treatment.
The rationale for a combination of capped insurability and unlimited
liability can also be derived from the notion that in absence of any specific
regime in this field, fault liability under civil law or negligence under common
law would also give rise to unlimited liability, which can only be insured up
to certain levels. Under the regime of the Draft Convention, the basis of fault
or negligence is simply transformed into the more severe basis of absolute
liability in order to facilitate the process of claiming from the aircraft operator
for its potential victims on the ground.
The fact that States were made guarantors to security under the conditions of the
Draft Convention
As has been described in the previous sub-paragraph, the renewed security
provisions of the Draft Convention could lead to liability of adhering States
under the conditions set out in Article 15A. The objection against such a
construction held that insofar as states were thus made guarantors, this was
premature having regard to the state of development of international aviation
of the time.153 As has been touched upon briefly in the previous paragraph,
this still is a valid objection, which is open to discussion in the future. The
open question remains to what extent States will be willing to guarantee
compensation in excess of obtainable insurance coverage or in excess of com-
pensation that can be made by the operators themselves in major aviation
151 See, e.g., the reservations made by Milde and Gertzler during the Working Session of Friday,
September 3, 1982, in: the International Law Association, Report of the Sixtieth Conference,
Montreal (1982), at 586 and 588-589.
152 Bin Cheng countered the argument of uninsurability by holding that the rise in premiums
would be relatively small and that many countries had already introduced regimes of
unlimited liability for carriers flying domestically, see Doo Hwan Kim, Some Considerations
of the Draft for the Convention on an Integrated System of International Aviation Liability, 53 JALC
765, at 781 (1988).
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disasters. In response to the terrorist attacks on the United States of September
11, 2001, a great number of states worldwide have indeed agreed to cover the
risks posed by terrorism in excess of the very limited coverage offered by
insurers in reaction to those attacks. But, as will be seen in more detail in this
study, such measures were only of a temporary nature.154
Despite these points of critique, the suggestions made under auspices of
the International Law Association to update the system of Rome based on the
pillars of absolute, unlimited, and secured liability as a whole are bold and
refreshing and can serve as a useful basis for reconsideration of the system
of Rome in the future. Perhaps the most important amendment lies in the brave
abandonment of the system of limitation, which has proven to be such a
burden to success in the past.
In the next and final paragraph of this Chapter, an overall evaluation of
the system of Rome will be given, including a number of suggestions for its
potential amendment in the future. The question of necessity of an international
regime in this field will be addressed and can serve as an introduction to
(supra) national alternatives to an international air law regime in this field.
3.11 FINAL REMARKS AND CONCLUSIONS
In this Chapter, the system of Rome has been described. As has become
apparent, the system has not been successful if measured in terms of number
of ratifications. However, the system of Rome has managed to raise the prob-
lem of liability for surface damage to an international legislative level. A final
review of the main aspects of the regime can help point out its strong points
and deficiencies, which may be of use for future attempts to update the system
of Rome. As a matter of interest, the findings of this Chapter will be compared
with the latest preliminary version of the Draft Convention on Damage Caused
by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface as prepared by the ICAO Secre-
tariat.155 The instrument will be referred as the ICAO Draft Convention in
order to distinguish it from the ILA Draft Convention in this comparison.
The findings of this Chapter will be evaluated in the following sub-para-
graphs 3.11.1–3.11.6 on the basis of the main characteristics of the current
system of Rome.
154 See in more detail paragraph 5.10 of this study.
155 In the version of Secretariat Draft No. 2 of 1 August 2003, as contained in the Memorandum
to the Members, ICAO Secretariat Study Group on the Modernization of the Rome Conven-
tion, SSG-MR/3-Memo/5, of 07/08/03.
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3.11.1 On the basis and scope of absolute liability
As a central pillar of the system of Rome, the international basis of absolute
liability of Rome can be qualified as the best option in view of the arguments
raised in its favor in this study. In short, the basis of absolute liability helps
simplify the process of obtaining compensation for damages from the operators
of aircraft for victims of surface damage by eliminating the traditional require-
ments of proof of unlawfulness and/or fault or negligence of the operator.
Unfortunately, the exact scope of absolute liability under the system of Rome
has not been resolved entirely, due to uncertainties concerning the potential
recoverability of damage caused by noise and sonic boom. That scope will
have to be clarified in the future. It should be borne in mind that under the
current phraseology of Article 1 of the Rome Convention, damage caused by
flight in non-conformity with air traffic regulations seems to be recoverable,
e.g. damage caused by too low overflight, although this was probably not the
intention of the drafters. The drafters of the ILA Draft Convention suggested
to encompass damage caused by sonic boom into the scope of absolute liability.
In view of the severe basis of absolute liability to which operators of aircraft
are subjected under the system of Rome, it seems no more than justified to
limit the scope of such liability as much as possible as a ‘quid pro quo’ to that
severe basis. Preferably, only cases of actual impact of the aircraft or parts
of the aircraft should be covered. For in case of genuine accidents, proof of
fault or negligence will generally be more difficult to furnish than in cases
of damage caused by (too low) overflight, due to factors such as the destruction
of the aircraft. Even very serious cases of damage inflicted by noise or sonic
boom due to mere overflight, which may cause damage to third parties on
the surface, are preferably left to the general rules of fault liability or negli-
gence or other applicable headings of liability for that reason.
In both preliminary versions of Article 3 of the ICAO Draft Convention,
the basis of absolute liability has been retained by a literal application of Article
1(1) of the Rome Convention of 1952. This means that the question could still
be raised if damage caused by flight in non-conformity with air traffic regula-
tions falls under the scope of absolute liability, which, as has been argued,
should not be the case.156
Notably, environmental damage has also been brought under the scope
of absolute liability in the first preliminary version of Article 3. In view of the
arguments raised in favor of a limited scope of absolute liability as a quid pro
quo for its severity, the question of recoverability of environmental damage
would largely depend on circumstances of the case. If construed narrowly
as the costs of any reasonable measures to effect environmental clean-up in
156 See both versions of Article 3 paragraphs (1)(2) of the ICAO Draft Convention.
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the aftermath of aviation accidents, a case could be made for inclusion.157
However, a too broad scope of recoverability of environmental damage,
especially in relation to cases in which the implicated aircraft do not crash,
is not recommendable, as this could stretch the scope of absolute liability and
subsequent legal causation too far.
3.11.2 On defences
The regime of the system of Rome has been qualified as absolute as it not only
dispenses with fault, but also dispenses with the normal defenses available
and does not necessarily require that the damage is caused by the person to
be held liable under the regime.158 Contributory negligence has been estab-
lished to be one of the main defences available to operators of aircraft
addressed by the system of Rome.
In view of the recent terrorist attacks of September 11 on the United States,
the problem of wrongful use and subsequent potential liability of the operator
for such wrongful use has regained enormous importance, especially if such
wrongful use leads to such deliberately inflicted surface damage on a grand
scale as in ‘9/11’ through the use of aircraft as weapons of destruction. Most
likely, a total exclusion of such cases from the absolute liability regime of the
system of Rome would be the most appropriate course for the future, e.g. by
encompassing the defence of an act of a third party into the absolute liability
regime. Another option would lie in a severely limited liability regime for
damage caused by acts of war and terrorism, of which the legal limitations
should preferably be linked to obtainable insurance coverage for the risks
posed by war and terrorism. The legal aftermath of really catastrophic events
such as ‘9/11’ could then be wholly or partly taken over by means of specific
governmental compensation funds and kept outside of the realm of liability
law as much as possible.
In the preliminary version of Article 12 of the ICAO Draft Convention,
contributory negligence has been maintained as one of the most important
defences available to operators of aircraft, albeit in a different wording based
on the Montreal Convention of 1999. Damage relating to acts of unlawful
interference, war, and terrorism has been limited to a maximum of 30 million
SDRs in the first preliminary version of Article 4 of the ICAO Draft Convention
157 See ICAO Secretariat Study Group on the Modernization of the Rome Convention, Third
Meeting, Montreal, 3 to 5 September 2003, SSG-MR/3-WP/2, Presentation by H. Kjellin
on Article 3.3 Alt 3.4: Environmental Damage. Kjellin makes use of a standard definition
of environmental damage, but also adds a possibility for encompassing the cost of measures
needed to mitigate threats to the biological diversity, if applicable domestic law so permits.
158 See paragraph 2.6 of this study.
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without any escape route to liability in excess of the limitation thus en-
acted.159 In the second preliminary version of Article 4, a correlation between
various weight categories of aircraft and levels of legal limitation in SDR has
been established, although the exact amounts of limitation have not been filled
in yet. Both alternatives provide a feasible solution, as long as the legal limita-
tions set out in the future Convention are made to correspond with available
insurance coverage for risks posed by war and terrorism. For that reason, a
regulatory mechanism whereby the existing levels of legal limitation can be
modified both downward and upward, is recommended.160
3.11.3 On limitation of liability
Although a great number of interrelated reasons can be given to explain the
failure of the system of Rome, one of its most elemental flaws has been its
regime of legally limited liability. Despite the fact that elder national third
party liability regimes in this field were generally based on absolute, unlimited,
and in some cases compulsory insured liability without apparent hindrance
to the development of international civil aviation, the drafters of the Rome
Convention of 1933 opted for an international regime based on limited liability.
This choice has led to a great deal of practical difficulties, whereby the more
structural problem that any form of limitation on a global scale is not possible
to codify fairly due to the fact that potential damages can vary so much
worldwide was never addressed. Examples of such practical difficulties
included the problem of appropriate levels of limitation on the basis of varying
weight categories, a fair apportionment of limits between the categories of
personal injury and property damage, and the problem how the limited
liability regime could be circumvented by claimants in order to obtain full
compensation. As has been described, claimants would then have to prove
gross negligence or wilful misconduct. That would mean a fallback on even
more severe bases of liability than mere fault or negligence, the initial starting
point of any regime. The unfairness of such severe bases becomes apparent
if one takes into account that the whole point of introducing a regime based
on absolute liability was that fault or negligence could be difficult to prove
for surface victims in the first place.
159 Note that the amount of 30 million SDR has been put between brackets in the Draft, as
a mere suggestion for an appropriate level of limitation.
160 In the preliminary version of Article 5 of the ICAO Draft Convention, a system has been
codified whereby the ICAO Council may modify the limits. Such a modification has been
linked to the scenario of potential disruption of international civil aviation and in particular
the availability of aviation insurance, which points to a downward modification. In my
view, upward modification should also be possible, if insurance coverage for risks posed
by war and terrorism is seen to expand in due course of time.
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But above all, the key problem of limitation of liability on an international
level is that it simply can never be made uniform fairly because surface
damage can vary enormously due to the great variety in living standards
worldwide. Inevitably, a regime based on unlimited liability seems to be the
only feasible solution for the future. This was also perceived by the Inter-
national Law Association, and has led to laudable proposals in which the
element limitation was entirely abandoned.
In view of the fact that a great number of important aviation countries have
based their national regimes in this field on unlimited liability as well, a
potentially renewed international regime based on unlimited liability seems
the only feasible, inescapable, and, of another great advantage, timeless alter-
native. For one of the inherent advantages of such a regime lies in the fact
that the limits need never be updated anymore. Thus, the firm recommendation
to future drafters involved in the amendment of the system of Rome under
auspices of ICAO would be to transform the current system of limitation into
an unlimited regime.161
The only justifiable exception to the rule of unlimited liability is provided
by damage caused by acts of unlawful interference, war or terrorism. As a
main rule, the ICAO Draft Convention has laudably managed to abandon the
existing regime of limited liability in the first preliminary version of Article
3, which has been based on unlimited liability, with the exception of punitive
or exemplary damages in paragraph 4. However, the alternative of the second
preliminary version has been based on a two-tier absolute liability regime of
100 000 SDR, similar to the contractual liability regime to which air carriers
have been subjected in relation to passengers under the Montreal Convention
of 1999. As has been argued in paragraph 2.7 of this study, the least one would
expect is a similar legal treatment of passengers and third parties. But a
stronger case can be made for better treatment of third parties by means of
an unlimited liability regime, as these have not even chosen to expose them-
selves to the risks of flying voluntarily.
As has been described in the previous sub-paragraph, the main exception
to the rule of unlimited liability is provided by two alternative limited liability
regimes for acts of unlawful interference, war, or terrorism.
161 As a suggestion to soften the blow of unlimited liability, especially in cases of excessive
surface damage, the Dutch Civil Code mechanism of Article 6:109 BW could provide a
feasible solution for such cases. Under Article 6:109 BW, the judge seized of the case may
reduce a legal obligation to repair damage if awarding full reparation would lead to clearly
unacceptable results in the given circumstances, including the nature of the liability, the
juridical relationship between the involved parties, and their financial capacity. However,
such a reduction may not exceed the amount for which the tortfeasor has been covered
for liability by (compulsory) insurance, see Article 6:109 BW (translated in English) in:
Haanappel & Mackaay, at 275; see also F. de Vries, Wettelijke limitering van aansprakelijk-
heid 232-234 (1990).
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3.11.4 On insurance
The insurance and security provisions of the Rome Convention of 1952 have
proven to be complex, but non-compulsory. An important complicating factor
that kept recurring during the drafting process of the system of Rome con-
cerned the possibility of direct actions from third parties against insurers. The
future holds two possibilities: either to abolish the insurance and security
provisions of the regime entirely or to transform them into compulsory pro-
visions. For if enacted in a non-compulsory manner, their point and use seem
limited.
The compulsory alternative was opted for in the ILA Draft Convention,
including the option of direct actions, if the law of the competent court so
provides. However, the ILA Draft Convention went even further by holding
States liable in cases where both operator and insurers failed to meet their
liabilities and in case States of registry and the operator only allowed operators
to obtain financial security up to specified maximum levels of coverage.
Furthermore, an interesting addition to the insurance provisions was made
by the suggestion to establish a common international fund that could meet
cases of extreme surface damage, which vastly exceed normal insurance
coverage and the financial potential of the implicated operators.
On the question of transforming the facultative insurance and security
provisions of the Rome Convention of 1952 into a compulsory system, the
answer should be affirmative for the simple reason that compulsory insurance
provides an extra safeguard for compensation of potential liability of inter-
national air carriers. This would also correspond to the latest developments
in the system of Warsaw, in which insurance has been made compulsory under
Article 50 of the Montreal Convention of 1999. Details on how to fill in those
insurance or security requirements could be left to the discretion of national
laws.162
The possibility of direct actions is not recommended on the grounds that
an insurance contract is primarily an agreement between the operator of an
aircraft and the insurance company or companies on the other hand. If third
parties are granted permission to claim directly from insurers, this could lead
to the situation whereby third parties have more rights than the insured parties
themselves, for instance if the insurance contract has expired or does not cover
the specific types of damage that are being claimed, e.g. certain scenarios of
damage caused by noise. Furthermore, direct actions can raise other difficulties
162 According to Article 50 of the Montreal Convention of 1999, States party to the Convention
shall require their carriers to maintain adequate insurance covering their liability under
this Convention. A carrier may be required by the State Party into which it operates to
furnish evidence that it maintains adequate insurance covering its liability under this
Convention. A similar provision, in which the term ‘carrier’ is transformed into ‘operator’,
could easily transform the current complex facultative insurance chapter of the Rome
Convention of 1952 into a more straightforward compulsory insurance provision.
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in view of the fact that insurance coverage is always capped to certain tiers
of maximum coverage. The question would then arise if third parties can still
claim from the operator in excess of the claim made against insurers (up to
the insured level of liability) or if such a possibility waived by direct actions.
If such a possibility is indeed waived by direct actions, third parties would
seem better off by claiming from the operator directly, who in turn is in-
demnified by his insurer(s). The option of insurers compensating victims
voluntarily and directly is then left to the discretion of the parties concerned.
The only apparent reason for allowing direct actions seems to lie in cases
where the implicated operator faces potential bankruptcy. For in such cases,
direct actions could prevent that indemnification by insurers to operators is
wholly or partly swallowed up by the bankruptcy instead of being received
by third parties for which such indemnification was ultimately meant. But
that scenario has been covered adequately under Article 18 of the Rome
Convention, which rules that any sums due to an operator from an insurer
shall be exempt from seizure and execution by creditors of the operator until
claims of third parties under the Convention have been satisfied. It is thus
recommended to retain this provision, which would automatically diminish
the need for direct actions.
Finally, it is deemed a bridge too far to create a provision by which certain
States can automatically be held liable if operators and insurers fail to meet
their liabilities, as has also been suggested by the International Law Associ-
ation. This idea, derived from space law, seems better fit for the more State-
related activities in outer space than the currently largely privatized field of
international civil aviation. It is difficult to imagine States willing to accept
such a provision in the future, specifically in light of the catastrophic risks
posed by terrorism in the aftermath of ‘9/11’. At this point in time, ad hoc
solutions in the form of governmental funds and/or temporary state aid seem
more feasible alternatives to automatic liability of States in cases involving
excessive surface damage.
Without any reference to potential State liability, Article 19 of the ICAO
Draft Convention has managed to simplify the current complex, but non-
compulsory insurance regime of the system of Rome by means of a compulsory
alternative based on Article 50 of the Montreal Convention of 1999. The re-
quirement is simply that States party to the Convention shall require their
operators to maintain adequate insurance or other guarantees to cover their
potential liability under the Convention. Evidence from the operator of this
requirement may be demanded by other States party to the Convention in
which he operates. This can be lauded as a step forward, especially since the
possibility of direct actions has been abandoned completely.
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3.11.5 On jurisdiction
The combination of limitation of liability and jurisdiction revealed another
problem inherent to limitation of liability. For the limited liability regime of
the Rome Convention of 1952 was considered to be best protected if only the
court of the loci delicti was seized of the case and could thus solely distribute
the applicable limits. However, this ‘single forum’ solution was opposed by
common law jurisdictions such as the United States since it would lead to a
far too advanced system of enforcement of foreign judgments that could not
be matched to the requirements of common law of the time. In that perspective,
a future regime based on unlimited liability has the inherent advantage of
dispelling with the main reason for a single forum – the distribution of limits.
Thus the abandoned forum rei of the Rome Convention of 1933 could easily
be reintroduced. The more controversial forum actoris could also be considered,
albeit under certain specified conditions in which extra links between the
operator and the permanent residence of the victim are stipulated.
Unfortunately, Article 21 of ICAO Draft Convention currently holds that
actions must be brought only before the courts of the State Party where the
damage occurred. However, by agreement between claimants and defendants,
action may also be taken before courts of any other State Party. For the reasons
stated above, this solution seems meagre.163
3.11.6 On necessity
Perhaps the most fundamental question to the future of the system of Rome
is its raison d’être in the first place. For national regimes often have covered
and still cover the problem adequately as has been established in the second
Chapter and will be elaborated upon in the next. Despite the advantages of
harmonization, uniformity, and a so-called level playing field inherent to a
fairly drafted international regime, the problem remains that the scope of such
a regime only covers surface damage caused by certain foreign international
civil aircraft. This implies that national legislators will also have to enact
separate and compatible regimes of liability for all other foreign and national
aircraft of different categories, e.g. military and private aircraft. Furthermore,
the international nature of damage inflicted to third parties on the surface by
aircraft is far less pronounced than the international nature of similar forms
of damage inflicted to passengers by air carriers. For whereas third parties
163 In that context, the remark made by Donato on the preference for an extra alternative of
the fora of the countries of the survivors and their relatives is of interest, see ICAO Secret-
ariat Study Group on the Modernization of the Rome Convention, Third Meeting, Montreal,
3 to 5 September 2003, Comments on the Draft Text and Some Items to be Considered at
The Third Meeting, presented by M. Donato.
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will generally be of the nationality of, or at least have their permanent resid-
ence in, the place of the aviation accident, passengers will often be of far more
varied origins. This implies that national law will generally be adequately
equipped and if necessary tailor-made to serve the needs of both most poten-
tially implicated aircraft operators as well as most potential victims, both in
terms of liability law and damage law. Such considerations will be explored
in greater detail in the next Chapter.

4 National liability regimes and insurance
requirements for surface damage inflicted by




After a description of the international air law in this field in the previous
Chapter of this study, the next logical step would be to evaluate the supra-
national European Community law regime of liability and insurance require-
ments in force in this field. However, the former is currently non-existent and
the latter merely stipulates that air carriers falling under the scope of Com-
munity law should be insured to cover liability in case of accidents, in parti-
cular in respect of passengers, luggage, cargo, mail and third parties.1 How-
ever, the terrorist attacks in the United States of September 11, 2001 have put
the problem of damage to third parties inflicted by aircraft on the agenda of
the European Commission, but only up to the point of a more harmonized
regulatory approach in respect of insurance requirements.2 As the Commission
is of the opinion that liability in this field has been sufficiently defined in the
national laws of Member States, no legislative action is to be expected on a
Community level in this field in the near future.3 This implies that the problem
of liability for surface damage will have to be evaluated on a national level
for Member States as well as most other countries worldwide in view of lack
of adherence to the current system of Rome. Once the proposed EC regulation
on insurance requirements has been enacted, only those requirements will be
harmonized on a Community level. In the meanwhile, national law largely
prevails in this field.
The introductory chapter to this study opened with the example of the
Bijlmer air disaster, which occurred in the Netherlands on 4 October 1992.
In view of the current void of applicable international air law in this field in
the Netherlands, the Dutch Civil Code would seem an ideal starting point
1 See Article 7 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2407/92 of 23 July 1992, OJ L 240, 24.8.1992.
No further conditions or criteria on minimal amounts of coverage are specified.
2 See the European Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council on insurance requirements for air carriers and aircraft operators, Brussels
24.9.2002 COM (2002) 521 final; 2002/0234 (COD), hereinafter cited as European Commission
Proposal.
3 See the Explanatory Memorandum to the European Commission Proposal at 5-6.
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for the description of a number of national private air law regimes in this field.
However, as of yet, the Dutch legislature has not codified such a specific
private air law regime. This means that third parties in the Netherlands will
have to rely on the general rules of fault liability in order to claim compensa-
tion from the operator(s) or owner(s) of the implicated aircraft. However, the
idea has been launched to codify such a specific regime in Book 8, title 17 BW
of the Dutch Civil Code, which was to be based on the system of Rome to
a certain extent.4
The question now arises how such a specific regime could be codified
satisfactorily on a national level. In order to address this question, a compara-
tive overview of a number of national private air law regimes in this field can
serve as examples on how such a regime can be construed. A choice has been
made for a comparative overview of the relevant sections of the national
private air laws of France, Germany & Austria, the United Kingdom, Switzer-
land, and Australia in a horizontal fashion. This specific range of countries
has been selected in view of the fact that their legislation in this field was
accessible for the author without causing substantial language problems, but
is otherwise admittedly arbitrary. From a purely Dutch legislative perspective,
all of the selected countries were deemed to be suitable for comparison with
the Netherlands in terms of criteria such as importance of aviation and applic-
able economic standards, as they are all located within Europe with the excep-
tion of Australia. The latter has been specifically chosen in view of its relatively
recent move to enact a national regime in this field. These regimes will be
compared horizontally, by splitting them up in separate (sub-)paragraphs on
the basis and scope of liability, persons liable, defences, limitation of liability,
and insurance requirements. The rationale of such a horizontal approach is
that the relevant items of each regime can thus be immediately compared with
one another. Furthermore, such an approach roughly corresponds with the
order of treatment of the previous chapters.
The national legislature can also deliberately decide not to codify any
specific regime in this field at all and leave the problem to its general rules
of negligence or fault liability. The rationale for that option can be derived
from the developments in the United States, in which a general tendency can
4 See R. Cleton, Aansprakelijkheid en schadevergoeding als nasleep van luchtvaartongevallen, NJB
621, at 624 (1993). Cleton points out that the Dutch Civil Code strict liability regime of
Article 6:173 BW does not apply to aircraft, since aircraft were excluded in anticipation
of a more specific regime. The current gap in Dutch civil law in this field leads to the
baffling situation that damage caused by a radio-controlled toy airplane is governed by
the strict liability regime of Article 6:173 BW, whereas a fully loaded Boeing 747 that crashes
into an apartment building is governed by the general rules of fault liability, see Stolker
and Levine, at 60-61. See also W.J.G. Oosterveen et al., Vervoersrecht in Boek 8 BW, Preadvies
van de Vereeniging ‘Handelsrecht’ en Nederlandse Vereniging voor Zee- en Vervoersrecht
13-14 (1997), on the idea of a specific liability regime in this field in Book 8 Title 17 BW
of the Dutch Civil Code.
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be observed to move away from absolute liability to negligence in this field.
Therefore, the developments in this field in the United States will be dealt
with separately in Chapter 5 of this study.
4.1.2 Order of treatment
This Chapter has been divided in two main parts. In the first part of this
Chapter, a comparative overview will be given of the specific third party
liability regimes that have been enacted in the aforementioned countries of
Europe and Australia. An introductory paragraph (4.2) is followed by para-
graphs and sub-paragraphs on the main areas of importance per regime. First,
the basis of liability, defences, the person(s) or entities liable, and types of
aircraft of the regimes under review will be reviewed (4.3). Next, the scope
of liability of these regimes will be analysed (4.4). Finally, the question if the
regime at hand is based on unlimited or limited liability will be addressed
in combination with an analysis of the insurance or security requirements
underlying the regime (4.5).
In the second part of this Chapter, the current developments under Euro-
pean Community law in this field will be described in more detail. After an
introduction including a brief historical review (4.6), the EC proposal on in-
surance requirements for air carriers and aircraft operators will be discussed
(4.7). Next, the question if a more harmonized Community approach to third
party liability is feasible will be dealt with (4.8). A synthesis of the discussed
national private air law regimes and developments in the European Com-
munity in this field will finalize the chapter. On the basis of this synthesis,
a number of suggestions and observations will be made on the possibilities
of legislation in this field on both a national and Community level (4.9).
PART 1 – NATIONAL REGIMES AND INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
4.2 NATIONAL REGIMES. INTRODUCTION
Before embarking on a comparative overview of the national private air
regimes in this field of France, Germany & Austria, the United Kingdom,
Switzerland, and Australia, a brief introduction of the relationship between
these specific regimes and the general rules of fault liability or negligence will
be given per country. In some cases, a reference will also be made to the more
general regimes of liability for things.
The brief introduction will be given in the following order: France (4.2.1),
Germany & Austria (4.2.2), the United Kingdom (4.2.3), Switzerland (4.2.4),
and Australia (4.2.5).
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4.2.1 France
The main and broadly formulated heading of fault liability of Article 1382
of the French Civil Code holds that ‘tout fait quelconque de l’homme qui cause
à autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé, à le réparer’
(anyone who, through his act, causes damage to another by his fault shall be
obliged to compensate the damage). Article 1383 of the French Civil Code adds
that ‘chacun est responsible du dommage qu’il a causé (…) par sa négligence ou par
son imprudence’(everyone is responsible for the damage caused not only by
his own act but also by his negligence or carelessness).5
In addition to these general rules of fault liability, a specific rule of liability
for damage caused by things has been enacted in Article 1384(1) CC. For
liability to arise, the act of the thing under custody of the ‘guardien’ (custodian)
must have caused the damage. Although Article 1384(1) CC was originally
perceived as a rule of fault liability, this notion gradually transformed into
a presumption of fault in various stages of French case law.6
A number of more specific regimes of liability have been enacted separately,
e.g. for the operators of nuclear installations, cable cars, and aircraft.7 Liability
for surface damage inflicted by aircraft is currently governed by the aviation
statute as instituted by means of Decree No. 67-333 of March 30, 1967.8
4.2.2 Germany and Austria
Under German civil law, a separate regime of liability for damage caused by
things has not been enacted. This means that damage caused by things in
general is governed by the general heading of fault liability of § 823 BGB of
the German Civil Code. However, a number of statutory regimes based on
absolute liability have been enacted for a number of (at one time) novel,
dangerous, and risky enterprises or forms of transport. Examples include the
specific liability regimes for railways and tramways, nuclear energy, and
5 The English translations of Articles 1382 and 1383 CC have been derived from W. van
Gerven et al., at 3.
6 See J. Flour & J-L. Aubert, Les Obligations 2 – Le fait juridique 217-223 (1997); Stone, s.
5: 24-26; Zweigert & Kötz, at 659-661.
7 See Sériaux, at 368. Liability of the operators of nuclear installations is regulated by means
of a specific statute of 30 October 1986 (L. 30 octobre 1986); liability of the operators of cable
cars is regulated by means of a specific statute of 8 July 1941 (L. 8 juillet 1941); see also
Zweigert & Kötz, at 661.
8 The first predecessor of the current statute of 31 May 1924 was consolidated in the Decree
of 30 November 1955, see Stone at 46. By means of the Decree No.67-333 of March 30, 1967,
the former Decree was repealed, see Mazeaud-Tunc, Traité Théorique et Practique de la
Responsabilité Civile Délictuelle et Contractuelle, Tome II, 458-460 (1970).
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aircraft operators.9 Liability of the operators of aircraft for surface damage
is governed by §§ 33-43 and § 53 of the German Aviation Law (Luftverkehrs-
gesetz or LuftVG) of 14 January 1981.10
Similar regimes of absolute liability for various dangerous activities have
been enacted under Austrian civil law.11 When Austria became part of the
Third Reich in 1938, the Austrian aviation laws were replaced by German
ones.12 This explains the similarities between section X, §§ 146-153 of the
current Austrian Aviation Law (Luftfahrtgesetz or LuftFG) and §§ 33-43 and
§ 53 of its German counterpart.13 Both regimes will be discussed jointly for
that reason.
4.2.3 The United Kingdom
Under English common law various headings of liability can be distinguished,
such as trespass, trespass to land and nuisance, and the more general tort of
negligence.14 Absolute liability has also developed into a separate heading
of tort under the famous rule of Rylands v. Fletcher, which originated from
nuisance.15 Furthermore, a number of specific Acts cover various areas of
potential liability. Examples include the Nuclear Installations Act (1965), the
Animals Act (1971), and the Civil Aviation Act (1982).16
The territorial scope of the Civil Aviation Act encompasses England, Wales,
Scotland, and Northern Ireland.17 Liability for surface damage inflicted by
9 Stone at s.19; B.S. Markesinis, The German Law of Torts, 695-696 (1994). Stone and Marke-
sinis refer to the Prussian Railway Act (1838) as incorporated in the Imperial Act on Liability
(1871) and the ‘Act Relating to the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and the Protection
Against its Dangers’ (1959). For more examples of specific strict liability regimes see W.
Fikentscher, Schuldrecht (1997), at 804 et seq.
10 The first version of the Aviation Law of August 1, 1922 (BGBl. I, p. 681) has been amended
and modified a number of times up to its current version of 14.1. 1981, BGBl. I 6l, see
Fikentscher at 809.
11 Zweigert & Kötz at 657.
12 The elder German air laws were repealed with the first ‘fully’ Austrian Aviation Law of
December 2, 1957, see Air Laws and Treaties of the World, An Annotated Compilation
prepared for the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives,
Eighty-Seventh Congress, First Session, May 11, 218 (1961).
13 The latest revisions of the Austrian LuftFG, BGBl. Nr 253/1957 have been made in: Bundes-
gesetz: Änderung des Luftfahrtgesetzes, BGBl. I Nr. 73/2003 of 21-08-2003. The elder regime
of §§19-29 has been replaced by section X in an earlier stage, which is in force since January
1, 1998 and is not applicable to cases that occurred before that date, see §173 (5) LuftFG.
As the main material amendment consists of an update of the applicable limitation of
liability, both regimes will be discussed jointly.
14 Van Gerven et al., at 3.
15 Winfield and Jolowicz at 443 et seq.
16 Zweigert & Kötz at 666.
17 See Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone, Halsbury’s Laws of England, Volume 2, 490-491
(1991).
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aircraft is governed by paragraph s 76 of the Civil Aviation Act. However,
liability for surface damage can also be based on other headings of tortious
liability, such as trespass or nuisance, dependant on the circumstances of the
case.18 This chapter will merely focus on the statutory regime of liability for
surface damage.19
4.2.4 Switzerland
Under Swiss civil law, specific regimes of statutory liability for various
dangerous enterprises have been enacted aside from the general rules of
tortuous liability. Examples include the Swiss law of railway liability (1905),
the statute on liability for harm caused by the operation of low or high tension
cables (1902), the Swiss pipeline law (1963), the law of explosives (1977), and
the Federal Aviation Law (1948).20 The Federal Aviation law of December
21, 1948 (Bundesgesetz über die Luftfahrt) contains a section on liability for
surface damage inflicted by aircraft.21
4.2.5 Australia
As a federal state under the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act,
Australia consists of six member states (New South Wales, Victoria, Queens-
land, Tasmania, South Australia, and Western Australia) and the federally
administered Territories. The member states, with their separate constitutions,
parliaments, and governments, have free competence over most areas of private
and commercial law. Although Australia is thus governed by six different legal
18 Hailsham at 490. Historically, the Air Navigation Act of 1919 ‘gave to His Majesty in Council
the power to control and to make regulations for aerial navigation over the British Isles
and adjacent territorial waters and to administer all matters relating to civil aviation.’ The
Air Navigation Act of 1920 repealed previous legislation and gave effect to the Convention
of Paris. In the Act of 1920, specific provisions on third party liability were first enacted,
see E.R. Gardner, Comparative Air Law, 20 JALC 34, at 34-38 (1953). For the text of these
provisions, enacted in Section 9(1)/(2) of the Act of 1920, see W.M. Marshall Freeman, Air
and Aviation Law 35-36 (1931).
19 For a detailed discussion of actions based on trespass and nuisance, see Shawcross and
Beaumont, Issue 72, nr V/131-132; Reference is made to the landmark case of Steel-Maitland
v. British Airways Board (1981) SLT 110, in which it was held that the owner of property
would have a remedy if the noise and vibration generated by aircraft caused serious
disturbance or substantial inconvenience without necessarily having to establish material
damage to the property. See also paragraph 5.5 of this study for a description of trespass
and nuisance under US common law in this field.
20 Zweigert & Kötz at 657-658.
21 The Swiss Federal Aviation law is officially known as the ‘Bundesgesetz über die Luftfahrt’
(Luftfahrtgesetz vom 21. Dezember 1948), see O. Riese, Luftrecht (1949), at 377 et seq; see also
F. Dessemontet, Introduction to Swiss Law 134 (1981).
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regimes, they are very similar in practice, as they are all based on English
common law.22
Australia is of interest for this study, as it has originally ratified the Rome
Convention of 1952 by means of the Civil Aviation (Damage by Aircraft) Act
1958.23 However, Australia has subsequently decided to renounce the Conven-
tion and to repeal the Act in order to enact a national Damage by Aircraft
Act 1999.24
The territorial scope of the Damage by Aircraft Act 1999 extends to each
external Territory and applies to acts, omissions, matters and things within
Australian Territory.25
4.3 BASIS OF LIABILITY. PERSONS LIABLE. DEFENCES. AIRCRAFT
In this paragraph, the basis of liability, persons liable, defences, and types of
aircraft per regime under review will be discussed in various sub-paragraphs
in the same order of appearance as in the previous paragraph of this study.
4.3.1 France
The French Aviation Decree of 1967 subjects the operator (‘l’exploitant’) of an
aircraft to a regime of absolute liability for surface damage caused by the
movements of the aircraft or by objects detached from the aircraft.26 The
regime of the Decree is stricter than the regime of liability for things of Article
1384 of the French Civil Code, as the defence of force majeure has been dis-
carded under the Decree. The operator can only invoke the defence of con-
tributory negligence.27
22 Zweigert & Kötz at 221-222.
23 The Civil Aviation (Damage by Aircraft) Act, No. 81 of 1958 was enacted to approve
ratification by Australia of the Rome Convention of 1952 and give effect to that Convention.
The Act also covered the liabilities of certain operators of aircraft in respect of damage
on the surface to which the Convention does not apply, see Articles 16-19 of the Act.
24 The government of Australia sent a notification of denunciation of the Rome Convention
of 1952 to ICAO on 8 May 2000 and took effect on 8 November 2000, see the list of parties
to the Rome Convention at www.icao.int/icao/en/leb/rome1952.htm.
25 Clause 9 of the Damage by Aircraft Act 1999. Aside from the Act, complementary state
legislation covers intrastate operations (except for Queensland, in which such legislation
is still in development), see Discussion Paper, Consideration of The Ratification by Australia
of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air done at
Montreal on 28 May 1999 (The Montreal Convention) and Related Aviation Insurance Matters,
Department of Transport and Regional Services, January 2001, at 9, hereinafter cited as
Discussion Paper).
26 Article L.141-2 of the Decree.
27 Mazeaud-Tunc at 461.
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A difference of opinion exists on the exact meaning of the term operator.
Some writers hold the operator to be the person who profits from exploitation
of the aircraft economically, whereas others define him as the person who is
in actual control of the aircraft, comparable to the custodian of Article 1384
CC.28
In cases of unregistered charter agreements, both the operator and owner
of the aircraft are jointly liable for surface damage.29 By including the owner
as a potentially liable party under unregistered charter agreements, the French
legislature aimed to create an extra safeguard for compensation in cases of
insolvent charter operators.30 In cases of registered charter agreements, the
owner of the aircraft can only be held liable if the claimant establishes that
he was at fault.
The Decree applies to civil, military, and state aircraft. Aircraft have been
defined as all machines capable of rising into- or circling in the air.31
4.3.2 Germany and Austria
The German and Austrian private air law regimes both subject the custodian/
operator (‘Halter’) of the aircraft to a combination of absolute and limited
liability for damage to persons and property arising directly from an accident
(‘Unfall’) during the operation of the aircraft.32
The rationale for absolute liability is that third parties who do not benefit
economically from aviation deserve the utmost legal protection against the
potential harm that can be inflicted by aircraft.33 Both the German and
Austrian regime only allow the operator the defence of contributory negli-
gence.34
In the German and Austrian aviation laws, the custodian/operator has
been defined as the person who has the aircraft at his disposal for his own
28 See P. le Tourneau & L. Cadiet, Droit de la Responsabilité, No. 3932 (1996). According to
Mazeaud-Tunc, the operator is he who profits economically from the exploitation of the
aircraft, see Mazeaud-Tunc at 462-463. In order to substantiate that definition, an interesting
linguistic argument is put forward based on the meaning of the French verb ‘exploiter’, which
means ‘faire valoir’ or ‘tirer profit’, and not ‘exercer un poivoir de commandement’.
29 Article L.141-4 of the Decree.
30 Mazeaud-Tunc at 464.
31 Mazeaud-Tunc at 465-466.
32 § 33 LuftVG (Germany) and § 146 LuftFG (Austria), formerly § 19(1) LuftFG, for cases prior
to January 1, 1998, see § 173(5) LuftFG. See also Stone at 45.
33 See W. Schwenk, Handbuch des Luftverkehrsrechts 692-693 (1996). .
34 See Giemulla/Schmid, Luftverkehrsgesetz – Frankfurter Kommentar zum Luftverkehrsgesetz,
Band 1.2, LuftVG § 33 sub A (Allgemeines) 2 (1997); Koziol, Österreichisches Haftplichtrecht,
II, 399 (1975). In cases of contributory negligence, the general rules of the German and
Austrian Civil Code of § 254 BGB and § 1304 ABGB apply, see § 34 LuftVG and § 157
(formerly § 20) LufFG.
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benefit.35 In order to clarify the question who can be construed as the operator
and who as the owner of an aircraft, an analysis of the underlying agreements
between both parties may be necessary. In cases involving short use of the
aircraft, both the user and the original operator that benefits from the aircraft
economically can be defined as operator. Dependant on the circumstances of
the case, these two entities can be held liable for surface damage on a joint
and several basis.36 Operators of colliding aircraft that cause surface damage
are also subjected to joint and several liability under the German and Austrian
regime.37
An unlawful user (‘Schwarzflieger’) of an aircraft can also be held liable
for surface damage on the basis of the German regime of absolute liability.
However, the legitimate operator can only be held liable if it was proven that
he was at fault in relation to such unlawful use. But if the unlawful user was
either employed by the operator or if the aircraft was entrusted to him by the
operator, the legitimate operator can be held absolutely liable for the damage,
without effecting the liability of the unlawful user under general rules of
German tort law.38 A similar regime has been enacted in the Austrian Avi-
ation Law.39
Aircraft (‘Luftfahrzeuge’) have been defined broadly as instruments designed
to move in the air and include various types of aircraft, such as helicopters,
airships, and even model aircraft in the German Aviation Law.40 The Austrian
Aviation Law makes use of a similar definition, which encompasses a number
of categories of aircraft lighter and heavier than air.41 Notably, the operators
of military aircraft are subjected to a combination of absolute and unlimited
liability under both the German and Austrian regime.42
35 Schwenk at 690; see also W. Wussow et al., Unfallhaftpflichtrecht 530 (1996). For Austria,
see Koziol at 395-396.
36 Schwenk at 690-691.
37 For the specific rules on apportionment of damages between the colliding aircraft, see §
41 LuftVG and § 840 BGB (1) and Schwenk at 700, 704-706. For the Austrian regime see
§152 LuftFG (formerly § 27 LuftFG) and Koziol at 404.
38 § 33(2) LuftVG; Schwenk at 706-707.
39 § 147(2) (formerly §19(2)) LuftFG; Koziol at 399. Note that the Austrian legislator refers
to ‘unbefugte Benutzing’.
40 See E. Wolf, Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts – Bd. 2, 687 (1978), referring to §1(2) LuftVG. The
total list encompasses ‘Flugzeuge, Drehflügler, Luftschiffe, Segelflugzeuge, Motorsegler, Frei-
und Fesselballone, Drachen, Fallschirme, Flugmodelle, Luftsportgeräte, sonstige für die Benutzung
des Luftraums bestimmte Geräte, Raumfahrzeuge, Raketen, and ähnlige Flugkörper’, see Fikentscher
at 809 and Geigel, Der Haftpflichtprozeß 1118 (1993); note that the last three categories
are only defined as aircraft whilst in airspace.
41 See § 11 LuftVG; covered categories include Flugzeuge, Segelflugzeuge, Schwingenflugzeuge,
Hubschrauber, Tragschrauber, Fallschirme, Luftschiffe, and Freiballone, see Koziol at 395-396.
42 See § 53 LuftVG and § 151 (formerly § 29k) LuftFG; § 151 also applies to military model
aircraft.
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4.3.3 The United Kingdom
The main rule of statutory liability for material damage to persons or property
caused by aircraft of the Civil Aviation Act reads:
[Subject to subsection 3 below,] where material loss or damage is caused to any
person or property on land or water by, or by a person in, or an article, animal,
or person falling from an aircraft while in flight, taking off or landing, then unless
the loss or damage was caused or contributed to by the negligence of the person
by whom it was suffered, damages in respect of the loss or damage shall be recover-
able without the proof of negligence or intention or other cause of action, as if the
loss or damage had been caused by the wilful act, neglect or default of the owner
of the aircraft.43
Subsection 3 reads:
Where, however, material loss or damage is thus caused and the circumstances
are such that damages are recoverable in respect of that loss or damage by virtue
only of the foregoing provisions, and a legal liability is created in some person
other than the owner to pay damages in respect of the loss or damage, the owner
is entitled to be indemnified by that other person against any claim in respect of
that loss or damage.44
As Shawcross and Beaumont have formulated it so eloquently, the rationale
of this rather densely formulated statutory regime of liability was ‘the removal
of certain activities from the realm of common law trespass or nuisance if they
only resulted in disturbance or inconvenience but to afford the aggrieved
person a remedy, at least as effective as his common law remedy, in respect
of the same activities if they caused material damage to him or his property.’45
Under the absolute liability regime, the owner can only invoke the defence
of contributory negligence of the injured party in order to escape liability.46
As a main rule, the owner of the aircraft can be held liable under the
statutory regime. However, ‘where the aircraft concerned has been bona fide
demised, let or hired out for any period exceeding 14 days to any other person
by the owner, and no pilot, commander, navigator or operative member of
43 Civil Aviation Act 1982 s 76(2); see Hailsham at 825.
44 Civil Aviation Act 1982 s 76(3); see Hailsham at 825.
45 Shawcross and Beaumont, Issue 72, V/136, referring to the English case law of Steel-Maitland
v. British Airways Board 1981 SLT 110 per Lord Jauncey at 112.
46 It is noteworthy that if contributory negligence can be established by the defendant, this
probably does not mean that his liability is altogether eliminated, but that his liability is
apportioned according to the extent of the contributory negligence. Apportionment of
responsibility has been regulated in the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945,
which is applicable to the regime of statutory liability of the Civil Aviation Act 1982, see
Shawcross & Beaumont, Issue 72, V/144.
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the crew of the aircraft is in the owner’s employment, the foregoing provisions
have effect as if for references to the owner there were substituted references
to the person to whom the aircraft has thus been demised, let or hired out.’47
In other words, when those conditions are met, the actual operator can be held
liable under the statutory regime. Otherwise, the owner is liable, even when
the aircraft is lent by him to another or used by another without his knowledge
or consent, albeit with a right of redress against such others.48 In the aftermath
of ‘9/11’, the English legislature is advised to reconsider such a regime of
absolute and unlimited liability of the owners of aircraft for (terrorist) acts
of third parties.
With respect to the types of aircraft that are covered by the regime, the
Air Navigation Order of 1995 does not make use of a general definition of
the phrase ‘aircraft’, but contains a table of general classification of aircraft.
Aircraft encompass all balloons, kites, gliders, airships, aeroplanes (landplanes,
seaplanes, amphibians and self launching motor gliders), powered lift (tilt
rotor) and rotorcraft (gyroplanes and helicopters). The regime is applicable
to Crown aircraft, but not to military aircraft.49
4.3.4 Switzerland
The Swiss liability regime for surface damage inflicted by aircraft has largely
been based on the international liability regime of the Rome Convention of
1933. The main difference lies in the abandonment of the system of limitation
of liability of the Convention in favor of a regime based on unlimited liabil-
ity.50 The only defence available to the operators of aircraft under the absolute
liability regime is that of contributory negligence.51
Under the regime, the operator (‘Halter’) of the aircraft can be held liable
for damage to persons and property on the surface on condition that the
damage was caused by the aircraft in flight. ‘In flight’ has been defined as
the period from the beginning of take-off procedures to the end of the landing
procedures.52 Damage caused by bodies or by objects falling from the aircraft
47 Civil Aviation Act 1982 s 76(4).
48 See Hailsham at 825; see also Shawcross and Beaumont, Issue 72, V/145.
49 See Shawcross and Beaumont, Issue 72, V/3, referring to Air Navigation Order 1995, SI
1995/1970, Sch I, Part A; Civil Aviation Act 1982 s 76(2) also applies to Crown aircraft,
see Civil Aviation (Crown Aircraft) Order 1970, SI 1970/289, art 2, as cited by Hailsham
at 825; see also Haisham at 491, on the non-applicability of the Civil Aviation Act to military
aircraft.
50 See Stone at 45-46; Riese at 377-378
51 Riese at 378. The general rules of contributory negligence of the Swiss Civil Code are
applicable.
52 Article 64(3) LFG. Damage caused by an aircraft that is not ‘in flight’ has to be dealt with
by means of the general rules of fault liability of the Swiss Civil Code, see Riese at 379.
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also falls under the scope of the regime of absolute liability (‘reine Kausalhaf-
tung’).53
The operator can also be held liable for damage caused by a person on
board of the aircraft, albeit up to the limits of mandatory insurance if that
person is not part of the crew. Such a scenario is the first exception to the
principle of unlimited liability of the operator.54 The second exception to that
principle is given by the scenario of an unlawful user (‘Schwarzflieger’) that
inflicts surface damage with the aircraft. In such a case, the unlawful user can
be held liable in full; the operator, on the other hand, can only be held liable
up to the limits of mandatory insurance coverage.55 Notably, the operator
can even be held liable for the damage caused by unlawful use if he has done
everything possible to prevent such use.56
In cases of collision between two or more aircraft, the implicated operators
can be held liable jointly and severally for potential surface damage.57
4.3.5 Australia
The Australian Damage by Aircraft Act 1999 aims to ‘facilitate the recovery
of certain damages for injury, loss, damage or destruction caused by aircraft
or objects falling from aircraft in flight.’58 Therefore, the general heading of
negligence has specifically been abandoned in favour of a regime based on
absolute liability.59
In respect of defences, the Act differs from the other regimes discussed
in this Chapter, as the Australian legislature has not included the defence of
contributory negligence, and has thus created one of the most severe regimes
of absolute liability possible.
The operator and owner of the implicated aircraft can be held jointly and
severally liable for surface damage caused by the aircraft in flight under the
53 Article 64(1) and (2a) LFG; Article 64 is based on Article 2 of the Rome Convention of 1933,
see Riese at 378.
54 Article 64 (2b) LFG. Riese remarks that a joint and several liability is thus created between
the operator and the person on board causing damage, including rules of redress and
subrogation on the basis of the principles of the Swiss Civil Code, see Riese at 379.
55 Article 65 LFG.
56 Riese at 379. Riese remarks that the Swiss regime differs from that of Article 5 of the Rome
Convention of 1933 in that respect. The regime would offer an interesting solution to cases
such as the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, see in greater detail
paragraph 5.10 of this study.
57 Article 66 LFG, which corresponds to Article 6 of the Rome Convention of 1933, see Riese
at 379.
58 Clause 3 of the Damage by Aircraft Act 1999.
59 Clause 11 of the Damage by Aircraft Act 1999.
Chapter 4 129
regime.60 If an authorized operator does not have the exclusive right to use
the aircraft for more than 14 consecutive days, the person who authorized its
use can also be held liable under the regime.
In case of unlawful use, the person normally entitled to control (generally
the operator of the aircraft) can also be held liable, unless he has taken all
reasonable steps to prevent such unlawful use.61 This seems to imply that
negligence prevails for the operator in cases of unlawful use. In case of author-
ized or unauthorized use by an employee of the operator in the course of his
employment, the employer is held to be the user of the aircraft.62
The Act applies to all types of aircraft as defined in the Civil Aviation Act
1988, with the exception of model aircraft.63 The Act applies to Common-
wealth aircraft (except Defence force aircraft), aircraft of Australian and foreign
corporations, and other aircraft (foreign and non-foreign) engaged in inter-
national and interstate flights, flights within and to and from the Territories,
and flights landing at or taking off from places acquired by the Commonwealth
for public purposes.64
4.4 SCOPE OF LIABILITY
All of the national aviation liability regimes under review have been based
on absolute liability. In the following sub-paragraphs, the scope of absolute
liability of these regimes will be dealt with on the basis of the three main
scenarios of conduct of aircraft that can inflict surface damage.65
4.4.1 France
The scope of absolute liability of Article L.141-2 of the French Aviation Decree
is broad and encompasses surface damage inflicted by movements of the
60 The term ‘operator’ has been defined in Clause 6 of the Damage by Aircraft Act 1999 as
the person using the aircraft except where another person retains control of its navigation,
after authorising its use. In this case, the person retaining control of the aircraft’s navigation
will be taken to be the operator. This means in practical terms that when use and control
of an aircraft are not exercised by the same person (eg a “wet” lease or charter), the person
who supplies the aircraft and crew is the one who would be liable as the operator.’ Note
also that the meaning of the phrase ‘in flight’ varies according to the type of aircraft
involved, see Clause 5 of the Damage by Aircraft Act 1999.
61 Clause 10(2)(3) of the Damage by Aircraft Act 1999.
62 Clause 7 of the Damage by Aircraft Act 1999.
63 Clause 4 of the Damage by Aircraft Act 1999.
64 Clause 9 of the Damage by Aircraft Act 1999.
65 As described in paragraph 2.2 of this study.
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aircraft or by objects detached from the aircraft. Movements include those
unrelated to landing or take-off procedures.66
Firstly, the scenario of damage caused by impact of the aircraft or parts
of the aircraft falls under the scope of the regime.67 Secondly, the regime
encompasses damage caused by objects thrown from board, even if that is
deemed necessary for the safety of the flight, e.g. in order to lose ballast.68
Both of these scenarios thus involve impact of (parts of) the aircraft or of
objects thrown from the aircraft. Under these scenarios, the link between
impact and subsequent personal injuries or property damage can be established
relatively easily. The rationale for absolute liability is thus clearly based on
the potential dangers posed by aviation to third parties on the surface. In that
sense, it is remarkable that the Decree does not cover cases of collisions
between aircraft which cause damage to third parties on the ground through
impact of the implicated aircraft or parts of the aircraft. For in such cases,
claimants have to fall back on the general rules of fault liability of Article 1382
CC.69 A rule of joint and several absolute liability would have seemed more
appropriate in that context.
The rather open-ended scope of the absolute liability regime is revealed
in cases of nuisance or noise caused by overflying aircraft. As a general rule,
aircraft have a right of overflight as long as they do not interfere with the
rights of property owners.70 However, property owners can claim for damages
on the basis of the absolute liability regime, if they can establish a sufficient
causal link between the damage and the movements of the aircraft. The re-
quirement of such a link of causation has been deemed too difficult to allow
claims based on the general noise or nuisance inherent to normal overflight.
The scope of absolute liability has thus been narrowed down to extremely
serious cases of damage inflicted by noise, such as sonic booms.71 The French
legal doctrines of “inconvénients de voisinage” and “pré-occupation” have also
helped to narrow down the scope of absolute liability to extreme cases. Factors
such as the ‘wrongful’ location of victims (e.g. near airports) have been used
as a yardstick for denying compensation of claims based on ‘normal’
nuisance.72
66 See Mazeaud-Tunc at 466-467, citing Cour de Cassation Civ. 2, 6 janv.1955, D. 1955.593,
J.C.P. 1955.II.8587 (1er arrêt); the case involved a driving aircraft hitting a stationary aircraft.
67 Mazeaud-Tunc at 467-468.
68 Mazeaud-Tunc at 467-468.
69 Stone at 46.
70 See Article L.131-1 and 2 of the Decree as cited by Mazeaud-Tunc at 469-470.
71 Mazeaud-Tunc at 469-470.
72 Le Tourneau & Cadiet, at No. 3937.
Chapter 4 131
4.4.2 Germany and Austria
The scope of absolute liability of the German regime can be derived from §
33 (1) of the German Aviation Law (LuftVG), which reads:
Wird beim Betrieb eines Luftfahrzeugs durch Unfall jemand getötet, sein Körper
oder seine Gesundheit verletzt oder eine Sache beschädigt, so ist der Halter des
Luftfahrzeugs verplichtet, den Schaden zu ersetzen.
Similarly codified, the scope of absolute liability of § 146 (1) (formerly §19)
of the Austrian Aviation Law (LuftFG) reads:
§ 146 (1) Wird durch einen Unfall beim Betrieb eines Luftfahrzeuges oder motori-
sierten Flugmodells ein Mensch getötet oder am Körper verletzt oder an der
Gesundheit geschädigt oder eine körperliche Sache beschädigt, so haftet der Halter
für den Ersatz des Schadens.
In other words, when a person is killed, injured, or suffers from health prob-
lems or when property is damaged due to an accident that occurred during
the operation of an aircraft, the operator of the aircraft shall be liable for the
damage. The link between damage and operation of the aircraft must comply
with the German or Austrian rules of causation.73
The question arises to what extent the scope of absolute liability is
narrowed down by the terms ‘operation’ and ‘accident’. These terms will be
discussed in subparagraphs 4.4.2.1 and 4.4.2.2 respectively.
4.4.2.1 Operation of the aircraft
Under the German absolute liability regime, the scope of the term ‘operation’
(‘beim Betrieb’) covers both damage caused by operational movements (‘Ver-
kehrsvorgang’) of the aircraft and damage caused by stationary aircraft. Opera-
tional movements start when passengers are in the process of embarking or
disembarking or while the aircraft is being loaded or unloaded and end when
the aircraft is parked or towed away and all activities related to the aircraft
have ceased. Stationary aircraft have been encompassed in the definition of
operation in view of their susceptibility to the forces of nature. For natural
phenomena such as extreme gusts of wind can at times be forceful enough
to cause certain types of aircraft to move on their own account and thus lead
to damage to third parties.74
The Austrian criteria to determine whether an aircraft is in operation have
been defined slightly more narrowly. For an aircraft is deemed to be in opera-
73 Schwenk at 693; Koziol at 396-397.
74 Giemulla/Schmid at 8-9.
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tion whilst moving on the surface, which includes movements generated by
natural phenomena, but not when it is merely in a stationary position. On
the other hand, an aircraft that is stationary with rotating propellors is deemed
to be in operation.75
4.4.2.2 Accident
In the German regime, the term accident (‘Unfall’) has been defined as ‘ein
plötzlich von außen kommendes unvorhersehbares, einen Personen- oder Sachschaden
verursachendes Ereignis’, or a sudden external unforeseeable event causing
personal injuries or property damage.76 The Austrian definition comes close
by defining an accident as ‘eine durch äußere und plötzliche Einwirkung entstan-
dene Schädigung’ (damage caused by an external and sudden force).77
What is the scope of the term ‘accident’? Historically, the German Aviation
law of 1922 merely covered genuine accidents and collisions of aircraft. On
the longer run the question arose to what extent damage caused by nuisance
could be brought under the scope of the regime.78 For overflying aircraft can
affect the property rights of landowners by the noise they produce. According
to the general rule of § 905 BGB, the landowner has to bear such flights above
certain altitudes. This corresponds with the rule that aircraft have a free right
of passage through German airspace, insofar as not limited by law or regula-
tions.79 However, certain exceptions to the main rule have been granted to
landowners, for example in cases of damage caused by sonic booms (“Knall-
schleppe”).80 Such exceptions can fall under the scope of the term accident,
if they cause serious forms of damage such as personal injuries or death to
persons or destruction of property.
The term accident has been filled in by case law. Rinck has enumerated
a number of examples of case law involving killed livestock and physical
damage to buildings caused by aviation that have been successfully brought
under the scope of absolute liability. On the other hand, more intangible forms
of property damage, such as devaluation of the value of property due to mere
overflight, have been excluded from the regime in case law.81 The criterion
of accident can even encompass cases of surface damage inflicted by normal
75 Koziol at 396-397.
76 Schwenk at 694. A slightly varying definition has been given by Giemulla/Schmid: “die
plötzliche Einwirkung eines äußeren Tatbestandes auf einen Menschen oder eine Sache, die eine
Schädigung zur Folge hat”, see Giemulla/Schmid at 19-21.
77 Koziol at 397.
78 Giemulla/Schmid at 19 et seq.
79 See §1(1) LuftVG and paragraph 2.5.2.2 of this study.
80 Comparable to the Austrian regime, which also allows for recovery of sudden damage
caused by sonic booms (“Stoßwellenbildung”) of supersonic aircraft, but exempts long term
and repetitive nuisance claims, see Koziol at 397.
81 See G. Rinck, Duldungspflicht und Ersatzansprüche gegenüber dem Flüglärm, 19 ZLW 98, at
99-101 (1970).
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overflight, as long as the effects of such overflight are qualified as ‘sudden’.
The scope of absolute liability is then only narrowed down by the rules of
causation. This can be illustrated by the “silverfox-farm” case of 1938.82
In the “silverfox-farm” case, a link of adequate causation between the
damage to silverfoxes that killed their young out of fright and the noise and
operation of overflying aircraft was denied by the Reichsgericht. The case
involved regular overflight at a normal altitude of a number of aircraft, which
would not harm ‘normal’ animals or humans, according to the court. This line
of reasoning led to the ruling by the court that the damage inflicted to the
extra-sensitive and foreign species of the silverfox fell outside the scope of
absolute liability of §33 LuftVG. This was substantiated by the criteria of height
of overflight and abnormal noise: compensation would only have been granted
in cases where “normal” animals would have been frightened by low overflight
or abnormal noise.83 In this case, the Reichsgericht applied the objective
approach of adequate causation to deny compensation for the harm done to
the silverfoxes. The objective approach of adequate causation generalizes the
potential classes of victims by comparing ‘normal’ animals to the ultrasensitive
species of silverfoxes and narrows the scope of causation down to foreseeable
cases of potential harm. Thus, unforeseeable and abnormal circumstances of
the case are denied compensation under the rule of adequate causation.84
In a number of later German cases, a more subjective test of causation was
applied which gave more consideration to the specific sensitivities of the
victim(s) at hand. In a judgment of 27 January 1981, the Bundes Gesetz Hof (BGH)
ruled that the link between operation of the aircraft and subsequent damage
should not be governed by the doctrine of adequate causation.85 The case
involved a helicopter flying over a house at a low level, which caused a part
of the 90 year old roof to collapse as a result of the movements of the motor-
blades. On the grounds that the roofparts had not been attached properly when
the roof was last renovated in 1939, the Court of Appeal rejected the applied
link of adequate causation between the operation of the helicopter and the
damage. However, the BGH overruled that decision on the grounds that the
rule of adequate causation was not held to be applicable to the case. According
to the court, the harm did fall under the protective scope of the violated rule.
For the question should not be if the harm is foreseeable to the defendant,
but far more if the specific realization of danger should lead to compensation
of damage. In other words, the violated rule of § 33 LuftVG is not meant to
set a standard of obligatory behaviour of the plaintiff (in casu, to properly
repair the roof), but is merely meant to create a basis for compensation of the
effects of the accident.
82 RGZ Bd. 158 (Silberfuchsfarm).
83 See Schwenk at 694-695.
84 See Schwenk at 695.
85 BGHZ 1979, 259.
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In a later case of 1 December 1981, the BGH endorsed its previous judgment
on the scope of the rule of § 33 LuftVG. The case involved two jet-aircraft flying
over a street in a short distance from each other, which so frightened a 19-year
old automobilist that she lost control of the car and had an accident. According
to the BGH, this presented a clear example of a case involving sudden and
intense noise and subsequent damage which falls under the scope of § 33
LuftVG.86
These cases have met with both support and critique in German literature.
An important critical observation has been that the BGH has not managed to
devise a more generally applicable formula to determine which cases fall
within the scope of § 33 LuftVG and which do not.87
A specific suggestion for the German legislature would be to narrow down
the scope of absolute liability to cases where the aircraft fly too low, that is,
in violation of the applicable rules of overflight. The advantage of such a
solution would be that cases such as the “silverfox-farm” case would auto-
matically fall outside the scope of § 33 LuftVG, as the implicated aircraft flew
over at a normal altitude.88 Questions on (adequate) causation would then
not even arise before a determination has been made whether the aircraft flew
too low or not. Specific exemptions based on severe damage caused by normal
overflight that do fall under the absolute liability regime would then only lie
in cases of damage caused by sonic booms.
4.4.3 The United Kingdom
The absolute liability regime of s 76(2) of the Civil Aviation Act covers
‘material loss or damage caused to any person or property on land or water
by, or by a person in, or an article, animal, or person falling from an aircraft
while in flight, taking off or landing.’ The regime also covers surface damage
arising from collisions (on the surface, in flight/during take-off or landing,
etc.).89
Damage caused by reasonable overflight has been excluded from the scope
of absolute liability in s 76(1) of the Civil Aviation Act as follows:
86 See Grabherr at 103-104 (1986).
87 Grabherr at 104-107; Schwenk at 694. Schwenk remarks that the scope of absolute liability
will have to be determined on a case by case basis in practice, but that the scope could
also be refined by means of corrective legislation.
88 Such a solution probably corresponds with the current scope of absolute liability of Article
1 of the Rome Convention of 1952, although it should be remarked that speaking more
generally than merely on a level of German legislation, a scope of absolute liability is
preferred in which damage caused by overflight at whatever level has been excluded.
89 Shawcross and Beaumont, V/146; Hailsham at 822.
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No action lies in respect of trespass or in respect of nuisance by reason only of
the flight of an aircraft over any property at a height above the ground which,
having regard to wind, weather and all the circumstances of the case is reasonable,
or by reason only of the ordinary incidents of such flight, so long as the provisions
of any Air Navigation Order and specified provisions of the Civil Aviation Act
are duly complied with.
Thus, the normal inconveniencies and ordinary incidents of flight inherent
to the activity of flying have been excluded from the regime.90 ‘Ordinary
incidents of flight’ refer to normal noise and vibrations arising from normal
overflight.91 In order to determine what is reasonable, a certain discretion
has been left to the courts by permitting all relevant circumstances to be taken
into account.
4.4.4 Switzerland
The scope of liability of the Swiss third party liability regime of the Federal
Aviation Law includes damage caused by things or bodies thrown off or falling
from the aircraft, even when such events happen in cases of emergency.92
Furthermore, surface damage caused by collisions of aircraft is included and
leads to joint and several liability of the implicated operators.93
Since the Swiss regime has copied the wording of the Rome Convention
of 1933, the question may arise to what extent damage caused by overflight
can be brought under the scope of the absolute liability regime. Leaving this
question of scope of causation entirely to discretion of the judges is not a
preferable solution, but a mere circumvention of the problem, as Riese has
pointed out in this context.94
4.4.5 Australia
Under the Damage by Aircraft Act 1999, liability for any injury or damage
can only arise
90 Shawcross and Beaumont, V/136.
91 Hailsham at 824-825. Note that the specific heights at which aircraft are permitted to operate
are regulated by means of specific statutory provisions on operation on or near aerodromes
and aerodrome traffic zones; provisions relating to minimum altitudes in general can be
found in special regulations restricting flying and in the Rules of the Air Regulations, see
Hailsham at 726 et seq.
92 Article 64(2a) LFG.
93 Article 66 LFG.
94 Riese at 338-339.
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where caused by impact with an aircraft in flight or in flight immediately before
the impact, or from contact with an object which has fallen from the aircraft in flight
or on impact, including part of an aircraft. This will include damage caused, which
is the result of the impact (for example, by fire).95
The Australian legislature has thus clearly narrowed the scope of the absolute
liability regime down to scenarios involving the impact of aircraft or parts
or objects of the aircraft. All scenarios of damage caused by normal or too
low sudden or general overflight have simply been excluded, even if such
scenarios cause serious forms of personal injuries or property damage.96
The meaning of the term ‘in flight’ varies per type of aircraft involved.
The Australian legislature has made specific distinctions between aircraft
lighter than air (such as balloons or airships), aircraft heavier than air and
power-driven (e.g. propeller or jet driven), and aircraft heavier than air, but
not power driven (e.g. gliders). The first category of aircraft lighter than air
is deemed to be in flight from the moment of detachment from the surface
until the moment of attachment to the surface. The second category of aircraft
heavier than air and power-driven is deemed to be in flight from the moment
when power is applied for the purpose of take-off until the landing run ends.
And finally, the third category of aircraft heavier than air, but not power
driven, is considered to be in flight from the moment of becoming airborne
until the moment the landing run ends.97
The ratio for these specifications is to exclude normal manoeuvres that
occur directly after the aircraft has landed and slowed to a normal speed from
the scope of the regime, for instance in case of an aircraft exiting from a
runway without stopping and then taxiing directly to a hard stand. The scope
of the regime has thus been narrowed down to crash landings and to specific
landings where the aircraft may have landed normally but has managed to
cause damage in the process anyhow. Examples of the latter include over-
shooting or leaving a runway at an airport, as well as damage arising from
the use of a taxiway, road, field, or other area as an emergency landing strip.98
Damage caused by collision or interference of two or more aircraft leads
to joint and several liability of the operators or owners of the implicated
aircraft.99
95 Clause 10(1) of the Damage by Aircraft Act 1999.
96 This corresponds to the first scenario of surface damage as described in sub-paragraph
2.2.1 of this study.
97 Clause 5 of the Damage by Aircraft Act 1999.
98 See the comment on Clause 5 of the Damage by Aircraft Act 1999.
99 Clause 10(4) of the Damage by Aircraft Act 1999. Such a solution could also serve to fill
in the current legislative gap in the French regime in that area, see sub-paragraph 4.4.1 of
this chapter.
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4.5 LIMITATION OF LIABILITY AND INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
This paragraph will focus on the question whether the absolute liability
regimes under review are based on limited or unlimited liability and whether
these regimes are backed up by compulsory insurance requirements. Most
States require proof of insurance coverage of domestic operators under the
registration procedures of their aircraft as well as of international operators
of aircraft flying within or over their territory. Furthermore, Community law
stipulates that air carriers falling under its scope should carry third party
liability insurance coverage, which is of relevance for the EU Member States
discussed in this paragraph.100
4.5.1 France
The French regime has not been limited, nor have any insurance requirements
for third party liability been made compulsory under French law.
4.5.2 Germany and Austria
Under the German and Austrian regimes, the operators of aircraft can only
be held liable up to certain legal limits of liability. These systems of limitation
of liability are comparable to those of the Rome Convention of 1952 as
amended by the Montreal Protocol of 1978.101 Under the German regime,
the correlation between weight of the aircraft and applicable limits ranges from
model aircraft (starting at a weight of 25 kilogrammes) with a legal limitation
of 1,5 million euro to aircraft of more than 14000 kilogrammes with a legal
limitation of 60 million euro. ‘Weight’ of the aircraft has been defined as the
maximum allowed take-off weight in that context. Furthermore, a maximum
limit of 600.000 euro per killed or injured person has been enacted, as well
as a system of division of limits between the categories of personal injuries
and property damage.102
100 Article 7 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2407/92 of 23 July 1992, OJ L 240.
101 See paragraph 3.5 of this study.
102 See § 37 LuftVG (1) for the six categories of weight and limitation and paragraph (2) for
the maximum limit person. Paragraphs 3 and 4 provide for a system of division whereby
two thirds of the amount calculated in accordance with paragraph (1) shall be used to pay
damages for injuries to persons. If such personal injuries exceed the limits, the applicable
limited amount should be divided proportionately between the claimants. The last third
of the amount shall be divided proportionately between property damage and as yet not
compensated personal injury claims (paragraph 4). If the total amount of damages exceeds
the limitations set out in paragraph 1, the payment to each claimant shall diminish in the
same ratio as that of the total amount to the maximum amount (paragraph 3).
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A comparable system of limitation has been codified in the Austrian regime,
with varying levels of weight and correlated limitation tiers ranging from flight
models from 20 kg with a legal limitation of 872.000 euro, to 65.400.000 euro
for aircraft of more than 14.000 kg. A system of division between personal
injuries and property damage has been also been enacted.103
However, an important difference between the system of Rome and the
German and Austrian regimes lies in the escape routes from limited to
unlimited liability. For under both the German and Austrian regime, the escape
routes from absolute and limited liability lie in the general rules of German
and Austrian fault liability.104 And such an alternative can be qualified as
far more reasonable than having to fall back on proof of gross negligence or
wilful misconduct of the operator, as is required under the system of Rome.105
The operators of military aircraft are subjected to unlimited liability for
surface damage in both the German and Austrian regime.106
Under the German Aviation Law, a system of compulsory insurance has
been enacted which requires compulsory insurance coverage or other financial
guarantees by means of money deposits or other securities for at least up to
the legally limited levels of liability. States and aircraft operated by the German
federal government are exempted from this rule. The possibility of direct
actions of third parties against insurers has not been codified under the Ger-
man regime.107
A similar system of compulsory insurance requirements has been codified
under the Austrian Aviation Law. Operators of aircraft are obliged to take
out third party liability insurance for at least up to the levels of limitation as
set out under the absolute liability regime.108 Operators of certain state air-
craft are exempted from this obligation.109
The main difference between the German and Austrian regime is that the
latter allows direct actions of third parties against insurers. For insurers and
insured operators can be held jointly and severally liable by third parties by
means of direct actions under the Austrian regime.110
103 See § 149 (formerly § 23) of the Austrian Aviation Code. Two thirds of the applicable limit
is meant for personal injuries and one third for property damage; if damage in one category
is less than the applicable limit, the remaining amount can be used for the other category
(paragraph 2).
104 See § 159 LuftFG and § 42 LuftVG.
105 See subparagraph 3.5.4 of this study.
106 See § 53 LuftVG and § 151 LuftFG.
107 See W. Wussow, Unfallhaftpflichtrecht 539 (1996); Geigel at 1174; § 43(1) LuftVG jo. §§ 102-
105 LuftVZO.
108 See § 163 (1) LuftFG.
109 § 167 (3) LuftFG exempts operators “der Bund, ein Land, ein Gemeindeverband oder eine
Ortsgemeinde mit mehr als 50 000 Einwohnern” from the obligation to take out liability
insurance.
110 See § 166 LuftFG.
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4.5.3 United Kingdom
The statutory regime of absolute liability for damage to third parties on the
surface has not been limited. Furthermore, no national compulsory liability
insurance requirements exist under English law for operators or owners of
aircraft. This is due to the fact that the compulsory insurance requirements
that were created in the past never came into effect.111 In practice, however,
the operators of aircraft are obliged to take out third party liability insurance
coverage in order to be granted an air service license by the Civil Aviation
Authority.112
4.5.4 Switzerland
As a main rule, operators of aircraft are subjected to unlimited liability under
the Swiss regime.
Operators of aircraft registered in Switzerland are obliged to take out third
party liability insurance coverage up to certain amounts or to furnish other
guarantees to back up potential liability.113 State and cantonal aircraft are
exempted from these compulsory requirements.114 The duty of foreign opera-
tors to furnish guarantees is governed by international agreements and the
Swiss Federal Air Office is allowed to make use of Swiss airspace dependant
on the furnishing of such guarantees.115
The Federal Council is obliged to specify the rules on technical details such
as the required amounts of coverage under such guarantees.116
As of April 24, 2001, the following levels of insurance coverage are required
by Swiss Law:117
111 In the past, English Parliament passed Part IV of the Civil Aviation Act 1949, which
contained compulsory insurance requirements based on those of the Rome Convention
of 1933, which was signed, but not ratified by the United Kingdom. Those requirements
never came into effect and were repealed by section 128 of the Companies Act 1967.
Likewise, another section that aimed to give effect to the Rome Convention of 1933 has
been repealed by section 26 of the Civil Aviation Act 1968, see N. Legh-Jones at 852.
112 Applicants for air service licenses must satisfy the Civil Aviation Authority that his financial
arrangements or insurance coverage have been met; see the Civil Aviation (Licensing)
Regulations 1964 (S.I. 1964 No. 1116) made under Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act 1960, s.2,
see J. Birds, Modern Insurance Law 395 (1997); See also N. Legh-Jones at 852. Furthermore,
Article 7 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2407/92 requires mandatory insurance coverage
for Community air carriers.
113 Art. 70(1) jo Art. 71(1) LFG.
114 Art. 72 LFG.
115 Art. 73 LFG.
116 Art. 74 LFG.
117 See Art. 125 (1) of the Resolution on Aviation of 14 November 1973 (‘Verordnung über die
Luftfahrt vom 14. November 1973’, also known as ‘Luftfahrtverordnung (LFV)’). For aircraft
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a. For aircraft and helicopters with a take-off weight up to
2000 kg: 3 000 000 F
b. For aircraft and helicopters with a take-off weight from
2001 to 5700 kg: 5 000 000 F
c. For aircraft and helicopters with a take-off weight from
5701 to 20 000 kg: 12 500 000 F
d. For aircraft with a take-off weight of 20 001 to 200 000 kg
and helicopters with a take-off weight exceeding 200 000 kg: 50 000 000 F
e. For aircraft with a take-off weight exceeding 200 000 kg: 75 000 000 F
f. For gliders equipped with motors: 3 000 000 F
g. For gliders: 3 000 000 F
h. For manned balloons: 3 000 000 F
The combination of unlimited liability and compulsory insurance or other
guarantees makes the Swiss regime straightforward and workable. For the
operator can be held absolutely liable for any amount of potential surface
damage, even if that amount exceeds the levels of compulsory insurance.
Damage caused by unlawful users or other persons that are not employed
by the operator provide exceptions to that main rule. If such persons cause
surface damage, the operator can only be held liable up to the applicable level
of mandatory insurance coverage.118
4.5.5 Australia
According to its Explanatory Memorandum, the main aim of the Act is to
upgrade the level of compensation for personal injuries and property damage
of third parties to modern and acceptable standards by subjecting all aircraft
that come within Australian jurisdiction to a uniform regime of absolute and
unlimited liability. For under the previous situation, different liability regimes
co-existed for foreign and domestic aircraft. This was due to the fact that
foreign carriers from States signatory to the Rome Convention of 1952 as well
as domestic carriers on international flights were subjected to an absolute and
limited liability regime on the one hand. On the other hand, foreign carriers
and domestic carriers flying within Australia were generally subjected to
absolute and unlimited liability.119 Due to this lack of uniformity, the levels
of obligatory compensation to third parties in Australia could vary enormously.
not categorized under paragraph 1, separate levels of coverage can be ordained (paragraph
2). For the carriage of dangerous goods, specific proportional third party liability insurance
can be demanded (paragraph 3).
118 Riese at 378.
119 See the Explanatory Memorandum on the Damage by Aircraft Bill 1999, as circulated by
Authority of the Minister for Transport and Regional Services, the Hon. John Anderson
MP, at 2, hereinafter cited as Explanatory Memorandum.
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According to the Australian legislature, that unfeasible situation was best
eliminated by enacting a new regime based on unlimited liability.
Third party liability aviation insurance coverage is not required in Austra-
lia, although discussions between the Australian Department of Transport and
the industry have made clear that the aviation industry would support a
national mandatory scheme in this field. In practice, most commercial and
non-commercial operators take out adequate coverage for third party liabil-
ity.120
PART 2 – DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
4.6 INTRODUCTION
As has been established in the introductory paragraph to this Chapter, Euro-
pean Community air law in the field of third party liability for damage to third
parties on the surface is currently non-existent. Community law merely
requires that air carriers and operators falling under the scope of Community
law should be insured to cover liability in case of accidents, in particular in
respect of passengers, luggage, cargo, mail, and third parties.121 However,
no minimal levels of compulsory coverage have been enacted. This means that
an aircraft operator or air carrier falling under the scope of Community law
can currently obtain any (minimal) level of insurance coverage for potential
liability in order to comply with the licensing requirements of Council Regula-
tion 2407/92.
A brief leap back in time can help to understand the current lack of Com-
munity legislation in this field. In a Consultation Paper of 1992 on liability
in air transport, the Commission made an evaluation of the existing inter-
national and national rules on liability toward passengers and third parties.
The Commission was of the opinion that a basis re-assessment of the situation
was required, since the rules on third party liability differed substantially per
Member State and the Rome Convention of 1952 was completely out of date.
According to the Consultation Paper, a Community approach would have the
advantage of including areas that were not governed by the system of Warsaw,
120 See Discussion Paper, at 9. It is noteworthy that passengers are better protected than third
parties in this respect, as the Australian Civil Aviation (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1959 requires
mandatory non-voidable insurance coverage for all operators carrying fare-paying
passengers with a minimum insurance level of A$500,000 per passenger, see Discussion
Paper, at 3; see also D.B. Johnston and T. Pyne, Case notes and commentaries – Australia, Recent
Developments in Australian Aviation Law, TAQ 142, at 146-148 (1998) and the Transport
Legislation Amendment Act 1995 for the insurance requirements to which Australian holders
of a charter and/or Regular Public Transport (RPT) Air Operator’s Certificate for inter-
national or domestic carriage are subjected.
121 Article 7 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2407/92 of 23 July 1992, OJ L 240, 24.8.1992.
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such as third party liability. The Commission concluded that the varying third
party liability regimes in force did not meet the basic requirements in terms
of establishing fair compensation limits and harmonized standards throughout
the Community and invited interested parties to give their views on these
issues.122
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) responded to this invitation
and held that the legal and economic problems that could arise from accidents
which cause damage to third parties were solved adequately by national
legislation in combination with proper insurance requirements and that the
degree of protection to third parties thus depended on the national regime
at hand. The ICC remarked that such national regimes were generally based
on a combination of strict and unlimited liability and that it supported such
an approach. At most, the ICC conceded that a recommendation or directive
to achieve uniformity in this respect might be desirable. For the Rome Conven-
tion of 1952 was held not to fill any vital or recognized need.123
After this brief examination of the problem, no further legislative action
was taken on a Community level in this field from 1992 onwards. Passenger
liability, on the other hand, was specifically dealt with by means of Council
Regulation (EC) No 2027/97 of 9 October 1997. In brief, the liability regime
of the Regulation provided for unlimited liability of Community air carriers
for damages sustained in the event of death, wounding, or any other bodily
injury by passengers in the event of accidents. For any damages up to the sum
of the equivalent in ecu of 100.000 SDR, the Community air carrier was not
permitted to exclude or limit his liability by proving that he and his agents
had taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible
for him to take such measures.124 The regime could thus be qualified as a
two-tier regime of absolute liability up to 100 000 SDR and fault liability or
negligence for amounts in excess of 100.000 SDR.
And then the problem of insurability of risks related to war and terrorism
forced itself upon the European agenda in the direct aftermath of ‘9/11.’ In
the aftermath of ‘9/11’, the Member States of the European Union introduced
temporary insurance measures for coverage of the risks posed by war and
terrorism in response to the decision of the aviation insurance industry to
reduce obtainable coverage for such risks to approximately 5% of the normal
coverage. These measures were approved by the Council of Ministers on
122 See EC Consultation Paper on Passenger Liability in Aircraft Accidents – Warsaw Conven-
tion and Internal Market Requirements of 5.10.1992, VII.C.1 – 174/92-8, at 2, 4-6.
123 See ICC Comments on the EC Consultation Paper: Passenger Liability in Aircraft Accidents
– Warsaw Convention and Internal Market Requirements, Doc. No. 310/403 at 5 (General
Observations on Third Party Liability).
124 Article 3(1) sub a jo. 3(2) Council Regulation (EC) No 2027/97.
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September 22, 2001 on the conditions that they were temporary, strictly regu-
lated and notified to the European Commission.125
State aid was also granted by the European Commission under certain
conditions, such as the condition that compensation was paid in a non-discrimi-
natory manner to all airlines in a given Member State and that it only con-
cerned the costs incurred during the period of 11 – 14 September 2001, follow-
ing the grounding of air traffic by the American authorities.126 The temporary
insurance measures were eventually prolonged to June 2002.
Another related legislative response to ‘9/11’ consisted of a the proposal
for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on insurance
requirements for air carriers and aircraft operators, which was launched on
24 September 2002. The proposal aims to bridge the current legislative gap
on levels of required insurance coverage and scope of the current legislation
in the future. Notably, no legislative action on a Community level was taken
in the field of third party liability. The proposal, which also states the reasons
for not taking legislative action in the field of third party liability, will be dealt
with in more detail in the next paragraph.
4.7 THE EC PROPOSAL ON INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
on insurance requirements for air carriers and aircraft operators, aims to fill
in the open-ended Community requirement on air carrier licensing which
merely requires that air carriers are insured without specifying to which levels
such insurance coverage should be obtained.127 It should be borne in mind
that the proposal is still in its drafting stages and has not been finalized
yet.128 Unfortunately, this means that this paragraph can only be based on
125 See Communication from the Commission on Insurance in the Air Transport sector following
the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States, Brussels, 2.7.2002 COM (2002)
320 final, at 3.
126 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council,
The repercussions of the terrorist attacks in the United States on the air transport industry,
Brussels, 10.10.2001 COM (2001) 574 final, at 7-8. Notably, state aid was permitted on the
basis of Article 87(2)(b) of the Treaty establishing the European Community. The events
of September 11, 2001 were held to be exceptional occurrences within the meaning of Article
87(2)(b) Treaty.
127 See Article 7 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2407/92.
128 The proposed Regulation is subjected to the Article 251 EC procedure (ex Article 189b),
and reached the stage of first reading by the European Parliament on April 1, 2003, see
European Parliament, Amendments 8-57, PE 314.759/8-57, April 1, 2003. At the time of
finalizing of this study, the outstanding issues of the final version of the Draft Regulation
(Aviation Doc. 12689/03 of 23 September 2003) as prepared by the Working Party on
Aviation under Greek and Italian Presidency were submitted to COREPER I on 26-09-2003
with the aim of facilitating political agreement on a Council common position at the
Transport Council on 9 October 2003.
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the initial proposal, as access to all further legislative amendments made by
the Working Party on Aviation under Greek and Italian presidency is formally
limited.
In order to achieve a fully harmonized approach and a level playing field
for Community and non-Community air carriers and aircraft operators, the
proposed Regulation applies to all aircraft carriers and operators flying to or
from Community airports as well as over territory of Member States.129 This
is a large step further than merely filling in Article 7 of ‘2407/92’ with obliga-
tory levels of required insurance, as the proposed Regulation also effects the
insurance requirements to which non-Community air carriers and operators
that merely fly over Community territory are subjected to. In various amend-
ments in the first reading of the European Parliament the question has been
raised whether such an imposition of insurance requirements on non-Commun-
ity air carriers and operators that have no intention to land in a Member State
is in conformity with the Chicago Convention of 1944.
According to Article 5 of the Chicago Convention, non-scheduled flights
are granted multilateral rights of overflight over the territory of Contracting
States, albeit subject to certain reservations. Article 6 of the Chicago Convention
holds that scheduled international air services can only be operated over or
into the territory of a Contracting State with special permission or other
authorization of that State and in accordance with the terms of such permission
or authorization. In both cases, specific insurance requirements have not been
explicitly regulated nor even mentioned. The open-ended question is thus if
the conditions of Article 5 and the permission and authorization of Article
6 can be interpreted as to include such insurance obligations. In that context,
both the International Air Services Transit Agreement of 1945, to which the
majority of Contracting States is party, as well as normal bilateral agreements
between States can be of relevance. The former holds that each Contracting
State reserves the right to withhold or revoke a certificate or permit to an air
transport enterprise of another State, if the air transport enterprise does not
comply with the laws of the State over which it operates.130 Bilaterals, in-
cluding bilaterals between Contracting States not party to the International
Air Services Transit Agreement, can also contain insurance requirements.
Article 5 and 6 of the Chicago Convention as well as the regime of the Inter-
national Air Services Transit Agreement of 1945 and general bilaterals seem
to point to the possibility of imposing Community insurance requirements
to non-Community air carriers or aircraft operators that merely fly over Com-
munity territory. This view was also substantiated by the Council Legal Service
in the drafting process.
In case of bilateral agreements between two non-EU States, such Community
legislation could effect the insurance provisions of the bilateral at hand, es-
129 See Article 2 of the proposed Regulation.
130 See Article 1 (5) of the International Air Services Transit Agreement of 1945.
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pecially if the Community insurance requirements are more rigid than those
of the State of registry of one or both parties to the bilateral. But even if non-
Community air carriers or aircraft operators can be subjected to Community
insurance requirements in case of such mere overflight, enforceability of the
Regulation could prove troublesome.
The initially proposed required levels of insurance coverage have been
based on the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) Resolution on mini-
mum insurance requirements (ECAC/25-1). On the presumption that the Maxi-
mum Take-Off Weight (MTOW) and subsequent level of required insurance
coverage correspond to the potential level of danger per type of aircraft to
a certain degree, the following categories of coverage for third party liability
have been suggested:
Category 1: aircraft with a MTOW of less than 25.000 kg: 80 million SDRs
Category 2: aircraft with a MTOW of less than 50.000 kg: 270 million SDRs
Category 3: aircraft with a MTOW of less than 200.000 kg: 400 million SDRs
Category 4: aircraft with a MTOW of more than 200.000 kg: 600 million SDRs.131
The Regulation specifically mentions that these levels of insurance also are
mandatory for coverage of acts of war and terrorism. It should be borne in
mind that these categories and potential levels of coverage have been subject
to discussion and have been amended in the drafting process of the proposed
Regulation. At this point, one can merely observe that any attempt to fill in
such requirements on the basis of MTOW of aircraft can be lauded as a step
in the direction of more clarity in relation to the specific requirements that
have to be met by air carriers and aircraft operators falling under the scope
of the proposed Regulation, as long as the final categories correspond to levels
of insurance coverage are reasonably obtainable for the aircraft operator or
air carrier at hand within a certain weight category.132
Insurance coverage can be obtained from insurers authorized to effect such
coverage under Community law or the laws of the country which has delivered
an operating license, the country where the aircraft is registered, or the country
where the insurer has its residence or principal place of business.133 Alter-
131 See Article 7 (2) of the proposed Regulation.
132 During the drafting stages of the proposed Regulation, the UK delegation suggested a more
refined division into nine categories of required insurance coverage. According to the UK
delegation, this would take the position of light aircraft into account more accurately. Such
a division would also take the Airbus A380 into account at the other end of the spectrum
by means of a category above 500.000 kg with a minimum coverage of 1000 million SDR’s,
see Annex to Council of the European Union, Interinstitutional File: 2002/0234 (COD),
Brussels, 25 February 2003, at 2. Almost all delegations were of the opinion that the initial
proposed categories were too broad and found the prescribed amounts of coverage too
high, especially for lighter aircraft, see Council of the European Union, Interinstitutional
File: 2002/0234, Working Party on Aviation, Brussels, 3 April 2003, at 21 (footnote 64).
133 See Article 5(1) of the proposed Regulation.
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natively, air carriers or aircraft operators from third countries shall provide
either a cash deposit in a depository maintained in the country that granted
the license, or a guarantee issued by a bank authorized to do so by the country
of registration and whose financial responsibility has been verified by that
country. Furthermore that country is not permitted to claim immunity from
suit in relation to such a guarantee. The latter rule has also proven to be
controversial during the drafting process of the proposed Regulation, in view
of the fact that such a provision distorts a level playing field between Com-
munity and third country air carriers and aircraft operators.
Air carriers and aircraft operators are obliged to deposit an insurance
certificate or any of the latter other securities with the competent aviation
authorities of the Member States at the beginning of each scheduling
period.134
The proposed Regulation does not deal with third party liability regimes,
which are left to the discretion of the Member States.135 In that sense, it is
remarkable that the Proposal initially defined scenarios which are to be covered
by insurance, but are normally used to define the scope of an absolute or strict
liability regime. For Article 7(1) of the Regulation held that insurance to cover
liability vis-à-vis third parties shall be understood to cover ‘any damage caused
by an aircraft in flight or on the ground or by any person or thing falling
therefrom to third parties, for each aircraft and incident, only if damage is
a direct consequence of incident giving rise thereto.’ Such criteria are meant
to define the scope of an absolute liability regime, such as been done under
Article 1(1) of the Rome Convention, but not to define beforehand to what
extent insurance coverage goes in terms of potential scenarios that can cause
surface damage. This can be seen as a flaw which complicates matters; for
if Community insurance requirements are deliberately codified separately from
liability regimes this should be done in a consequent manner.
As a whole, the move to fill in the insurance requirements of Article 7 of
‘2407/92’ by means of the proposed Regulation can be lauded as a step for-
ward toward more clarity in relation to the precise level of obligatory insurance
coverage for the air carriers and aircraft operators that fall under the scope
of the proposed Regulation. Despite the fact that enforcement may prove
difficult in cases of mere overflight of non-Community air carriers or aircraft
operators, at least a level playing field in relation to level of mandatory insur-
ance coverage has been created for all parties concerned, both in the air and
on the ground. However, at the time of finalizing this study, a number of
issues still needed to be resolved, such as the question to what extent scenarios
of market failure should be brought under the scope of the proposed Regula-
tion.
134 See Article 5(2)(3) of the proposed Regulation. Notably, Member States that are merely flown
over may also require evidence that such insurance has been effected.
135 See Article 7(1)(a) of the proposed Regulation.
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4.8 A MORE HARMONIZED COMMUNITY APPROACH TO THIRD PARTY LIABILITY?
In absence of any instrument on third party liability in this field on a Commun-
ity level, the question could be raised whether the enactment of such an
instrument should be considered by the Commission.
In the Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on insurance requirements for air
carriers and aircraft operators, the Commission concedes that there are no
Community rules defining what third party liability should be based on.136
The Commission acknowledges that air carrier’s liability toward third parties
is generally based on proven tort arising from negligence or any other wrong-
ful acts (wilful misconduct), as opposed to strict liability in the Member
States.137 However, ‘as far as third party liability of air carriers and aircraft
operators in case of incidents is concerned, the Commission is of the opinion
that liability has been already sufficiently defined in the Member States.’138
This view seems contrary to an earlier notion put forward by the Commission
in 1992 that a Community approach to aviation liability could encompass areas
such as third party liability, as the varying national regimes in force did not
establish harmonized standards throughout the Community.139 But is the
current rather meagre justification for not taking legislative action on a Com-
munity level on the basis of the requirements of subsidiarity of Article 5 EC
sufficient?140 In order to examine that question, a number of considerations
of the Council of the European Union to Regulation 2027/97 on passenger
liability can be of comparative value in order to find justifications and argu-
ments for similar legislative action on a Community level in the field of third
party liability.
The fourth consideration of Regulation 2027/97 holds that in the internal
aviation market, the distinction between national and international transport
136 See Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council on insurance requirements for air carriers and aircraft operators, Brussels,
24.9.2002 COM (2002) 521 final, at 5 (point 13), hereinafter cited as Explanatory Memoran-
dum of 24.9.2002.
137 See Explanatory Memorandum of 24.9.2002 at 5, point 14. The Commission also points out
that some Member States have enacted specific regimes based on strict and unlimited
liability, such as France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
138 See Explanatory Memorandum of 24.9.2002 at 6, point 15.
139 See paragraph 4.6 of this study.
140 Subsidiarity in the sense of Article 5 EC provides that action by the Community should
only be taken if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently
achieved by the Member States and can therefore by reason of scale or effects of the
proposed action be better achieved by the Community. If Community action is deemed
necessary, the Commission will opt for directives rather than regulations, as minimum
as opposed to total harmonization is now more the norm, see P. Craig & G. de Burca, EU
Law 135-136 (2003).
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has been eliminated. Therefore, it is appropriate to have the same level and
nature of liability in both national and international transport.
The sixth consideration holds that action at a Community level is desirable
in order to achieve harmonization in the field of air carrier liability and could
serve as a guideline for improved passenger protection on a global scale. Such
action would be in compliance with the principle of subsidiarity.
The seventh consideration holds that it is appropriate to remove all
monetary limits of liability of the Warsaw Convention or any other legal or
contractual limits in accordance with present trends at an international level.
The eighth consideration holds that in order to avoid situations where
victims of accidents are not compensated, Community air carriers should not
be able to invoke any defence of Article 20(1) of the Warsaw Convention up
to a certain limit.
If modified to the specific area of third party liability, such considerations
could equally serve as arguments for harmonization of third party liability
regimes within the internal aviation market on a Community level.141 For
the point not addressed by the Commission is that as only a number of Mem-
ber States have enacted national regimes based on absolute liability, whereas
others have no regime at all, a level and harmonized playing field is currently
lacking both for aircraft operators and air carriers as well as third parties
falling under the scope of Community law. One would at least expect the same
level of legal protection of third parties as of passengers, if not more so, as
third parties do not even profit from aviation in the way that passengers do.
For aircraft operators and air carriers can currently invoke all defences avail-
able under general rules of fault liability or negligence at hand in Member
States without specific third party liability regimes in force, whereas passengers
always profit from absolute liability up to 100.000 SDR of Regulation 2027/97,
irrespective of the Member State at hand. Since the whole point of this study
is to explore the difference between the situation in absence of any regime
and stricter regimes of liability which offer more protection to third parties,
the Commission has not justified its grounds for not taking legislative action
on a Community level sufficiently in my opinion. On the grounds of har-
monization and a level playing field for all parties concerned in the internal
aviation market, both a legislative instrument on a Community level in the
field of second party as of third party liability thus seem practically equally
defendable. The technical question if such an instrument should be enacted
in the form of a Regulation or Directive is difficult to answer. Arguments in
favor of the less far fetching instrument of a Directive include the fact that
a number of Member States already have legislation in force in this field, which
141 For it should be borne in mind that the law of the European Community is primarily meant
to establish an internal market and not to unify the law on the basis the EC Treaty; therefore
pleas for harmonization of national laws should be based on the grounds of necessity for
the establishment and functioning of the internal market, see Van Gerven et al., at 475-476.
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would then simply have to be amended to the requirements of the Directive
instead of abolished. Member States without any legislation in force would
need to create specific legislation in this field on a national level within a
certain timeframe that would replace the general regime of fault liability or
negligence at hand.142
However, as long as the legislative void in Community law remains, the
problem of third party liability will have to be resolved on a national level
of legislation by the Member States, which ultimately means that no level
playing field exists in this area in the European Community. The only valid
counter-argument against the current lack of harmonized rules, which was
also raised in Chapter 3 of this study in relation to the necessity of an inter-
national regime in this field, is that Member states are now free to enact
national regimes with a greater range of types of aircraft covered by them than
mere civil aircraft.
4.9 FINAL REMARKS AND CONCLUSIONS
In this Chapter, the question has been raised how a national legislature could
best deal with the problem of liability for surface damage inflicted by aircraft
on a national level. Such legislative action on a national level is partly justifi-
able on the grounds that the current international system of Rome is deemed
to be obsolete at this point in time. In order to provide the fictitious national
legislator with pointers in this area, the first part of this Chapter dealt with
the third party liability regimes in the aviation laws of France, Germany,
Austria, the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Australia. These regimes were
deemed to contain useful patterns of legislation in respect of persons liable,
basis and scope of liability, etc. Despite their inherent differences, the discussed
regimes all have a basis of absolute liability in common.
Although its exact definition may vary, the main person or entity that can
be held absolutely liable under the majority of regimes is the operator of the
aircraft.143 In a number of regimes and dependant on certain conditions, the
owners of aircraft can be held liable as well.144
142 In that context, Directive 85/374 of 25 July 1985 [1985] OJ L 210/79 on the approximation
of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning
liability for defective products could serve as a comparative example of harmonization
of (product) liability rules on a Community level by means of a Directive as opposed to
a Regulation.
143 The main exception to that rule is provided by the absolute liability regime of the United
Kingdom, which attributes liability to the owner of the aircraft; however, in practice, this
generally amounts to the operator as well, see sub-paragraph 4.3.3 of this study.
144 See in that context, sub-paragraphs 4.3.1, 4.3.3, and 4.3.5 on the French, United Kingdom,
and Australian regimes.
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In view of the worldwide aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United
States of 11 September, 2001, it is of interest that the problems related to
liability for surface damage inflicted by unlawful use of the aircraft have been
dealt with in a number of regimes.145 The solution opted for in the Swiss
liability regime is recommendable, which holds that the unlawful user can
be held fully liable, whereas the operator of the aircraft can only be held liable
up to the limits of mandatory insurance coverage. If such a legislative solution
were to be applied to scenarios involving excessive damage, such as ‘9/11’,
the implicated operator of the aircraft could only be legally held liable up to
their (actual and/or compulsory) levels of insurance coverage, without subject-
ing them to the dangers of potential bankruptcy.146
Although a feasible regime of international liability in this field would
certainly have a great number of advantages, one of its main disadvantages
remains that its scope of application is far more narrow than the potential
scope of national regimes. For the Rome Convention of 1952 only applies to
scenarios of surface damage inflicted by international civil aviation in the
territory of a Contracting State by an aircraft registered in the territory of
another Contracting State and does not apply to damage caused by military,
customs, or police aircraft.147 The scope of application of national regimes
can be made a lot broader, since national regimes can be made to apply both
to international and domestic flights above national territory and are not
dependant on adherence by foreign states whose aircraft are permitted to fly
to or over the state with such legislation in force. Furthermore, the national
legislator is free to determine which range of types of aircraft are covered by
the regime. The French regime in this field thus applies to civil, military, and
state aircraft;148 and according to the Air Navigation Order of the United
Kingdom, aircraft even include balloons and kites.149 By means of such
categorizations, the national legislature can also create variations in the liability
regime per type of aircraft.150 Furthermore, national regimes can be made
to encompass all potential cases of collisions of aircraft, whereas the inter-
national regime of liability of the system of Rome only covers cases of collision
145 See in that context, paragraphs 4.3.2, 4.3.4, and 4.3.5 on the German, Austrian, Swiss, and
Australian regimes.
146 The necessary excess coverage could then be taken up by States to a certain extent on the
grounds that such catastrophic risks should not be borne by aviation alone, see also para-
graph 2.10, argument 3 in that context.
147 See Articles 23(1) and 26 of the Rome Convention of 1952.
148 See sub-paragraph 4.3.1 of this study.
149 See the Air Navigation Order of 1995 as cited in sub-paragraph 4.3.3 of this study.
150 Under the German and Austrian regimes, for instance, the operators of military aircraft
are subjected to regimes of unlimited absolute liability for surface damage, whereas the
operators of other types of aircraft are subjected to limited regimes of absolute liability,
see sub-paragraph 4.3.2 of this study.
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between two or more international civil aircraft of States party to the Conven-
tion.151
Perhaps the most striking variations between the national regimes of
liability under review lie in the scope of absolute liability per regime. All of
the discussed regimes cover the most severe scenario of surface damage caused
by the impact of aircraft or parts, objects, or bodies falling or thrown from
the aircraft, although their wording varies. Some regimes also specify the type
of damage covered by the regime.152 Damage caused by nuisance or noise
has either been completely excluded or only included to a certain extent, for
instance by narrowing it down by means of criteria such as severity of the
damage or ‘suddenness’.153 The general idea is to at least expel the normal
inconveniencies of overflight that people on the ground have to bear from
aviation from the scope of absolute liability.
Most of the regimes have been based on unlimited liability and in most
cases compulsory insurance or security requirements have been enacted to
provide an extra financial safeguard for such regimes. In some cases, direct
actions have been permitted. Even in case of legally limited liability regimes,
the potential escape route to unlimited liability is based on the applicable rules
of general fault liability.154
As a whole, all of these national regimes based on absolute liability reflect
the notion that potential victims of surface damage deserve a better legal
protection than the general rules of negligence or fault liability of these systems
of law can offer. The rationale for such a notion is generally based on argu-
ments such as the potential complexities involved in proving fault or negli-
gence inherent to aviation accidents or incidents in general. Other arguments
include the fact that third parties generally do not benefit directly from aviation
or are able to prevent flights from being conducted above their heads. In short,
despite its improving track record, the aviation industry is still held to pose
dangers to third parties that are best dealt with by means of specific regimes
based on absolute liability.
151 See Article 7 of the Rome Convention of 1952; for the inherent problems involved in the
combination of collisions and the limited liability regime of the Rome Convention of 1952,
see sub-paragraph 3.3.2 of this study. Whenever collisions are specifically covered by a
national regime, a rule of joint and several liability will generally prevail, see e.g. sub-
paragraph 4.3.2 on the German regime of absolute liability in case of collisions.
152 The German and Austrian third party liability regimes specifically define the types of
personal injuries and property damage that must have been inflicted by the aircraft, see
sub-paragraph 4.4.2 of this study.
153 Under the Australian regime, the scope of absolute liability has been narrowed down by
the impact criterion, by which any damage caused by overflight has been excluded, see
sub-paragraph 4.4.5 of this study. The German and Austrian regimes have been limited
in scope of absolute liability to ‘accidents’, which require that certain elements are met,
see sub-paragraph 4.4.2.2 of this study.
154 See sub-paragraph 4.5.2 of this study.
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The second part of this Chapter dealt with the latest developments in
Community law in this field. A distinction was made between the current
proposed Regulation on insurance requirements and the lack of legislative
action on a Community level in the sphere of liability, which has been left
to the discretion of Member States. The proposed Regulation can be hailed
as a useful step to fill in the current legislative gap on required levels of
compulsory insurance coverage per category of aircraft on the basis of a
correlation between Maximum Take-Off Weight and corresponding level of
coverage (MTOW). However, the proposed Regulation has not been finalized
yet and a number of issues will still have to be resolved, such as the question
whether specific rules for market failure should be enacted in the proposed
Regulation.
The question has also been raised why the Commission has not also opted
for a more harmonized approach with respect to liability in this field. A
number of arguments have been put forward to substantiate such a move in
order to create a more level playing field for all parties concerned.
However, in the current void of any legislative instrument on third party
liability on a Community level or of any plans to enact such an instrument
in the near future, Member States are currently forced to approach the problem
on a national level. As has been mentioned, one advantage of such an approach
is that the national legislature can encompass all types of aircraft in its regime,
including military aircraft. Thus, the Dutch legislature, which was taken as
a starting point in this Chapter, is advised to combine the best aspects of the
discussed regimes and create his own regime of third party liability in Book
8, title 17 of the Dutch Civil Code. A regime based on absolute and unlimited
liability, which is limited in scope by the criteria of the first scenario of impact
of the aircraft or parts of the aircraft or persons/things falling therefrom is
recommended. The Australian regime of the Damage by Aircraft Bill of 1999
can serve as an example of such a regime, albeit that inclusion of the defence
of contributory negligence is advisable, which was omitted by the Australian
legislator. Any form of damage or injury, however severe, caused by aircraft
that remain intact and merely fly over, at whatever height, should not fall
under scope of the absolute liability regime as an important quid pro quo to
the severity of the absolute liability regime. For the difficulty to prove fault
or negligence is deemed the most feasible justification for absolute liability
as well as the greatest potential problem in cases of actual crashes of aircraft
or when parts of the aircraft fall from the aircraft. The broader scope of liability
of for instance the German and French regimes is therefore not recommended.
Damage caused by unlawful users should form the main exception to the
rule of absolute and unlimited liability. The Swiss solution of subjecting the
operator of the aircraft to a combination of absolute and limited liability up
to the level of compulsory insurance is recommended in that context.
5 The gradual move to negligence in
the United States
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous Chapter of this study, a general outline has been given of a
number of specific national liability regimes and insurance requirements for
damage to third parties on the surface inflicted by aircraft. Despite their
differences, these national regimes are generally based on the pillars of absolute
and in most cases unlimited liability, and have generally been financially
safeguarded by compulsory insurance or other security requirements. Even
the common law jurisdictions of the United Kingdom and Australia have been
seen to rely on statutory regimes of absolute liability.
This Chapter is dedicated to the developments in the United States in this
field. These developments are of interest, as they indicate a general move in
a different direction than that of specifically codified regimes based on absolute
liability. For in absence of international law or federal liability statutes and
with only a marginal number of statutory regimes in force, the general rules
of negligence have won the day in this field in the United States.1 This implies
that the victims of surface damage within the majority of jurisdictions within
the United States have to prove that the owners or operators of the implicated
aircraft were negligent in order to receive compensation for their personal
injuries or property damage.2
An exploration of the past is necessary in order to understand this move
away from common law or statutory headings of absolute liability to negli-
gence: for the historical origins and rationale of absolute liability can help to
clarify the apparent change of perception that aviation has undergone in the
last four decades of the twentieth century from an activity worthy of absolute
liability to an activity deemed adequately covered by the general principles
of negligence. This exploration will range from the absolute liability rule of
1 The United States have signed nor ratified any of the Rome instruments, mainly in view
of objections raised against the principle and scope of absolute liability, the relatively low
limits of liability, and the security provisions set out in the Convention, see E.T. Nunnely,
Report of the Chairman of the United States Delegation to the International Conference held at Rome,
Italy, September 9-October 7, 1952 – to adopt a Convention on damage caused by foreign aircraft
to third parties on the surface, 20 JALC 89, at 91(1953). As will be seen in more detail, attempts
to codify federal aviation liability legislation have not succeeded in the United States.
2 See G.I. Whitehead, Jr., Legal liability of owners and operators of aircraft in general aviation for
damage to third parties, 15 Syracuse Law Review 1, at 2 (1963).
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the landmark case of Rylands v. Fletcher for abnormally dangerous conditions
and activities to the current status quo of general negligence. In order to clarify
this exploration, the three main headings of liability will be discussed in three
parts (A to C). First, the basis and scope of absolute liability under common
law will be discussed (Part A, 5.2 – 5.5). A description of the common law
bases of absolute liability that have been applied to surface damage will be
given, using the landmark case of Rylands v. Fletcher as a starting point (5.2).3
In that context, the two main Restatements of Torts in this field will be evalu-
ated (5.3). The relationship between the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher, the Restate-
ments, and the activity of flying will subsequently be addressed (5.4). Finally,
the other bases of common law absolute liability of trespass and nuisance will
be described (5.5).
Next, the statutory regimes of absolute liability will be discussed. The
relevant provisions of the Uniform State Law for Aeronautics as well as other
proposed legislation in this field will be taken into account. Furthermore, the
constitutionality of such regimes will be addressed (Part B, 5.6). The gradual
move to negligence will subsequently be described, with its range from pre-
sumptions of negligence to pure negligence (Part C, 5.7).
These paragraphs on applicable basis and scope of liability are followed
by paragraphs on persons liable under these varying bases of liability (5.8)
and federal insurance requirements in this field (5.9) (Part D). The case of
September 11, 2001 will be dealt with separately, in view of its uniqueness
in the history of aviation and its effects on existing tort law and insurance
(Part E, 5.10). The Chapter will end with a number of final observations on
the developments in the United States (Part F, 5.11).
A ABSOLUTE LIABILITY UNDER COMMON LAW
5.2 LIABILITY FOR ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES
The origins of the doctrine of absolute liability for abnormally dangerous
conditions and activities lie in the English landmark case of Rylands v. Fletcher
of 1868.4 The case involved a mill-owner that was ultimately held liable for
the damages inflicted by a dam that he had ordered to power his mill. For
the dam created a reservoir that lay over ancient coalmines, which led into
an operating colliery. Damage was subsequently caused by water that ran
through the old shafts, which flooded the colliery.
The two most influential opinions on the case were made by Mr. Justice
Blackburn in the Court of Exechequer and Lord Cairns in the House of Lords.
Blackburn held that
3 Rylands v. Fletcher (1866) LR 1 Ex 265 (ExCh), (1868) LR 3 HL 330.
4 Rylands v. Fletcher (1866) LR 1 Ex 265 (ExCh), (1868) LR 3 HL 330.
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the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings on his
lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes must
keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all
the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape… etc.5
Cairns agreed, but restricted the scope of the rule of absolute liability to ‘non-
natural users’, under which the mill-owner was categorized. Cairns did not
further define the term non-natural user, although he probably referred to
the difference between traditional and novel use.6
The case of Rylands v. Fletcher can be qualified as an important court-made
rule of absolute liability, which should be distinguished from the common
law bases of liability of trespass and nuisance. However, the borderlines
between these three bases of liability are often fine and can vary per common
law jurisdiction.7 The rule of Rylands v. Fletcher was adopted in a number of
English cases, which had in common that the thing or activity must be unduly
dangerous and not normal to maintain in the chosen place and its surround-
ings. In 1947, the scope of the rule was narrowed down to cases involving
an escape of a dangerous substance in the United Kingdom.8
In the United States, the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher met with approval
followed by disapproval in case law and doctrine of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century.9 The opposition held that the rule led to an unjustifi-
able extension of liability in the sphere of accidents, which could easily be
met by a combination of negligence and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This
point of view was substantiated by the notion that the nascent industries and
dangerous enterprises of the United States needed protection against too-easily
filed claims from potential victims located in the vicinity of these industries.10
5 Fletcher v. Rylands (1866) LR 1 Ex 265, 279 f.
6 See C. Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 Yale Law Journal 1172,
at 1172-1173 (1952).
7 As a rough distinction, liability for trespass only arises when the invasion of land is
intentional, whereas if a person conducts activities on his land which unintentionally lead
to damage on nearby property, trespass is only fulfulled if the damage was negligently
inflicted. However, on the basis of Rylands v. Fletcher, liability would arise regardless of
fault for the activities that fall under the scope of the rule. Nuisance, on the other hand,
leads to liability without fault for smoke, vapours, smells, etc., that effect adjacent territory,
see Van Gerven et al., at 19. See also paragraph 5.5 of this study.
8 See Prosser and Keeton on Torts 548 (1984); Zweigert & Kötz at 668-669. The scope of the
rule was narrowed down in Read v. Lyons & Co. [1947] AC 156, in which injuries caused
by an explosion in a munitions factory were excluded from the rule. Aeroplanes were not
considered as dangerous things under the rule in the United Kingdom, see Walton et al.,
at 813, citing Fosbroke-Hobbes v. Airwork Ltd [1937] 1 All E.R 108 at 110.
9 See, e.g., Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476 (1873), in which the court held that the rule of Rylands
v. Fletcher decision was in direct conflict with American (negligence) law, and that a case
comparable to Rylands v. Fletcher would thus require proof of some fault or negligence of
the mill-owner; the case is derived from Phillips et al. at 438.
10 Prosser and Keeton at 548-549.
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The rule then regained ground on the notion that hazardous enterprises should
make up for damages inflicted to innocent third parties. The scope of the rule
was broad and encompassed all types of cases where the thing or activity was
out of place and abnormally dangerous, varying from water collected in
quantity in dangerous places to dangerous party walls.11
As Morris points out, the notion that novel enterprises were obliged to
compensate potential damages under the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher was attract-
ive: for the rule combined the fact that profits were made and risks were
involved in such enterprises. Such a justification for the rule is a preliminary
step to the perception that industrial risks should be borne by the risk-taker
and profit-maker, rather than by innocent victims.12
In the next paragraph, the manner in which the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher
was incorporated into the Restatement of Torts will be taken into account.
5.3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
In the Restatement of Torts, the problem of liability for ultrahazardous or
abnormally dangerous activities was taken into account by the American Law
Institute in 1938 and 1976.13 The Restatement of Torts (1938) incorporated
a regime of absolute liability for “ultrahazardous” activities in Sections 519
and 520, which read:14:
Section 519. Miscarriage of Ultrahazardous Activities Carefully Carried On.
Except as stated in 521-4, one who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable
to another whose person, land or chattels the actor should recognize as likely to
be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting
thereto from that which makes the activity ultrahazardous, although the utmost
care is exercised to prevent the harm.
Section 520. Definition of Ultrahazardous Activity.
An activity is ultrahazardous if it necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to
the person, land or chattels of others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise
of the utmost care, and is not a manner of common usage.
11 Prosser and Keeton at 550-551.
12 Morris at 1174.
13 The American Law Institute was founded in 1923. Upon recommendation of the founding
Committee, the American Law Institute started addressing uncertainties in various fields
of common law between 1923 and 1944, including Torts. The aim was to advise judges
and lawyers on the law in these fields, see ‘About the American Law Institute’, at www.a-
li.org.
14 The texts of Sections 519 and 520 have been derived from G.W. Boston, Strict Liability For
Abnormally Dangerous Activity: the Negligence Barrier, 36 San Diego L. Review 597, at 605
(1999).
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The aim of the first Restatement of Torts was to hold enterprisers absolutely
liable for the abnormal risks posed to innocent third parties by their uncommon
activities.15 It is of comparative interest that liability is connected to ‘activities’
as opposed to ‘things’, which was deemed a more suitable qualification by
most European legislatures.16
Although the first Restatement was clearly based on the rule of Rylands
v. Fletcher, its scope is broader as it includes activities that are not a manner
of common usage (broader than the category of non-natural users) and does
not narrow down the potential danger of ultrahazardous activities to surround-
ing land.17 On the other hand, the regime does add the criteria of extreme
danger and an impossibility of eliminating such danger by the exercise of the
utmost care. And that was not entirely in conformity with American case law
of the time, which also took the place of the activity into account.18
After a number of decades, the Second Restatement of Torts was adopted
and promulgated by the American Law Institute in 1976. Sections 519 and
520 now read:19
Section 519. General Principle
1. One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for
harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity,
although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.
2. This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which makes
the activity abnormally dangerous.
Section 520. Abnormally Dangerous Activities
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors
are to be considered:
a. existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels
of others;
b. likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
c. inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
d. extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
e. inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
f. extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
15 Prosser and Keeton at 555.
16 Dutch Civil Law can serve as an example in this context. For it attributes liability to ‘things’
as opposed to ‘activities’. Of further interest in this context is that the Dutch legislator has
not opted for the qualification of ‘ultrahazardous’ or ‘abnormally dangerous’, in view of
the fact that it would be difficult to distinguish between ‘ultrahazardous’ and ‘safe’ things,
see Asser-Hartkamp, Verbintenissenrecht 4-III, nr. 166 (1998).
17 Boston at 605.
18 Prosser and Keeton at 551.
19 Restatement of the Law Second Torts 2d Volume 3 §§ 504-707A, As Adopted and Promul-
gated by the American Law Institute at Washington, D.C. May 19, 1976, 34-36 (1977).
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Although the comments to these Sections suggest that they are based on a
form of absolute liability, this is by no means a clear-cut or straightforward
regime.20 The lack of clarity is due to the fact that it is not entirely clear to
what extent factors (a) to (f) are to be considered. The comments suggest that
all factors are of importance, and that any one of them is not sufficient by itself
as a sole justification for absolute liability. The key question that has to be
raised is whether the risk created is so unusual, either because of its magnitude
or because of the circumstances surrounding it, as to justify the imposition
of absolute liability for the harm that results from it, even though it is carried
on with all reasonable care.21 Although the comments seem to insist that all
factors must be taken into account in order to determine whether absolute
liability is justified, relevant case law in this field tends to lay a certain em-
phasis on factors (a) to (c).22
Recapitulating, the First Restatement of Torts has been drafted more clearly
than its successor in view of the uncertainties concerning the exact application
and interplay of the six criteria under the regime of the Second Restatement.
Furthermore, the First Restatement has a greater scope than the Second Restate-
ment, since the criteria of locational inappropriateness, uncommon usage, as
well as the value of the activity to the community have been ignored under
the First Restatement.23
The question now arises how the rules of Rylands v. Fletcher and the Re-
statements have been applied to the problem of liability for surface damage
inflicted by the activity of flying.
5.4 THE RULES OF RYLANDS V. FLETCHER AND THE RESTATEMENTS IN RELATION
TO SURFACE DAMAGE INFLICTED BY THE ACTIVITY OF FLYING
In the previous two paragraphs, the fundamental principles and justifications
for the basis of absolute liability under general common law have been given
as derived from the landmark case of Rylands v. Fletcher and as perceived
by the drafters of the Restatement of Torts. Criteria to determine whether the
basis of absolute liability should be applicable included the abnormal danger
or ultrahazardousness of the activity in relation to its surroundings, the fact
that such dangers cannot be eliminated by the exercise of utmost care, and
the extent to which the activity is not a manner of common usage. The question
now arises to what extent the activity of flying can be categorized as an activity
20 See Comment to Restatement of the Law Second, at 34-35.
21 See Comment to Restatement of the Law Second, at 37-38.
22 Boston at 622. However, the comments seem to insist that all factors must be taken into
account at the end of the day in order to qualify an activity as abnormally dangerous, see
Comment to Restatement of the Law Second, at 39.
23 Boston at 625-626. Bohlen drafted the First- and Prosser the Second Restatement.
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that can automatically be subjected to absolute liability under common law
in absence of specific statutory regimes of liability in the field of aviation. In
order to answer this question, this paragraph has been divided in four sub-
paragraphs. First, the question to what extent the absolute liability rule of
Rylands v. Fletcher is applicable to the activity of flying will be taken into
account (5.4.1). Next, the position of the Restatements on the hazards involved
in the activity of flying will be described (5.4.2). And finally, other justifications
for absolute liability in this field under general common law will be enumer-
ated (5.4.3), followed by a recapitulation of all arguments that can be raised
in favour of absolute liability for surface damage inflicted by the activity of
flying (5.4.4).
5.4.1 The application of the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher to the activity of flying
The justification for application of the absolute liability rule of Rylands v.
Fletcher to surface damage inflicted by the activity of flying has been based
on three arguments:
· the fact that third parties on the surface are helpless to avoid such injuries or
damage;
· the notion that aircraft can be qualified as dangerous instrumentalities of which
the safety depends upon factors beyond human control;
· the notion that it is almost impossible for third parties to prove the cause of
an aviation accident.24
On the other hand, such a direct application of the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher
to the activity of flying has also been questioned on the grounds that the rule
cannot be applied to movable chattels.25 Other objections include the question
if typical Rylands v. Fletcher elements such as ‘accumulation’ and ‘escape’ can
be applied satisfactorily to the conduct of aircraft. In the words of the following
often cited passage:
If, in arriving at the conclusion of the court in Rylands v. Fletcher, there was a
consideration of any fault element, the fault must have been one occurring prior
to the actual accident, i.e., the negligent act must have been that of the accumulation
of the potentially dangerous thing on the land and not its escape therefrom.26
24 See H.S. Goldin, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Aviation Law, 18 Southern California
Law Review 124, at 125 (’44-’45).
25 Goldin at 125-126.
26 Goldin at 126; R.E. Kingsley and S.E. Gates, Liability to Persons and Property on the Ground,
4 Journal of Air Law 515, at 521 (1933).
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Kingsley and Gates explain that an aircraft does not “escape” onto the land
of others by itself: evidently human control is necessary, in the same manner
as a stationary car cannot harm third parties without human control. Since
the mere ownership or operation of an aircraft cannot automatically be
qualified as wrongful conduct, some act or omission will then have to be
established which will qualify such ownership or operation as an accumulation
of a thing “likely to do mischief if it escapes.”27
Although a literal application of the criteria of Rylands v. Fletcher to the
activity of flying is evidently troublesome, the three aforementioned arguments
derived from the case that point to application of absolute liability in this field
are of interest. Those arguments have resurfaced in the position taken by the
drafters of the Restatement of Torts in relation to aviation. As will be seen
in more detail in the next sub-paragraph, the most crucial and ambiguous
argument of the three is the perception of aviation as an ultrahazardous or
extra-dangerous activity.28
5.4.2 The Restatements of Torts and the activity of flying
The Restatements’ positions on the specific problems of surface damage
inflicted by aviation were mainly based on the perceived danger of the activity
of flying, although other factors, such as the level of usage, have also played
a role.
The position taken in the First Restatement of Torts (1938) reveals that the
drafters still perceived aviation as an ‘ultrahazardous activity’, which war-
ranted the application of absolute liability.29 That position was reflected in
comment b on Section 520, which stated that
aviation in its present stage of development is ultrahazardous because even the
best constructed and maintained aeroplane is so incapable of complete control that
flying creates a risk that the plane even though carefully constructed, maintained
and operated, may crash to the injury of persons, structures and chattels on the
land over which the flight is made.30
27 Kingsley and Gates at 521.
28 Kingsley and Gates, who clearly opposed the application of absolute liability in this field,
contended that aviation was ‘safe’ as early as 1933, which would justify negligence, see
Kingsley and Gates at 523.
29 The developing aviation industry severely opposed this qualification, which was in con-
formity with the manner of treatment of a number of early cases in this field in New York,
see Prosser and Keeton at 556-557.
30 See Comment b on § 520 of the First Restatement, as cited by W.J. Appel, Strict liability, in
absence of statute, for injury or damage occurring on the ground caused by ascent, descent, or flight
of aircraft, 73 ALR 4th 416, at 419 (1989). See also A.T. Hollyday, Aviation Law: Owner-lessor
liability – The need for uniformity, 36 Maine Law Review 93, at 96-97 (1984).
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Another criterion that was held to justify absolute liability concerned the notion
that aviation at that time had not yet become either a common or an essential
means of transportation in comparison with for instance the far more common
use of automobiles.31
Despite the fact that from the 1950’s onward, American case law in this
field was gradually started to apply negligence on the grounds that aviation
was no longer considered an ultrahazardous activity, the Restatement (Second)
of Torts (1976) specifically retained its position on the fairness of absolute
liability in Section 520A. Section 520 A, a species of Sections 519 – 520, reads:32
Section 520A. Ground Damage From Aircraft
If physical harm to land or to persons or chattels on the ground is caused by the
ascent, descent or flight of aircraft, or by the dropping or falling of an object from
the aircraft,
a. the operator of the aircraft is subject to liability for the harm, even though he
has exercised the utmost care to prevent it, and
b. the owner of the aircraft is subject to similar liability if he has authorized or
permitted the operation.
This position was based on the notion that aviation had not yet reached the
stage of development “where the risks of accidental physical harm to persons
or to land or chattels on the ground is properly to be borne by those who
suffer the harm, rather than by the industry itself.”33 If taken literally, this
line of reasoning implies that once aviation has reached that stage of develop-
ment, third parties, rather than the industry, may have to bear those risks,
which seems remarkable to say the least.
Other considerations include “the gravity of the harm resulting when a
few tons of flaming gasoline descend upon a dwelling”, which is still a factor
to be taken into account, as well as the fact that third parties have no place
to hide from falling aircraft and are generally helpless to select any locality
for their residence or business in which they are not subjected to such risks
from above. These factors make the risks posed by aviation unique in com-
parison with the risks posed by other forms of transportation.34 The choice
of the term ‘still’ is remarkable if it is meant to reflect the notion that the
gravity of such harm might one day not be deemed an important factor to
take into account. Hopefully it is meant to reflect the notion that somewhere
in the future, such risks are history due to the fact that aircraft are so safe as
not to crash anymore, although that hope seems rather unlikely.
31 See Comment g to § 520 as cited by Hollyday at 97.
32 See Restatement of the Law Second Torts at 43.
33 See comment c. to Section 520A, Restatement of the Law Seconds, Torts 2d at 43-44.
34 See comment c. to Section 520A, Restatement of the Law Seconds, Torts 2d at 44.
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Another argument put forward in favour of absolute liability is based on
the numerical notion that those who carry on the activity of flying are still
relatively few (similar to the argument raised under the First Restatement).35
Upon closer scrutiny, that argument is also remarkable, for it seems to imply
that once a great(er) number of people or entities are engaged in the activity
of flying, a regime of absolute liability would no longer be necessary. Arguably,
such a regime would then be all the more necessary, for the chances that
aviation accidents might occur will evidently also increase with the growth
of the number of aircraft in the air.
The scope of absolute liability of Section 520 A encompasses the ‘ascent,
descent or flight of aircraft’ as well as the ‘dropping or falling from an object
from the aircraft’, upon the condition that such scenarios cause physical harm
to land or to persons or chattels. This seems to exclude general scenarios of
nuisance or noise caused by normal overflight as long as such nuisance or
noise does not cause physical harm, but can merely be qualified as a disturb-
ance or annoyance.
As to persons liable, the owners of aircraft have not been defined precisely
under Section 520 A. “Owners” are merely held to be those entities that have
a beneficial interest in the aircraft and such control over it at the time of the
accident or incident, that they should be held responsible for the ensuing
damages.36
5.4.3 Other justifications for absolute liability under common law
In the previous two sub-paragraphs, the main grounds for subjecting the
activity of flying to absolute liability for surface damage as derived from the
rule of Rylands v. Fletcher and the Restatements have been enumerated. The
qualification of aviation as an ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous activity
is the most significant of these grounds. Two other important justifications
have been added to the aforementioned ones by Vold, who argued that the
criterion of ultrahazardousness was too meagre as the sole justification for
absolute liability in this field. The first extra justification added by Vold
concerned the one-sidedness of the benefits for those involved in the activity
of flying on the one hand and the risk to third parties on the other hand. The
35 See comment d. to Section 520A, Restatement of the Law Seconds, Torts 2d at 44.
36 See comment f. to Section 520A, Restatement of the Law Seconds, Torts 2d at 44-45. A
reference is made to § 1404 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1404, which excludes
liability for a person having a security interest in, or security title to, any civil aircraft under
a contract or conditional sale, equipment trust, chattel mortgage or other similar instrument
unless the aircraft was in actual possession or control of such a person at the time of the
accident or incident.
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second justification was based on the ability of the aviation industry to dis-
tribute potential losses as part of its cost of operation (insurability).37
Vold stressed the difference between one-sidedness and mutuality of an
activity by comparing the position of aircraft operators vis-à-vis third parties
with the position of users of highways amongst one another. In the latter case,
the mutuality lies in the fact that all users of highways both profit from such
use as well as expose themselves to its risks, whereas only the aircraft operators
profit from the activity of flying in the former case. In other words, where
negligence may be a defendable basis of liability in case of mutuality, absolute
liability should prevail in case of one-sidedness of an activity.38
The argument of insurability holds that the party better equipped to
distribute its losses through insurance coverage can be taken into account as
a factor to help determine who ought to bear the risk.39 A number of reserva-
tions can be made against such a direct link between the preferable basis of
liability and the question of insurability if the argument is perceived in a
strictly legal sense. For insurance and insurability of any activity are secondary
matters that do not directly concern the question of preferable basis of liability
per activity. One may be held liable in negligence for throwing a stone through
a window or held absolutely liable for damages inflicted by one’s dog, while
both scenarios are covered by the same personal insurance policy for third
party liability. But that does not directly imply that the former regime of
liability should be transformed into one based on absolute liability, merely
because the stone-thrower is perceived to be the most logical party to take
out insurance. However, practically speaking, the argument has a certain
validity. For the aviation industry is evidently better equipped to take out
insurance and analyse the potential risks involved in the activity of flying than
third parties in general.
5.4.4 Recapitulation
Recapitulating, the following arguments in favour of absolute liability in this
field as distilled from the previously described sources can be enumerated:
1 the fact that third parties on the surface are helpless to avoid personal injuries
or property damage inflicted by aircraft;
2 the notion that aircraft can be qualified as dangerous instrumentalities (or that
aviation can be qualified as an ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous activ-
ity) of which the safety depends upon factors beyond human control;
37 See L. Vold, Strict liability for aircraft crashes and forced landings on ground victims outside of
established landing areas, Hastings Law Journal 1, at 1 (1953). These extra criteria have also
been based directly on the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher, see Wolff at 205-206.
38 Vold at 2-3.
39 Vold at 5-7.
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3 the notion that it is almost impossible for third parties to prove the cause of
an aviation accident;
4 the notion that aviation has not yet reached the stage of development where
the risks of accidental physical harm to persons or to land or chattels on the
ground is properly to be borne by those who suffer the harm, rather than by
the industry itself;
5 the notion that relatively few persons or entities are involved in the activity
of flying;
6 the one-sidedness of the activity of flying with respect to profits for those
engaged in the activity on the one hand and the risks imposed by the activity
to third (non-benefitted) parties on the other hand;
7 the ability of the aviation industry to distribute potential losses as part of its
operational costs (insurability).
A number of reservations can be made to the assumptions on which a number
of these arguments rest. The underlying assumption to the second argument,
for instance, is based on the notion that once aviation is no longer deemed
ultrahazardous, a regime of absolute liability for surface damage would no
longer be justified. But the consequence of this remarkable line of reasoning
is that it ultimately will be more difficult to claim successfully for surface
damage when flying is perceived as ‘safe’ than in times when it was deemed
to be ultrahazardous. For in ‘safe’ times, negligence will have to be proven
by plaintiffs, whereas plaintiffs could rely on absolute liability in the past. Such
a line of reasoning could easily be reversed by holding that if flying is so ‘safe’,
the least the rule of law could guarantee is that liability is easily established
by application of absolute liability to those very few cases when things do
go wrong. For the mistake of linking a basis of liability to the notion that an
activity in general is perceived as safe, lies in the fact that negligence can be
just as difficult to prove on a case by case basis in times when aviation
accidents decrease in a statistical sense.
A similar fallacy in reasoning is revealed upon closer scrutiny of the fourth
argument, which asserts that the risks involved in flying should be carried
by third parties rather than the industry itself, once the aviation industry is
fully developed. If ever an argument can be reversed, it must be this one. In
that sense, the historical reason for application of negligence to industrial
accidents in the nineteenth century as a developing-industry-friendly gesture
of no liability without fault also point in the direction of stricter liability
regimes in the long run. For one could then argue that once such nascent
industries are no longer in their infancy and have become safer, they are even
better equipped to bear the strongly diminished risks they impose on innocent
third parties.40 Another deficiency lies in the fifth argument, which links the
40 The industrial revolution and development of railways and the subsequent rise of industrial
accidents have probably contributed to the evolution of negligence, see Prosser and Keeton
at 160-161; Zweigert & Kötz at 608.
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rationale for absolute liability to the limited number of people or entities
involved in the activity. As has been argued previously, a basis of absolute
liability would be just as defendable if not more, once a great number of people
are involved in the activity, as negligence may remain difficult to prove on
a case by case basis irrespective of the number of people involved in the
activity.
In the light of the aforementioned seven arguments, of which a number
have been seen to point even more strongly to absolute liability in a timeless
sense when perceived more closely, the gradual overall move to negligence
in this field in the United States is all the more surprising. For most of the
aforementioned arguments provide sound policy reasons for permanent
application of absolute liability in this field.
5.5 TRESPASS AND NUISANCE
Aside from the application of absolute liability for ultrahazardous activities
to the activity of flying under general common law, the common law bases
of trespass and nuisance can also be applied to certain cases of surface damage
inflicted by aircraft. Some intricate questions can be raised on which heading
of liability should apply in borderline cases of damage inflicted by (too) low
overflight, which can even constitute a taking under certain conditions.41
In the following sub-paragraphs, the application of trespass will first be
discussed in relation to the scenario of actual impact of aircraft (5.5.1). Next,
the application of trespass and nuisance will be discussed in relation to surface
damage caused by (too) low overflight (5.5.2).
5.5.1 Trespass and actual impact of aircraft or objects falling from aircraft
A number of early aviation cases involving intrusion of aircraft or objects
falling from aircraft on property were ruled on the basis of trespass on the
grounds that aviation was perceived as an ultrahazardous activity.42 The most
ancient of these cases is the New York case of Guille v. Swan (1822), in which
the operator of a balloon was held liable on the basis of trespass for damage
to crops in a garden caused by a combination of the downfall of his balloon
and a crowd of bystanders that trampled the crops in order to come to his
41 See also sub-paragraph 2.5.2.1 in that context.
42 Appel at 419. This notion is substantiated by the Restatement (First) of Torts, section 165,
sub c., which upheld liability for such scenarios of surface damage, see Lee S. Kreindler,
Aviation Accident Law 6-6 (1993).
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aid. The court based its decision in trespass on the hazards of operating
balloons, which can become beyond control of their operators.43
Another New York case, Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v. Dunlop (1933),
involved a single-engine private aeroplane that struck and damaged a steel
transmission tower during a forced landing at night.44 The plaintiff sued on
the basis of negligence, substantiated by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, as
well as on the basis of trespass. Interestingly enough, the argument raised by
defendant that the science of aviation was not developed enough as yet to
establish negligence by the mere occurrence of an accident backfired. For the
judge held that if there was such chance that a plane could become uncon-
trollable despite the utmost care in management or operation, flying could
justifiably be perceived as so dangerous an activity that its risks should be
borne by those engaged in it and not by unbenefitted victims on the surface.
On the basis of this line of reasoning, negligence was dismissed and the
question of liability was based on trespass.45
In Margosian v. U.S. Airlines (1955), a house was damaged by an aircraft
crash. The plaintiff based his claim on negligence, but this was not deemed
necessary by the federal district court, which ruled that trespass would
suffice.46
Examples of governmental liability ruled on the basis of trespass include
Parcell v. United States (1951) and Gaidys v. United States (1952). In Parcell v.
United States, two fighter airplanes crashed and caused damage to a barn and
other adjacent buildings. The accident was defined as a trespass, for which
the United States could be held absolutely liable under the Federal Tort Claims
Act.47 In Gaidys v. United States, the United States was also held liable under
the Federal Tort Claims Act for the crash of a jet aircraft in a residential area
during take-off. The accident caused personal injuries to a husband and wife
by burning parts and flaming fuel of the aircraft as well as property damage.
43 See Guille v. Swan, New York Supreme Court, January, 1822, 1 (CCH) Avi. 1. See, on Guille
v. Swan, also Kreindler at 6-6; Goldin at 127; P.A. Peterson, Liability for ground damage from
crashes or forced landings of aircraft, 43 California Law Review 309, at 312 (1955); Speiser &
Krause at 148.
44 Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v. Dunlop, 148 Misc. 849, 266 N.Y.S. 469 (Supp. Ct. 1933).
45 See F.H. Bohlen, Aviation under the common law, 6 ALR 155, at 155 (1935); Billyou, Air Law
84-85 (1964); Peterson at 312, who remarks that New York imposed strict liability for trespass
without fault; see also J.A. Eubank, Land Damage Liability in Aircraft Cases, 57 Dickinson Law
Review 188, at 188-189 (1952-’53). Eubank comments that the line of reasoning in this case
was based on trespass, but came close to ‘pure’ liability-without-fault.
46 Margosian v. U.S. Airlines, 127 F. Supp. 464, (E.D.N.Y. 1955), as cited by Peterson at 312.
47 Parcell v. United States (1951, DC W Va) 104 F Supp 110. At that time, the Federal Tort
Claims Act incorporated the tort law of the State in which the accident occurred (in this
case, West-Virginian law). The Federal Tort phraseology of ‘wrongful act’ was interpreted
as to include acts for which the government could be held absolutely liable, see Appel at
422. As will be seen in more detail, the United States can only be held liable on the basis
of negligence since 1971.
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The court ruled that aviation was an ultrahazardous activity and that the crash
constituted a trespass.48
However, courts gradually began to overrule trespass as a feasible basis
of liability for surface damage inflicted by aircraft accidents. This tendency
can be illustrated by the case of Wood v. United Airlines (1961), in which the
impact and subsequent spillage of jet-fuel of a United Airlines aircraft caused
damage to a building. The claims for personal injuries and property damage
were based on trespass. However, the court ruled that since it no longer
considered aviation to be an ultrahazardous activity, an intentional act had
to be established by plaintiffs in order to successfully claim on the basis of
trespass. The court subsequently held that there had not been a trespass, as
there had not been an intent to land.49
As will be seen in more detail, that change of perception of the dangers
of flying under common law also affected the number of codified regimes of
absolute liability in this field, which can help explain the overall move to
negligence in the United States. But the boarderline cases of trespass and
nuisance are also of interest for scenarios of surface damage that are not
inflicted by actual crashes, but by (too) low overflight. In that context, questions
on the relationship between rights of property owners and the use of airspace
by those engaged in the activity of flying can emerge. Such issues will be dealt
with in more detail in the next sub-paragraph.
5.5.2 Trespass and nuisance; damage caused by overflight
The cases described in the previous sub-paragraph all involved scenarios of
actual impact of the aircraft or parts of the aircraft.50 However, cases of sur-
face damage have also arisen through mere sudden or repetitive (too low)
overflight. In Hoebee v. Howe (1953), for instance, a child was struck by a
runaway horse that bolted out of fright caused by a low flying aeroplane.51
48 United States v. Gaidys, 194, 194 F.2d 762 (10th Cir. 1952). The case was decided solely on
basis of the Federal Tort Claims Act in absence of Colorado decisions or applicable statute,
see Peterson at 313; see also Annotation 74 ALR 2d, at 869; Annotation 81 ALR 2d, at 1062-
1063.
49 See Wood v. United Air Lines, Inc. 1961, 32 Misc.2d 955, 223 N.Y.S.2d 692, affirmed mem.
16 A.D2d 659, 226 N.Y.S.2d 1022, appeal dismissed 11 N.Y.2d 1053, 230 N.Y.S.2d 207, 184
N.E.2d 180, as cited by Prosser and Keeton at 557; see also Appel at 425; Kreindler at 6-8;
F.E. Malony Jr., Torts – Airplanes no longer considered ultrahazardous, 13 Syracuse Law Journal
619, at 619-621 (1962).
50 Previously defined as ‘scenario 1’ in sub-paragraph 2.2.1 of this study: surface damage
inflicted by ‘direct contact’ or ‘impact’ of the aircraft or parts, objects, chemicals, or persons
from the aircraft.
51 See Kreindler at 6-16 – 6-17 and Speiser & Krause at 151-152 for various examples of case
law in this area.
168 The gradual move to negligence in the United States
The question arises when such scenarios create a cause of action under
common law and if so, on which basis of liability: trespass, nuisance, or
perhaps even on the grounds of a taking of property.52 Such an approach
can help to determine the boarderlines between various scenarios of surface
damage and subsequent actions as well as the justifiable scope of statutory
regimes of absolute liability in this field. For, as has been described previously,
one of the main justifications for application of absolute liability in this field
is that aircraft can pose a serious threat to third parties on the ground in view
of their ability to crash and that negligence of the aircraft operator can be
difficult to prove in such cases. However, the degree of potential surface
damage will generally be less severe when aircraft remain airborne. Simply
put, the higher the altitude of the aircraft, the less severe the potential damage
to people on the surface. The question arises how such scenarios are dealt with
under common law bases of liability, especially in relationship to property
owners.
As a starting point on the relationship between trespass and nuisance and
normal (high) overflight in general, the logical observation can be made that
there can be no liability toward property owners when no actual damage has
been inflicted. For it has been held that “the upper air is a natural heritage,
common to all people, and its reasonable use ought not to be impaired by the
ancient maxim cujus est re infernis usque ad coelum.”53 But this observation
leads to questions on the possible extent of ownership of airspace of property
owners. In other words, which causes of action are available to property
owners against aircraft that somehow invade their property?54
Taking the ad coelum doctrine as a starting point, the following five theories
on the extent of ownership of airspace have been put forward:55
1. The landowner owns all airspace above his property without any limitations
(the pure ad coelum doctrine);
52 See sub-paragraphs 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 of this study.
53 Goldin at 124, citing Johnson v. Curtiss Northwest Airplane Co., (1928) U.S.Av.Rep. 42, 43 Minn.
D.C., Ramsey Co., 1923; see also sub-paragraph 2.5.2.1 of this study.
54 In Gaidys v. United States (1952), as discussed in the previous sub-paragraph, the appellate
court deliberated on such questions. For in that case, a U.S. Army plane crash into a house
was qualified as a wrongful act and trespass, as well as a breach of privileged passage
through plaintiffs’ airspace by the court. This was substantiated by the fact that the plane
was flying too low, at a 100 feet in non-navigable airspace, at the time of the crash. The
appellate court admitted that the case would have been more complex for the court if the
aircraft had been flying at a safe altitude (above the limit of a 1000 feet of navigable
airspace) just before the crash. For then the decision would have to have been based on
either liability-without-fault directly, negligence, or the notion that aviation was ultra-
hazardous. Non-liability could have also been an outcome, e.g. on the basis of Act of God,
see Eubank at 189-190.
55 See R.B. Anderson, Some Aspects of Airspace Trespass, 27 JALC 341, at 342 (1960).
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2. The landowner owns the airspace above his property without any limitations
subject to an ‘easement’ or ‘privilege’ of flight;56
3. The landowner owns the airspace up to such a height as fixed by statute;
4. The landowner owns the airspace within the scope of effective possession;57
5. The landowner owns the airspace that he actually occupies and can only object
to such uses of the airspace over his property as do actual damage.58
The third theory generally prevails in most jurisdictions by allowing air
navigation over private land on the basis of statutory laws that regulate the
allowed flight of aircraft in terms of height, flightpath, etc. Within that regula-
tory framework of permitted air navigation, actions based on nuisance may
be invoked by property owners, even if their rights of ownership have not
been breached but the annoyance is nevertheless severe.59
As a first observation on the distinctions between trespass and nuisance,
an invasion of realty is actionable upon trespass per se, whereas an action
based on nuisance requires interference with the use and enjoyment of property
or with personal rights. In other words, the effects of such an invasion, as
opposed to the invasion itself, are actionable on the basis of nuisance. Thus,
as has been seen in the previous sub-paragraph, surface damage inflicted by
aircraft crashes was actionable on the basis of trespass as such accidents
involved a direct invasion of property.60 Recurrent trespasses of governmental
aircraft that fly over without crashing can also give rise to a cause of action
referred to as ‘inverse condemnation’ against a governmental agency in order
to recover the value of constitutionally taken property without formal exercise
of the power of eminent domain.61
For claims based on nuisance other criteria, such as interference of use and
enjoyment of land by the effects of overflying aircraft have to be met. Depend-
ing on the circumstances of the case, such criteria can also include unreason-
ableness, unlawfulness, continuity and recurrence, noise, lighting, air pollution,
vibration, altitude, and apprehension of danger.62 However, courts have also
56 This theory was adopted by the Restatement of Tort (Second), Sections 159 and 194 and
the Uniform Aeronautics Act, Uniform Laws Annotated (1923), see Anderson at 342.
57 This theory represents an attempt to establish a third dimension to property, which would
make trespass an invasion of possessory rights, see Anderson at 342.
58 This theory would only provide a cause of action in cases of actual impact; however, it
has been applied to a larger scope of scenarios, see Anderson at 342.
59 See J.L. Litwin, Annotation: Airport operations or flight of aircraft as nuisance, 79 ALR3d 253,
at 259-260.
60 Although the element of intent was later added as a requirement for trespass once aviation
was no longer considered ultrahazardous, see Wood v. United Airlines (1961), as discussed
in sub-paragraph 5.5.1 of this study.
61 Litwin at 262; see also Zitter at 868-869, and sub-paragraph 2.5.2.1 of this study.
62 Anderson at 342; J.L. Litwin at 253 et seq., in which a clear enumeration of cases based on
these categories of nuisance has been made.
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accepted trespass and nuisance as a single cause of action in a number of
cases.63
Depending on the circumstances of the case, property owners located near
airports can sue airport operators and perhaps even the implicated aircraft
on the basis of nuisance. Furthermore, they can either claim for damages or
equitable relief by injunction if they suffer irreparable injury.64 However, as
a general rule, the airport operators, and not the aircraft operators that will
generally operate in accordance with the applicable Federal Aviation Regula-
tions and local noise regulations, are exposed to potential claims based on
noise, nuisance, or pollution. It would go therefore go beyond the scope of
this study to delve into case law on noise and nuisance extensively.65 In that
context, it should also be borne in mind that the type of damage suffered will
generally consist of property devaluation or the personal inconveniences caused
by noise or vibration, as opposed to death, serious personal injuries or actual
destruction of property. And, as has been seen in the description of English
law in this field, claims based on trespass and nuisance that merely lead to
the normal inconveniencies of overflight have been excluded from the English
statutory regime of absolute liability for that reason.66
B STATUTORY REGIMES OF ABSOLUTE LIABILITY FOR SURFACE
DAMAGE
5.6 UNIFORM STATE LAW FOR AERONAUTICS AND OTHER PROPOSED LEGIS-
LATION. INTRODUCTION
The problem of liability for surface damage in the field of air law has been
dealt with by means of statutory regimes based on absolute liability in a
number of states in the past. The most important foundation for such statutory
regimes was the Uniform Aeronautics Act, which was adopted and promul-
gated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
in 1922.67 However, the number of jurisdictions that adopted statutory regimes
based on absolute liability on the basis of the Uniform Aeronautics Act
63 Anderson at 342.
64 Litwin at 261.
65 Even in cases where the claims based on nuisance or noise are directed against airport
operators, liability will generally be difficult to establish in view of the fact that in most
cases, property will have been acquired when the airport was already in function (informa-
tion received from G.N. Tompkins, Jr.). Notably, other systems of law use comparable
yardsticks to deny compensation in such cases, see, e.g., sub-paragraph 4.4.1 of this study
on the French yardstick of wrongful location of victims near airports in that context.
66 See sub-paragraph 4.4.3 of this study.
67 See G.J. Kuenhl, Uniform State Aviation Liability Legislation, Wisconsin Law Review 356, at
357 (1948).
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gradually declined due to the overall tendency to not consider aviation as an
ultrahazardous activity anymore. This led to a gradual move to general negli-
gence and away from such enacted regimes based on absolute liability in the
United States.
The statutory regimes based on absolute liability in this field will be taken
into account in sub-paragraphs 5.6.1 to 5.6.3 of this section (B). First, the
relevant provisions on liability for surface damage of the Uniform State Law
for Aeronautics and their implementation in statutory state law will be dealt
with (5.6.1). Attacks on the constitutionality of such regimes in relevant case
law will subsequently be described (5.6.2). And finally, a number of failed
attempts at legislation will serve as an introduction to the general move to
negligence in this field (5.6.3).
5.6.1 Uniform aviation legislation (I): The Uniform State Law for Aeronautics
A certain uniformity of aviation legislation was first achieved in 1922 by means
of the Uniform State Law for Aeronautics. Sections 4 and 5 of the Uniform
Aeronautics Act dealt with the problem of liability for surface damage in the
following manner:
Section 4.
Flight in aircraft over the lands and waters of this state is lawful, unless at such
a low altitude as to interfere with the then existing use to which the land or water
or the space over the land or water is put by the owner, or unless so conducted
as to be imminently dangerous to persons or property lawfully on the land or water
beneath. The landing of an aircraft on the lands or waters of another, without his
consent, is unlawful, except in the case of a forced landing. For damages caused
by a forced landing, however, the owner or lessee of the aircraft or the aeronaut
shall be liable, as provided in § 5.
Section 5 (Damage on land).
The owner of every aircraft operated over the lands and waters of this state is
absolutely liable for injuries to persons or property on the land or water beneath,
caused by the ascent, descent, or flight of the aircraft, or the dropping or falling
of any object therefrom, whether such owner is negligent or not, unless the injury
is caused in whole or in part by the negligence of the person injured, or of the
owner or bailee of the property injured. If the aircraft is leased at the time of the
injury to person or property, both owner and lessee shall be liable. An aeronaut
who is not the owner or lessee shall be liable only for the consequences of his own
negligence.68
68 The texts of Sections 4 and 5 have been derived from Annotation 81 ALR2d, at 1059.
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Comparable to one of the most important foundations for absolute liability
under the Restatements and (older) general common law in this field, Sections
4 and 5 were based on the notion that aviation was an ultrahazardous activ-
ity.69
5.6.1.1 Scope of Sections 4 and 5
Sections 4 and 5 offer a rather detailed codified regime of absolute liability.
Under Section 4, the scope of unlawful flight ranges from flying at such a low
altitude as to interfere with use of the land in the sense of actually being
dangerous to persons and property lawfully on the land or water beneath.
Section 4 also qualifies the landing of aircraft on another’s land as unlawful,
unless done with consent of the owner or in case of forced landings. Even if
forced landings are not qualified as unlawful, the owner, lessee, or the aeronaut
can be held absolutely liable for subsequent damages arising out of forced
landings.
Section 5 elaborates on the scope of absolute liability, which includes
surface damage caused by the ascent, descent, or flight of the aircraft or the
dropping or falling of any objects therefrom. The only defence available is
that of contributory negligence. The range of the term ‘flight’ of the aircraft
is narrowed down by the scope of unlawfulness as specified in Section 4. For
if this were not the case, even the most remote forms of nuisance (incon-
venience, property devaluation) caused by normal overflight would fall under
the scope of the absolute liability regime of Section 5.
The scope of statutory provisions based on Sections 4 and 5 has been dealt
with in case law. In Birckhead v. Sammon (1937), the court held that Sections
4 and 5 did not apply to the lawful landing and take-off on and from an
airport, which was governed by general principles of negligence. The case
involved the death of a boy that was killed by a descending plane while he
was bicycling on a road across a flying field. The court held that the statute
would only be applicable if the descent of the aircraft could be construed as
a trespass upon the rights of a landowner.70
In Dahlstrom v. United States (1955), the Minnesota statutes based on Sec-
tions 4 and 5 of the Uniform Aeronautics Act were held to be applicable to
the scenario of a flight of a United States aircraft at a 100 feet. This low over-
flight caused horses to run away frightened and harm the plaintiff who was
69 Kreindler at 6-3, referring to Boyd v. White, 128 Cal. App. 2d 641, 276 P.2d 92 (1954); Prentiss
v. National Airlines, 112 F. Supp. 306 (D.N.J. 1953).
70 Birckhead v. Sammon, 171 Md. 178, 189 Atl. 265, [1937] US Av. Reports. 11 (1936); see also
Eubank at 190-191; Goldin at 131; Kreindler at 6-5; Appel at 427; 81 ALR2d at 1062.
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working on his farm. The court construed this scenario as an affirmative,
intentional act, which amounted to an unlawful trespass.71
5.6.1.2 Statutory implementation of Sections 4 and 5
The number of jurisdictions that implemented statutory provisions based on
Sections 4 and/or 5 of the Uniform Aeronautics Act gradually declined since
the Act was declared ‘obsolete’ and withdrawn by the Commission on Uniform
State Laws in 1943.72
By approximately 1957, thirty states had no applicable statute; seven states
imposed statutory liability on the basis of negligence; five states relied on
rebuttable presumptions of negligence against the owner or lessee of the
aircraft; two states only imposed absolute liability on the owners or lessees
of aircraft for forced landings; and a mere seven states still relied on statutory
regimes based on Sections 4 and 5 of the Uniform Aeronautics Act.73
By the end of 2000, the number of states with such statutory regimes in
force had dropped to six; a number of other states still relied on a rebuttable
presumption of negligence; and several states had statutory provisions in force
which determined that cases of surface damage should be decided in accord-
ance with the rules of law applicable to land. But the majority of states had
no statutory provisions at all and relied solely on the general principles of
negligence. However, it should be borne in mind that if the applicable rules
of tort law within a jurisdiction rely on the common law rule of absolute
liability for abnormally dangerous activities, this can imply that liability for
surface damage is also qualified on that basis. That can be qualified as the
71 Dahlstrom v. United States (1955, DC Minn) 129 F Supp 772, revd on other grounds (CA8)
228 F2d 819, as cited in 74 ALR2d at 870; 81 ALR2d at 1063; Speiser & Krause at 152. An
interesting aspect of this case was the fact that the District Court held that the flight was
within the exercise of a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency on
the basis of an exception for claims on that basis within the Federal Tort Claims Act;
however, on the assumption that the conduct was in violation of the statute or negligent
(or both), the scenario was held to be ‘wrongful’ within the meaning of the Federal Tort
Claims Act nonetheless, see 74 ALR2d at 870-871.
72 Restatement of the Law Third, The American Law Institute, Council Draft No. 2, September
26, 2000, at 129.
73 Peterson at 317 and 321. States without statutory provisions: Alabama, Alaska, Colorado,
Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Miane, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hamp-
shire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia. States with statutory negligence: Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Idaho, Pennsylvania, South Dakota Vermont. States with rebuttable presumptions
of negligence: Georgia, Maryland, Nevada, Rhode Island, Wisconsin. States imposing
absolute liability for forced landings (Section 4): Montana, Wyoming. States that have
implemented Sections 4 and 5: Delaware, Hawaii, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Dakota,
South Carolina, Tennessee; see also Billyou, Air Law 88 (1964); Eubank at 191-193.
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only exception to the general rejection of absolute liability in this field.74
Negligence has thus clearly won the day in this field within the majority of
jurisdictions within the United States.
5.6.2 Constitutionality of statutory regimes
The question whether statutory regimes based on Sections 4 and 5 of the
Uniform Aeronautics Act can be attacked as unconstitutional has also arisen
in a number of cases.
In Prentiss et al. v. National Airlines (1953), the implied unconstitutionality
of the New Jersey statute was based on the argument that it deprived the two
air carriers in question of their property without due process of law and was
also in violation of the Interstate Commerce clause of the United States Consti-
tution as an invalid restraint upon interstate commerce.75 The due process
argument was refuted by the court on the grounds that the doctrine of absolute
liability was historically recognized as due process of law and that it was
proper to impose a rule of absolute liability for surface damage since the
aviation industry must be considered as ultrahazardous.76
The ultrahazardous nature of aviation was subsequently held to have a
reasonable relation to health, welfare, and safety of the people, and such issues
are allowed to be promoted by the police power of a state by means of specific
regulations. The main policy ground for statutory absolute liability, which
was based on the difficulties of proving negligence in the present situation,
was also accepted by the court. Furthermore, the court acknowledged the
underlying purpose of the statutory regime of placing the cost of the dangers
of the enterprise upon the industry itself rather than upon completely innocent
and unbenefitted third parties.77
The argument that such statutory regimes of absolute liability were in
violation of the Interstate Commerce clause was also refuted by the court on
the grounds that:
74 Implementations of Sections 4 and 5 can still be found in DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 2 § 305
(1999); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 263-5 (Michie 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 360.012 (West
2000); N.J. REV. STAT. § 6:2-7 (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 55-3-60 (Law Co-op 2000), and
VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 5 § 479 (1999), see Restatement of the Law Third, The American Law
Institute, Council Draft No. 2, September 26, 2000, at 129-130.
75 Prentiss et Al. v. National Airlines, Inc. (1953, DC NJ), 4 Avi. 17,123 – 17,124; see also White-
head Jr., at 17. The case evolved out of three aircraft crashes of aircraft owned by American
Airlines, the National Airlines and the Miami Airlines, in which injuries to and death of
persons as well as damage to property were inflicted as a result of these crashes, aside
from passenger fatalities. The defendants referred to the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, which holds that ‘nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.’
76 Prentiss et Al. v. National Airlines, Inc. (1953), at 17,123.
77 Prentiss et Al. v. National Airlines, Inc. (1953), at 17,125; Annotation, 81 ALR2d at 1059-1060.
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1 They do not affect the actual movement of airplanes in interstate commerce.
2 They do not affect the average airplane, even financially, as would a tax.
3 They only affect an airplane owner financially on the occurrence of an accident.
The defendant owners will certainly agree that such an accident is not the
ordinary result of air travel.
4 The benefit of the statutory provisions does not go to any one who in any wise
participates in such air travel, such as passengers, but only to those who are,
under ordinary circumstances, entire strangers to air travel, and who are totally
without fault themselves.78
Ergo, both attacks on the constitutionality of the statutory regime in question
were found to be without merit by the court.
In Adler’s Quality Bakery et als. v. Gasetaria (1960), a similar attack was
launched against the applicable New Jersey absolute liability statute. The case
involved actions of property owners against the owner of an aircraft for
damages caused by the collision of the aircraft with a TV tower and the
subsequent falling debris.79 Similar to the grounds raised in the Prentiss-case,
it was held that the statute was an unconstitutional exercise of police power
and that it deprived aircraft owners of their property without due process
of law on the grounds that aviation is no longer ultrahazardous. The court
countered this argument by pointing out that the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher
on absolute liability for extra-hazardous activities did not refer to statutory,
but common law law liability.80 In other words, the court did not base its
finding of the constitutionality of the statute on the qualification of aviation
as an ultrahazardous activity, but on policy grounds such as the potential
problems of proof of fault and the expenses inherent in obtaining such proof
as well as the shift of risk to the enterprise rather than innocent victims. Such
grounds were found to be within the legislative power to act in behalf of
general welfare by means of specific legislation.81
The second attack focused on the persons liable under the statute. For the
statute only imposed absolute liability on the owner or lessee, but not on the
operator of the aircraft. The attack argued that such a classification was uncon-
stitutional and contrary to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, the court countered that such a classification was
reasonable as it was based on the fact that the risk of loss was thus placed
78 Prentiss et Al. v. National Airlines, Inc. (1953), at 17,129; Annotation, 81 ALR2d, at 1060.
79 Adler’s Quality Bakery, Inc. et Als. v. Gasetaria (1960), 6 Avi., at 17,953 (32 NJ 55, 159 A2d
97).
80 Note the different approach in the Prentiss-case, in which the statute was deemed to be
based on the ultrahazardous nature of the activity.
81 Adler’s Quality Bakery, Inc. et Als. v. Gasetaria (1960), 6 Avi., at 17,956; see also Annotation
81 ALR2d at 1060, in which the ineffectiveness of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is also
mentioned as an argument for the justification of the statute in question.
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upon the better risk bearer, which was deemed to be the owner of the aircraft
in the majority of cases.82
The third attack was based on the notion that the statute raised an unconsti-
tutional burden on interstate commerce. This was refuted by the court on
similar grounds as in the Prentiss-case.83
In the case of Torchia v. Fisher (1983), the validity of the absolute liability
statute of New Jersey was yet again upheld and this time by the New Jersey
Supreme Court. In that case, the owner of a stolen aircraft held that application
of the statute violated due process. But the court argued that even in case of
theft, the statute legitimately shifted the loss to the better risk bearer, the
owner, as opposed to unbenefitted third parties, who cannot protect themselves
against the risks imposed by aviation.84
These three cases illustrate the fact that statutory regimes of absolute
liability have been qualified as valid and permitted under the United States
Constitution in a number of decisions and need not necessarily be based on
the mere qualification of aviation as an ultrahazardous activity, but can also
be based on other policy grounds, such as the potential difficulty of proving
negligence and the shift of potential damages to the better risk bearer. In other
words, the current general move toward negligence can still legitimately be
reversed by means of statutory regimes based on absolute liability if this is
deemed necessary by the State legislature.
5.6.3 Uniform aviation legislation (II): failed legislative attempts
The following legislative attempts of the past to adopt uniform rules in the
field of aviation liability have all failed and can help to illustrate the apparent
lack of willingness to create more uniformity in this field in the United States.
A re-examination of such attempts is also deemed useful for the day the
legislature decides to give the green light to more uniformity in this field.
1) The Uniform Aviation Liability Act (1937)
The Uniform Aviation Liability Act was drafted in 1937 and approved by the
National Conference in 1938. However, the Executive Committee withheld
promulgation of the Act before state legislatures in view of potential differences
between the Uniform Aviation Liability Act and the federal Civil Aeronautics
82 Adler’s Quality Bakery, Inc. et Als. v. Gasetaria (1960), 6 Avi., at 17,956-17,957; see also Annota-
tion 81 ALR2d at 1060. The term ‘owner’ does not refer to lessors as mere financial owners
of aircraft in this context.
83 Annotation 81 ALR2d, at 1060.
84 Kreindler at 6-4, citing Torchia v. Fisher, 95 N.J. 43, 468 A.2d 1061, 18 Avi., at 17,695 (1983).
Although the same line of reasoning could be adapted in that context, the analogy between
a stolen and hijacked aircraft may not be applied as vigorously after the September 11,
2001 attacks on the United States.
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Act of 1938. Aside from the problems posed by these potential differences,
the Uniform Aviation Liability Act was opposed by the Air Transport Associ-
ation and the National Association of State Aviation Officials. In the end, it
was not adopted in view of the fact that the Civil Aeronautics Authority
preferred to do its own research on the possibilities of a Federal Aviation
Liability Act. That research culminated in the so-called Sweeney Report (see
sub 2).85
In Sections 201-207 of Article II of the Uniform Aviation Liability Act, a
regime of absolute, albeit limited liability was codified, including a Section
on mandatory insurance or security. Excerpts from Article II can help illustrate
the envisaged regime:86
Article II – Liability for bodily injury to individuals on the land and damage to
property thereon
Section 201. (a)
This article shall apply to liability for bodily injuries within this State and for death
resulting therefrom to individuals on the land, and for damage within this State
to property on the land, caused by the ascent or descent or attempt to ascend, or
flight of aircraft, or by the falling of an object therefrom;
Section 202.
In cases within the scope of this article, the operator of an aircraft shall be liable,
in an action brought within this State as in this article specified, regardless of
negligence, for bodily injury to an individual and for death resulting therefrom
and damage to property, to the extent in this article specified.
Section 203.
The operator of an aircraft shall not be liable under the preceding section, if the
injury or damage was caused by the wilful misconduct of the individual injured
or the person who would otherwise be entitled to recover for damage to property.
Section 205.
It shall be unlawful for any person to operate or to cause or permit to be operated
an aircraft either on or over land in this State unless the operator of such aircraft
carries valid insurance or has furnished security or deposited cash as in this act
prescribed, against the liabilities imposed by the preceding sections of this article;
Section 207.(a)
Any person or his personal representative may elect, notwithstanding the preceding
provisions of this article, to bring an action to recover from the operator of an
aircraft for negligence, but in any such action, such person or his personal repres-
85 Kuenhl at 358-360. The Act was drafted jointly by the American Law Institute, the American
Bar Association, and committees of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. See also Hollyday, at 108, who remarks that the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws has never made another attempt at a uniform aviation
liability act, despite the possibility of doing so on the basis of its self-imposed criteria.
86 The text of the excerpts is derived from the Uniform Aviation Liability Act as printed in
9 Journal of Air Law 726, at 726-744 (1938).
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entative must prove affirmatively the cause of the accident and that it was caused
by the negligence of the operator.
These excerpts reveal that the envisaged regime was one of absolute liability
to which the operator, as opposed to the owner or lessee as under Section 5
of the Uniform Aeronautics Act, was subjected. Although the regime was
limited for death and bodily injury and property damage separately (Sections
204(a) and (b)), the effects of that limitation were mitigated by also allowing
claims to based on (unlimited) negligence.87 However, Section 207(a) seems
to require full proof of negligence, and not merely a presumption, in view
of the requirement of proving affirmatively the cause of the accident. Notably,
a remarkable deviation from the more normal defence of contributory negli-
gence was enacted in Section 203, by requiring wilful misconduct of third
parties. A final remarkable aspect of the Act concerns the fact that liability
for surface damage arising from collisions of aircraft was governed by com-
parative negligence and not by joint and several absolute liability (under
Article V, Section 504). For negligence of one or more of the implicated aircraft
operators can evidently be just as difficult to prove in cases of collisions of
aircraft, if not more so.
2) The Sweeney Report (1941)
A study on the possibility of federal aviation liability legislation was made
by Sweeney under auspices of the Civil Aeronautics Board in 1941.88 His
position on the problem of liability for surface damage can be derived from
the following quotation:
Persons on the ground (not a landing area of an established airport) should be
compensated for injuries directly attributable to the operation of aircraft, irrespective
of the aircraft operator’s negligence. It is believed that the imposition of this liability
by legislation involves no departure from law as it is now developing, and that
it would have the desired effect of eliminating the confusion in legal theories
prevailing in the decisions of the courts that have considered this liability. Important
as the continued development of civil aviation is believed to be, no convincing
reason has been presented why it should be subsidized at the expense of the
luckless victim on the ground who, without participating in aviation in any way,
is injured by an aircraft accident not attributable to the fault of the operator.89
87 Which is a more fair solution than was opted for under the Rome Convention of 1952, which
required proof of wilful misconduct in order to circumvent limitation of liability, see sub-
paragraph 3.5.4. of this study.
88 Sweeney was a member of the Civil Aeronautics Authority’s legal staff, who made a
comprehensive study of aviation liability and insurance practices, entitled “Report to the
Civil Aeronautics Board of a Study of the Proposed Aviation Liability Legislation”, which
was published in 1941 by the Board, see E.C. Sweeney, Is Special Aviation Legislation Essential?
– Part 1, 19 JALC 166, at 166 (1952).
89 Quotation from Eubank at 195.
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Unfortunately the Sweeney Report is not available anymore, but his own
recommendations of 1952 on his suggested regime of federal aviation liability
for surface damage are. According to these recommendations, the regime
should be based on absolute liability. The scope of absolute liability should
encompass damage caused by forced landings, crashes or objects or persons
falling from aircraft in flight, but not necessarily damage arising from the
alleged nuisance of ordinary flight. In order to make this distinction, Sweeney
introduced the ‘contact’ criterion between victims of surface damage and the
aircraft or parts of the aircraft or objects or persons falling from the aircraft.
According to Sweeney, the ‘contact’ criterion would automatically exclude
claims based on nuisance and noise arising from ordinary flight from the scope
of absolute liability.90 Sweeney also limited the scope of potential claimants
under the regime by excluding claims from passengers of other aircraft, other
aircraft in general, and other persons who voluntarily visit landing areas of
airports. This exclusion was based on the rationale that such persons or entities
assume the risks posed by aviation voluntarily. For such claimants, negligence
was deemed to suffice.91
According to Sweeney, his proposed regime would have eliminated the
confusion inherent in the potential application of various headings of liability
under common law to various scenarios of surface damage. For aviation
crashes and forced landings can be construed as a privileged trespass, but also
as unintentional and non-negligent entries or accidental intrusions for which
no direct liability exists under common law, unless the activity of flying is
considered as an ‘ultrahazardous activity’ or if negligence is established.92
Sweeney made some useful suggestions for a liability regime in this field,
such as the application of the ‘contact’ criterion to narrow down the scope
of absolute liability. His recommendations also make clear that a regime based
on absolute liability can only be guaranteed by specific legislation under
common law in view of the uncertainties and changing attitudes to the ques-
tion whether aviation is considered ultrahazardous or not. And as has been
described previously, the overall tendency under common law within the
United States has been to not consider aviation as ultrahazardous anymore
since the nineteenfifties.
The main objection that can be put foward to Sweeney’s regime from the
perspective of third parties was that it was also based on a system of limitation
90 As well as claims based on potential damage caused by too low general or sudden over-
flight.
91 E.C. Sweeney, Is special aviation liability legislation essential? – Part II, 19 JALC 317, at 324-325
(1952). The ‘contact’ criterium has also been used in the Australian Damage by Aircraft
Bill to define the scope of its liability regime, albeit phrased as ‘impact’, see sub-paragraph
4.4.5 of this study.
92 Sweeney at 324.
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of liability with a maximum death recovery and an overall limit on the amount
of recovery per accident based on the weight of the aircraft.93
3) The O’Hara bills (H.R. 4912/532, 1945)
A number of bills that were far more aviation- than victim- oriented and were
(not surprisingly) actively supported by the Air Transport Association of
America were launched in Congress by O’Hara in 1945. The proposed liability
regime of the bills was in effect so pro- aviation, that third parties would even
be better off under the general rules of negligence. For the aircraft operator
could only be held liable for surface damage unless he proved that he had
taken all measures to avoid such damage or that such measures were im-
possible to take. Furthermore, the liability regime was limited and the scope
of potential claimants was narrowed down by excluding persons or property
within the area of an airport as claimants.94 In effect, such a combination
comes down to a limited liability regime based on a ground of liability that
closely resembles the rule of normal negligence due to the fact that the defence
of ‘necessary measures’ has been left intact. Thus, third parties would be better
off under the general rules of negligence, which at least guarantee liability
without any monetary limitations.
Neither of these three attempts at uniform aviation liability legislation have
ever been enacted. And as the number of courts in the United States that no
longer considered aviation to be ultrahazardous expanded, the gradual move
to negligence in this field gained ground. This move to negligence will be dealt
with in the next part of this Chapter.
C NEGLIGENCE AND SURFACE DAMAGE
5.7 THE GRADUAL MOVE TO NEGLIGENCE
As has been described in parts A and B of this Chapter, the problem of liability
for surface damage in the field of aviation has been dealt with under various
headings of absolute liability under common law as well as under statutory
regimes of absolute liability in the United States. The most important justifica-
tion for absolute liability in general has turned out to be the perception of
aviation as an ultrahazardous activity. But a change of view became apparent
from approximately halfway the 1950’s, when more and more courts and state
legislatures started to reject the notion that aviation was (still) ultrahazardous
93 Kuenhl at 377-378.
94 Kuenhl at 379-380; Eubank at 193-194.
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and thus began to apply negligence as opposed to absolute liability to the
problem of surface damage inflicted by aircraft.95
Important arguments that substantiated this move to negligence included
the notion that aircraft technology and maintenance were by then far more
advanced than in the early days of aviation and that the operation of aircraft
was governed by a plethora of government regulations. In other words, the
risk of surface damage could be sufficiently reduced through due care in the
areas of maintenance and improvements of aircraft.96 A more general argu-
ment in favour of negligence held that regimes based on absolute liability
would unjustifiably discriminate against aircraft operators and could turn out
to be an obstructing factor to expansion of the aviation industry. According
to this argument, operators of aircraft should thus always be able to rely on
a basis of negligence and its defences. Bluntly speaking, these arguments can
amount to letting the loss lie where it falls by making compensation of surface
damage dependant upon proof of negligence.97
That a great number of arguments in favour of negligence lack substance
has been established previously; the aim of this part of the Chapter is primarily
to describe the effects of application of negligence in this field in the majority
of jurisdictions within the United States. First, the effects of a presumption
of negligence as well as the criteria for application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur will be discussed. As will be seen in more detail, some jurisdictions
have enacted specific statutory regimes in this field based on a presumption
of negligence. For practical purposes, these will be discussed jointly with cases
in which the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was permitted to be invoked under
general negligence in view of the comparability of both alternatives (5.7.1).
Next, a number of cases based on the requirement of ‘pure’ negligence, without
any presumption or application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, will be
evaluated (5.7.2). Finally, the potential scope of negligence will be dealt with
(5.7.3).
5.7.1 Presumptions of negligence. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
A number of jurisdictions have incorporated statutory regimes of liability for
surface damage based on a rebuttable presumption of negligence.98 The statut-
95 That line of reasoning holds that since the Second World War, aviation can no longer be
considered as ultrahazardous due to the technological advancements and excellent safety
records of the industry, see Notes: Liability for aircraft damage to ground occupiers – A study
of current trends in Tort Law, 31 Indiana Law Journal 63, at 64 (1955).
96 Appel at 419, 421. The numerous Federal Aviation Regulations have been used by courts
to help determine the reasonable standard of care, see C. Robertson, Aviation, A Complete
Legal Guide 59 (1987).
97 Goldin at 126-127; Notes at 67.
98 See sub-paragraph 5.6.1.2 of this chapter.
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ory regime of Maryland played a role in the case of D’Anna v. United States
(1950), in which persons and property on the ground suffered injuries and
damages when a gasoline tank from a United States naval aircraft fell into
a fruit market. The court held the United States liable, since the evidence that
was put forward to rebut the presumption of negligence was held to be too
vague and unsatisfactory.99
Under a number of jurisdictions in which the general rules of negligence
prevail, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can be invoked in order to help prove
negligence. The adherents of the application of negligence in this field generally
claim that the combination of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and negligence
provide a sufficiently satisfactory framework for claiming compensation for
surface damage. However, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is by no means clear-
cut and has been defined varyingly under case law as a presumption of
negligence, a ‘permissible inference’ of negligence, a ‘prima facie case of
negligence’, and a shift of the burden of proof to the defendant. Although
related to the wrongful death of a passenger killed in the wreck of a transport
airplane, the case of Smith et Al. v. Pennsylvania Central Airlines Corporation
(1948), can help recapitulate how the doctrine is applied.100 In that case the
court held that:
the bases of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are two fold: first, if the mechanism
involved in the accident is within the sole and entire control of the defendant, the
latter is in a better position than the plaintiff to adduce an explanation as to how
and why the accident happened; second, if the accident is of an unusual kind, and
would not ordinarily occur without failure on the part of some human agency,
it is reasonable to assume in the absence of a satisfactory explanation that it was
due to some negligence on the part of the defendant. These principles are as
applicable to airplane crashes as they are to railroad wrecks. That airplane crashes
may occur as a result of the action of the elements, or without any carelessness
or deficiencies on the part of any human being, is no doubt true… It must be borne
in mind that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not result in a conclusive presumption
of negligence nor does it even compel such an inference. It merely permits it and calls
upon the defendant for an explanation. The concept of res ipsa loquitur does not
impose on the defendant a liability that would not otherwise exist. If it be the fact
that the defendant was not guilty of negligence, he will be free of liability. The
doctrine does not even lift the burden of proof from the plaintiff and place it on
the defendant. It merely calls on the defendant to offer an account of the cause
99 D’Anna v. United States (1950), CA4 Md 181 F2d 335, 3 CCH Avi 17171; Speiser and Krause
at 148. The tank became detached while the aircraft was involved in a 30-degree dive during
a public exhibition over Baltimore with 69 other aircraft. No explanation could be offered
on the question why the tank, that was attached to the bomb rack by hooks, became
detached. Apparently, a pin that was held by a sheared lock ring popped out of the bomb-
rack for unknown reasons. See also Eubank at 190; Annotation, 74 ALR2d at 868-869.
100 Smith et Al. v. Pennsylvania Central Airlines Corporation (1948), CCH 2 Avi, 14,618. See also
Mr. Chief Groner on the varying ways in which the doctrine has been defined at 14,619.
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of the accident. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation exculpating him, the
jury may, but is not compelled to, make a finding that the disaster was caused
by the defendant’s negligence.101
This opinion reveals that the doctrine does not necessarily provide plaintiffs
with a presumption or even an inference of negligence, but merely allows the
defendant to give an explanation of the reason why things went wrong, which
is subsequently evaluated by the jury. One of the key assets of application
of the doctrine is that its inference of negligence can be legally adequate to
satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of proof, which enables him to survive a motion
to dismiss at the close of his case. The jury can subsequently decide either way,
as it is permitted to draw an inference of negligence, but need not necessarily
do so. This can also be an important factor for the settlement value of cases.102
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was held applicable in a number of cases
involving surface damage. In Northwestern National Insurance Company et Al.
v. United States of America (1949), a P-51 Mustang Pursuit Plane crashed into
a building in Chicago, which subsequently caught fire. The court held that
plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case of negligence by establishing that
the instrumentality was under the management and control of the alleged
tortfeasor and that the accident was such as in the ordinary course of things
would not have happened if proper care had been used. Therefore, the accident
itself afforded reasonable evidence – in the absence of an explanation to the
contrary – that it arose from want of proper care.103
United States v. Kesinger et al. (1951) involved an Army Air Force aircraft
that took off, touched the ground, became air-borne again, but finally crashed
and destroyed several farm buildings. The court held the doctrine applicable
as the ‘thing’ which caused the injury was under exclusive control of the
defendant at the time of the injury and that the occurrence was one which
in the ordinary course of things does not happen if the defendant uses proper
care. The court even declared that the trend of authority was to hold the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applicable to airplane accidents, referring to the
case of Sollak v. State of New York (1927).104
On the notion that it automatically applies in every case of surface damage
inflicted by aircraft, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would arguably provide
a reasonably fair compromise between the poles of absolute liability on the
101 Smith et Al. v. Pennsylvania Central Airlines Corporation (1948), at 14,620.
102 See Dobbs & Hayden at 175-177 on Eaton v. Eaton, 119 N.J. 628, 575 A.2d 858 (1990).
103 Northwestern National Insurance Company et Al. v. United States of America (1949), CCH 2
Avi. at 14,965 sub 3 and 4; Peterson at 314.
104 United States v. Kesinger et Al. (1951), CCH 3 Avi., at 17,611; Notes at 64; Speiser & Krause
at 126; Sollak v. State of New York, New York Court of Claims, October 14, 1927, 1 CCH
Avi. 99, involved the collision between a state aircraft and an automobile on a public
highway, in which a presumption of negligence was successfully raised by plaintiff by
invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur; see also Goldin at 129.
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one hand and pure negligence on the other hand. For it would then allow the
defendant to give his side of the story in order to counter the automatic
presumption or prima facie evidence of negligence, while also leaving im-
portant defences available under negligence intact. For the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur does not affect the defences available under common law negligence,
which include Act of God, bailment, agency relationships, and proximate
cause.105 However, the doctrine does not apply automatically, nor can it
always be invoked successfully.106 In the case of Williams et al v. United States
(1952), for instance, not all of the criteria of the doctrine were met. For the
court then ruled that it not only must be shown that the aircraft was under
exclusive control of the government, but also that the accident would not have
occurred in the ordinary course of events if due care had been exercised. Ergo,
negligence can be difficult to establish even with the aid of the doctrine, as
was also noted in the dissenting opinion in the case of Crosby v. Cox Aircraft
Co. (1987).107
Although perhaps far too exaggerated in tone, the prediction made by
Goldin on the developments in this field in the nineteenforties thus still hold
some validity at the beginning of the 21st century. For Goldin held that
with respect to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the law of the air is replete with
confusion…. Indeed, the trend is unmistakingly in the direction of applying to
aeronautical accidents, both on the ground and in the air, the rules of negligence
and proximate cause generally applicable to torts on land. Adherence to this modern
view automatically transfers into the realm of aviation law all the vagaries and
uncertainties which surround the application of res ipsa loquitur doctrine to land
accidents. Moreover, the prospects for the future seem none too encouraging. That
harmony and uniformity soon will reign where chaos and confusion now are firmly
entrenched, appears to be mere wishful thinking rather than an expectation.108
105 Wolff at 214-216.
106 In discussions of the American Law Institute in 1964 and 1965 on this topic, it was acknow-
ledged that aircraft accidents are generally a result of negligence, but that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur is only available sometimes; furthermore, it was held that the burden of
investigating the causes of such accidents can often be extremely onerous for plaintiffs,
see Restatement of the Law Third, The American Law Institute, Council Draft No.2 (Septem-
ber 26, 2000), at 131.
107 See, on the latter case sub-paragraph 2.5.1 of this study. See also Williams et Al. v. United States
(1955), 4 CCH Avi, 17,537. In the Williams case, injuries and other damage on the surface
was caused by falling fuel from an Air Force jet bomber that had exploded in mid-air. The
plaintiffs relied solely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in order to establish negligence,
but failed to meet the required criteria. The case provides a sad example of a negligence-
based case in which the doctrine was of no help either. See Prosser and Keeton on Torts
at 558 for examples of other cases in which the courts have refused to apply the doctrine
and in which recovery was subsequently denied.
108 Goldin at 152-153.
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In view of the fact that defendants’ attorneys may indeed convince the jury
that the the aviation accident or incident at hand was caused by events other
than than the lack of due care of the aircraft operator, the doctrine is not often
relied on by plaintiffs in current aviation litigation in the United States.109
This brings us to the predicted ‘chaos and confusion’ involved in the
application of negligence unaided by rebuttable presumptions of negligence
or the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
5.7.2 Negligence and surface damage
The long and winding road through past legislative developments and case
law in this field leads to the destination of negligence as it is currently upheld
in the majority of jurisdictions in the United States and in the majority of
decisions. The basis of negligence has either been specifically incorporated
in statutory provisions on surface damage in a number of jurisdictions, or is
applicable in absence of any liability regulation in this field.
Although perhaps more suited as an example of a case on the question
who can be held liable, the landmark case of Boyd v. White (1954) can be given
in the context of application of negligence in this field as well.110 For in Boyd
v. White, in which plaintiff claimed for recovery of damages caused by fright
and mental suffering and for property damage due to the crash of an aircraft
into her house, the California District Court of Appeal held that aircraft were
no longer inherently dangerous instruments. The court explicitly examined
the trend away from the absolute liability doctrine of the Restatement of Torts
and the absolute liability regime of the Uniform Aeronautics Act, which was
followed by Californian legislation. As of 1947, the California legislature
deliberately refused to adopt the provisions of the Uniform Aeronautics Act.
For the legislature was of the opinion that the question of liability of owners,
lessees, or operators of aircraft was to be determined by the normal rules of
negligence, as incorporated in a specific statute.111 It is of particular interest
that the court did acknowledge the ‘strong public policy’ argument raised by
the appellant. For the appellant argued that the risk of damage to third parties
owning property over which airplanes are flown should be borne by the
owners of planes, who can insure themselves against such risks, and not by
innocent property owners. However, the court added that such arguments
should be addressed to the legislature and not to courts, who are tied to
negligence once aviation is no longer perceived to be ultrahazardous per se.
109 Information received from G.N. Tompkins, Jr.
110 Boyd v. White et Al., California District Court of Appeals, November 12, 1954, CCH 4 Avi.
17,485.
111 Boyd v. White et Al., at 17,488 – 17,491; Peterson at 309-311; Hollyday at 97-98.
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In another Californian case, Southern California Edison Co. v. Coleman
(1957), an aircraft collided with the wires, poles, and equipment of a power
company near an airport. The power company asserted that the defendants
should be held absolutely liable for the damages to its property on the basis
of trespass. The defendants countered that the trespass (if any) was unavoid-
able and the result of an Act of God in the form of a downdraft which caused
the aircraft to collide with the wires. The court followed that line of reasoning
and held that there could be no liability for trespass unless the trespass was
intentional, the result of recklessness or negligence, or the result of engaging
in extrahazardous activity. And as an aircraft that was properly handled by
a competent pilot was not considered extrahazardous anymore, the court ruled
that liability could only arise out of a defect in the aircraft or out of its negli-
gent operation.112
Negligence or wrongful misconduct has also been adopted as the sole basis
of recovery from the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act since the
Supreme Court decision of Laird v. Nelms (1972).113 Since that decision, the
government cannot be held liable on the basis of any absolute liability statute
or common law rules of absolute liability anymore. This was not always the
case, as can be established by aviation cases involving military aircraft prior
to 1972.114
5.7.3 Scope of negligence
The basis of negligence requires proof of the broad criteria of breach of a legal
duty to use a reasonable degree of care and proximate cause. Therefore, it is
not surprising that a great number of potential scenarios of surface damage
112 Southern California Edison Co. v. Lloyd S. Coleman, Jr., et Al, 150 Cal App 2d Supp 829, 310
P2d 504, CCH 5 Avi. 17,415; Appel, at 424. In that case, a reference was made to San Diego
Gas & Electric Co. v. United States (1949), 173 Fed. Rep. 2d 92 (Ninth Circuit), 2 Avi. 14,842
in which a Coast Guard plane hit the wires of an electric company, and in which negligence
was alleged, see Whitehead at 11; Speiser and Krause at 146.
113 Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972), see Kreindler at 6-5.
114 See, e.g., United States v. Praylou et Al., United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit,
November 9, 1953; Certiorari denied, United States Supreme Court, April 5, 1954, 4 Avi.
17,191. In that case, the United States was held liable on the basis of the South Carolina
absolute liability statute of the time. It was held that the fact that the Federal Tort Claims
Act submits the government to the liability of an individual only where there is a negligent
or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the government does not make the statute
inapplicable: for the Federal Tort Claims Act requires that the United States shall be liable
in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under similar circum-
stances. In general, the Federal Tort Claims Act can be qualified as a strictly construed
waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States. State law can come into play to
draw a comparison between potential liability for similar conduct of a private individual
under State law and the alleged conduct for which the Federal Government is held liable
(information received by G.N. Tompkins, Jr.).
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can fall under the scope of negligence. Case law ranges from scenarios of direct
contact or impact of the aircraft or parts of the aircraft to scenarios of damage
caused by overflight. All sorts of sub-scenarios have also been dealt with in
case law, which includes cases of surface damage related to the taxiing of
aircraft, airplane propellors striking persons on the ground, sonic booms,
damage caused by too low overflight, cropdusting, and so on. A great range
of varying examples can be given per main scenario, of which a number have
been chosen to help illustrate the broad potential scope of negligence.
For the scenario of damage caused by impact or direct contact with the
aircraft, the bizarre case of Platt v. Erie County Agricultural Soc. (1914) can be
mentioned, in which an an aircraft damaged the ear of a surface victim with
its wingtip and injured several other persons, and for which the pilot was held
negligent by the court.115
For the scenarios of normal or too low overflight, the case of Boskovich v.
U.S.(1950), can serve as an example. In that case it was held that a poultryman
who suffered loss due to fright of his chickens when a formation of military
aircraft flew over his farm had no cause of action in negligence as the forma-
tion flew in conformity with existing air traffic regulations.116 The case of
Brunt v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. (1962), in which cattle stampeded and were
lost out of fright of an aircraft in take-off was also based on negligence.117
Kreindler has enumerated a number of mainly military cases based on
damage caused by sonic booms, which produce conical shock waves that
emanate from the aircraft and can cause surface damage. Although all of these
cases are based on negligence, they do not always lead to liability of the
implicated aircraft, since such flights can be protected by the discretionary
function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, which can exempt the
government from potential liability.118
The scope of negligence in relation to unlawful use of aircraft by terrorists
has evidently become of great relevance in the aftermath of the events of ‘9/11’
in the United States and will be dealt with in greater detail in Part E of this
Chapter.
115 164 App Div 99, 149 NYS 520, 1 CCH Avi. 34, as cited by Speiser and Krause at 150; see
also sub-paragraph 2.2.1 of this study.
116 Boskovich v. United States of America, United States District Court, District of Utah, Central
Division, April 7 (1950), 3 CCH Avi. 17,252; Kreindler at 6-16 – 6-17.
117 243 Miss 607, 139 So 2d as cited by Appel at 424-425; Speiser & Krause, at 152.
118 See, e.g. Maynard v. United States, 430 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1970), in which personal injuries
of a horserider were caused by the sonic boom from a U.S. Air Force aircraft, which
frightened the horse. The route taken by the aircraft was within the discretionary function,
as cited by Kreindler at 6-27.
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D PERSONS LIABLE AND INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
5.8 PERSONS LIABLE
The question who can be held liable for surface damage inflicted by aircraft
depends on the applicable regime at hand and on the specific facts of the case.
A first distinction can be made between cases governed by statutory regimes
of absolute liability and cases governed by general headings of liability under
common law, of which negligence generally prevails. For the latter cases, a
second distinction can be made between liability of the operators and owners
of aircraft.
The persons liable under the absolute liability statutes can be derived from
Section 5 of the Uniform State Law for Aeronautics (1922). The main rule of
Section 5 holds that the owners of aircraft can be held absolutely liable for
surface damage. However, if the aircraft is leased at the time of the injury to
person or property, both owner and lessee shall be liable. Section 5 also
specifies that an aeronaut who is not the owner or lessee can only be held
liable for the consequences of his own negligence.119 The term ‘owner’ refers
to actual owners, not financial owners, such as lessors or mortgagees.120
As has been described previously in this study, the most logical person
or entity to be held liable for surface damage has been held to be the operator
as opposed to the owner of the aircraft if the two are not one and the same
person or entity. For the operator is generally the person or entity that has
actual control of the aircraft and/or the one that profits economically from
the activity of flying. Owners of aircraft, on the other hand, can face the danger
of being perceived as the deepest pocket by claimants, even if their role in
the actual operation of the aircraft is limited or non-existent. Legal distinctions
between the position of operators and owners have been made under common
law for that purpose. For under common law, the owner or lessee of an aircraft
cannot be held liable automatically for surface damage, unless some relation-
ship of agency with the operator or pilot can be established.121 If such a re-
lationship can be established, the doctrine of respondeat superior might make
119 See Section 5 of the Uniform Aeronautics Act (1922).
120 Whitehead at 17. Whitehead refers to federal law, which exempts lessors or mortgagees
from liability unless in actual control of the aircraft.
121 A relationship of agency can be defined as a relationship between two persons, by agree-
ment or otherwise, where one (the agent) may act on behalf of the other (the principal)
and bind the principal by words and actions. The relationship can be one of principal and
agent, employer or proprietor and independent contractor, or master and servant, see
Blacks’s Law Dictionary 62 (1990). In the master/servant relationship, the owner of an
aircraft may be held liable for torts committed by the pilot of the aircraft, see Hollyday at
95-96.
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the owner or lessee responsible for the tort committed by the operator or
pilot.122
As the doctrine of respondeat superior requires the pilot to be acting within
the scope of his employment, liability of the owner of the aircraft is excluded
if this was not proven to be the case. A sad example of such a scenario is
provided by the case of King v. United States (1949), in which an intoxicated
student airforce pilot flew a military aircraft into plaintiff’s home without the
authorization, knowledge, or consent of the United States. The court held that
the pilot was on a frolic of his own and was not acting within the scope of
his employment. Therefore, the United States could not be held liable under
the Federal Tort Claims Act.123
Similarly, a bailor cannot be held liable automatically for surface damage
inflicted by a bailee unless a relationship of agency or the doctrine of
respondeat superior can be established.124 The previously described case of
Boyd v. White (1954) can also serve as an example in this context. The case
involved a flight instructor who operated a flying school and had rented an
aircraft from another firm of aircraft owners, as all of his own aircraft were
in use. After a joint flight that was carried out by the flight instructor and the
student pilot, the student pilot was allowed to fly solo. During the solo flight,
the student pilot attempted a forced landing due to engine trouble and loss
of altitude, but crashed into a house. The key question was if the owner of
an aircraft who leases such an aircraft to a competent flying instructor can
be held liable for subsequent surface damage caused by a student pilot. Ac-
cording to the court, this was not the case, since no agency relationship could
be established between owner and instructor in absence of evidence that the
instructor acted under direction or control of the owner.125 The underlying
relationship between all parties concerned was qualified as one of bailment,
not agency. That qualification necessitated proof that the owner or lessee that
122 Peterson at 313, referring to a number of cases in which the operators, and not the owners,
of aircraft were subjected to liability based on trespass. The doctrine of respondeat superior
(‘let the master answer’) holds a master liable in certain cases for wrongful acts committed
by a servant or a principal for those of his agent. Notably, the doctrine only applies when
the employee is acting within the scope of authority of the master, see Black’s Law Diction-
ary 1311-1312 (1990).
123 King v. United States, United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, December 14, 1949, 2
Avi. 15,103; Peterson at 315; Speiser and Krause at 154.
124 Bailment in general can be defined as a delivery of goods or personal property (in casu
aircraft) by one person (bailor) to another (bailee), in trust for the execution of a special
object upon or in relation to such goods, beneficial either to the bailor or bailee or both,
and upon a contract to perform the trust and carry out such object, and thereupon either
to redeliver the goods to the bailor or otherwise dispose of the same in conformity with
the purpose of the trust, see Black’s Law Dictionary 141-142 (1990).
125 Boyd v. White, California District Court of Appeals, November 12, 1954, 4 Avi. 17,485 –
17,488.
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furnished the aircraft knew that the (student) pilot was reckless or incompe-
tent.126
Other grounds on which owners of aircraft may be held liable for damages
include the furnishing of a dangerously defective chattel to the operator and
joint venture. In the first case, the burden of proof of defectiveness lies with
the plaintiff, perhaps aided by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Joint venture,
which can be defined as a partnership in a joint undertaking for mutual profit,
would also have to be proven to exist between the owner and operator of the
aircraft in order to claim successfully from the owner.127
Statutory regimes based on based on Sections 4 and 5 of the Uniform
Aeronautics Act are based on absolute liability of the owners of aircraft,
irrespective of the principles of respondeat superior and the question whether
the pilot/employee was acting in the scope of his employment at the time
of the accident.128 However, such absolute liability regimes only allow the
owner of the aircraft to invoke the defence of contributory negligence. And
such a lack of available defences may also lead to liability too easily in cases
of extreme surface damage caused by others than the owner. The defence
available under general negligence that the owner or his agents are not the
persons or entities responsible for the surface damage is of interest in this
context. This was established in the landmark case of Palsgraf v. Long Island
R.R. Co (1928), in which the court held that the defendant could only be held
liable for the foreseeable consequences of his own actions. Potential defendants
are thus permitted to invoke ‘proximate cause’ as a defence against liability
under negligence.129 The relevance of applicable liability regimes and the
defences available to potential defendants in cases of surface damage inflicted
by others than the official operators/pilots of civilian aircraft has become
evident in the aftermath of the extreme damage inflicted by terrorists on
September 11, 2001 in the United States and will be dealt with in more detail
in paragraph 5.10.
5.9 LIMITATION OF LIABILITY AND INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
Irrespective of the applicable basis of liability, liability of the operators or
owners of aircraft for damage to third parties has not been legally limited in
general in the United States. The legislative aftermath of ‘9/11’ is the only
exception to that rule.130
126 Appel at 422-423; Peterson at 319; Whitehead at 15-16.
127 Peterson at 319-320.
128 Annotation, 74 ALR2d at 871.
129 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), as cited by Wolff at 215-216.
130 See Part E of this Chapter.
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The insurance requirements for aircraft accident liability have been enacted
on a federal level in Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 205.131
The requirements apply to all United States direct air carriers and foreign direct
air carriers, and make air transportation by these entities dependant on certain
minimal levels of compulsory aircraft accident coverage. Such coverage may
be obtained either by insurance policies (listed on certificates of insurance)
or by self-insurance plans.132
Within the codified limits of minimal coverage, the scope of such insurance
policies or self-insurance plans must encompass all sums that the carrier shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages for bodily injury to or death of
a person, or for damage to property of others, resulting from the operation
or maintenance of the aircraft.133
Three classes of air carriers can be distinguished with varying requirements
of coverage for third party liability:
A. Requirements for U.S. and foreign direct air carriers
Third-party aircraft accident liability coverage for bodily injury or death to persons
other than passengers (but including nonemployee cargo attendants) and for
damage to property, with a minimal limit of $300.000 for any one person in any
one occurrence, and a total of $20.000.000 per involved aircraft for each occurrence.
Aircraft of not more than 60 seats or 18.000 pounds maximum payload capacity
only require coverage of $2.000.000 per involved aircraft for each occurrence.134
Requirements for U.S air taxi operators
Third-party aircraft accident liability coverage for bodily injury or death to persons
other than passengers (but including nonemployee cargo attendants), with a
minimal limit of $75.000 for any one person and a limit of at least $100.000 for
damage to property and a total of $300.000 per involved aircraft for each
occurrence.135
Requirements for Canadian charter air taxi operators
Third party aircraft accident liability coverage for bodily injury or death to persons
other than passengers (but including nonemployee cargo attendants) and for
damage to property, with a minimal limit of $75.000 per person and a total of
$2.000.000 per involved aircraft per occurrence. If the operated aircraft has more
than 30 seats or 7500 pounds of maximum cargo payload capacity and a maximum
131 14 CFR 205.1-8. In Standard Policy Forms, these requirements can be found under Aviation
policy clause AVN 57A, see Lloyd’s Aviation Underwriters’ Association Standard Policy
Forms, Proposal Forms and Clauses, Etc. (1996).
132 14 CFR 205.1-3.
133 14 CFR 205.5(a)
134 14 CFR 205.5(b1); if such carriers also carry passengers, extra coverage of $300,000 per
passenger and a total per involved aircraft for each occurrence of $300.000 x 75% of the
number of passenger seats installed in the aircraft is required, see 14 CFR 205.5 (b2).
135 14 CFR 205.5(c1); if U.S. air taxi operators also carry passengers, extra coverage of $75.000
per passenger and a total per involved aircraft for each occurrence of $75.000 x 75% of the
number of passenger seats installed in the aircraft is required, see 14 CFR 205.5 (c2).
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authorized takeoff weight on wheels not greater than 35.000 pounds, a coverage
of $20.000.000 per involved aircraft per occurrence is required.136
Notwithstanding these separate requirements for third party and passenger
liability per category of aircraft, a combined single limit of liability encom-
passing both second and third party liability for at least the same total amount
of coverage of both categories is also permitted.137 The most important pro-
hibited exclusion of coverage concerns the violation of any safety-related
requirement as imposed either by statutory law or by rule of a government
agency.138 In general, these required levels of ‘adequate’ coverage can be
qualified as surprisingly low, if one takes into account that international air
carriers are currently generally insured on the basis of a single limit of liability
of approximately $ 1.5 billion per accident.
E THE IMPACT OF THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11,
2001
5.10 THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
And then came September 11, 2001, the infamous date in which two civilian
aircraft of American Airlines and two civilian aircraft of United Airlines were
used as manned bombs on the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon,
and Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The unprecedented terrorist attacks, which
resulted in an extremely high death toll of people aboard the aircraft, third
parties on the ground, and massive destruction of property, have had such
an impact on the traditional rules of tort and law and aviation insurance
practice, that numerous legal studies could be written on the subject alone.139
136 14 CFR 205.5 (d1); if Canadian charter air taxi operators also carry passengers, extra
coverage of $75.000 per passenger and a total per involved aircraft for each occurrence
of $75.000 x 75% of the number of passenger seats installed in the aircraft is required, see
14 CFR 205.5 (d2).
137 14 CFR 205.5 (e).
138 14 CFR 205.6 (b1).
139 A death toll of approximately 3000 people as well as varying degrees of personal injuries
to thousands of others on the ground was caused by the impact of three of the four hijacked
aircraft. The three aircraft were American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175,
which flew into the North and South Tower of the Twin Towers respectively, and American
Airlines Flight 77, which struck a Pentagon building, see G.N. Tompkins, Jr., Claims arising
from 11 September 2001 – The current situation, talk given at the Annual Meeting of the
European Air Law Association, Stockholm, Sweden, on 22 November 2002, at 7; see also
Lee S. Kreindler, The Terrorist Attacks of 11 September 2001. Legal Liability Issues Confronting
Claimants – The Congressional Response – Salvation or Frustration? XXVII AASL 377, at 378
(2002).
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The events of ‘9/11’ have given rise to a whole new set of legal and
practical problems, of which only a number have been temporarily resolved.
On a governmental level, the worldwide takeover of war and terrorism related
liability insurance coverage can serve as an example of at least a temporary
solution. But such a solution cannot mask the fact liability coverage for risks
related to war and terrorism has still often been severely limited in aviation
insurance policies and that another aviation-related terrorist event comparable
in scale to ‘9/11’ may lead to a situation in which such risks may no longer
be adequately covered at all.140
In the following sub-paragraphs, the manner and extent in which the
aftermath of ‘9/11’ has been dealt by the United States government by means
of specific legislation will be evaluated in relation to the traditional route of
litigation. First, the scope and regime of the governmental legislative initiative
of the so-called ‘Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act’ and
its Victim Compensation Fund will be evaluated (5.10.1). Next, the alternative
of the traditional route of litigation, as affected by the Act, will be addressed
on the basis of the ruling of the United States District Judge Hellerstein of 9
September 2003 (5.10.2). And finally, a comparative assessment of both altern-
atives and their feasibility will be made (5.10.3).
5.10.1 The Act and Victim Compensation Fund
In the United States, ‘9/11’ has led to the unique and extremely speedily
enacted Congressional initiative of the ‘Air Transportation Safety and System
Stabilization Act’, which was meant to preserve the continued viability of the
United States air transportation system on the one hand and to provide com-
pensation to the individual victims of ‘9/11’ or their relatives on the other
hand.141
As Tompkins has remarked, the rationale of Congress for this solution was
based on the important notion that the terrorist attacks of ‘9/11’ were perceived
as an attack on the United States as a whole, and not merely on the implicated
air carriers or the individual victims.142 The relevance of this notion lies in
the legislative acknowledgment that both the implicated air carriers as well
as the individual victims were thus perceived as victims of the terrorist attacks
directed against the United States. This could in turn serve as an implicit
140 See Ken Coombes, Marsh Update on Aviation War Insurance for European Commission Ad-Hoc
Group (Insurance), Brussels, 12 September, 2003. As of September 2003, governments that
still provide or assist with war and terrorism coverage include Australia, Brazil, Canada,
China, Ghana, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Quatar, Singapore,
South Korea, Thailand, and Turkey.
141 107th Congress, 1st Session, H.R. 2926. On September 22, 2001, a mere eleven days after
‘9/11’, the Act was signed into law by the President of the United States.
142 Tompkins, at 3.
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argument to soften the blame of the implicated air carriers for the terrorist
attacks.
The viability of the United States air transportation system was guaranteed
by a number of measures which included federal loan and compensation
mechanisms and reimbursments for the increased cost of insurance to air
carriers as a result of the events of ‘9/11’.143
The mechanism for compensation of individual victims and their relatives
was enacted in Title IV of the Act by means of the so-called “September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund of 2001”. Not only does the Fund provide an
important alternative to the route of traditional civil law suits, but it has also
in fact amended existing liability law and procederal rules for claims arising
from ‘9/11’. This can be derived from Section 408 of the Act, in which the level
of potential liability of the implicated air carriers has been limited up to the
amount of obtained liability coverage.144 Although understandable from the
perspective of protecting American and United Airlines against potential
bankruptcy, such a legislative move can be probably qualified as an unconstitu-
tional taking of property rights of the victims as it was made after the events
of ‘9/11’ took place.145 But what does the Fund offer as alternative to such
a transformed regime of liability based on limited as opposed to unlimited
negligence?
According to Section 403 of the Act, the Fund aims to provide compensa-
tion to any individual or relatives of a deceased individual who was physically
injured or killed as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September
11, 2001. Notably, any claim based on property damage has thus been excluded
from the scope of the Fund.146
Compensation on the basis of the Fund has not been made dependent on
proof of negligence or any other theory of liability.147 However, once a claim
has been filed under the Fund, the right to file a civil action in any federal
or state court for damages sustained as a result of the attacks is formally
waived.148
143 See Titles I and II of the Act.
144 Notably, the current Title IV was preceded by a Final Interim Rule implementing Title IV,
which was open to comment until January 22, 2002, see Morrison, Mahoney & Miller,
Aviation Update, Victim Compensation Fund, 14118.1. This sub-paragraph is based on the final
wording of Title IV.
145 Kreindler (2002), at 383.
146 As property losses are generally covered by property insurance on the basis of policies
which cover all property losses regardless of fault, Congress saw no need to cover such
losses in the Act (information received by G.N. Tompkins, Jr.); see also O.A. Haazen, Een
jaar lang 11 september, De balans van de juridische bijdragen aan de oplossing van de problemen
naar aanleiding van de aanval op New York, 77 NJB 1598, at 1601 (2002). Haazen comments
that the Fund contains 18 billion dollars.
147 Section 405 (3)(b)(2) Act.
148 Section 405 (3) (B) (i). Note that civil actions to recover colleteral source obligations are
still permitted and that the right to sue the terrorists is not waived.
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Claims can be filed with the so-called Special Master, who has been speci-
fically appointed by the Attorney General to administer the Fund.149 On a
specific form, claimants will have to substantiate the physical harm suffered,
or confirm the decendent’s death if the claim is filed on behalf of a decendent,
as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11. Furthermore,
any possible economic and non-economic losses suffered through the attacks
as well as information regarding collateral sources must be provided.150 The
claim form can be downloaded from the September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund of 2001 website, which also contains background information on items
such as the applicability of state wrongful death laws for economic loss and
the manner of distribution of non-economic loss.151 Information on collateral
sources is necessary as the Special Master is obliged to reduce the amount
of compensation due under the Fund by the amount of collateral source
compensation that the claimant has received as a result of the attacks.152
Claims will have to be filed within two years after the date on which
regulations are promulgated by the Attorney General in consultation with the
Special Master to carry out the requirements needed to activate the Fund.153
Eligibility of an individual third party to claim from the Fund has been
specifically determined by the criteria of being present either at the World
Trade Center, the Pentagon, or the site of the aircraft crash at Shanksville,
Pennsylvania at the time or in the immediate aftermath of the attacks and
having suffered physical harm or death as a result of the aircraft crash at
hand.154 In comparison with traditional yardsticks of tort law to determine
149 Sections 404 and 405 Act.
150 Section 405 (2) (B)(i)(ii)(iii) Act. Economic loss has specifically been defined as ‘any pecuni-
airy loss resulting from harm (including the loss of earnings or other benefits related to
employment, medical expense loss, replacement services loss, loss due to death, burial costs,
and loss of business or employment opportunities to the extent recovery for such loss is
allowed under applicable State law.’ Noneconomic losses refer to ‘losses for physical and
emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish, disfigure-
ment, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium (other
than loss of domestic service), hedonic damages, injury to reputation, and all other non-
pecuniary losses of any kind or nature,’ see Section 402 (5)(7) Act. Recovery for economic
losses and non-economic losses has to be permitted under the applicable State law and
punitive damages have been excluded under the regime of the Fund, see Tompkins at 15.
151 See www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/compensation.html. Determination of economic
and noneconomic losses has been simplified for claimants by means of specific presumptive
loss calculation tables created by the Special Master. The tables are based on criteria such
as age, income, number of dependants and can be traced on www.usdoj.gov/victimcompen-
sation/loss_calc.html, see J.L. Geraghty, To Sue or Not to Sue: A look at the legal landscape
for victims of ‘September 11’, XXVII AASL 363, at 366-369 (2002).
152 Section 405 (6) Act. Collateral sources refer to ‘all collateral sources, including life insurance,
pension funds, death benefit programs, and payments by Federal, State, or local govern-
ments related to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001,’ see Section
402 (4) Act.
153 Sections 405 (a) (3), 407 Act.
154 Section 405 (c) (1)(2) (A) (i)(ii) Act.
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to whom tortfeasors owe a duty of care, the range of eligible claimants has
thus been narrowed down by excluding potential claims from individuals that
have suffered any form of mental injury or emotional distress unaccompanied
by physical harm and may have had a valid claim under negligence.
In view of the fact that individual circumstances such as economic loss
are considered by the Special Master, the Fund has been criticized both on
the basis of disparities between the highest and lowest awards as on the notion
that the high-end awards are too low.155 As such evaluations on the feasibility
of the Fund in comparison to the route of a court claim based on negligence
will have to be made by each potential claimant on a case by case basis, the
level of success of the Fund can only be determined in hindsight after the time
limit of two years after promulgation in which all claims have to be made.
This means that the deadline for filing claims has been set at 21 December
2003.156
But what does the alternative of tort law as transformed by the legislature
into a limited regime of negligence hold in store for potential claimants?
5.10.2 The transformed liability regime based on limited negligence
As has been touched upon in the previous sub-paragraph, a remarkable aspect
of the Act is that it has transformed the applicable regime of liability after ‘9/
11’, by limiting liability for claims arising both from death or personal injuries
as well as property damage against all potential defendants up to the amount
of insurance coverage. Furthermore, the Act merely provides for a federal cause
of action as the exclusive remedy for damages arising out of the hijacking and
subsequent crashes of ‘9/11’ before the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.157 The Act also provides that the substantive
law that governs the case shall be derived from the law and choice of law
principles of the State in which the crash occurred.158
Taking the general requirements of negligence into account, plaintiffs will
have to prove that:
155 See ‘Statement of the Special Master Regarding the Progress of the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund’, at 1. In the Statement, the Special Master has declared that in general
it would be rare for victims to receive less than $250.000 or more than $3.000.000 to $
4.000.000 tax-free after collateral source offsets.
156 By September 2003, approximately 1250 death claims and 1035 injury claims have been
filed with the Fund, see K. Semple, Judge Allows 9/11 Suits to Proceed, New York Times, 9
September 2003. However, the Special Master has predicted that most potentential applicants
will postpone their decision to the end in view of the fact that they have to come to terms
with their loss and may want to compare the treatment of other applicants with their own
potential treatment out of tactical reasons, see Statement of the Special Master at 2.
157 Section 408 (b) (1) (3) Act.
158 Section 408 (b) (2) Act.
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1 they suffered damages;
2 the defendants owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs;
3 the defendants breached their duty to the plaintiffs. That requires an
analysis of the question whether the defendants’ conduct was reasonable
by a jury;
4 the breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ damages. In other
words, were the terrorist attacks foreseeable to the defendants or could
they be qualified as an intervening event breaking the chain of causation?
In what is bound to become complex and mass tort litigation that will take
years to resolve, the first important ruling was given on September 9, 2003
by the United States District Judge Hellerstein. His opinion and order denying
defendants’ motion to dismiss will be partly evaluated in relation to the
implicated airlines. The next steps in the litigation process will not be dis-
cussed, since no exact predictions can be made on the course of events. At
the time of writing, it seems plausible that after the opportunity that is pro-
vided by the discovery procedure for parties to request information from one
another, the defendants will demand a court ruling on these issues prior to
trial in a so-called motion for summary judgment.159
In his opinion, Hellerstein particularly focused on the second requirement
of duty of care owed by the defendants under negligence and on the important
element of foreseeability under negligence. Aside from the implicated airlines,
the defendants included the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the
owners of the World Trade Center in New York, and the Boeing Company.
In their motions to dismiss, the defendants argued that they did not owe
duty of care to the victims on the ground and that their injuries were beyond
the scope of any foreseeable duty that may have been owed to them, and even
if it was owed, the terrorist attacks broke the chain of proximate causation.160
The subtle underlying acknowledgement of defendants implies that even if
they owe a general duty of care to ground victims, this was not the case in
the unprecedented terrorist attacks of ‘9/11’.
The plaintiffs argued that the aviation defendants negligently failed to carry
out their duty to secure the aircraft against terrorists and their weapons
smuggled aboard. Furthermore, they held that security measures are speci-
fically meant to guard against the risks of hijacking, and that defendants knew
or should have known that those risks included risks to third parties on the
ground. The last argument that was raised by plaintiffs is of particular interest,
159 If the judge then rules for the defendants, the case will not go to trial; if he rules for some
defendants, only these will be dismissed from the trial, see P. Binder, 9-11 Civil Liability
Web Site, at www.gsu.edu. Binder is also quoted in D.B. Henriques and S. Saulny, Judge
permits Sept. 11 lawsuits, International Herald Tribune Online, 10 September 2003, at www.ih-
t.com.
160 A. K. Hellerstein, Opinion and Order Denying Defendants’ motions to dismiss, United States
Distict Court Southern District of New York, in Re September 11 Litigation, at 4-5.
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as it held that ‘terrorism was a substantial concern, and that suicidal acts by
terrorists seeking to cause death, injury and havoc to as many innocent people
as possible had become a frequently used strategy.’161 Perhaps so, but one might
add that that strategy was never before carried out by the use of aircraft as
manned bombs, and never on such a grand scale.
In order to substantiate his ruling, Hellerstein took the following step by
step approach:
a. Airplane crashes in residential areas are not unknown and in such cases,
airlines typically recognize responsibility to victims on the ground.162
Notably, Hellerstein admits that in such cases, the quantity or quality of
tragedy of the ‘9/11’ crashes is not matched. And therein lies an important
nuance. For it could also be argued that airlines indeed hold a general re-
sponsibility to victims on the ground by operating safely and minimizing the
risk of potential aviation accidents as much as is fairly possible. And if things
go wrong, airlines will perhaps generally recognize responsiblity to ground
victims, as the scale of damages and scope of victims in aviation accidents
or incidents that were not deliberately set in motion by unlawful acts will
generally be surveyable and insurable.
b. The refutal of the argument that the potential for a limitless liability to
an indeterminate class of plaintiffs distinguishes the ‘9/11’ cases of inten-
tional intervening acts from aviation accidents unrelated to terrorism.
The argument raised by the defence that the scope of duty would be unreason-
ably extended in case of ‘9/11’ in comparison with aviation accidents unrelated
to terrorism was refuted by Hellerstein on the basis of the scope of duty criteria
of Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Center, Inc (2001).163 In that
case, the Court of Appeals limited the scope of duty to those who had suffered
personal injury or property damage, and thus excluded those who had merely
suffered financial losses. According to Hellerstein, such yardsticks for narrow-
ing down the scope of duty to a foreseeable range of potential plaintiffs could
also be applied to the ‘9/11’ cases. In other words, the claims to recover for
personal injuries, death, or property damage arising from ‘9/11’ were held
to be within the thus defined scope of duty and were not perceived as an
impermissable proliferation of claims. This argument is substantiated by the
fact that the liability of defendants has been capped by federal statute, which
161 Hellerstein at 8.
162 Hellerstein at 8-9, referring to a string of aviation accidents unrelated to terrorism, such
as Rehm v. United States, 196 F. Supp. 428 (E.D.N.Y. 1961) and In re Air Crash Disaster at
Cove Neck, 885 F. Supp. 434 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
163 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1101 (N.Y.2001)(Kaye, Ch.J.).
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eliminates the inherent danger of unlimited or insurer-like liability in this
case.164
Although Hellerstein points out that the type of damage falling under the
scope of duty has been neatly demarcated by means of the categories of
personal injury or property damage, one could argue that the scope of eligible
claimants would then still be enormous in view of the scale of the inflicted
damages to persons and property on the ground.
c. The refutal of the argument of ‘disproportionate risk and reparation alloca-
tion.’
Hellerstein argues that the airlines and airport security companies had a duty
to protect against the risks at stake in terms of costs and efficacy, not only
to passengers, but also to the public at large.165
This point raises the difficult question if such a duty can be stretched as
far as to take precautions against the potential risks involved of not merely
a hijack, but a manned bomb attack by means of civilian aircraft, without such
an event ever happening before. Although such an event might now be foresee-
able in hindsight, that was arguably not the case prior to ‘9/11.’
The question if the reasonable level of protection of passengers and third
parties had to include all potential measures in terms of cost and efficacy to
prevent the new risk of the use of aircraft as manned bombs thus remains open
to debate in my view. The difficulty lies in the all or nothing approach to
breach of duty, which holds that if the security companies can be held re-
sponsible for those breaches, that responsibility extends to whatever level of
damage the hijackers inflict.166
If a visitor of my house suddenly leaps from the second floor balcony,
without any prior warning or indication, and thereby causes personal injuries
to downfloor neighbours in the garden, would I be held to be in breach of
a duty of care owed to my neighbours? Even if one takes into account that
the costs of raising the balcony balustrade so as to make such an act impossible
would have been reasonable, this still seems a far fetching level of required
duty of care. For I had no reason to suspect that any visitor would commit
such an act. In my view, the normal height of the balustrade would qualify
as a sufficient guarantee for the duty of care owed to the neighbours, as that
would sufficiently prevent people falling from the balcony.
164 Hellerstein at 11-13.
165 Hellerstein at 13-14.
166 Tompkins at 10.
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d. The notion that recognition of a duty of the defendants would not sub-
stantially expand or create ‘new channels of liability’.
By means of this argument, Hellerstein draws a comparison between negli-
gence for surface damage on the basis of a number of aviation cases and
negligence in regulating the boarding of airplanes and comes to the conclusion
that both scenarios are governed by the same underlying principle that air
carriers owe a duty to both passengers and people on the ground.167
Although that line of reasoning may be generally true, the same point of
critique as has been raised under point c. can be made. For the ‘normal’
security measures prior to ‘9/11’ may also very well be qualified as up to the
standards of protection of the time, as the extreme risks of the ‘9/11’ attack
could not have been predicted prior to ‘9/11’.
e. Foreseeability.
The argument raised by the defence that the events of ‘9/11’ were not within
the scope of reasonably foreseeable risks was weighed by Hellerstein on the
basis of criteria such as the relationship to such plaintiffs, the question whether
they were within a zone of foreseeable harm, and whether the harm was within
the class of reasonably foreseeable hazards that the duty exists to prevent.168
In short, Hellerstein held that the precise manner in which the harm was
inflicted need not be perfectly predicted. Thus, a certain unexpected way in
which harm is brought about could also lead to liability. It is unfortunate that
Hellerstein has not delved more deeply into this very important issue. As has
also been argued under a number of previous points, the crucial element of
foreseeability of the events of ‘9/11’ in terms of duty owed to the victims
remains controversial.
On the basis of these considerations, Hellerstein came to the following con-
clusion:
Construing the factual allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, I conclude
that the crash of the airplanes was within the class of foreseeable hazards resulting
from negligently performed security screening. While it may be true that terrorists
167 Hellerstein at 14-15
168 Hellerstein at 15-16. Reference is made to the landmark case of Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.
Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100-01 (N.Y. 1928); unfortunately the manner in which the Palsgraf-test
has been applied is not specifically mentioned in the ruling. In the landmark Palsgraf-case,
the plaintiff was held to be unforeseeable by Judge Cardozo. Notably, the dissenting opinion
went further by holding that due care is a duty imposed upon each of us to protect society
from unnecessary danger, not to protect A, B, or C alone. Thus, duty is extended to the
world at large, which would include persons outside of what would generally be thought
of as the danger zone.
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had not before deliberately flown airplanes into buildings, the airlines reasonably
could foresee that crashes causing death and destruction on the ground was a
hazard that would arise should hijackers take control of a plane. The intrusion by
terrorists into the cockpit, coupled with the volatility of a hijacking situation, creates
a foreseeable risk that hijacked airplanes might crash, jeopardizing innocent lives
on the ground as well as in the airplane. While the crashes into the particular
locations of the World Trade Center, Pentagon, and Shanksville field may not have
been foreseen, the duty to screen passengers and items brought on board existed
to prevent harms not only to passengers and crew, but also to the ground victims
resulting from the crashes of hijacked planes, including the four planes hijacked
on September 11.169
And here lies the heart of the problem: for one could also argue that the hazard
of death and destruction on the ground was not a risk that could have been
foreseen to that extent, even with the foreseeable risk of intrusion by terrorists
into the cockpit normal to any hijack, for the simple reason that no hijack prior
to ‘9/11’ had the aim to deliberately direct the hijacked aircraft into a number
of preordained targets. And that aim automatically will most likely give rise
to a vastly more substantial level of damages than other cases of potential
surface damage, even if they arise due to hijacking, as the aim of hijacks to
this date has not been to use aircraft as manned bombs directed at targets with
the aim of as much damage as possible. For if an aircraft would merely crash
due to a struggle in the cockpit between the pilots and the hijacker(s), the
careful prediction can be made that subsequent surface damage will most likely
be far less severe than if an aircraft is deliberately steered into a target with
the aim of destruction.
However, it should be borne in mind that Hellerstein’s ruling is merely
a denial of the motions to dismiss the complaints of the defendants, which
paves the way to the next stage of discovery of the lawsuits at hand. And in
view of the fact that potential liability of the implicated aircraft has been
capped anyhow and that not all potential victims are eligible under the Fund,
it seems reasonable as such that the cases at least are permitted to go to trial.
A great number of substantive issues have specifically not been dealt with,
such as the reasonableness of the defendants’ conduct or the proximate cause
of the suffered damage, or even the question whether the terrorist attacks can
ultimately be constituted as an intervening act that would break the chain of
causation.170 All these issues will have to be resolved in later stages of litiga-
tion.
In the next sub-paragraph, a comparative assessment will be made of the
alternatives of the Fund and litigation.
169 Hellerstein at 17.
170 This is also specifically stated in the ruling by Hellerstein at 12.
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5.10.3 A comparative assessment of the Act and the litigation route
The main problem of the aftermath of ‘9/11’ is of course the unprecedented
enormity of the damage, both in terms of death and personal injury toll as
in terms of property damage. The prompt creation and enactment of the Act
can be seen as at least a stopgap and at most as a crafty and in any case
absolutely necessary move in order to preserve the viability of air transporta-
tion and to compensate a number of defined victims by means of the Fund.
Despite possible questions on constitutionality, the Act has also sub-
stantially affected the traditional tort route of litigation by capping the liability
of the implicated air carriers to the levels of acquired liability insurance, which
protects them against potential bankruptcy arising from litigation. In short,
the only conclusion as to the option of ground victims that are eligible for the
Fund of either applying for the guaranteed route of at least partial compensa-
tion by the Fund or the far longer and more uncertain route of litigation, is
that they are faced with the devil’s alternative.
If they opt for the litigation route, the plaintiffs will have to bear in mind
that liability of the implicated air carriers has been capped. Taking into account
that the liability policy coverage of the implicated United and American
carriers amounts to approximately $1.5 Billion per aircraft/accident, this means
that for the impact on the Twin Towers alone, the total coverage of $ 3 Billion
of the two aircraft will have to be distributed proportionately between all
eligible second and third party claimants. In view of the enormous number
of thousands of potential claimants, these figures lead to the inevitable con-
clusion that next to nothing can be gained from tort law for claimants in the
‘9/11’ cases.171 Furthermore, negligence of the implicated air carriers or other
defendants may not necessarily be proven, if for instance, the conduct of
defendants is qualified as reasonable by the jury or the terrorist attacks are
qualified as an intervening event breaking the chain of causation.
Aside from such considerations, plaintiffs that are also eligible under the
Fund will have to compete with categories of claimants that are not and are
thus forced to resort to tort law, such as people who suffered emotional distress
unaccompanied by physical harm.
And finally, the problem of deadlines both for appeal to the Fund as well
as for filing wrongful-death lawsuits raises immediate problems for the victims
and their families. For the Fund deadline is December 22, 2003 and the formal
deadline for litigation was September 10, 2003. However, New York State has
extended that deadline until March 2004, which raises the question whether
171 Tompkins remarked that each claimant could wind up collecting 1 or 2 cents on the dollar
of proven damages, if anything, at the end of the day, see Tompkins at 12.
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families living outside of the state are also allowed to profit from that ex-
tension.172
F FINAL REMARKS AND CONCLUSIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE UNITED STATES
5.11 FINAL REMARKS AND CONCLUSIONS
In the United States, a common law rule of absolute liability for surface
damage inflicted by the activity of flying has been based on seven main
arguments as derived from Rylands v. Fletcher as well as both Restatement of
Torts. Recapitulating, these arguments held that
· third parties are helpless to avoid surface damage;
· flying can be qualified as an ultrahazardous activity;
· it is impossible to prove the cause(s) of aviation accidents;
· aviation has not yet reached the stage of development where its risks should
be borne by those who suffer the harm rather than by the aviation industry;
· the notion that relatively few persons or entities are involved in the activity
of flying;
· the one-sidedness of the acitivity of flying in terms of profits for the industry
and risks to third parties;
· the notion that the aviation industry is better equipped to insure itself against
potential risks than third parties.
The common law basis of trespass has also been applied to the problem of
surface damage in the past on the grounds that aviation was perceived as an
ultrahazardous activity. However, in due course of time, most courts stopped
qualifying aviation as ultrahazardous and generally added the requirement
of proof of an intentional act to the basis of trespass, which in effect meant
that negligence had to be proven. The basis of nuisance has been seen to be
more suitable for claims based on loss of enjoyment of property, etc, than for
cases involving direct invasion of aircraft, e.g. due to forced landings or
crashes. Furthermore, nuisance claims are generally directed against airport
operators as opposed to aircraft operators.
Sections 4 and 5 of the Uniform Aeronautics Act created a more solid
statutory basis of absolute liability, which was implemented by a gradually
declining number of jurisdictions. The number of such regimes still in force
in the United States has declined to six. That decline can be attributed to the
same notion that aviation is not considered ultrahazardous anymore by the
State legislatures. It should be borne in mind that such regimes have not been
172 See Henriques and Saulny, at 1.
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found to be unconstitutional in a number of cases. Since all other attempts
at more uniformity in legislation have failed, negligence has been victorious
in this field in the United States. Supporters of this move to negligence often
refer to the applicablity of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur; however, as has
been established earlier, that doctrine is not always available, nor can its
varying criteria always be easily met. This means that victims of surface
damage are often faced with the full brunt of negligence, which ultimately
may lead to the situation that their damages are not compensated, as in the
discussed case of Crosby v. Cox Aircraft Co.173
Other potentially unfair consequences of negligence are revealed upon
closer scrutiny of persons that can be held liable under that main heading of
liability. For the applicability of the doctrine of respondeat superior may lead
to the situation where the owner of the aircraft escapes liability if the pilot
caused damage while he was officially not acting within the scope of his
employment. And this brings us to the heart of the problem: the notion that
the general application of negligence can lead to unjustifiable results and has
been based too meagrely on the mere change of perception of the dangers of
flying. As Prosser and Keeton have acknowledged, the question of surface
damage has as yet not been finally determined. However, their suggestion
to only retain absolute liability in cases of ‘abnormal’ aviation, which would
include scenarios of stunt flying, crop dusting, experimental aircraft, and sonic
booms, and to leave the risks of normal aviation to negligence, can hardly
be qualified as satisfactory in view of the problems that third parties can also
face in the quest for proof of negligence in such ‘normal’ cases, of which the
effects can be no less disastrous.174 And this brings the dissenting opinion
of the Crosby-case against application of negligence back into the picture, which
related to the defendant’s exclusive causation of harm as opposed to a “wholly
innocent, nonactive, nonbenefitted homeowner into whose home an airplane
suddenly crashes.”175
The usual string of policy arguments in favour of absolute liability also
keeps ringing true, which include the non-admissability of NTSB reports as
to probable cause in civil litigation and the theory of enterprise liability and
its link to enterprise insurability. As a whole, from a socio-economic per-
spective, and even in absence of the criteria of ultrahazardousness of the
activity of flying, absolute liability generally seems a more fair basis of liability
than negligence in this field in principle.176
173 See sub-paragraph 2.5.1 of this study.
174 See Prosser and Keeton, at 558, who admit that rapid technological changes would also
make such a classification difficult to explain.
175 See the citation in Restatement of the Law Third, Council Draft No.2 (September 26, 2000),
at 131.
176 Notes at 67-70, 74-75. However, it should be acknowledged that all factual evidence gathered
by the NTSB in the course of its investigations is permissable in civil litigation (information
received from G.N. Tompkins, Jr.).
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As an admission to the overall governance of negligence, it can be conceded
that in actual practice, application of negligence generally has not given rise
to substantial problems in the United States, as air carriers and aircraft opera-
tors and their insurers will generally be willing to settle claims out of court
and are not likely to dispute negligence.177 But even in such cases, a plea
in principle can be made for absolute liability, as that could strengthen the
bargaining position of those seeking compensation.178 And such a plea can
particularly be directed at cases of surface damage inflicted by smaller private
aircraft involved in general aviation. For they may prove less willing to settle
on the basis of negligence, as they have less to lose publicly by not settling
than major airlines that are far more exposed to media attention in the after-
math of major aviation accidents.
As the main exception to any current rule and any level of ‘normally’
inflicted damage to third parties by aviation accidents or incidents, the cata-
strophic events of September 11, 2001 stand alone in their enormity. These
massive events have given rise to a great number of legal and practical prob-
lems and are bound to do so for years to come.
The far reaching Congressional solution of the Air Transportation Safety
and System Stabilization Act has been seen to provide a solution both for the
continuing viability of civil aviation in the United States as for the victims
that are eligible for compensation under the Fund. A remarkable aspect of
the Act is that it has capped liability of the implicated air carriers after the
event took place. As has been established in this study, such a limitation can
be justified in principle on the grounds that catastrophic events should not
be borne by aviation alone, especially if perceived as not specifically directed
against the implicated air carriers or the victims, but against the Unites States
as a whole.
As those seeking redress in litigation will have to prove negligence, the
evolving case law in this field is predicted to give rise to a whole new kaleido-
scope of interpretations of the applicable criteria of negligence in relation to
unlawful acts. But, as has also sadly been demonstrated, the main problem
remains that the enormity of the damages will only be partly compensated
by the Fund and most likely next to nil through litigation in view of the capped
liability of the implicated air carriers, although the latter move is understand-
able in order to preserve their existence.
In relation to the general plea for absolute liability in this field, it is evident
that a combination of absolute and unlimited liability would prove fatal for
the implicated air carriers in case of unlawful acts of the enormity of ‘9/11’.
However, as has been established in this study, specific provisions for unlawful
use could be enacted within absolute liability regimes. Solutions could lie in
the capping of liability of the operator up to the levels of mandatory insurance
177 Information received by G.N. Tompkins, Jr.
178 See the similar argument raised in paragraph 1.2 of this study.
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in cases of unlawful use, or by leaving the operator the defence that he has
taken all necessary measures to prevent such use.179 But such solutions ad-
mittedly still allow plaintiffs to rely on negligence. A more radical solution
for damage brought about by extreme cases of terrorism involving aircraft
would be to completely exclude them from the scope of any liability regime.
Such immunity of the aircraft operators from liability caused by severe unlaw-
ful acts could be justified on the grounds that both the aircraft operators or
air carriers and their passengers as well as the people on the ground are
perceived as victims of those attacks, which are held to be directed against
the State at large. But if such a legislative approach is taken, feasible altern-
atives to tort law will evidently have to set up in the form of solid compensa-
tion Funds for the victims and adequate measures to guarantee continued
viability of the aviation industry.
179 See, e.g., the Swiss and Australian absolute liability regimes respectively in sub-paragraphs
4.3.4 and 4.3.5 of this study.
6 Final pointers and arguments for specific
regimes of liability and insurance require-
ments for surface damage inflicted by aircraft
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In this study, an evaluation has been made of the theoretical underpinnings
and actual liability regimes and third party insurance requirements in force
or lack of them on an international, supranational and national levels for
damage inflicted to third parties on the surface of the earth by aircraft. In this
chapter, pointers will be given to our ‘fictitious’ legislator on the most prefer-
able manner to deal with the problem of surface damage on a legislative level.
All the main issues that are of relevance in the quest for specific regimes of
liability will be re-evaluated on a step by step basis per paragraph, similar
to the approach of this study as a whole. First, the scenarios of conduct of
aircraft that are capable of inflicting surface damage will be enumerated (6.2).
Next, the merits and demerits of not codifying any regime, but leaving the
problem of surface damage to the applicable national rules of fault liability
or negligence will be discussed (6.3). The main alternative of- and justifications
for a specific regime based on absolute or strict liability will subsequently be
evaluated (6.4). Next, variations in potential scope of a regime based on ab-
solute or strict liability and the arguments for such variations will be taken
into account (6.5). The persons or entities that should be addressed by such
a specific regime will subsequently be reviewed (6.6). The question whether
such a specific regime should be based on limited or unlimited liability will
then be dealt with (6.7). An evaluation of third party liability insurance or
other security requirements and the problem of insurability will then be made
(6.8). The feasibility of specific liability regimes in this field on an international,
supranational, or national level will subsequently be addressed (6.9). In view
of the impact of the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11,
2001, a number of problems that can arise in relation to liability and insurance
in cases of unlawful use will be evaluated separately (6.10). The evaluation
of preferred and actual third party liability regimes and insurance requirements
in this field will end at the point of departure of this study: the Bijlmer air
disaster. The recommendations derived from this study will be applied to the
Bijlmer air disaster in order to demonstrate their effects (6.11).
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6.2 SCENARIO’S OF CONDUCT OF AIRCRAFT AND SURFACE DAMAGE
As a starting point to any consideration on the necessity of a specific regime
of liability in this field, an assessment of how damage can be inflicted by
aircraft is necessary in order to determine the potential scope of such a regime.
Thus, the first issue raised in this study concerned the question which range
of conduct of aircraft is capable of inflicting which types of surface damage.1
Although the potential scenarios of surface damage are innumerable if taken
strictly on a case by case basis, a choice was made to narrow all such scenarios
down to three main scenarios in this study. Such a classification was deemed
to be a useful tool to help any legislature determine the scope of a potential
liability regime in this field.
The scope of the first and potentially most severe scenario of surface
damage was determined by the yardsticks of ‘direct contact’ or ‘impact’ of
the aircraft or parts, components, objects, persons, or cargo carried by the
aircraft. The first scenario thus primarily covers cases of genuine accidents
of one or more aircraft, in which the damage on the ground is caused by the
impact of the aircraft or its parts, objects, persons on board, or cargo. Cases
of damage inflicted by the activity of cropdusting could also be categorized
under the first scenario, since direct contact with the sprayed chemicals can
also lead to damage on the ground.2
The second and third scenarios involved surface damage inflicted by
aircraft in situations of overflight without any physical contact between the
aircraft and persons or property on the ground. A rather broad distinction
has been made between a second scenario of aircraft flying in non-conformity
with air traffic regulations and a third scenario of aircraft flying in conformity
with air traffic regulations. The second scenario refers to aircraft flying too
low. Too low overflight, whether repetitive or sudden, can lead to various
forms of personal injuries or property damage. The element of suddenness,
for instance, can lead to reactions of fright and subsequently to damage.
Examples of bolting horses and of a person driving her car against a tree out
of fright have been given in the sphere of personal injuries. In the area of
property damage, an example of a roof that partly collapsed due to the rota-
tions of the blades of a low-flying helicopter has been described. The criteria
of ‘too’ low overflight or flight ‘in non-conformity with air traffic regulations’
have deliberately been used to distinguish this scenario from damage caused
by ‘normal’ overflight in conformity with air traffic regulations. For the former
scenario can generally be qualified as unlawful, unless the alleged tortfeasor
can justify his conduct by invoking a defence under the liability regime at
hand, whereas the latter scenario is generally lawful. Another presumption
underlying the distinction between the two scenarios is that damage caused
1 See paragraph 1.2 of this study.
2 See sub-paragraph 2.2.1 of this study.
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by normal overflight will generally be less severe than damage caused by too
low general and especially too low sudden overflight. For normal overflight
will normally only give rise to more intangible forms of damage arising from
nuisance or noise, loss of enjoyment of property or property devaluation,
whereas too low overflight can potentially lead to more serious forms of
personal injury or tangible property damage. However, borderline cases
between lawful and unlawful overflight can easily be envisaged in which the
subsequent damage is strongly comparable in terms of severity, for instance
in cases of damage caused by sonic boom of aircraft.3
In sum, no definitive distinctions can be made between the second scenario
and third scenario. Criteria such as ‘suddenness’, ‘too low overflight’ and ‘in
non conformity with air traffic regulations’ are only meant to serve as potential
yardsticks for determining the potential scope of a specific liability regime
in this field. As a whole, the most important distinction between the first
scenario on the one hand and the second and third scenarios on the other hand
lies in the ‘impact’ criterion. As will be seen in more detail in paragraph 6.5,
the ‘impact’ criterion can both serve as an important justification for more a
specific regime based on absolute or strict liability and as a workable tool to
narrow down the scope of a specific regime.
6.3 LIABILITY BASED ON FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE
The second main question that was raised in this study concerned the question
which regimes can be codified to cover third party liability of operators or
owners of aircraft and what the scope of such regimes is.4
As a starting point on the first part of the question whether specific liability
regimes are deemed necessary for surface damage inflicted by aircraft, a brief
description was given of the general headings of fault liability and negligence
under civil and common law jurisdictions. Despite their inherent differences,
these general headings of fault liability have in common that they are based
on the requirements of unlawfulness, fault, damage, and a causal connection
between the unlawful act and the damage under civil law systems and a breach
of the duty of care, causation, and damage under common law systems.
Furthermore, these general headings of general fault liability and negligence
both allow potential defendants to disprove their fault or negligence by in-
voking a number of defences, such as force majeure or Act of God, act of a
third party, and contributory negligence.5
One could argue that no special rules are needed for the specific problem
of surface damage inflicted by aircraft to third parties, as the latter can base
3 See sub-paragraphs 2.2.2 – 2.2.4 of this study.
4 See paragraph 1.2 of this study.
5 See paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of this study.
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their claims against implicated aircraft owners or operators on the applicable
rules of fault liability under civil law systems or negligence or other applicable
headings of liability under common law systems. For one of the great ad-
vantages of the rather amorphous headings of fault liability and negligence
is that they are potentially applicable to any scenario of potential harm inflicted
by any alleged tortfeasor.
Dependant on the circumstances of the case, the burden of meeting all of
the necessary criteria of fault liability or negligence can even be softened by
presumptions of fault under the former or the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
under the latter.
Dependant on the common law jurisdiction at hand and the court seized
of the case, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur either gives rise a presumption
of negligence, a reversal of the burden of proof, or simply a possibility for
the defendant to give his view on the alleged cause(s) of the accident. How-
ever, the doctrine does not automatically apply to all cases of damage inflicted
by aircraft, but can depend on a number of criteria which have to be met. In
a number of aviation cases, courts have rejected application of the doctrine
on the grounds that the aircraft was not established to be under exclusive
control of the defendant or that it was not an unusual occurrence for an
airplane to crash without the intervention of a human agency. Another reason
for rejection of the doctrine was based on the notion that court experience was
not qualified as sufficiently uniform to justify a presumption that aviation
accidents do not happen in the absence of negligence.6 And even in cases
where a reversal of the burden of proof or invocation of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur have been permitted, disproof of alleged fault or negligence is
still allowed. This could succeed by claiming that the accident was inevitable
or unavoidable. The doctrine is not often relied upon in aviation litigation in
the United States nowadays, since plaintiffs’ attorneys fear that the defendants
may indeed convince the jury that the accident was caused by events other
than a lack of due care of the operator.7
Furthermore, the general regimes of negligence or fault liability provide
alleged tortfeasors with a number of important defences such as Act of God
or force majeure in order to escape liability.
In short, the application of general rules of fault liability or negligence can
lead to situations in which victims of surface damage may have difficulties
in positively proving that the operator, owner, and/or pilots were at fault or
negligent. Specifically in cases of surface damage caused by the first scenario
of actual aviation accidents, proof of the exact causes and of fault or negligence
of the implicated pilot(s) or operator(s) can be difficult to obtain in view of
the inherent complexities of most aviation disasters. Potential causes can
include birdstrikes, pilot errors, meteorological conditions, faulty engineering,
6 See paragraphs 2.4.3 and 2.5.1 of this study.
7 See sub-paragraph 5.7.1 of this study.
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construction and/or maintenance errors or intricate combinations of such
causes. Plaintiffs may then be forced to rely on aircraft accident investigation
reports of national accident investigation agencies in their quest for proof,
which can give rise to other problems. For such reports are officially not
intended for the purpose of establishing civil liability, often take a while to
be released, and need not necessarily be accepted as evidence by courts.8
If persuaded by such arguments against the application of general negli-
gence or fault liability in this field, the fictitious legislator could decide to
address the problem of liability for surface damage by means of a tailor-made
regime of liability. This brings the alternative of regimes based on absolute
or strict liability and their justifications in the picture.
6.4 REGIMES BASED ON ABSOLUTE OR STRICT LIABILITY
Although the concepts of absolute and strict liability are often defined syn-
onymously as liability without fault, their subtly differing distinctions have
been evaluated on the basis of the definitions put forward by Bin Cheng. Strict
liability has thus been held to be based on the criteria of an author of an act
– causing – damage, while all similar defences of fault liability or negligence
except those aimed to disproving fault have been maintained. Absolute liability,
on the other hand, arises when the criteria person in a prescribed relationship
to a specific circumstance – such circumstance arising and causing damage are met.
As opposed to strict liability, the requirement that the damage has to be caused
by the person to be held liable has thus been abandoned, nor are the normal
defences available. However, regimes based on absolute liability do not dis-
pense with all potential defences. Defences such as contributory negligence,
armed conflicts, and grave natural disasters can be made available to the
person(s) addressed by the absolute liability regime.9
Furthermore, the requirement of causation is less pronounced under
absolute liability, although causal requirements will generally be linked to
the circumstances that have to be met in order for liability to arise. However,
it should be borne in mind that the aforementioned definitions need not be
applied rigidly and that the best guidelines for the type of liability are pro-
vided by the actual regime at hand.
6.4.1 Justifications for absolute or strict liability
As a starting point, the legislature – whether on an international, supranational,
or national level – can thus take legislative action by creating a specific regime
8 See paragraph 2.7 of this study.
9 See paragraph 2.6 of this study.
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based on absolute or strict liability for surface damage inflicted by aircraft
on the following grounds, which have been enumerated in this study:
1 the burden of loss should fall on the person who by his own free will and
for his own benefit voluntarily chooses to fly in stead of on wholly in-
nocent, non-active and non-benefitted third parties on the surface who
consequently suffer damage, which they are unable to avoid. In sum, the
rationale for this justification lies in the eminent position of aircraft toward
third parties on the surface;
2 The fact that the causes of the accident and fault or negligence of the
operators of the implicated aircraft can be difficult to prove, even with
the aid of doctrines such as res ipsa loquitur, which can not be invoked
successfully in every accident or incident;
3 The perception of the inherent dangerous qualities of certain things or
activities of of them becoming dangerous when used improperly. Or more
specifically, the qualification of aircraft as dangerous instrumentalities. The
related argument that aviation has not yet reached the stage of develop-
ment where the risks of accidental physical harm to persons or to land
or chattels is properly to be borne by those who suffer the harm, rather
than by the industry itself can also be put forward in that context;
4 The notion that relatively few persons or entities are involved in the activ-
ity of flying;
5 The balancing of the use of the activity to society in general and the poten-
tial harm it can create to certain members of society;
6 The economically founded argument of the relatively common and easy
availability of insurance coverage for the entities that choose to take the
risk of the activity rather than letting the risk fall on innocent parties or
their insurance coverage for such risks. In other words, the ability of the
aviation industry to distribute potential losses as part of its operational
costs (insurability).
7 Absolute or strict liability is the corollary to the freedom of flying over
private property. This argument is substantiated by the fact that property
owners generally cannot prevent overflight legally.
8 The more spurious argument that current developments in international
air law and European Community law in the field of passenger liability
have also moved in the direction of regimes based on (capped) absolute
liability.
On the basis of one or more of these justifications, the international regime
of the system of Rome as well as a number of national regimes that have been
evaluated in this study have all been based on absolute liability, albeit with
variations in scope, persons liable, limitations etc.10
10 See Chapters 3 and 4 of this study.
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As has been established in the course of this study, most of these justifica-
tions for absolute or strict liability ring true universally and on a timeless level,
that is, independent of the question where or when the aviation accident or
incident that causes damage to persons and/or property on the surface takes
place. This is especially true for the first, second, fifth, and seventh justification.
Generally speaking, this can also be said for the sixth argument: for what party
is more justifiably and better equipped to insure itself against the risks of
surface damage than the person engaged in the activity as opposed to all the
potential victims that may suffer from the risks posed by the activity? How-
ever, an important exception to this general observation can be put forward
in relation to insurability of the specific risks posed by war and terrorism in
the aftermath of ‘9/11’, which will be addressed separately.11
As to the question why not to simply let aircraft be covered by the specific
regimes of liability for things as have been codified in certain civil law juris-
dictions, such as France and the Netherlands, the objection can be raised that
such regimes are based on strict as opposed to absolute liability and allow
the important defence of force majeure to be invoked by the possessors of such
things. Under regimes of absolute liability that defence has been abandoned,
which makes sense in the field of air law, as meteorological conditions can
play a significant role in aviation accidents.
As has been described in this study, the majority of jurisdictions in the
United States have moved the away from absolute liability to negligence. In
the past, third party liability in this field was governed by unwritten absolute
liability under common law and a number of specific statutory regimes based
on absolute liability in a great number of jurisdictions in the United States.12
In due course of time, absolute liability was generally abandoned in favor
of negligence on the notion that aviation is not considered to be an ultra- or
extrahazardous activity anymore by most legislatures and courts. But the
inherent flaw of this line of reasoning has also been exposed: for the notion
of not perceiving aviation as ultrahazardous anymore does not make it any
easier to prove negligence for those unfortunate enough to suffer damage in
times when aviation is considered ‘safe.’ In my view, concepts such as ‘danger’,
‘ultrahazardousness’ or ‘extrahazardousness’ should at most serve as yardsticks
to generally illustrate the fact that aircraft can cause serious damage on the
surface by crashing, but not as criteria to substantiate that aviation should
be perceived as a safe activity at some point in time if analysed statistically.
Statistics should therefore not play a role at all in the determination of the
appropriate basis of liability, as the causes of any single aviation accident can
be difficult to prove, irrespective of the number of aviation accidents that occur
in a certain period of time.
11 See paragraphs 6.8, and 6.10 of this study.
12 See paragraphs 5.2 – 5.4, 5.6 of this study.
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As has been touched upon in the previous paragraph, another advantage
of the application of absolute liability in this field is that plaintiffs need no
longer necessarily rely on accident reports of national safety boards, as the
exact causes of the aviation accident or incident at hand no longer play a
substantial role in the determination of liability.
6.5 SCOPE OF ABSOLUTE LIABILITY
In order to address the question what range of conduct should be covered
by specific regimes based on absolute liability, a combination must be made
between the sketched scenarios of aircraft inflicting surface damage and the
arguments that have been enumerated in favor of absolute liability. Further-
more, the comparative overview of international and national regimes in force
in this field can provide guidelines in that area.
As has been described, the first scenario of surface damage inflicted by
direct contact or impact of one or more aircraft or parts, components, objects,
or persons (falling) from the aircraft is capable of inflicting the most severe
forms of potential personal injuries and property damage. Practically all of
the arguments raised in the previous paragraph justify that this scenario should
be brought under the scope of absolute liability. The only controversial argu-
ment against absolute liability that aviation is no longer considered an
ultrahazardous activity has been exposed as unjust on the grounds that aviation
disasters should not be considered statistically, but on a case by case basis.
And on that basis, absolute liability guarantees that potential victims are not
bothered by problems of proof of the exact causes of the accident in order to
substantiate their claims against the implicated operator(s) or owner(s) of the
aircraft. It is therefore not surprising that the scope of all specific international
and national absolute liability regimes under review in this study encompasses
the first scenario.
The next two scenarios, although categorized separately as surface damage
caused by too low overflight in non-conformity with air traffic regulations
and surface damage caused by ‘normal’ overflight in conformity with air traffic
regulations, at least have in common that the implicated aircraft stay in the
air and do not crash.
Is it justifiable that under certain conditions a mere causal link between
an aircraft in flight and subsequent surface damage should automatically give
rise to liability of the operator(s) or owner(s) of the implicated aircraft? That
question has proven difficult.
Useful discussions on this issue have been derived from the drafting
procedures of the Rome Convention of 1952. At that time, the drafting Sub-
Committee was in favor of limiting the scope of absolute liability to the first
scenario of damage arising from direct contact with the aircraft or things or
objects, etc. falling therefrom. However, a number of delegates opposed such
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a limited scope of liability on the grounds that that would exclude damage
caused by scenarios such as airstream of propellors, fire, explosions, or extra-
ordinary noise. At this stage, it should be remarked that scenarios involving
fire or explosions of the aircraft can be categorized under the first scenario.
For such scenarios can be construed as the result of impact of the aircraft or
parts of the aircraft.
The core problem thus comes down to the question whether and if so,
under which precise circumstances, damage caused by mere overflight should
lead to absolute liability. The Rome Convention of 1952 provides an interesting
test case for that problem. The scope of absolute liability of the Rome Conven-
tion at least makes clear that damage resulting from the mere fact of passage
of the aircraft through the airspace in conformity with air traffic regulations
has been excluded. Ergo, the third scenario of ‘normal’ overflight can not give
rise to absolute liability, even if the subsequent surface damage can be qualified
as serious.
The question of scope of absolute liability is thus narrowed down to
scenarios of potential damage inflicted by aircraft in non-conformity with air
traffic regulations. Although earlier drafts of the Rome Convention of 1952
completely excluded recoverability of damage caused by noise, the current
wording of Article 1(1) of the Rome Convention remains ambiguous.13
The problem was neither resolved during the International Conference
on Air Law in 1978, in which the Montreal Protocol was drafted. Another
related unresolved issue that came up during that Conference concerned the
potential recoverability of damage caused by sonic booms of supersonic
aircraft. However, it did become apparent during that Conference that a
number of important aviation nations, such as the United States and Great
Britain, were opposed to a regime of absolute liability which encompassed
surface damage inflicted by noise.14
A number of national air law regimes based on absolute liability that have
been reviewed in this study allow recoverability of surface damage inflicted
by noise under certain conditions. Examples include the French, German and
Austrian regimes. The French regime only permits claims based on extremely
serious cases of noise-related surface damage, e.g. sonic booms. The German
and Austrian regime have based the scope of their absolute liability regimes
in this field on the criterion of an ‘accident’, which has been defined as a
sudden external and unforeseeable event causing personal injuries or property
damage, including sonic booms.15
13 See sub-paragraph 3.3.2 of this study. Unfortunately, the current wording of Article 3 of
the ICAO Draft Convention has as of yet not resolved this issue either, see sub-paragraph
3.11.1 of this study.
14 See sub-paragraph 3.9.2 of this study.
15 See sub-paragraphs 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 of this study.
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On the other hand, the Australian regime has completely excluded scenarios
of surface damage caused by noise by making absolute liability dependant
on the impact with an aircraft or from contact with objects or parts that have
fallen from the aircraft.16 In my opinion, a lot can be said for this solution.
For it should be borne in mind that absolute liability is the most severe form
of liability possible with practically no defences left to the operators or owners
of aircraft except contributory negligence. And an important justification for
absolute liability in this field lies in the notion that fault or negligence can
be difficult to prove. This is certainly true in many cases involving genuine
accidents in which one or more aircraft actually crash. But the argument is
less convincing in cases of noise-related damage, however severe. For in such
cases, the pilots will always be able to testify, the CVR and FDR data of the flight
will be easily obtainable, and the aircraft will always be intact. In other words,
proof that an aircraft operator or owner unlawfully inflicted noise-related
damage is far more easy to furnish than in cases of genuine aviation accidents.
In my view, the scope of any regime of absolute liability in this field should
thus be narrowed down to the first scenario of damage caused by impact of
(parts of) the aircraft or things falling from the aircraft. Such a narrow scope
of absolute liability could also serve as a first justifiable ‘quid pro quo’ for
the severe basis of absolute liability.
Another issue related to the scope of absolute liability concerns the question
to what extent damage caused by the aircraft whilst not yet airborne should
be encompassed in the regime. Criteria such as ‘operational movements’
employed by the German regime can be of aid. Under the German regime,
operational movements are held to commence whilst the aircraft is stationary
and being loaded or unloaded and when passengers are embarking or dis-
embarking and end when the aircraft is finally parked or towed away. The
English regime specifically encompasses the scenarios of flight, take-off and
landing. The Australian regime makes use of an even more detailed
categorization of the phrase ‘in flight’, dependant on the type of aircraft
involved. However, normal taxiing maneuvers have been specifically excluded
from the scope of the Australian regime.
6.6 PERSONS LIABLE. TYPES OF AIRCRAFT
The third question posed in the introduction to this study concerned the issue
which persons or entities should be addressed and which types of aircraft
16 See paragraph 4.4.5 of this study.
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should be covered by the specific regimes of liability for surface damage.17
The main options consist of the operators and owners of aircraft.18
The operator can generally be defined as the entity (person, organization,
or enterprise) engaged in, or offering to engage in an aircraft operation.
Although the operator will normally be the entity that both uses the aircraft
and profits economically from such use, difficulties can arise if the aircraft
is controlled by one entity, whereas another entity profits economically.19
Plain logic would dictate that the actual user/operator should be held absolute-
ly liable as the person in control of the aircraft at the time of the accident or
incident involving surface damage. Under French legal doctrine, this problem
has not been clarified.20 The German liability regime has opted for joint and
several liability of the user and the original operator in cases of short use.21
The other main entity is the owner of the aircraft. If the owner and operator
of the aircraft are one and the same person or entity, no specific difficulties
will arise. If the owner of the aircraft is not engaged in the operation of the
aircraft, but can merely be qualified as the financier or lessor, the legislature
should specifically make a distinction between those two entities in order to
guarantee that the specific liability regime does not apply to the financiers
or lessors of the aircraft.
Under the Rome Convention of 1952, the regime of absolute liability is
primarily attributed to the operator of the aircraft. The main rule holds the
operator to be the person who was making use of the aircraft at the time the
damage was caused. However, if control of the navigation of the aircraft was
retained by the person from whom the right to make use of the aircraft was
derived, that person is considered to be the operator. The registered owner
is presumed to be the operator and can be held liable upon proof of the
contrary.22
Under most of the national liability regimes that have been reviewed,
liability is also primarily attributed to the operators of aircraft, although the
exact definitions of that entity vary slightly per regime.23 In some cases, the
owner can also be held liable under the regime at hand under certain con-
ditions.24
17 See paragraph 1.2 of this study.
18 Unlawful use will be dealt with separately in paragraph 6.10 of this study in relation to
the terrorist attacks of ‘9/11’ in the United States.
19 As has been touched upon in (sub-) paragraphs 2.9 and 4.3.1 of this study, this has led
to a divergence of opinion concerning the entity that should be liable under the French
liability regime.
20 See sub-paragraph 4.3.1 of this study.
21 See sub-paragraph 4.3.2 of this study.
22 See sub-paragraph 3.4.1 of this study.
23 Exceptions to the rule include the English Civil Aviation Act, which attributes liability to
the owner of the aircraft, see sub-paragraph 4.3.3 of this study. However, upon closer
scrutiny, this generally comes down to the actual operator of the aircraft.
24 See, e.g., sub-paragraphs 4.3.1 and 4.3.5 on the French and Australian regime in that context.
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In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of ‘9/11’ in the United States, the
problem of liability of aircraft operators for unlawful use and/or wrongful
taking of aircraft has regained enormous importance. Incidentally, that problem
provides yet another implicit argument to enact specific regimes of liability
in this field. For if surface damage is governed by general and unlimited fault
liability or negligence, that could lead to potential bankruptcy of the implicated
aircraft operators in case they are held to be negligent in relation to unlawful
use of the severity of ‘9/11’. A possible solution to the problem is to limit
liability of the aircraft operator for unlawful use up to the level of obtainable
insurance coverage for the risks posed by war and terrorism. Such a solution
was adopted by U.S. Congress , albeit after the events took place, in the
aftermath of ‘9/11’ by means of the Air Transportation Safety and System
Stabilization Act.25 In the preliminary ICAO Draft Convention which is meant
to update the system of Rome, damage relating to acts of unlawful interference,
war, and terrorism, has also been limited up to a capped maximum level.26
And on the basis of the justification that catastrophic events should not be
borne by aviation alone, such solutions seem the most feasible manner to deal
with the problem of unlawful use in the sphere of liability.
As to the types of aircraft that fall under the regime, the ideal starting point
for any legislature would be to define the term ‘aircraft’ and to subsequently
determine which types of aircraft and their function (military, civilian, state,
etc) fall under the regime at hand.
In the Rome Conventions, the term aircraft has not been defined, but left
to the discretion of the court seized of the case.27 The discussed national
regimes apply slightly varying definitions of the term aircraft. The French
regime, for instance, defines aircraft as all machines capable of rising into-
or circling in the air and the German regime comes close by defining aircraft
as instruments designed to move in the air.28
On the question of scope of types of aircraft and their functions that are
encompassed by existing regimes, variations prevail. The Rome Convention
of 1952 does not apply to military, customs, or police aircraft, as the jurisdiction
of the International Civil Aviation Organization is limited to international civil
air transport. This sheds light on an inherent advantage that national legis-
latures have above the international legislature in this field: a broader scope
of types of aircraft can be brought under the framework of national regimes.
For national regimes can be made to cover (inter) national civil aircraft as well
as military and state aircraft, as the French regime does.29 Furthermore, the
potential scope of types of aircraft covered by the regime can also be
25 See sub-paragraph 5.10.1 of this study.
26 See sub-paragraph 3.11.2 of this study.
27 See sub-paragraph 3.4.5 of this study.
28 See sub-paragraphs 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 of this study.
29 See sub-paragraph 4.3.1 of this study.
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broadened by national legislatures. The regime of the Civil Aviation Act of
the United Kingdom can serve as an example, which covers surface damage
caused by balloons, kites, gliders, airships, aeroplanes, powered lift and
rotorcraft.30
Generally speaking, one could argue that the broader the scope of types
of aircraft covered, the better the regime. For it does not make much difference
whether the surface damage is inflicted by an F-16 or a Boeing 747 from the
perspective of third parties. Another inherent advantage of a broad scope of
types of aircraft that fall under a regime is that potential collision cases
between all those types of aircraft can also be encompassed by the regime by
means of a rule of joint and several liability. Liability regimes that cover as
broad a scope of types of aircraft as possible are therefore held to create the
most feasible and uniform approach to liability in this field for all parties
concerned.
6.7 UNLIMITED OR LIMITED LIABILITY
The fourth question posed in the introduction of this study concerned the
problem whether a specific regime in this field should be based on unlimited
or limited liability.31 Unlimited liability implies that the person or entity
addressed by the regime will have to pay full compensation for damage that
can be attributed to him on the basis of the liability regime at hand. As that
person or entity will generally also have to pay full compensation if he is
established to be at fault or negligent in absence of any regime, a regime based
on the combination of absolute and unlimited liability would merely fortify
the position of third parties in the establishment of liability and ultimately
lead to the comparable result of full compensation. Dependant on the legal
system at hand, the only difference would then lie in the fact that the scope
of the protective norm of fault or duty of care under negligence could be
drawn more broadly in terms of types of recoverable damage and persons
entitled to claim than under regimes based on absolute liability. Such a
narrowed down scope of the protective norm or duty of care under absolute
liability could automatically serve as an important quid pro quo for that more
severe basis of liability.32
30 See sub-paragraph 4.3.3 of this study.
31 See paragraph 1.2 of this study.
32 German civil law, for instance, generally excludes the possibility of claiming damages for
bereavement or immaterial loss (Schmerzengeld)., under most of its specific regimes based
on absolute liability, see E. Deutsch, Allgemeines Haftungsrecht (2) 446-447 (1996). In this
field, the only exception to that rule concerns immaterial loss caused by military aircraft,
which is recoverable, see § 53 (3) LuftVG; Geigel at 1176-1177. However, it has been argued
that such claims should be permitted under regimes based on absolute liability in German
220 Final pointers and arguments
However, the legislature could also decide to grant aircraft operators
addressed by a specific regime more protection by legally limiting the regime.
The following justifications have been enumerated by Drion for legally limiting
liability in this field:33
1 Analogy with maritime law with its global limitation of the shipowner’s liabil-
ity;
2 Necessary protection of a financially weak industry;
3 Catastrophic risks should not be borne by aviation alone;
4 Necessity of the carriers or operators being able to insure themselves against
these risks;
5 Possibility for potential claimants to take insurance themselves;
6 Limitation of liability as a counterpart to the aggravated system of liability
imposed upon the carrier and operator;
7 Avoidance of litigation by quick settlements;
8 Unification of the law with respect to the amount of damages paid.
As has been established, most of these arguments do not stand the test of closer
scrutiny. In short, the inadequacy of a system of legally limited liability is
specifically revealed under an international regime of liability on the grounds
that the potential damage can vary so widely worldwide and in due course
of time. For legal limitation of liability can lead to the situation whereby the
limits are grossly inadequate to cover the amount of surface damage inflicted
by an aviation accident in a developed country, whereas those same limits
would easily cover the amount of surface damage inflicted by a similar aviation
accident in an underdeveloped country. This means that a just unification of
the law with respect to the amount of damages paid is never adequately
possible in practice.
The quid pro quo of absolute liability on the one hand and limitation of
liability on the other hand could be justified to a certain extent if claimants
could fall back on the applicable rules of fault liability or negligence in order
to claim for damage in excess of the legal limits. Such a solution has been
opted for in the German and Austrian regimes in this field.34 However, the
Rome Convention of 1952 has been based on a practically unbreakable system
of limitation of liability by making unlimited liability dependent on proof of
a deliberate act or omission of the operator as opposed to his mere fault or
negligence!35
Aside from the international system of Rome and the national regimes of
Germany and Austria, the other national regimes that have been evaluated
literature, see H. Kötz, Gutachten und Vorschläge zur Überarbeitung des Schuldrechts, Band
II, 1824-1825 (1981).
33 See paragraph 2.10 of this study.
34 See sub-paragraph 4.5.2 of this study.
35 See sub-paragraph 3.5.4 of this study.
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in this study are all based on unlimited liability, although specific exceptions
to that rule have sometimes been enacted within those regimes for cases of
unlawful use of the aircraft.36 Notably, liability of the implicated air carriers
arising from ‘9/11’ has been limited after the event took place under ‘Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act.’37
The International Law Association’s proposals for an integrated system
of civil aviation liability in international carriage by air and in respect of
surface damage were also based on the principle of unlimited liability. The
predicted effects of a combination of absolute and unlimited liability would
be the channeling of liability to the operator, who in turn would be able to
(re)claim from other liable parties by means of the applicable rules of
subrogation.38
The only really valid exception to the basic principle of unlimited liability
lies in the third assertion that catastrophic risks should not be borne by avi-
ation alone. That assertion has specifically regained its importance after the
terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001. For under such
a scenario, the combination of absolute and unlimited liability would be too
much to bear for the aviation industry. Thus, liability could justifiably be
legally limited up to the level of insurance coverage in cases of unlawful use.
As has been argued in the previous paragraph, such a regime of legal limita-
tion in the specific area of liability for unlawful use or wrongful taking of
aicraft should be enacted by all legislatures, even those who rely on the general
rules of fault liability or negligence. This is recommended in order to protect
the implicated aircraft operator(s) from bankruptcy, especially as such events
may now be perceived as foreseeable by courts in the aftermath of ‘9/11’.
6.8 INSURANCE AND INSURABILITY
In this study, a number of issues relating to aviation third party liability
insurance have been dealt with on the basis of the fifth question if insurance
coverage should be compulsory in this field.39 The issues under consideration
concerned the question how insurance contracts can be defined and which
scenarios are covered or excluded by insurance policies in this field. Further-
more, the links that exist or are presumed to exist between insurance law and
liability law have been explored. Such links include the notion that unlimited
liability is not insurable and the link that can be made between insurers and
third parties by means of direct actions.
36 See, e.g., sub-paragraph 4.3.4 of this study on the Swiss regime in that context.
37 See sub-paragraph 5.10.1 of this study.
38 See paragraph 3.10 of this study.
39 See paragraph 1.2 of this study.
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Recapitulating, the following picture emerges. As a starting point, the
situation in absence of any legislative interference has been described in which
aircraft operators are free to take out insurance coverage for third party liability
from aviation insurers. The rationale for not requiring compulsory insurance
or other security requirements lies in the notion that aircraft operators will
generally take out liability insurance coverage anyhow.40
It is important to bear in mind that third party liability insurance can only
be obtained to certain levels of coverage and that blanket coverage is not
obtainable. This means that there is always a risk that the actual damage will
exceed the obtained level of coverage by aircraft operators and that they will
have to bear the extra loss above coverage themselves. The level of coverage
obtainable will depend on factors such as the weight of the aircraft and the
type of policy opted for.41
Legislatures faced with the problem of liability for surface damage can
opt for compulsory insurance mechanisms or other security requirements for
third party liability for those operators addressed by the regime at hand as
an extra financial safeguard for compensation of victims.
In this study, such requirements have been discussed on three levels: the
international level of the Rome Convention of 1952 and the suggestions made
by the International Law Association; the supranational level of European
community law; and the national level of the states within the scope of this
study. A brief recapitalution of these three levels will be made in the following
three subparagraphs (6.8.1–6.8.3). A number of final observations and recom-
mendations will be made in a final subparagraph (6.8.4).
6.8.1 Third party liability insurance requirements under the Rome Conven-
tion and the ILA Draft Convention. Direct actions.
Under the Rome Convention of 1952, a compulsory system of insurance or
other security requirements was not achieved. For the general rule holds that
contracting states may require the operators of aircraft of other contracting
states to be insured for damage as specified by the Convention and up to the
limits set out in the Convention.42
The Draft Convention proposed by Cheng and Dutheil de la Rochère under
auspices of the International Law Association set out to make such require-
ments mandatory by requiring every operator to maintain insurance or other
forms of security in such amount, of such type and in such terms as the State
40 In Australia, for example, third party liability insurance is currently not required in this
field, see sub-paragraph 4.5.5 of this study.
41 See paragraph 2.11 of this study, in which the usual exclusions under liability policies are
also dealt with.
42 See paragraph 3.6 of this study.
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of registry and/or the State of the operator may specify.43 This can be hailed
as a more constructive move in view of the fact that a facultative option is
effectively of little use to guarantee that potential liability of the operator will
be met financially. However, the other idea proposed in the Draft Convention
to hold the states of registry responsible for liabilities of the operator and of
the persons furnishing financial security to the extent that such liabilities have
not been met, is more controversial. According to the Draft Convention, such
responsibility also arises if the state of registry only allows the operator to
obtain financial security only up to specified maximum levels.44 The latter
scenario can of course be easily circumvented by the requirement of specified
minimal levels of coverage as opposed to compulsory maximum levels, which
is a far more logical move for any legislature. But to automatically shift re-
sponsibility to the State of registry in cases of damage in catastrophic cases
which cannot be met by the operator and its insurers seems a bridge too far,
especially in light of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United
States. An ad-hoc scheme of partial compensation by means of specific govern-
mental funds, as has been enacted by the United States government in the
aftermath of ‘9/11’, seems more likely to gain acceptance by States of registry
worldwide. The suggestion of an international common fund for catastrophic
aviation accidents, which was also proposed under the Draft Convention, has
also become of renewed interest in view of those terrorist attacks and deserves
closer scrutiny.45
6.8.1.1 Direct actions
The possibility of direct actions was first considered during the drafting period
of the Rome Convention of 1933, but turned out to be controversial, which
led to the codification of the Brussels Protocol of 1938. Under the regime of
the Rome Convention, direct actions were only permitted under certain con-
ditions.46 The ILA Draft Convention only allows a direct action if the law of
the competent court so provides.47
Three main objections to the possibility of direct actions can be raised: first,
that it would be unfair to insurers if third parties could potentially obtain more
rights than the insured parties. Scenarios could easily be envisaged in which
certain contractual provisions in the policy would bar compensation to the
operator, for instance, if the contract has expired or does not cover certain
forms of suffered damage (e.g. noise).
43 See sub-paragraph 3.10.2 of this study.
44 See sub-paragraph 3.10.2 of this study.
45 See sub-paragraph 3.10.2 of this study.
46 See paragraph 3.6 of this study.
47 See paragraph 3.6 and sub-paragraph 3.10.2 of this study.
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Second, that the only case in which a direct action can be of interest, that
is, when the operator at hand faces potential bankruptcy, can also be dealt
by the legislature without resorting to the possibility of direct actions. This
has been achieved under the Rome Convention of 1952 by enacting the rule
that any sums due to an operator from an insurer shall be exempt from seizure
and execution by creditors of the operator until claims of third parties under
the Convention have been satisfied.48 Third, that if the possibility of a direct
action implies that the claim against the operator has to be abandoned, this
could turn out to be disadvantageous for claimants in cases where the total
amount of damage exceeds the level of coverage. For in such cases, claimants
will be deprived of a part of their claim from the operator, even if the operator
does not risk potential bankruptcy in spite of the fact that he will have to grant
a certain percentage of compensation above his insurance coverage. In practice,
insurers will often take over claims handling in the aftermath of aviation
accidents from the implicated operators and other potential liable parties.
However, that should not imply that third parties are automatically deprived
of their right to claim from the implicated aircraft operators directly if they
so desire.
6.8.2 Third party liability insurance requirements under European Commun-
ity law
European Community law in this field currently merely consists of the air
carrier licensing requirement that air carriers and operators falling under the
scope of Community law should be insured to cover liability in case of acci-
dents, in particular in respect of passengers, luggage, cargo, mail, and third
parties.49 Remarkably, no minimal levels of compulsory coverage have been
codified. This means that an aircraft operator could theoretically obtain insur-
ance coverage for potential liability for a single Euro in order to comply with
European licensing requirements.
However, a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council on insurance requirements for air carriers and aircraft operators
was launched on 24 September 2002, which aims to fill in the basic requirement
of compulsory insurance by means of various tiers of compulsory insurance
coverage, dependant on the MTOW of the aircraft. As has been discussed, a
number of facets of the proposed regulation are still under discussion, such
as the question to what extent market failure should be taken into account.50
A remarkable difference between the proposal and the current status quo is
that the proposal is also meant to govern non-Community air carriers and
48 See paragraph 3.6 of this study.
49 See Article 7 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2407/92 of 23 July 1992, OJ L 240, 24.8.1992.
50 See paragraph 4.9 of this study.
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aircraft operators flying to or from Community airports as well as over territ-
ory of Member States. This has been interpreted as being in conformity with
the Chicago Convention of 1944.51
The proposal can be hailed as a move toward a greater degree of har-
monization and a level playing field in the European Community. For it
manages to clarify to what level of liability coverage the aircraft operators and
air carriers that fall under its scope should be insured or backed up by other
securities.
6.8.3 Third party liability insurance requirements under national law
Aside from the aforementioned general insurance requirement prescribed by
European Community law, most states of registry prescribe compulsory
insurance or other security requirements for third party liability for aircraft
operators within the scope of their jurisdiction. Exceptions include the United
Kingdom, France, and Australia. But even in the United Kingdom, such
requirements are implicitly compulsory, since the granting of an air service
license depends on aircraft operators being able to satisfy the Civil Aviation
Authorities that they can meet their financial obligations in case of liability.52
In many cases, compulsory levels of minimal insurance coverage have been
linked to the weight of the aircraft, such as in the German, Austrian, Swiss,
and United States requirements. Under the limited third party liability regimes
of Germany and Austria, the prescribed levels of compulsory insurance cover-
age correspond with the legal limitations.53 Notably, the Swiss regime has
combined a main rule of unlimited liability with certain minimal levels of
compulsory insurance coverage, but has legally limited liability up to those
levels in cases of damage caused by illegal users or other persons not employed
by the operator.54 Such a rule is of comparative importance to other legislators
and could regain importance in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001 on the United States.
6.8.4 Final remarks and recommendations on insurance
Whether on an international, supranational, or national level, insurance or
other security requirements are only deemed useful if made compulsory and
filled in by certain minimal levels of coverage dependant on the varying weight
of aircraft. However, legislatures should bear in mind that insurance coverage
51 See paragraph 4.7 of this study.
52 See paragraph 4.5.3 of this study.
53 See paragraph 4.5.2 of this study.
54 See paragraph 4.5.4 of this study.
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is often obtained in combined policies with a single maximum. In such cases,
both the required level of second and third party liability coverage will have
to be specified. This can be done by also specifying the level of required
coverage per passenger.
The International Law Association proposals for updating the system of
Rome in this respect are not all satisfactory. In my view, the proposed auto-
matic link between insurance requirements and potential liability of the States
that have enacted such requirements under certain conditions, such as when
maximum levels of coverage are only allowed, is not recommendable. At most,
States can create specific funds to help compensate victims of surface damage
in cases of catastrophic disasters, such as the September 11 attacks on the
United States. But not many States will be keen to adhere to automatic liability
in such cases. As has also been argued, the legal right to direct actions is not
recommended either. In the normal aftermath of aviation accidents or incidents,
a system whereby insurers grant indemnity to insured operators that
subsequently grant compensation to those legally entitled to such compensa-
tion, seems workable and fair enough. De facto claims handling by which
insurance companies, as opposed to the insured operators, grant compensation
directly to the victims can always be arranged under such a system.
Finally – and in conjunction with the arguments raised against limitation
of liability in this field – it has to be conceded that unlimited liability cannot
be completely insured in view of the fact that insurers do not provide for
unlimited coverage in any field of endeavor. However, in my view this ob-
jection does not satisfy a structural link to a legally limited liability regime.
Only in extremely catastrophic cases, such as the September 11 attacks, should
such links play a role. The discussed Swiss provision in which liability is
limited up to the compulsory levels of coverage could provide a solution in
such cases. But for ‘normal’ aviation accidents, the risk of flying uninsured
from a certain level of coverage onward should preferably fall on those parties
taking that risk, as opposed to those suffering from it.55
A more feasible solution for such cases, without necessarily having to fall
back on any statutory limitation liability, has been enacted in Article 6:109
BW of the Dutch Civil Code, which allows judges to moderate the extent of
liability whenever full liability would lead to unwanted consequences. Factors
that are taken into consideration include the circumstances of the case, the
relationship between the parties concerned, and their financial capabilities.
However, liability cannot be moderated to a level which is lower than the
55 The same argument can be illustrated on a more personal level. If I decide to take out
personal third party liability insurance coverage, my personal level of obtained coverage
(e.g. up to 500.000 Euro) should not have the effect of limiting my potential liability to that
level. If I inflict damage for 600.000 Euro, this should generally mean that the insurer has
to grant compensation for 500.000 Euro and that the remaining 100.000 Euro can still be
claimed from me.
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applicable level of insurance coverage. The great advantage of such a solution
is that liability is then only limited on a case by case basis after the event took
place and not beforehand.56
6.9 THE FEASIBILITY OF REGIMES ON AN INTERNATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL OR
NATIONAL LEVEL
The question whether a regime of liability in this field should be enacted on
an international and/or supranational and/or national level will be dealt with
in sub-paragraphs 6.9.1–6.9.3 respectively.
6.9.1 The feasibility of the Rome Convention of 1952 as amended by the
Montreal Protocol of 1978
In Chapter 3 of this study, the system of Rome as well as the suggestions made
under auspices of the International Law Association to update those instru-
ments have been discussed. In the final remarks and recommendations raised
in paragraph 3.11 of that chapter, the main pillars of the system have been
evaluated. Suggestions have also been made to redraft or abolish certain of
those pillars in order to update the regime to more modern day standards.
The final question posed in that evaluation concerned the necessity of the
system as a whole. In this sub-paragraph, a brief recapitalution of these points
will be given on the basis and scope of absolute liability (1), defences (2),
limitation of liability (3), insurance (4), jurisdiction (5), and finally necessity
or feasibility of the system as a whole (6).
1 Basis and scope of absolute liability
The basis of absolute liability should be maintained as a central pillar of the
system of Rome in view of the arguments raised in its favor in this study.
Unfortunately, the scope of absolute liability of the system has not been
resolved satisfactorily as to the question whether damage caused by flight in
non-conformity with air traffic regulations is covered or not. As has been
argued in view of the severe basis of absolute liability, such noise-related
claims (including sonic boom) should not be covered by the absolute liability
regime.57
In my opinion that scenario should be completely left to general principles
of applicable fault liability, negligence, or other existing headings of liability
as a quid pro quo to the severe basis of absolute liability. The main argument
for this plea lies in the notion that absolute liability should serve as a useful
56 See sub-paragraph 3.11.3 of this study in which that suggestion was also made.
57 See sub-paragraph 3.11.1 of this study.
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alternative to negligence or fault liability in view of difficulties that can arise
in proving negligence or fault liability as well as the number of defences that
can be invoked under those bases of liability, such as Act of God or force
majeure. But these problems are mainly perceived to play a role in cases of
genuine aviation accidents or at most cases where parts of the aircraft or things
or persons transported by the aircraft fall from the aircraft and cause personal
injuries or property damage.
In any case, however severe, of damage caused by noise or sonic boom,
on the other hand, the aircraft will remain intact, the pilot can be heard, and
the Flight Data Recorder and Cockpit Voice Recorder are easily accessible.
Such a limited scope of absolute liability also concurs with the outcome of
Article 1(1) of the earlier Montreal Draft of the Rome Convention of 1952,
which read:
any person who suffers damage on the surface, other than damage due to noise
or to passage by aircraft in normal flight, shall be entitled to compensation upon
proof only that the damage was caused directly by an aircraft in flight or by any
person or thing falling therefrom.58
Another way of making even more absolutely sure that damage caused by
aircraft in flight is excluded can be achieved by narrowing down the absolute
liability regime by means of the ‘contact’ or ‘impact’ criterion (e.g. by codifying
‘upon proof only that the damage was caused by the impact of the aircraft’).
Complete exclusion of noise and sonic boom also corresponds to the
opinions of the delegates of important aviation nations such as the United
States, Canada, Great Britain during the Montreal Conference of 1978.59 Such
an exclusion has also been made under the Australian national regime of the
Damage by Aircraft Act 1999 through application of the ‘impact’ criterion.60
2 Defences
The current defences available under the Rome Convention(s) are not felt to
raise great difficulties. In view of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001
on the United States, the potential liability of operators of aircraft for damage
caused by unlawful users has become of importance. Evidently, absolute
liability for damage caused by such unlawful use could lead to unwanted
effects such as potential bankruptcy of the implicated operators, if such liability
were to be unlimited. Such scenarios of unlawful use should thus either be
left out of the regime of absolute liability entirely or at least limited to the
extent of obtainable insurance coverage. In that respect, the current defence
that the operator can prove that he has exercised due care to prevent such
58 See sub-paragraph 3.3.2 of this study.
59 See sub-paragraph 3.9.2 of this study.
60 See sub-paragraph 4.4.5 of this study.
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use could regain importance if the Rome Convention manages to attract more
ratifications in the future. But as proven lack of due care may then lead to
unlimited liability, a preference can be made to limit liability under the
scenario of unlawful use, irrespective of the basis of liability that governs it.
3 Limitation of liability
The objections against limitation of liability have been dealt with in paragraph
6.7 of this chapter. The key objection to the legal limitation provisions of the
Rome Convention of 1952 and their update in the Montreal Protocol of 1978,
is that the level of potential surface damage can vary enormously worldwide.
This would thus place surface victims of the more developed countries in a
less advantageous position than those in less developed countries. In short,
uniformity can never be realized fairly on an international level by means of
any system of limitation of liability.
The other main objection lies in the fact that in order to escape the limited
liability regime, claimants will have to prove that the damage was caused by
a deliberate act or omission of the operator or his servants or agents done with
the intent to cause damage.61 The least one would expect is that claimants
can fall back on the general rules of fault liability or negligence in such cases.
Therefore, the suggestions made under auspices of the International Law
Association to completely dispense with the provisions on limitation of liability
are to be hailed. At most, a specific provision could be introduced by which
the judge seized of a case can reduce the legal obligation to repair damage
if awarding full compensation would lead to clearly unacceptable results on
a case by case basis.
In the first preliminary draft of Article 3 of the ICAO Draft Convention,
such a laudable move toward unlimited liability has been made. Hopefully,
that draft will survive later stages of drafting discussions.62
4 Insurance
The main objection to the insurance and security provisions of the Rome
Convention of 1952 is that they have been codified in a complex, but non-
compulsory fashion.
In my view, they should either be made compulsory as an extra safeguard
for actual compensation in order to have any effect, or otherwise dispensed
with altogether. If made compulsory, certain minimal levels of required cover-
age based on MTOW of the aircraft can be introduced. Another alternative could
lie in merely requiring adequate insurance coverage or other guarantees, and
61 See sub-paragraph 3.5.4 of this study.
62 See sub-paragraph 3.11.3 of this study.
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leaving more specific requirements to the adhering States of registry of the
aircraft.63
5 Jurisdiction
The single forum solution involving the loci delicti under the Rome Convention
of 1952 was perceived as the best way to guarantee that the limitations set
out in the Convention were distributed fairly amongst claimants. In view of
the objections raised against limitation of liability in general as well as the
objections raised against the single forum in this study, a more feasible altern-
ative would be to reinstate the so-called forum rei, that is, the defendant’s
ordinary place of residence. That solution would correspond with the juris-
dictional provision of the Rome Convention of 1933.64
An even more bold suggestion would be to also include the more contro-
versial so-called forum actoris under certain conditions in cases where the victim
of surface damage is not a resident of the loci delicti, nor of the of the de-
fendant’s ordinary place of residence. Such a solution would be comparable
to the so-called fifth jurisdiction of Article 33 of the Montreal Convention of
1999. Conditions to be fulfilled could include criteria such as the fact that the
operator in question operates to or from the country of principal and
permanent residence of the third party.65
The greatest advantage of the forum actoris would be that that forum is
best equipped to determine the level of damages suffered by the third party,
as it can easily apply the damage laws of his place of principal and permanent
residence.
6 Necessity and feasibility
Even if the system of Rome were to be modernized satisfactorily, the question
of necessity and feasibility of such a uniform regime of liability in this field
remains difficult to resolve. The main arguments in favor of uniformity hold
that international civil aviation as well as potential victims on the surface are
then subjected to the same standards of liability for surface damage worldwide,
which would create a global level playing field. But even is such an objective
were realized, the problem remains that the scope of such an international
regime ultimately remains limited to cases of foreign civil aircraft from Con-
tracting States causing damage in the territory of other Contracting States.
Another argument against real necessity of such an international regime
is the notion that the international character of damage to third parties is by
its very nature far less pronounced than the international character of damage
to for instance passengers. Generally speaking, third parties will be of the
63 In Article 19 of the ICAO Draft Convention, the latter option has been enacted, based on
Article 50 of the Montreal Convention, see sub-paragraph 3.11.4 of this study.
64 See sub-paragraph 3.7.1 of this study.
65 See sub-paragraph 3.7.3 of this study.
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nationality of the place of the accident or incident. And even the more ex-
ceptional cases in which the victim is of another nationality than the loci delicti,
do not necessarily justify the application of an international regime. For both
the determination of liability of the implicated operator(s) as well as subsequent
damage suffered by such a victim could also be made by the court seized of
the case if liability in this field is governed by national law. The court would
simply have to appoint experts in the field of damage law of the nationality
or place of permanent residence of the victim in order to assess the level of
compensation due. From a perspective of insurance, the point can also be
raised that the necessary coverage for third party liability is underwritten
satisfactorily to this day, despite the fact that national liability legislation in
this field varies.66 These arguments, specifically that of the limited scope of
an international regime in terms of aircraft operators covered by it, point to
more feasible alternatives on a national level.
A perhaps more spurious argument concerns the notion that the biggest
aviation-generating country in the world, the United States, has generally
moved away from specific absolute liability regimes to general negligence in
this field. The United States may thus be found unwilling to adhere to any
international instrument founded upon absolute liability in the future. And
the level of success of any international air law instrument largely depends
on adherence by the United States, in view of its prime importance as an
aviation nation.
6.9.2 The feasibility of a third party liability regime on a European Commun-
ity level
In absence of any rules on air carrier’s or aircraft operator’s liability for damage
to persons and property on the ground on a European Community level, the
question arises if a supranational Council Regulation or Directive in this field
is feasible and on which grounds such an instrument could or should be
enacted.
As has been described in this study, the Commission is currently of the
opinion that as far as third party liability of air carriers and aircraft operators
in case of incidents is concerned, liability has been already sufficiently defined
in the Member States.67
As has been argued, a legislative instrument on a European Community
level which harmonizes the basis and scope of liability for damage to third
parties within the European Community, would provide a feasible solution
66 See B.G. Nilsson, Liability and Insurance for Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties
on the Surface – A Possible New Approach to an Old Problem, in A. Kean (Ed.), Essays in Air
Law 181, at 185 (1982).
67 See paragraph 4.8 of this study.
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for a more level playing field within the European Union for all parties con-
cerned. In view of the fact that a number of Member States already have
legislation in force in this field, the instrument of a European Directive con-
taining certain minimal requirements may suffice. This would allow Member
States with regimes in force to at most amend their existing legislation on a
national level in order to meet such requirements. Member States without any
legislation in force would need to create specific legislation in this field on
a national level within a certain timeframe that would replace the general
regime of fault liability at hand. However, taking the current position of the
Commission into account, the problem will remain one to be resolved by
national regimes of the Member States in the near future.
6.9.3 The feasibility of a third party liability regime on a national level
The ‘fictitious’ legislator that has been addressed throughout this study is
advised to create a specific statutory regime for third party liability within
his national framework of civil or common law. This is substantiated by lack
of feasible alternatives both on an international and on a Community level.
The theoretical underpinnings and step by step approach for codification
of such a regime that have been discussed in this study can serve as important
justifications and guidelines in this respect. In addition to these guidelines,
the actual liability regimes in force both on an international and national level
can serve as comparative examples from which the national legislator can
derive fruitful information and ideas. Regimes in this field codified on a
national level have the inherent advantage above international or supranational
regimes that they can be tailor-made to fit into the relevant sections or acts
on air law of the civil code or common law system at hand. And as has been
argued previously, the scope of potential aircraft that can be encompassed
by national regimes is always greater than the scope of potential aircraft
encompassed by international or supranational regimes. This difference of
scope is due to the more limited jurisdiction over civil aviation of both the
international ICAO and European Community legislatures.68
68 As has been established in this study, the Convention Rome of Rome of 1952 as amended
by the Montreal of 1978 only applies to damage caused by international civil aviation in
the territory of a Contacting State by an aircraft registered in another Contracting State
and not to military, customs, or police aircraft. A national regime could be made to en-
compass all those categories of aircraft, whether foreign or national.
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6.10 A NUMBER OF EFFECTS OF TERRORISM
6.10.1 General observations
The terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 have had an
enormous impact on the aviation industry as a whole and more in particular
on the aviation insurance industry. As to that date, the aviation world had
not been confronted by the use of aircraft as bombs and by the subsequent
enormity of the level of damage to third parties and property on the surface.
The short and long term effects of this calamity are so complex and profound
as to justify a whole series of economical, legal, political, and psychological
studies and cannot be done justice in the framework of this study. However,
a number of important aspects need to be dealt with in conjunction with the
main theme of this study – the general plea for absolute, unlimited, and
secured liability of aircraft operators for damage to third parties on the surface.
Clearly such a regime would lead to disastrous results if applied to severe
cases of terrorism as the damage inflicted can vastly exceed normal levels of
insurance coverage of the implicated air carriers.
Even if such cases were to be governed by general fault liability or negli-
gence, that could lead to disastrous results for the implicated airlines if proven
successfully. That helps to explain the described move of US Congress to limit
negligence by means of the regime of the Air Transportation Safety and System
Stabilization Act, albeit that this was done after the events of ‘9/11’ took place.
Such legislative action can serve as a firm recommendation to national legis-
latures without any specific limitation provisions in force in the area of liability
for unlawful or wrongful use. Notably, a number of discussed national regimes
in this field have enacted similar solutions. The Swiss absolute liability regime
can serve as an example in which the operator of an aircraft can only be held
liable up to the applicable level of mandatory insurance coverage in cases of
unlawful use.69 Alternative measures in cases of catastrophic aviation
accidents related to terrorism include the instruments of victim compensation
funds and measures of temporary State aid to guarantee continued viability
of the aviation industry. These alternatives will be briefly discussed in the next
two sub-paragraphs.
6.10.2 Victim Compensation Funds
The only feasible alternative to the applicable rules of liability, which has also
been followed by the United States government, is to create a specific com-
pensation fund for the victims of the attacks and their relatives. The primary
aim of such a fund is to compensate certain closely defined damages of a
69 See sub-paragraph 4.5.4 of this study.
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closely defined scope of victims and their relatives.70 The secondary aim is
to try to dissuade potential claimants from going to court and accepting pay-
ment from the Fund instead. For any claim under the Fund will result in a
waiver of right to file a civil action. The success of any victim compensation
fund will largely depend on the number of rightful claimants willing to give
up the right to file a civil action in favor of the perhaps more limited com-
pensation available on the basis of the Fund. This will depend largely on the
level of generosity of the fund at hand.
6.10.3 Insurance coverage for risks posed by war and terrorism. Governmental
measures
In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the aviation insurance
industry made the move to narrow down third party liability coverage to
$ 50 000 000 in cases of loss arising from risks such as war and terrorism.71
This move could have lead to the grounding of entire fleets if governments
worldwide had not intervened by taking care of the terrorism coverage that
was terminated by the insurance industry.72
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, U.S. Congress adopted a number
of emergency measures. These measures included a direct and immediate aid
of $5 billion to compensate the American airlines for direct losses resulting
from the closure of airspace and the consequences of the attacks on air traffic
for the last four months of 2001, the allocation of federal credit instruments
in the form of Treasury loans or loan guarantees of approximately $ 10 billion,
and the allocation of $ 3 billion for safety and security of air transport from
the Victim Compensation Fund of $ 40 billion.73
70 The provisions for claims from the Fund to be eligible include the rule that claimants must
have suffered physical harm, which must constitute a bodily injury treated by a medical
profession within 24 hours of the injury; rescue workers can only claim if they suffered
physical harm within 96 hours of the impact of the aircraft; awards will not be less than
$500 000 for any claim made on behalf of a deceased victim with a spouse or dependent
or $ 300 000 for a deceased victim without relatives; loss of earnings based on salary figures
for a three year period (1998-2000) up to a maximum of the 98th percentile of individual
income in the United States for the year 2000 (=$ 231 000); and presumed non-economic
losses up to a maximum of $ 250 000 limit for each dependent with an additional $ 50 000
for a spouse and each dependent of the deceased victim, see Morrison, Mahoney & Miller,
Aviation Update, at 1-2.
71 See Dennis Jankelow & Associates, Terrorist Attacks in the USA, The Implications for the
Aviation Insurance Market – Restricted Insurance Coverage Threatens to Ground Airlines/Aviation
Worldwide, at www.jankelow.co.za/terrorism_5.htm.
72 See AON, World Trade Center Bulletin, Quarterly Supplement, ‘US Extends terrorism cover
for airlines’ and ‘EC extends government terrorism cover’, July 2002, at 13-14.
73 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council,
The repercussions of the terrorist attacks in the United States on the air transport industry,
Brussels, 10.10.2001 COM (2001) 574 final, at 4-5.
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In the same period of time, all Member States of the European Union
introduced temporary insurance mechanisms for coverage of third party war
and terrorism risks. The initial period of 30 days of coverage was eventually
prolonged up to June 2002. These measures were approved by the Council
of Ministers on September 22, 2001 on the conditions that they were temporary,
strictly regulated and notified to the European Commission.74 State aid was
also granted by the European Commission on certain conditions, such as the
condition that compensation was paid in a non-discriminatory manner to all
airlines in a given Member State and that it only concerned the costs incurred
during the period 11-14 September 2001 following the grounding of air traffic
by the American authorities.75
Although difficult to predict the long term future, it is safe to say that the
normal route of coverage of risks posed by war and terrorism will have to
be taken up by the aviation insurance market on the longer run, even if at
higher premiums than in the past. But even then, ‘normal’ coverage will not
even come close to the potential level of damage that can be potentially be
inflicted by terrorists, as has been demonstrated by ‘9/11.’ For such exceptional
cases, extra measures on a governmental level will most likely remain
necessary, albeit on an ad-hoc basis and not necessarily as a codified right.
However, a more structured approach may also be opted for, for instance by
a specific Convention that governs war and terrorism as ‘sovereign risks’
provided for by adhering States under certain conditions.76
6.11 FINAL REMARKS AND CONCLUSIONS
At the end of this study, it is time to retrace our steps to its starting point:
the Bijlmer air disaster. For the figure of a ‘fictitious’ legislator, which has been
introduced in this study, can refer to any legislature without specific rules
in force on aircraft operators’ liability for damage to third parties and property
on the ground.
In absence of any feasible international or supranational regime in this field,
the Dutch legislature is thus advised to create a specific regime in this field
in Book 8 of the Dutch Civil Code based on the pillars of absolute and
74 See Communication from the Commission on Insurance in the Air Transport sector following
the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States, Brussels, 2.7.2002 COM (2002)
320 final, at 3.
75 See Commission Communication of 10.10.2001, at 7-8. Notably, state aid was permitted
on the basis of Article 87(2)(b) of the Treaty establishing the European Community. The
events of September 11, 2001 were held to be exceptional occurrences within the meaning
of Article 87(2)(b) Treaty.
76 See H. Caplan, War and Terrorism Insurance, Long term plans for international stability and
affordability, paper presented at the IATA – Airline Insurance Rendezvous –2003, at 2 et
seq.
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unlimited liability, backed up by certain minimal levels of compulsory insur-
ance or other guarantees.
Liability of the aircraft operators for unlawful or wrongful use should form
the main exception to that rule, for instance by subjecting the operators of
aircraft to a regime based on legally limited liability up to the levels of obtain-
able insurance coverage for the risks posed by unlawful use.
The main reasons for enacting a specific regime in this field have been
policy-based on the position of non-benefitted third parties on the ground.
A regime of absolute liability would dispense with any potential problems
of proof of fault of the implicated aircraft operators or defences that can be
invoked by him under the general rules of fault liability of Article 6:162 of
the Dutch Civil Code.
Specific investigation of the cause(s) of an accident would then also no
longer be strictly necessary from the perspective of attribution of liability. The
conclusion of the Netherlands Aviation Safety Board which held that the
Bijlmer air disaster was caused by a combination of the design and inspection
of the B 747 pylon need no longer be awaited or used by claimants; for a
regime based on absolute liability will automatically channel liability to the
operator of the aircraft. A mere link of causation between the occurrence
– whether defined as accident or incident – and subsequent damage is all that
is needed in order to claim compensation from the implicated operator.
Evidently, El Al should have the full right of redress or subrogation from
other potentially liable parties, such as Boeing or potentially implicated Air
Traffic Control Agencies. Important ‘quid pro quo’s’ for such a regime could
lie in a limited scope of absolute liability, for instance by completely excluding
any noise-related claim based on damage caused by mere overflight, whether
in conformity or non-conformity with Dutch air traffic regulations or not. Such
an approach has been opted for by the Australian legislator, based on the
criterium of ‘impact’ of the aircraft or parts of the aircraft.
In my view, a lot can be said for such a solution as it manages to define
the scope of the severe basis of absolute liability far more clearly and fairly
than absolute liability regimes which do allow noise- related claims under
certain conditions, such as the French and German regime. Furthermore,
problems of proof are more likely to arise in cases of genuine accidents than
in cases of damage caused by mere overflight, in view of partial or complete
destruction of the aircraft and subsequent potential loss of important informa-
tion in the former case.
Other important quid pro quo’s not necessarily related to aviation and not
discussed in this study could lie in both the scope of persons entitled to claim
as well as the scope of recoverable damages under the absolute liability regime.
A manner to do so could lie in the application of the specific damage categories
of personal injuries and tangible property damage. Such limitations of scope
of duty of care under common law or the so-called Schutznorm under civil
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law as well as limitations of recoverable damages can be achieved within the
liability regime itself. The regime of the United Kingdom, for instance, limits
the scope of its liability regime to ‘material loss or damage caused to any
person or property.’77
77 See Civil Aviation Act 1982 s76(2) and paragraph 4.4.3 of this study.

Samenvatting
Aansprakelijkheid van de exploitanten en eigenaren van luchtvaartuigen voor schade
toegebracht aan personen en zaken op de grond
Het luchtvaartongeval van het El Al vrachttoestel in the Bijlmermeer in 1992,
waarbij de 4 mensen aan boord en 44 mensen op de grond omkwamen en
twee appartementcomplexen grotendeels werden verwoest, vormde de tra-
gische aanleiding voor dit onderzoek. Het onderzoek richt zich op het pro-
bleem van aansprakelijkheid van exploitanten en eigenaren van luchtvaartuigen
voor schade aan derden op de grond. Het onderzoek is toegespitst op de vraag
aan welk aansprakelijkheidsregime voor schade aan derden de exploitanten
of eigenaren van luchtvaartuigen onderworpen zouden moeten worden. Om
deze vraag te beantwoorden zijn een aantal deelvragen geformuleerd. Deze
deelvragen hebben betrekking op de wijze waarop aan een aansprakelijkheids-
regime op dit gebied gestalte kan worden gegeven, de geadresseerden van
een dergelijk regime, de mogelijke limitering van wettelijke aansprakelijkheid,
en de mogelijke verzekeringsverplichting die aan het regime ten grondslag
kan liggen.
In hoofdstuk 2 worden deze deelvragen allereerst vanuit een theoretisch
perspectief benaderd door aan de figuur van een fictieve wetgever bouwstenen
aan te reiken om een dergelijk aansprakelijkheidsregime op te tuigen. Hiertoe
wordt in de eerste plaats onderzocht hoe luchtvaartuigen schade aan derden
op de grond kunnen toebrengen. Dit blijkt enerzijds te kunnen door daad-
werkelijke impact van (delen van) het luchtvaartuig en/of personen of zaken
die door het luchtvaartuig worden vervoerd en anderzijds door overvlucht.
Bij overvlucht kan een onderscheid worden gemaakt tussen normale overvlucht
en te lage overvlucht in strijd met de geldende luchtverkeersregels.
De algemene regels van schuldaansprakelijkheid of negligence van respectie-
velijk de civil law en common law rechtsstelsels kunnen op zich als algemene
grondslagen van aansprakelijkheid dienen op dit gebied. Daarbij kunnen echter
de per rechtsstelsel geldende en in dit terrein belangrijke rechtvaardigingsgron-
den van onder meer overmacht worden ingeroepen en kan schuld worden
betwist. Wel kan de positie van eisers worden versterkt door middel van
bijvoorbeeld een rechterlijke omkering van de bewijslast bij schending van
verkeers- en veiligheidsnormen onder civil law rechtsstelsels of door middel
van de zogenaamde doctrine van res ipsa loquitur onder common law rechtsstel-
sels. Deze doctrine kan op het gebied van de luchtvaart onder bepaalde om-
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standigheden worden ingeroepen om de bewijslast van schuld te verzachten.
Hierbij geldt onder meer de voorwaarde dat de oorzaak van het schadetoebren-
gende onder exclusieve controle van de verweerder moet liggen. De verweer-
der kan zich op zijn beurt beroepen op het feit dat het desbetreffende ongeval
zich buiten zijn schuld om heeft voorgedaan, bijvoorbeeld omdat er sprake
was van een onvermijdelijk ongeval, dat onmogelijk met menselijke vaardig-
heid had kunnen worden voorkomen.
Er wordt eveneens ingegaan op de verhouding tussen de grenzen van het
recht van grondeigenaren en de grenzen van het recht van overvlucht op basis
van de oude cujus est solum doctrine, waarbij de vraag wanneer overvlucht
als een inbreuk op het eigendomsrecht kan worden gekwalificeerd centraal
staat.
Vervolgens wordt een regime gebaseerd op risico-aansprakelijkheid als
mogelijk alternatief voor de toepassing van de algemene regels van schuld-
aansprakelijkheid of negligence aangereikt. Er wordt hierbij nog onderscheid
gemaakt tussen de strengere zogenaamde absolute liability en de wat dichter
bij schuld liggende strict liability. Hierbij dient te worden opgemerkt dat dit
mogelijke onderscheid niet te dogmatisch moet worden opgevat, maar veelal
blijkt uit de bewoording van het desbetreffende aansprakelijkheidsregime zelf.
Op de vraag waarom risico-aansprakelijkheid de voorkeur kan verdienen
boven schuldaansprakelijkheid of negligence zijn enkele belangrijke argumenten
te geven. Zo kan worden gesteld dat het redelijker is om de aan luchtvaart
verbonden risico’s bij de participanten in plaats van onschuldige derden te
latten liggen. Daarnaast kan worden aangevoerd dat schuld of negligence
moeilijk aantoonbaar kan blijken te zijn bij luchtvaartongevallen of incidenten.
Luchtvaart zou ook beschouwd kunnen worden als een gevaarlijke activiteit,
hetgeen een strenger aansprakelijkheidsregime rechtvaardigt. Verder kunnen
de aan luchtvaart verbonden risico’s gemakkelijker verzekerd worden door
luchtvaartexploitanten dan door derden. Ook zou risico-aansprakelijkheid als
de logische ‘quid pro quo’ kunnen worden beschouwd voor het algemene recht
van overvlucht, dat in de regel niet door derden kan worden verhinderd. Tot
slot wijzen de ontwikkelingen op het gebied van aansprakelijkheid van civiele
luchtvervoerders jegens passagiers ook in de richting van algemene toepassing
van regimes gebaseerd op risico-aansprakelijkheid. Er zou kunnen worden
betoogd dat derden op zijn minst dezelfde rechtsbescherming verdienen als
passagiers.
Indien overtuigd door een of meer van bovengenoemde argumenten kan
de wetgever gestalte geven aan een specifiek risico-aansprakelijkheidsregime
op dit gebied. Hiertoe zal hij moeten bepalen welke vormen van schade onder
de reikwijdte van het regime dienen te worden gebracht en tot wie het regime
zich richt. Als hoofdregel zou hierbij kunnen worden gedacht aan de exploitant
van het luchtvaartuig. Eveneens zal moeten worden onderzocht in hoeverre
het regime gebaseerd zou moeten worden op een wettelijk gelimiteerde aan-
sprakelijkheid. De belangrijkste argumenten voor een wettelijke limitering van
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aansprakelijkheid zijn hiervoor geëvalueerd. Deze argumenten zijn als volgt:
(1) analogie met wettelijke limitering van aansprakelijkheid onder het klassieke
zeerecht; (2) noodzakelijke bescherming van een kwetsbare industrie; (3)
catastrofale ongevallen zouden niet louter door de luchtvaart gedragen moeten
worden; (4) de noodzaak tot verzekerbaarheid; (5) de mogelijkheid voor
potentiële slachtoffers om zichzelf te verzekeren; (6) limitering van aansprake-
lijkheid als quid pro quo voor de zwaardere risico-aansprakelijkheid; (7) het
voorkomen van civiele procedures door schikkingen te stimuleren; (8) unificatie
van het niveau van schadevergoeding. Met uitzondering van het derde argu-
ment zijn deze argumenten in het algemeen te ontkrachten. Het derde argu-
ment is relevant geworden in de nasleep van de terroristische aanslagen op
de Verenigde Staten van 11 september 2001.
Tot slot zal de fictieve wetgever moeten bepalen of hij aan de personen
die onder zijn aansprakelijkheidsregime vallen een verzekeringsverplichting
wil opleggen als extra financiële waarborg voor aansprakelijkheid jegens
derden op de grond.
Na de bespreking van het theoretisch kader is het bestaande internationale
regime op dit gebied van het Verdrag van Rome van 1952, zoals gewijzigd
door het Protocol van Montreal van 1978 in hoofdstuk 3 onder de loep geno-
men. Deze instrumenten worden gemakshalve ook wel aangeduid als het
systeem van Rome. Daarbij is tevens een vergelijking getrokken met het
voorgaande Verdrag van Rome van 1933. Het voornaamste oogpunt van deze
exercitie vormt het aandragen van suggesties voor de mogelijke wijziging van
het systeem van Rome in de toekomst. Hiertoe zijn ook de op dit gebied
gedane voorstellen tot verdragswijziging van de International Law Association
(ILA) onderzocht.
Uit deze analyse blijkt dat het systeem van Rome gebaseerd is op een
strenge vorm van risico-aansprakelijkheid (absolute liability), waarbij nooit
geheel duidelijk is geworden wat de reikwijdte van die aansprakelijkheid is.
Hiermee wordt gedoeld op de nog openstaande vraag in hoeverre schade
veroorzaakt door geluidshinder onder de risico-aansprakelijkheid valt, indien
er niet conform de geldende regels gevlogen wordt. Het feit dat het systeem
gebaseerd is op een wettelijk gelimiteerde aansprakelijkheid is bekritiseerd,
omdat het niet mogelijk wordt geacht om dit op een billijke wijze internationaal
te doen. Dit komt omdat het niveau van potentiële schade toegebracht door
luchtvaartuigen wereldwijd sterk kan verschillen, gezien de verschillen in
welvaartsniveau per land.
De verzekeringsbepalingen van het Verdrag van Rome van 1952 zijn
eveneens bekritiseerd op grond van het feit dat ze niet verplicht zijn gesteld,
waardoor de zin van de bepalingen in twijfel kan worden getrokken. Tot slot
is er kritiek geleverd op het feit dat slechts het forum van de plaats van het
ongeval als bevoegd forum is aangewezen onder het Verdrag van Rome van
1952. De ratio bleek te zijn dat een enkel forum het best in staat werd geacht
de uit te keren schadevergoeding bij bevonden aansprakelijkheid op grond
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van de wettelijke limieten te verdelen over de rechthebbenden. Dit zou name-
lijk tot moeilijkheden kunnen leiden bij bevoegdheid van meerdere fora.
Het Protocol van Montreal van 1978 heeft het regime van het Verdrag van
Rome van 1952 niet structureel weten te wijzigen. Het systeem van Rome is
dan ook gezien de bezwaren van verschillende staten tegen het single forum
en de wettelijk gelimiteerde aansprakelijkheid in termen van ratificatie niet
erg succesvol gebleken.
Om de vraag te beantwoorden hoe het systeem weer levensvatbaar gemaakt
zou kunnen worden gemaakt zijn de ILA-voorstellen om verschillende redenen
interessant gebleken. Ook al blijkt er kritiek mogelijk op sommige aspecten
van de voorstellen, zijn de drie hoofdpijlers van een lovenswaardige eenvoud
gebleken. Dit zijn de pijlers van (1) risico-aansprakelijkheid; (2) onbeperkte
aansprakelijkheid; (3) verplichte verkeringsdekking. Met name de tweede pijler
wordt beschouwd als de enige oplossing om dit aansprakelijkheidsgebied
middels een internationaal instrument tot op zekere hoogte te harmoniseren.
Internationale wettelijke limitering van aansprakelijkheid zou namelijk in ieder
geval voor de slachtoffers wereldwijd nooit tot een level playing field kunnen
leiden.
Er zijn eveneens suggesties gedaan om de reikwijdte van aansprakelijkheid
aan te scherpen tot schadegevallen die veroorzaakt worden door impact van
(delen van) het luchtvaartuig of personen of zaken afkomstig van het luchtvaar-
tuig. Als belangrijkste uitzondering op de onbeperkte aansprakelijkheid zou
schade ten gevolge van terrorisme wettelijk dienen worden beperkt op grond
van het argument dat dergelijke catastrofale gevallen niet door de luchtvaart
alleen gedragen kunnen worden. In het recente ICAO voorstel tot verdragsher-
ziening is een dergelijke onbreekbare limitering op dit gebied ook voorgesteld.
Op het punt van jurisdictie is een voorstel gedaan om het forum van de loci
delicti in ieder geval uit te breiden met het forum rei van de woonplaats van
de verweerder en wellicht onder bepaalde voorwaarden ook met het forum
actoris van de permanente verblijfplaats van de eiser.
Toch kan meer in zijn algemeenheid de vraag worden gesteld in hoeverre
er een noodzaak bestaat om dit aansprakelijkheidsterrein internationaal gedeel-
telijk te uniformeren. Het probleem is namelijk dat de reikwijdte van een
internationaal regime slechts beperkt is tot schade toegebracht door de inter-
nationale civiele exploitanten afkomstig uit verdragssluitende staten aan derden
op de grond binnen het territorium van andere verdragssluitende staten. Een
voordeel van het alternatief van nationale regelingen is dat zij meer soorten
luchtvaart kunnen bestrijken, bijvoorbeeld militaire of recreatieve nationale
luchtvaart.
Aan de hand van deze laatste constatering is in hoofdstuk 4 een rechtsver-
gelijkend onderzoek gepleegd naar aansprakelijkheids- en verzekeringsregels
op dit gebied in nationale luchtvaartwetgeving. Hiertoe is een algemeen
onderscheid gemaakt tussen de op risico-aansprakelijkheid gebaseerde regimes
van Frankrijk, Duitsland, Oostenrijk, het Verenigd Koninkrijk, Zwitserland,
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en Australië enerzijds, en de in de Verenigde Staten prevalerende algemene
regels van negligence anderzijds.
Uit de vergelijking tussen de nationale risico-aansprakelijkheidsregimes
blijkt dat zij in het merendeel der gevallen betrekking hebben op de exploitant
van het luchtvaartuig. In sommige gevallen zijn er specifieke bepalingen
opgenomen over aansprakelijkheid bij onrechtmatig gebruik van het luchtvaar-
tuig, die wederom van groot belang zijn geworden in de nasleep van de
aanslagen van 11 september 2001 op de Verenigde Staten. De in het Zwitserse
regime gehanteerde oplossing kan als voorbeeld dienen. Hierin rust een
ongelimiteerde aansprakelijkheid op de onrechtmatige gebruiker, terwijl de
exploitant wettelijk slechts aansprakelijk gesteld kan worden tot de hoogte
van de verplichte verzekeringdekking.
Qua reikwijdte van risico-aansprakelijkheid zijn er belangrijke verschillen
aan te wijzen tussen de besproken regimes. Zo laten het Franse, Duitse, en
Oostenrijkse risico-aansprakelijkheidsregime onder bepaalde omstandigheden
ernstige gevallen van schade veroorzaakt door geluid toe. Hiertoe zijn bijvoor-
beeld het Duitse en Oostenrijkse regime afgebakend op basis van het criterium
van een ongeval (‘Unfall’), dat onder het Duitse regime gedefinieerd is als een
plotseling van buitenaf afkomstig onvoorzienbaar voorval dat schade aan
personen of eigendom veroorzaakt. Toch wordt er een voorkeur gegeven aan
een nog strengere beperking van het risico-aansprakelijkheidsregime, waarbij
welke vorm van schade ook door overvlucht uitgesloten is. Hiertoe kan het
Australische regime tot voorbeeld dienen, waarin de afbakening is geschied
op basis van het criterium van impact van het luchtvaartuig of delen of objec-
ten afkomstig van het luchtvaartuig. Een dergelijke afbakening kan worden
gerechtvaardigd op grond van het feit dat de bewijslast om schuld of negli-
gence aan te tonen minder onoverkomelijk wordt geacht indien het luchtvaar-
tuig intact blijkt in plaats van te verongelukken. Daarnaast is gebleken dat
de meeste regimes zijn gebaseerd op ongelimiteerde aansprakelijkheid, en dat
er in de regel een verplichting tot verzekering is gecodificeerd. Voorzover wel
wettelijk gelimiteerd, kan aan de limieten worden ontkomen door schuld aan
te tonen, hetgeen redelijker wordt geacht dan opzet of grove nalatigheid, zoals
vereist is onder het systeem van Rome.
Bij gebrek aan geharmoniseerde aansprakelijkheidsregels binnen het Euro-
pees gemeenschapsrecht op dit gebied zijn de huidige en toekomstige verzeke-
ringseisen die op gemeenschapsniveau worden gesteld eveneens geëvalueerd.
Hierbij is tevens de vraag geopperd of er argumenten te vinden zouden zijn
om eveneens aansprakelijkheidsregels op het niveau van het gemeenschaps-
recht dit gebied te harmoniseren.
Het huidige regime van EG-Verordening 2407/92 bepaalt slechts dat de
aansprakelijkheid bij ongevallen van luchtvaartmaatschappijen die in de
Gemeenschap zijn gevestigd ten aanzien van passagiers, bagage, vracht, post
en derden dient te zijn verzekerd. Hierbij worden echter geen specifieke eisen
gesteld aan de hoogte van de verplichte dekking.
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Het voorstel van de Commissie van 24 september 2002 tot een nieuwe
verordening die de verzekeringsvereisten ook voor niet in de Gemeenschap
gevestigde luchtvaartmaatschappijen nader invult kan derhalve beschouwd
worden als een stap in de goede richting. Kern van het voorstel is een eis van
verplichte verzekering tot een zekere hoogte van dekking, die afhankelijk is
gesteld van het gewicht van het desbetreffende vliegtuig. Een van de opmerke-
lijkste aspecten van het voorstel is dat de vereisten ook gelden voor luchtvaart-
maatschappijen die louter binnen het Europese luchtruim vliegen zonder daarin
te landen. Hoewel waarschijnlijk niet in strijd met de bepalingen van Artikel
5 en 6 van het Verdrag van Chicago, heeft dit ruime bereik van het voorstel
wel de vraag van de handhaafbaarheid opgeroepen.
Op basis van een vergelijking met het wel geharmoniseerde regime van
aansprakelijkheid van luchtvaartmaatschappijen jegens passagiers van EG-
Verordening 2027/97 is betoogd dat een meer geharmoniseerde aanpak van
aansprakelijkheid jegens derden op gemeenschapsniveau ook gerechtvaardigd
zou kunnen worden. Dit zou ook bewerkstelligd kunnen worden met het
minder vergaande instrument van een richtlijn, om lidstaten met al bestaande
wetgeving op dit gebied wat meer speelruimte te bieden. Aangezien de Com-
missie heeft aangegeven hier niet voor te voelen, blijft dit terrein voorlopig
echter onder verantwoordelijkheid van de lidstaten vallen.
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt nader ingegaan op de ontwikkelingen in de Verenig-
de Staten. In de Verenigde Staten is het aansprakelijkheidsrecht op dit gebied
een andere weg ingeslagen en heeft risico-aansprakelijkheid het afgelegd tegen
schuldaansprakelijkheid (negligence). De grondslagen van risico-aansprakelijk-
heid op dit gebied kunnen enerzijds worden afgeleid uit beginselen van
ongeschreven common law en anderzijds uit gecodificeerde aansprakelijkheids-
regimes uit het verleden. De beginselen van ongeschreven common law die een
grondslag van risico-aansprakelijkheid rechtvaardigden, zijn af te leiden uit
de zaak Rylands v. Fletcher (1866) en de Restatement of Torts. Deze beginselen
zijn: 1) derden kunnen schade op de grond veroorzaakt door de luchtvaart
niet verhinderen; 2) vliegen kan gekwalificeerd worden als een zogenaamde
ultrahazardous activity; 3) het is onmogelijk om de oorzaken van luchtvaartonge-
vallen te bepalen; 4) luchtvaart heeft nog niet het stadium bereikt waarin de
eraan verbonden risico’s door de slachtoffers gedragen moeten worden; 5)
de notie dat er nog relatief weinig mensen actief zijn op het gebied van de
luchtvaart; 6) de eenzijdigheid van de activiteit in termen van winst voor de
luchtvaartindustrie enerzijds en risico’s voor derden anderzijds; 7) de notie
dat de luchtvaartindustrie beter geëquipeerd is om zichzelf te verzekeren voor
de eraan verbonden risico’s dan derden.
Al wordt de uitkomst van risico-aansprakelijkheid onderschreven, zijn deze
argumenten gedeeltelijk bekritiseerd, met name op de correlatie tussen de
ultrahazardousness (het gevaar) van de activiteit en de grondslag van aansprake-
lijkheid. Het gevolg van die redenering zou namelijk zijn dat toepassing van
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negligence weer gerechtvaardigd zou zijn in ‘veiliger’ tijden, terwijl schuld
dan voor de betrokken derden net zo lastig aantoonbaar kan blijken.
Daarnaast is ingegaan op de toepassing van de common law grondslagen
van trespass en nuisance op dit gebied.
De gecodificeerde risico-aansprakelijkheid vindt zijn oorsprong in Secties
4 en 4 van de Uniform Aeronautics Act. Het aantal staten dat op basis hiervan
gecodificeerde aansprakelijkheidsregimes in het leven heeft geroepen is inmid-
dels echter teruggelopen tot zes. De ratio van deze omslag van risico-aanspra-
kelijkheid naar schuldaansprakelijkheid (negligence) is dat de activiteit van
vliegen noch door de rechterlijke, noch door de wetgevende macht van de
meeste staten meer als ultrahazardous wordt gekwalificeerd.
Mede op basis van eerder in deze studie naar voren gebrachte argumenten
kan deze ontwikkeling worden bekritiseerd. Toepassing van negligence kan
namelijk wel degelijk leiden tot schade die niet gecompenseerd wordt, ondanks
de notie dat betrokken mogelijk aansprakelijke exploitanten van luchtvaartui-
gen vaak bereid tot schikkingen blijken te zijn.
De juridische gevolgen van de terroristische aanslagen op de Verenigde
Staten van 11 september 2001 zijn eveneens besproken. Daarbij is nader in-
gegaan op de twee routes tot schadevergoeding die aan derden openstaan.
De eerste route behelst een aanspraak op het compensatiefonds, dat onder
de zogenaamde Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act door het
Amerikaans Congres het leven is geroepen. De andere processuele route is
middels diezelfde Act geconsolideerd voor de United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York. Hierbij is van belang dat de wettelijke aan-
sprakelijkheid van de betrokken luchtvaartmaatschappijen achteraf middels
de Act is gelimiteerd. Los van het logische motief om de betrokken luchtvaart-
maatschappijen te behoeden voor faillissement, zou de vraag kunnen rijzen
of dat grondwettelijk toegestaan is.
De opinie van Judge Hellerstein van 9 september 2003, waarin hij de eisers
groen licht heeft gegeven om te procederen, is in dit kader besproken. Hierbij
kunnen enkele kanttekeningen worden geplaatst bij de door Hellerstein gepo-
neerde stelling dat de terroristiche aanslagen als voorzienbaar voor de betrok-
ken luchtvaartmaatschappijen en luchthavenbeveiligingsbedrijven kunnen
worden bestempeld. Ook al mag het proces doorgang vinden blijft het pro-
bleem voor eisers dat de uiteindelijke gelimiteerde schadevergoeding bij
bevonden aansprakelijkheid over een zeer groot aantal eisers verdeeld zal
moeten worden.
Al met al is het duidelijk dat onrechtmatig gebruik van luchtvaartuigen
ook in de toekomst nader zal moeten worden geregeld, waarbij de optie van
wettelijke limitering van aansprakelijkheid van de exploitant een goede oplos-
sing biedt.
Op basis van deze studie is in hoofdstuk 6 een laatste analyse gemaakt
van het te prefereren regime van aansprakelijkheid van exploitanten van
luchtvaartuigen voor schade aan derden op de grond. Hoewel er zowel inter-
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nationaal als op Europees gemeenschapsniveau aansprakelijkheidsregimes
mogelijk zijn gebleken, gaat in eerste instantie de voorkeur uit naar nationale
regelingen, gezien de ruimere reikwijdte van types van luchtvaartuigen en
soorten luchtvaart die onder een nationale regeling gebracht kunnen worden.
Los van de vraag of het een internationale, supranationale of nationale
regeling betreft, is hierbij uitgekomen op een onbeperkt risico-aansprakelijk-
heidsregime, waaraan de exploitanten van luchtvaartuigen onderworpen
dienen te worden. Hiervan zou schade veroorzaakt door (te lage) overvlucht
als quid pro quo moeten worden uitgezonderd. Daarbij heeft de exploitant
vanzelfsprekend regres op andere mogelijk aansprakelijke partijen. Een derge-
lijk regime zou ondervangen moeten worden door verplichte verzekeringsdek-
king voor aansprakelijkheid jegens derden. Aansprakelijkheid voor onrecht-
matig gebruik zou van de hoofdregel uitgezonderd kunnen worden door op
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